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JULIUS  C/ESAR 


JULIUS  C/ESAR 


AND  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  THE  ROMAN       \ 
IMPERIAL  SYSTEM 


'  There  may  be  many  Csesars 
'Ere  such  another  Julius." 


Cymbeline 


BY 


W.  WARDE  FOWLER,  iVl.A. 

SUB-RECTOR    OF    LINCOLN    COLLEGE 
OXFORD 


G.  P.   PUTNAM'S    SONS 


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BY  G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 


4^02. 


Electrotyped,  Printed,  and  Bound  by 

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G.  P.  Pi'tnam's  Sons 


PREFACE 


^^ 


this  volume  I  have  tried  to  meet 
the  wishes  of  the  pubHshers,  by 
explaining  to  those  who  are  com- 
paratively unfamiliar  with  clas- 
sical antiquity  the  place  which 
'aesar  occupies  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  He  was  not  the  founder, 
much  less  Was  he  the  organiser  of  the 
Roman  Empire  ;  yet  his  life  marks  a 
great  change  in  European  history.  I 
have  tried  to  sho^V  (andt^ave  done  my  best  to 
express  on  the  title-page)  what  this  change  means, 
how  it  was  in  part  the  result  of  pre-existing  tenden- 
cies, and  was  due  in  part  to  Caesar's  extraordinary 
force  of  will  and  intellect.  In  a  volume  of  this  size, 
it  has  been  impossible  to  keep  this  main  object  in 
view  without  sacrificing  many  details  and  avoiding 
criticism  and  controversy  on  innumerable  disputed 
points,  whether  of  Roman  constitutional  law,  or  of 
the  geography  of  the  Gallic  and  Civil  wars.  The 
tendencies  of  the  age,  and  the  growth  of  Caesar's 
character,  are  the  two  leading  themes  of  the  book  ; 
and  I  have  endeavoured  to  treat  these  as  far  as 
possible  by  the  help  of  contemporary  evidence,  and 
chiefly  of  Caesar's  own  writings  and  those  of  Cicero, 


VI  Preface. 

omitting  much  that  we  are  told  by  later  writers,  as 
matter  for  the  detailed  criticism  of  a  complete 
biography. 

A  word  is  needed  about  the  busts  of  Caesar  of 
which  illustrations  appear  in  this  volume.  One  of 
these  illustrations  (p.  78)  most  probably  does  not 
represent  Caesar,  but  some  other  pontifex  maximus ; 
but  it  is  included  in  this  volume  by  the  particular 
desire  of  Mr.  G.  H.  Putnam.  Another,  the  beautiful 
and  striking  basalt  bust  in  the  Berlin  Museum,  is 
somewhat  doubtful  ;  but  I  have  the  opinion  of  at 
least  one  excellent  authority  in  favour  of  including 
it  among  the  genuine  busts.  The  two  which  are 
most  generally  recognised  as  genuine  as  well  as  good 
works  of  art,  are  the  well-known  busts  in  the  British 
Museum  (p.  18)  and  at  Naples  (p.  56),  the  latter  rep< 
resenting  a  younger  man  than  the  former.  These 
two  at  least  present  one  or  two  peculiarities  of  feat- 
ure visible  also  on  the  coin,  which  are  the  only  cer- 
tain contemporary  representations  of  Caesar's  face. 
The  very  beautiful  gem  which  we  have  attempted 
to  reproduce  (p.  92)  may  however  also  be  of  Caesar's 
own  time  ;  this  is  in  the  British  Museum,  and  I  have 
to  thank  my  friend  Professor  Gardner  for  drawing 
my  attention  to  it. 

I  have  also  to  thank  the  Editor  of  this  series  for 
his  careful  attention  to  my  proofs,  and  Mr.  P.  E. 
Matheson  of  New  College,  for  reading  them  all,  and 
for  many  valuable  suggestions.  Other  friends  and 
pupils  have  given  me  occasional  help,  which  I  hope 
I  have  duly  acknowledged  at  the  time.  I  need 
hardly  mention,   in   a  book  not   primarily  intended 


Preface.  vll 

for  scholars,  the  many  modern  works,  from  that  of 
Drumann  downwards,  which  have  been  of  use  to  me. 
But  in  any  biography  of  Caesar  it  is  impossible  not  to 
allude  with  gratitude  and  reverence  to  the  great 
genius  and  learning  of  Professor  Mommsen  ;  for 
even  if  they  venture  to  dissent  from  some  of  his 
conclusions,  all  students  of  classical  antiquity  will 
allow  that  his  life-long  labours  have  wrought  as 
great  a  change  in  the  study  of  Roman  history,  as  the 
work  of  his  great  hero  brought  about  in  the  Roman 
state  itself. 

W.  W.  F. 

Oxford,  November  12,  1891. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAGE 

BIRTH,  FAMILY,  AND  EDUCATION  (102-89  B.C.)  .  I 

Great  men  of  Italy — Sketch  of  rise  and  progress  of  Rome — 
Degeneracy  of  Roman  oligarchy — Gracchi  and  Marius — 
Problems  of  statesmanship — Caesar's  birth  and  family — His 
mother — His  tutor  Gnipho — Defects  of  Roman  education — 
Personal  appearance  of  Caesar. 

CHAPTER   II. 

BOYHOOD  DURING  THE  CIVIL  WARS  (89-82   B.C.)  .       20 

Victories  of  Marius — The  social  war  and  its  results — Caesar's 
connection  with  Marius  and  the  Populares — Views  of  the 
two  parties  in  the  State — Civil  wars — Sulpicius,  Cinna, 
Sulla — Caesar  marries  Cinna's  daughter — Death  of  Cinna, 
and  absolutism  of  Sulla — Caesar  under  Sulla's  rule. 

CHAPTER   III. 

EARLY  LIFE  UNDER  THE  SULLAN  GOVERNMENT    (81- 

70  B.C.)  .  .  . 33 

Caesar's  first  military  service — Lepidus'  revolt — Caesar  as  an 
orator — Captured  by  pirates — At  Rhodes — Return  to  Rome 
— Paralysis  of  Sullan  government— An  imaginary  traveller — 
Attacks  on  the  Sullan  constitution — Its  overthrow  by  Pom- 
peius  and  Crassus,  B.C.  70. 


Contents. 

CHAPTER  IV. 


PAGE 


QUiESTORSHIP  ;    AND  SUPREMACY    OF    POMPEIUS  (69- 

66  B.C.) 53 

The  political  outlook — Caesar  quaestor  in  Spain — The  Trans- 
padani — Caesar  supports  the  Lex  Gabinia — Nature  of  the 
power  given  to  Pompeius  by  this  law  and  the  Lex  Manilla — 
Indications  of  coming  monarchy. 

CHAPTER  V. 

/EDILESHIP  ;    AND    CONSPIRACY  OF  CATILINA    (65-63 

B.C.) 66 

Pompeius'  conquests — Their  influence  on  home  politics — 
Schemes  of  the  democratic  party — Caesar  curule  aedile — Bill 
of  Rullus — Its  failure — Cicero  consul — His  policy  of  unit- 
ing Senate  and  equites — Trial  of  Rabirius — Caesar's  part  in 
it — Caesar  elected  pontifex  maximus — Conspiracy  of  Catilina 
— Meeting  of  the  Senate,  December  5th — Speech  of  Caesar 
— Conspirators  put  to  death  by  Cicero's  orders. 

CHAPTER  VI. 

PRiETORSHIP  ;     AND     FORMATION     OF     TRIUMVIRATE 

(62-60    B.C.) 87 

Attitude  of  parties  towards  Pompeius — His  return  from  the 
East — Disbands  his  army — Effect  on  Caesar's  career — Affair 
of  the  Bona  Dea — Trial  of  Clodius — Caesar  in  Spain  as 
propraetor — His  government — Gades  and  Cornelius  Balbus — 
Caesar's  return — Elected  consul — Forms  a  coalition  with 
Pompeius  and  Crassus — Negotiation  with  Cicero — Objects 
of  the  coalition, 

CHAPTER  VII. 
Caesar's  first  consulship  (59  b.c.)         .         .         .   104 

Policy  of  conciliation — Publication  of  the  Acta  Senatus — 
Agrarian  law — Its  object — The  bill  obstructed — Caesar  defies 
the  Senate — The  bill  passed — The  Campanian  land — Ratifi- 


Contents.  xi 


cation  of  Pompeius'  work  in  the  East — Marriage  of  Pom- 
peius  and  Julia — The  law  against  extortion — Caesar  obtains 
the  government  of  the  Gallic  provinces — Fresh  negotiation 
with  Cicero,  and  failure — Recapitulation. 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  DEFENCE  OF  TRANSALPINE  GAUL  (58  B.C.)  .     126 

Caesar's  book  on  the  Gallic  war — Its  value  and  style — 
Previous  relations  of  the  Gauls  with  Rome — Insecure  state 
of  the  Transalpine  province — Arverni,  .T^dui,  Sequani — 
Ariovistus  and  the  Germans — The  Helvetii  attempt  to  in- 
vade the  province — The  lines  at  Geneva — Battle  near 
Bibracte — Caesar  master  of  southern  Gaul. 

CHAPTER    IX. 

THE  DEFEAT  OF  THE  GERMANS   (58  B.C.)    .  .  .     148 

The  ^dui  ask  help  against  Ariovistus — Caesar  negotiates 
with  him  and  fails — Marches  against  him — Interview  and 
treachery — Panic  in  Caesar's  army — Geography  of  the  cam- 
paign— Battle  near  Muhlhausen — Caesar  master  of  eastern 
Gaul. 

CHAPTER  X. 

CONQUEST  OF  NORTH-WESTERN  GAUL  (57  B.C.)  .     161 

Caesar's  position  and  views  during  the  winter — The  Belg^e 
combine  against  him — His  march — Fighting  at  Berry-au-Bac 
— Caesar  advances  to  Amiens — Great  battle  on  the  Sambre 
— Treachery  and  punishment  of  the  Aduatuci. 

CHAPTER    XI. 

CONFERENCE    AT    LUCCA,    AND    CAMPAIGN     IN    BRIT- 
TANY (56  B.C.)     .......     176 

Caesar  in  Illyria — News  of  rebellion  in  Brittany — Events  at 
Rome  since  59  B.C. — Cicero's  exile  and  return — He  attacks 


>^'ii  Conteiits. 


the  coalition — Conference  of  the  triumvirs  at  Lucca — Its 
results — Caesar  in  Brittany — Naval  defeat  of  the  Veneti — 
Severe  treatment  of  the  conquered. 

CHAPTER  XII. 

INVASIONS  OF  GERMANY  AND  BRITAIN  (55-54  B.C.)  .  1 87 
Caesar's  account  of  the  Suebi — Migration  of  Usipetes  and 
Tencteri — Destroyed  by  Ca;sar  on  the  Meuse — He  bridges 
the  Rhine — Advance  into  Germany,  and  retreat — Invasion 
of  Britain — The  fleet  broken  by  a  storm — Caesar  returns  to 
Gaul — Second  invasion — Criticism  of  his  policy — Fleet  again 
damaged— Advance  to  the  Thames — Forcing  the  ford — 
Retreat — Results  of  the  expeditions. 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  GALLIC   REBELLIONS  (54-52   B.C.)  .  .  .     207 

Fortune  turns  against  Caesar — He  stays  the  winter  in  Gaul 
— Disaster  at  Aduatuca — Q,  Cicero  in  peril  at  Charleroi — 
Relieved  by  Caesar — Anxious  winter — Second  invasion  of 
Germany — Caesar's  sixth  book — General  rising  in  Gaul 
under  Vercingetorix — Caesar  forces  his  way  to  the  legions — 
vSiege  of  Avaricum — Operations  at  Gergovia — Caesar's  defeat 
and  retreat  on  the  ^dui — Vercingetorix  at  Alesia — Siege  of 
Alesia  by  Caesar— Great  battle,  and  rout  of  the  Gauls — 
Fate  of  Vercingetorix. 

CHAPTER    XIV. 

PACIFICATION    OF    GAUL     AND    OUTBREAK    OF    CIVIL 

WAR  (52-49  B.C.) 238 

Sufferings  of  the  Gauls — Caesar's  work  of  peace — Effect  of 
the  Gallic  war  on  Caesar's  character — Events  at  Rome  since 
56  B.C. — Strained  relations  between  Caesar  and  Pompeius — 
Death  of  Clodius — Pompeius  sole  consul — The  question 
between  Caesar  and  the  Senate — Schemes  to  ruin  Caesar — 
His  negotiations  and  concessions — No  real  hope  of  peace — 
Outbreak  of  civil  war. 


Contents.  xlil 

CHAPTER  XV. 

I'AGK 

CIVIL   WAR  IN   ITALY   AND  SPAIN   (49   B.C.)  .  .     258 

Caesar  unprepared  for  war — Crosses  the  Rubicon — Pompeius 
and  Senate  leave  Rome — Caesar  takes  Corfinium — His  clem- 
ency— Siege  of  Brundisium — Pompeius  escapes  to  Epirus — 
Caesar  in  Rome — He  undertakes  the  government — Leaves 
Rome  for  Spain — Campaign  on  the  Segres — Operations  at 
Ilerda — Surrender  of  Pompeian  generals — Caesar  master  of 
Spain — Siege  of  Massilia — Caesar  at  Rome  as  Dictator. 

CHAPTER   XVI. 

DYRRHACHIUM   AND  PHARSALUS   (48  B.C.)  .  .     281 

Caesar's  strategy — He  lands  in  Epirus  and  takes  Apollonia 
— Forced  inaction  till  May — Antonius  joins  him — Pompeius 
cut  off  from  Dyrrhachium — Caesar  attempts  to  invest  Pom- 
peius— Failure  and  defeat — Ceesar  retreats  to  Thessaly,  and 
draws  Pompeius  after  him — Battle  of  Pharsalus — Flight  of 
Pompeius  to  Egypt — His  death  and  character. 

CHAPTER  XVn. 

CiESAR's  LAST   WARS  (48-45   B.C.)         ....    308 

Caesar  goes  to  Egypt — Cleopatra — Caesar  besieged  in  Alex- 
andria— Extricated  by  Mithridates  of  Pergamum — Settle- 
ment of  Egypt — Proceeds  to  Syria  and  Asia  Minor — Defeat 
of  Pharnaces — Return  to  Italy — Leaves  again  for  Sicily  and 
Africa — Campaign  in  Africa — Battle  of  Thapsus — Death  of 
Cato — Caesar  in  Rome — Triumph — Leaves  for  Spain — Last 
campaign  and  battle  of  Munda. 

CHAPTER    XVIII. 

Cesar's  use  of  absolute  power  (49-44  b.c.)         .  326 

The  revolutionary  tendencies  to  which  Caesar  gave  expression 
— Reconstruction  of  the  machinery  of  government — Gradual 
increase  of  Caesar's  absolute  power — His  views  for  the  future 
— Octavius — Caesar's  social  legislation — Social  and  economic 


XIV 


Contents, 


state  of  the  empire — His  care  for  the  provinces — Political 
re-organization — The  empire  in  a  state  of  chaos — Two 
principles  of  later  imperial  government  initiated  by  Coesar 
— His  scientific  method,  and  extraordinary  intellectual 
power. 


CHAPTER   XIX. 

THE  END    (44  B.C.)       ....... 

Anxiety  for  Caesar's  return  from  Spain — His  arrival — Out- 
ward signs  of  monarchy — His  great  projects — tlis  visit  to 
Cicero — Preparations  for  war  with  Parthia — Dictatorship  for 
life  and  other  honours — Ill-will  against  him — The  conspira- 
tors— Character  of  Brutus — Assassination  and  funeral. 


360 


EPILOGUE 


INDEX 


'  379 

.  385 


CHIEF  EVENTS  IN  THE  LIFE  OF  C^SAR. 


B.C. 

I02(orioo?).      Rirth,  July  I2th 

87.  Assumes  the  toga  virilis 

82,  Proscribed  and  pardoned  by  Sulla  ;  first 

journey  to  Asia  Minor 

78.  Returns  to  Rome  on  death  of  Sulla 

76.  Accuses   Dolabella  ;    second    journey    to 

East     ....... 

74.  Return  to  Rome      ..... 

70.  Aids  in  overthrow  of  Sulla's  constitution, 

68.  Qucestor  in  Further  Spain 

66.  Supports  the  Lex  Manilia 

65.  Curule  ledile  ;    Pompeius  in  the  East 

63.  Pontifex  niaximus ;  Cicero  consul  ;   con- 

spiracy of  Catilina         .... 

62.  Prcetor  ;   affair  of  Bona  Dea    . 

61.  PropTLZtor  in  Further  Spain     . 

59.  Consul ;     coalition    with    Pompeius    and 

Crassus         .         .         .         .         .         .       98  ^. 

58.  Proconsul   in    Gaul  ;     campaign    against 

Helvetii  and  Ariovistus         .  .  .      126  _^. 

57.  Campaign  against  Belgae  .  .  .      160  ff. 

56.  Coalition  reconstituted  at  Lucca       .  .      i"}^  ff. 

55.  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain    .  .      1%"}  ff. 

54.  Second  invasion  of  Britain        .  .  .     200  ff. 

53-51.  Gallic   rebellions  ;   death  of  Crassus,  and 

alienation  of  Pompeius         .         .         .     207  ff. 

XV 


7 

23 

29/"- 

34 

36/: 

39 

51 

56/: 

62 

68 

11  ff- 

85/-. 

94  # 

xvi        Chief  Events  in  the  Life  of  Ccesar. 


49.  Civil  war  ;  campaign  in  Spain  ;  Dictator  I.,  238  jf. 

48.  Battle  of  Pharsalus ;  Z?/V/rt/^'r //.     .         .281/". 

47.  Returns  to  Rome  in  Sept.  ;  Dictator  III.,     310  ff. 

46.  Caesar   in    Africa  ;    returns    to    Rome    in 

July;    Dictator  IV.      .  .  .  .      317 /". 

45.  Caesar  in  Spain  ;   battle  of  Munda  .         .     324  ff. 

Returns  to  Rome  in  September        .         .     325  _^. 

44.  Dictator  for  life;  assassinated  March  15th,     362  ff. 


ILLUSTRATIONS. 


JULIUS     C^SAR.         FROM     A     MARBLE    BUST     IN      THE 

BRITISH  MUSEUM       ....         FroiiHspiech. 

JULIUS     C^SAR.         FROM    A    MARBLE     BUST     IN      THE 

BRITISH    MUSEUM         .  .  ,  .  .  l8 

THE    FORUM.       AS    SEEN    FROM    THE    CAPITOL. 

^  Baumeister       26 

BUST     OF     POMPEIUS.  IN     THE    SPADA     PALACE    IN 

ROME         .....         Bawneister       48 

JULIUS    C^SAR.       FROM   THE    FARNESE  BUST    IN    THE 

MUSEUM    AT    NAPLES 56 

CICERO.  FROM      A      BUST      NOW      IN      THE      ROYAL 

GALLERY    IN    MADRID       .         .  Baufuetster       72 

JULIUS  CiESAR  (?)  AS  PONTIFEX  MAXIMUS.  FROM 
THE  BUST  IN  THE  MUSEO-CHIARAMONTI,  IN 
THE     VATICAN 78 

HEAD    OF    JULIUS    C^SAR.        ENLARGED     FROM     GEM 

IN     BRITISH     MUSEUM  .  .  .  .  -9^ 

HEAD     OF    JULIUS    CiESAR.       FROM     COIN    IN    BRITISH 

MUSEUM 92 

THREE-HEADED     TYRANNY         .....       I03 


*  Baunieister's  '"'' Denkmaler  dcs  I'lassisch'n  Altcrlums,, 

xvii 


xviii  IllMstrations, 


JULIUS     C^SAR  FROM     BUST     NUMBERED     I07     IN 

THE    VATICAN    MUSEUM,    ROME. 


MAP     OF     GAUL     IN     CESAR's     TIME 


106 
136 
140 

142 


ROMAN     SOLDIERS 

ROMAN     MILITARY     AND     CIVIL     OFFICIALS 

GALLIC      SOLDIERS,     AND       CARNYX,     OR      TRUMPET. 

FROM      THE      TRIUMPHAL      ARCH      IN       ORANGE 

(aRAUSIO).       [21   A.D.] 144 

THE     CAMP     OF     A     LEGION 146 

CATAPULT.       USED     IN     SIEGE      OPERATIONS. 

Baumeistcr     152 

TESTUDO,     OR      SHIELDS      INTERLOCKED       FOR       THE 
STORMING     OF     A     FORTRESS.       FROM     TRAJAN'S 

COLUMN    .         .         .         .         .         Baumeister     158 
ballista,    or    stone-thrower      .         Batimetster     168 

MAP     OF     BATTLE     OF     THE     SAMBRE,    57    B.C.  .  I70 

BRIDGE     BUILT     BY     C^SAR     ACROSS     THE     RHINE       .  I94 
SECTION     OF      THE     BRIDGE,     SHOWING     METHOD     OF 

CONSTRUCTION 196 

A    SIEGE    FIGHT     WITH    ARCHERS,    AND     BATTERING- 
RAM.     FROM    trajan's    COLUMN.     Baunieister  212 

SIEGE     SCENE.       FROM     TRAJAN's     COLUMN. 

Baumeister     224 

ALESIA,    SKETCHED     FROM     MOUNT     BASSY. 

Napoleon's  '"''Cesar''     230 
ROMAN    WORKS    AT    ALESIA     .  Napolcoii's  ^^Cesar''     232 

MAP     OF     OPERATIONS     AT     ALESIA.       AFTER     NAPO- 
LEON III.     '*  Jules  Cesar "         .         .  .         .     234 

A     ROMAN     HEAD        ,,.....       237 
MARCUS       ANTONIUS.         FROM      THE      BUST      IN      THE 
UFFIZI     GALLERY     IN     FLORENCE     (viSCONTi). 

Baumeister     256 

ROMAN     LICTOR  .  .  .  .  .  .  -257 


Illustrations. 


XIX 


FROM    THE    BUST    IN    THE 

Baujneister 


A     SEAPORT     TOWN 
THE    YOUNG    AUGUSTUS. 
VATICAN    . 

A     BESIEGED     CITY 

MAP    OF    operation;    NEAR    DYRRACHIUM,    48    B.C., 

(after    stoffel)      

map    of   macedonia    and  greece 

rough    map    of    the   environs   of    pharsalus. 

(after    stoffel)     

DEFENCES     OF     A     CAMP 

MARCUS  BRUTUS.  FROM  THE  BUST  IN  THE  MUSEUM 
OF     THE     CAPITOL     IN     ROME     (viSCONTi). 

Baumeister 

ROMAN  SWORDS 

THE  ROMAN  EMPIRE  AT  THE  TIME  OF  C^ESAr's 
DEATH,  44  B.C.    ...... 

AUGUSTUS  AND  IMPERIAL  ROME.  FROM  A  RE- 
PRODUCTION IN  wieseler's  "  Denkmdler  de?' 
Alien   Kunst**  of    the    cameo    in    vienna. 


264 

268 

278 

282 
290 

300 
320 


2,62 
378 

378 


384 


JULIUS  C^SAR, 

AND   THE   FOUNDATION   OF  THE  ROMAN 
IMPERIAL    SYSTEM. 


CHAPTER  I. 

BIRTH,  FAMILY,  AND    EDUCATION. 
102-89    B.C. 

TALY,    the    most    beautiful    of 
European  lands,  has  also  been 
the  richest  in  men  whom  the 
world    has    acknowledged    as 
great.     Long  indeed  is  the  list 
of  her  men  of  letters,  her  art- 
ists, her  men  of  action,  and  her 
great  priests.     Of  the  world's 
six  greatest  poets  she  has  pro- 
duced two,  Virgil  and  Dante. 
And  twice  at  least,  in  ages  of  general  confusion  and 
chaos,  it  has  fallen  to  Italy  to  provide  a  leader  strong" 
enough  to  put  an  end  to  anarchy,  and  by  virtue  of  a 


2  yulius   Ccesar.  [102  B.C.- 

powerful  personality,  to  assert  the  force  of  a  unifying 
principle. 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  this  principle  was  the  spiritual 
supremacy  of  the  Church,  and  the  man  who  enforced 
it  was  Hildebrand,  the  greatest  of  the  Popes.  Eleven 
centuries  earlier,  Julius  Caesar,  personifying  the  prin- 
ciple of  intelligent  government  by  a  single  man,  had 
made  it  possible  for  the  Roman  dominion,  then  on 
the  point  of  breaking  up,  to  grow  into  a  great  politi- 
cal union,  and  so  eventually  to  provide  a  material 
foundation  for  modern  civilisation.  It  might  seem 
indeed  at  first  sight  as  if  the  work  done  by  each  of 
these  men  depended  for  its  vitality  on  their  own 
genius,  and  barely  survived  them.  But  the  ideas  they 
represented  and  enforced  continued  to  govern  the 
course  of  history  for  centuries  after  they  had  passed 
away  ;   and  they  affect  us  in  some  measure  even  now. 

To  understand  adequately  the  position,  the  power, 
and  the  ideas  of  either  of  these  Italians,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  one  whose  life  we  are  to  trace,  it  is 
necessary  to  have  at  least  some  acquaintance  with 
the  history  of  the  city  of  Rome  for  many  genera- 
tions before  they  came  into  the  world.  The  influ- 
ence of  Italy  on  civilisation  is  in  fact  mainly  due  to 
the  marvellous  fortunes  of  the  city  on  the  Tiber. 
Not  indeed  that  many  of  the  greatest  Italians  have 
been  natives  of  Rome  :  from  Virgil  downwards  they 
have  sprung  from  all  parts  of  the  peninsula,  and  from 
a  variety  of  races.  But  to  the  fortunes  of  Rome, 
and  to  the  discipline,  the  tenacity  of  purpose,  and 
the  political  skill  of  her  earliest  rulers,  the  Italians 
owe  their  position  as,  in  a  sense,  a  chosen  people. 


89  B.C.]      Birth,  Family,  and  Education.  3 

In  order  to  place  Caesar  in  his  right  position  in  the 
history  of  Rome  and  of  the  world,  it  is  hard  to  dis- 
pense with  a  review  of  the  growth  of  the  Roman 
dominion,  of  the  Roman  constitution,  and  of  Ro- 
man society,  up  to  the  date  of  his  birth.  But  this 
volume  must  be  occupied  by  Caesar  himself  and  his 
work,  and  we  must  be  content  with  the  very  briefest 
outline  of  the  evolution  of  the  Roman  power,  down 
to  that  age  of  storm  and  peril,  when  the  greatest  of 
Romans — himself  of  the  purest  Roman  descent — 
seized  forcibly  on  the  helm,  and  pointed  out  the 
state's  true  course. 

The  city  of  Rome  was  originally  one  of  those  little 
communities,  consisting  of  a  walled  town  with  a 
small  adjoining  territory,  the  nature  of  which  we 
learn  best  from  Greek  history,  and  from  the  writings 
of  Greek  philosophers.  The  Greeks  lived  entirely 
in  such  cities,  which  were  for  the  most  part  quite  in- 
dependent of  each  other,  self-subsisting,  self-govern- 
ing ;  federations  and  empires  were  violations  of  the 
spirit  of  independence  which  they  cherished,  and 
they  never  grew,  or  wished  to  grow,  into  a  nation 
united  by  political  ties.  In  Italy  this  passion  for 
autonomy  was  less  strong,  though  it  was  not  absent. 
Leagues  or  federations,  for  the  mutual  support  of  a 
group  of  towns,  were  not  unknown.  When  history 
dawns,  we  find  the  city  on  the  Tiber  in  league  with 
the  other  cities  of  the  Latin  race  which  lay  around  it, 
and  in  course  of  time  it  won  a  position  as  their  leader 
and  champion.  When  they  rebelled  against  its  in- 
creasing power,  they  were  put  down  ;  and  Rome  be- 
gan to  be  a  mistress  whose  will  other  cities  obeyed. 


4  yulius   CcBsar.  [102  B.C.- 

Some  were  absorbed  into  her  own  body  politic,  some 
were  left  to  govern  'themselves  in  their  own  way  ; 
but  all  had  to  fight  for  her  as  she  gradually  increased 
her  dominion.  In  course  of  time  Rome,  with  the 
aid  of  the  Latins,  had  overcome  all  the  peoples 
of  Italy  up  to  the  river  Po.  They  were  treated 
in  different  ways,  as  the  Latins  had  been  ;  but  what^ 
ever  their  political  status,  they  all  had  to  supply^ 
soldiers  to  the  Roman  armies.  Thus  this  wonder- 
ful city  went  forward,  steadily  storing  up  material 
strength  ;  and  wherever  she  went  she  took  lands 
from  the  conquered,  built  fortified  towns,  establish- 
ing in  them  a  Roman  or  Latin  population,  and 
connected  these  with  herself  by  indestructible  mili- 
tary roads.  And  after  a  long  struggle  with  the 
Phoenician  city  of  Carthage,  in  the  course  of  which 
she  learnt  the  art  of  naval  warfare,  she  conquered 
also  the  islands  of  Sicily  and  Sardinia,  the  natural 
appendages  of  Italy. 

At  last  it  seemed  that  her  downfall  was  at  hand. 
In  the  sixth  century  of  her  existence  (218  B.C.) 
the  greatest  military  genius  of  antiquity,  Hannibal 
the  Carthaginian,  invaded  Italy  from  Spain,  bent  on 
her  destruction.  He  annihilated  one  Roman  army 
after  another,  and  reduced  her  to  the  last  gasp.  But 
her  vitality  was  marvellous  ;  she  kept  him  at  bay  for 
fourteen  years,  forced  him  to  leave  Italy,  followed 
him  to  Africa,  and  broke  the  power  of  Carthage, 
taking  from  her  all  her  possessions  in  Spain,  which 
were  added  to  the  Roman  dominion.  Hannibal 
then  tried  to  enlist  the  King  of  Macedonia  in  his 
life-long  effort  to  war  down  Rome  ;  but  the  Romans 


89  B.C.]     Birth,  Family,  and  Education.  5 

crossed  the  Adriatic,  and  in  time  both  Macedonia 
and  Greece  acknowledged  her  sway.  When  in  146 
B.C.,  she  finally  razed  Carthage  to  the  ground,  she 
was  the  acknowledged  arbiter  of  all  the  peoples 
living  around  the  Mediterranean  Sea.  Twenty-five 
years  later  she  was  mistress  not  only  of  Italy,  Spain, 
the  Carthaginian  territory  in  Africa,  Macedonia, 
Greece,  and  lUyria,  but  also  of  a  considerable  portion 
of  Asia  Minor,  and  of  a  valuable  territory  in  what  is 
now  the  south  of  France. 

This  wonderful  growth  of  a  single  city  into  a  vast 
empire  is  without  a  parallel  in  the  world's  history  ; 
and  it  raised  problems  unparalleled  for  complexity 
and  extent.  It  had  been  achieved  partly  by  the 
stern  and  steady  character  of  the  conquering  race, 
by  their  habits  of  self-denial  and  obedience,  bred  in 
them  through  their  rigid  family  life  and  religion, 
and  by  their  talent  for  political  organisation ; 
partly  also  by  the  nature  of  their  constitution,  which 
had  grown  in  the  last  two  centuries  into  a  narrow 
and  compact  but  shrewd  and  hard-working  oli- 
garchy. The  outward  expression  of  this  oligarchy 
was  the  Senate  or  Council  of  Three  Hundred,  of 
which  all  or  nearly  all  the  members  had  seen  state- 
service,  and  understood  the  work  they  had  to  do. 
In  the  course  of  the  long  wars  this  great  council 
had  shown  extraordinary  administrative  ability  and 
tenacity  of  purpose.  The  magistrates,  who  were 
elected  for  one  year  only,  gradually  lost  their  inde- 
pendence, and  willingly  obeyed  the  decisions  of 
a  body  whose  function  was  in  theory  only  to  advise 
them.     When  their  year  of  office  expired  they  be- 


6  yuliMS   CcBsar.  [102  B.C.- 

came  practically  life  members  of  the  Senate  ;  and 
thus  it  may  be  said  that  this  wonderful  council  rep- 
resented all  the  gathered  wisdom  and  experience  of 
the  state.  The  people,  theoretically  sovereign, 
elected  the  magistrates  from  families  of  senatorial 
renown,  and  ratified  laws  which  the  Senate  ap- 
proved ;  but  the  Roman  democracy  was  unrealised, 
and  the  senatorial  oligarchy  was  supreme. 
-"  Such  an  oligarchy  as  this  is  better  suited  to  rule 
in  time  of  war  than  in  time  of  peace.  When  the 
great  wars  were  at  last  coming  to  an  end,  it  was 
found  that  power,  and  the  wealth  which  that  power 
had  brought  with  it,  had  corrupted  the  ancient  vir- 
tue of  the  rulers  of  Rome.  They  owned  half  the 
soil  of  Italy  ;  as  magistrates,  sent  out  to  govern  the 
conquered  territories,  they  oppressed  the  conquered 
and  enriched  themselves.  Their  wealth  made  them 
luxurious  and  enfeebled  them  ;  they  began  to  let 
the  discipline  of  their  armies  go  to  ruin  abroad, 
and  at  home  their  political  efforts  were  all  of  a 
self-seeking  kind.  And  now  too  the  old  Roman 
family  life  began  to  show  signs  of  breaking  up, 
and  the  old  religion  lost  its  hold.  Greek  rhetoric 
and  Greek  philosophy  came  in,  and  with  them  the 
love  of  art  and  literature ;  but  these  could  not 
supply  the  place  of  the  old  faith  and  the  old 
morality  for  men  whose  duty  was  to  govern  the 
world.  Things  began  to  grow  worse  and  worse,  and 
it  was  clear  that  some  change  in  the  government 
was  at  hand. 

In  133  B.C.,  Tiberius  Gracchus,  by  developing  the 
latent  power  of  the  people,  and  of  the  Tribunate  of 


89  B.C.]      Birth,  Family,  and  Education.  7 

the  Plebs,  an  ancient  and  anomalous  magistracy 
which  the  Senate  had  subordinated  to  its  own  ends, 
struck  a  severe  blow  at  this  oligarchy  and  its 
wealth  ;  but  he  was  young  and  inexperienced,  used 
violence,  and  was  repaid  with  violence.  Ten  years 
after  his  death  his  brother  Gaius  succeeded  for  two 
years  in  displacing  the  Senate  from  supremacy  ;  but 
he  was  forced  to  rule  himself,  and  his  personal  in- 
fluence, unsupported  by  an  army,  was  not  enough 
to  save  him  from  his  brother's  fate.  But  Gaius 
sounded  the  note  of  revolution,  and  gave  a  practical 
example  of  better  government,  which  was  never 
forgotten. 

Then  followed  a  long  reaction,  in  which  the  cor- 
ruption of  the  oligarchy  is  seen  at  its  highest  pitch. 
Two  great  wars,  grossly  mismanaged  by  the  Senate, 
produced  at  last  a  great  general  from  among  the 
people,  who  revolutionised  the  Roman  army  and  was 
the  first  to  make  it  a  great  factor  in  politics.  For  some 
months  in  the  year  100  B.C.,  Rome  was  in  the  hands 
of  Marius ;  but  the  Senate  was  again  too  strong, 
and  he  was  ignorant  of  politics.  He  yielded  to 
senatorial  prestige,  and  the  oligarchy  was  established 
once  more. 

This  man  was  a  native  of  the  Italian  town  of 
Arpinum  ;  but  he  had  had  the  discretion  to  marry 
into  one  of  the  oldest  and  most  famous  Roman 
families.  His  wife  was  Julia,  the  sister  of  C.  Julius 
Caesar,  and  the  aunt  of  the  great  man  whose  career 
we  are  about  to  trace.  Her  nephew,  Gaius  Julius 
Caesar,  was  probably  born  on  the  12th  day  of  the 
month  Quinctilis,  which  ever  since  his  death  has  borne 


8  yulius   Ccesar,  [102  B.C.- 

his  gentile  name,  in  the  year  102  B.C.,*  when  his  kins- 
man was  drawing  to  a  close  that  splendid  military 
career,  in  which  he  saved  Rome  for  the  time  from 
invasion  and  ruin,  and  began  a  new  period  of  glory 
for  the  Roman  armies. 
.^m^  Caesar  was  thus  born  into  a  world  full  of  doubt 
and  insecurity,  with  problems  confronting  the  states- 
man which  few  could  understand,  much  less  attempt 
to  solve.  The  frontiers  of  this  unwieldy  empire  had 
to  be  protected,  and  the  generals  to  whom  this  task 
was  committed  had  to  be  controlled.  The  con- 
quered territories,  or  provinces  as  they  were  called, 
must  be  governed  equitably,  and  gradually  Roman- 
ised, if  they  were  to  be  held  together  in  any  strong 
bond  of  union.  Italy  itself  was  disaffected,  and  de- 
manding admission  to  the  privileges  of  Roman  citi- 
zenship. The  capital  was  swarming  with  a  mongrel, 
idle,  and  hungry  population,  who  claimed  to  be  the 
Roman  people,  and  to  legislate  for  the  whole  em- 
pire. The  senatorial  constitution  was  falling  to 
pieces,  and  the  only  alternatives  were  mob  rule  or 
military  rule.  The  distribution  of  wealth  was  fear- 
fully unequal ;  capital  and  pauperism  faced  each 
other  menacingly,  and  both  were  bred  and  main- 
tained on  a  slave  system  unparalleled  in  its  degrada- 
tion. The  slaves  themselves  constituted  a  permanent 
danger  to  the  state.  Piracy  abounded  on  the  seas, 
brigandage  and  murder  in  Italy.     Lastly,  the  ideas 

*  The  year  is  uncertain.  Suetonius  says  that  Caesar  was  fifty-six  at 
his  death  in  44  B.C.,  and  the  date  of  his  birth  has  been  usually  fixed 
at  100  B.C.  But  there  are  strong  reasons  for  believing  with  Mommsen 
that  the  real  date  was  two  years  earlier. 


B9  B.C.]     Birth,  Family,  and  Education,  g 

of  loyalty,  obedience,  self-restraint,  were  growing 
steadily  rarer  among  the  rulers  at  the  very  time 
they  were  most  called  for.  The  outlook  was  a  ter- 
rible one.  Rome  and  her  empire  must  surely  come 
to  an  end,  unless  some  statesman  should  arise,  able 
enough  to  comprehend  the  problems,  and  strong 
enough  to  put  his  hand  to  their  solution. 

The  family  of  the  Caesars  descended  from  one  of 
the  oldest  and  purest  of  Roman  stocks,  and  it  was 
one  of  the  many  truly  Roman  characteristics  of  its 
greatest  scion,  that  he  set  a  high  value  on  his  noble 
descent,  and  knew  how  to  turn  it  to  advantage  in 
pursuing  his  political  aims.  The  Julii  believed  them- 
selves to  be  descended  from  Ascanius  or  Julus,^  the 
founder  of  Alba  Longa,  the  son  of  ^neas  and  grand- 
son of  Venus  and  Anchises,  and  thus  carried  back 
the  legend  of  their  origin  to  a  period  long  before 
the  foundation  of  Rome.  Caesar  never  lost  an  op- 
portunity of  bringing  this  splendid  tradition  before 
the  minds  of  his  contemporaries.  When  he  deliv- 
ered the  funeral  oration  over  his  aunt,  Julia,  wife  of 
Marius,  he  reminded  his  hearers  of  her  divine  ances- 
try. In  the  two  pitched  battles  which  decided  his 
political  fortunes,  Pharsalus  and  Munda,  he  chose 
the  name  of  Venus  Genetrix  as  the  watchword 
of  the  day.  The  image  of  his  ancestral  deity  may 
still  be  seen  stamped  on  many  of  his  coins,  and  his 
own  head,  together  with  that  of  his  ancestor  JEneas, 
is  found  on  those  of  the  city  of  Ilium,  which  in  the 
days  of  his  supreme  power  he  distinguished  with 
special  favour  as  the  ancient  legendary  home  of  his 
race.    iThe  glory  of  a  great  ancestry  passed  on  from 


lO  yulius    CcBsar,  [l 02  B.C. 

Caesar  himself,  by  the  fiction  of  adoption,  to  the 
plebeian  Augustus,  and  had  its  due  influence  in 
building  up  the  prestige  of  the  imperial  system  ;| 
and  it  still  lives  on,  inseparably  combined  with  the 
story  of  the  fortunes  of  Rome,  in  the  verses  of 
Rome's  greatest  poet. 

Hanc  adspice  gentem 
Romanesque  tuos.     II ic  Cassar,  et  omnis  luli 
Progenies,  magnum  c£eli  ventura  sub  axem.* 

Of  the  various  families  belonging  to  the  gens 
Julia,  some  were  patrician,  some  probably  plebeian  ; 
that  one  which,  at  least  since  the  war  with  Hannibal, 
had  borne  the  cognomen  or  surname  of  Caesar,  was 
undoubtedly  patrician.  The  distinction  implied  by 
these  terms  had  ceased  to  be  of  any  real  political 
significance  long  before  the  age  with  which  this 
biography  has  to  deal.  The  struggles  between  patri- 
cians and  plebeians,  or  the  originally  privileged  and 
unprivileged  inhabitants  of  Rome,  had  ceased  for 
over  two  centuries  before  Caesar's  birth,  and  the 
aristocracy  of  his  day  was  composed  chiefly  of  ple- 
beian families,  whose  ancestors  had  won  distinction 
by  good  service  to  the  state  either  at  home  or  in  the 
field.  When  we  speak  therefore  of  Caesar,  Sulla,  or 
Catilina,  as  patricians,  we  mean  nothing  more  than 
that  they  traced  their  descent  from  one  of  those 
families  which,  in  days  of  yore,  had  exercised  the 
whole  power  of  government  in  the  state.  Patrician 
descent  was  a  proof  of  pure  Roman  birth,  but  in 
political  life  was  of  no  more  advantage  in  the  last 

♦  Virgil,  ^n.,  vi.,  756  foil. 


89  B.C.]     Birth,  Family,  and  Education,  1 1 

century  of  the  Republic  than  is  at  the  present  day 
in  Swiss  politics  the  patriciate  of  the  ancient  repub- 
lic of  Bern.  In  one  respect  at  least  it  might  be 
reckoned  a  disadvantage,  for  a  patrician  was  disquali- 
fied from  holding  the  powerful  office  of  tribune  of 
the  plebs,  through  which  so  many  young  men  of 
energy  or  ability  entered  public  life  ;  nor  could  he 
vote  in  the  plebeian  legislative  or  judicial  assemblies 
over  which  the  tribune  presided. 
f  The  family  of  the  Caesars,  however,  belonged  not 
only  to  the  old  patriciate,  but  to  the  newer  nobility, 
of  which  the  test  had  been  not  so  much  either  birth 
or  wealth  as  honourable  service  rendered  to  the  state. 
A  Julius  Caesar  had  been  consul  in  157  B.C.,  another 
in  90  B.C.,  who  was  afterwards  also  censor ;  another 
had  been  praetor  in  the  eventful  year  when  G.  Grac- 
chus was  for  the  first  time  tribune.  Caesar's  uncle 
was  consul  in  another  critical  year  (91  B.C.),  when 
another  great  tribune,  Livius  Drusus,  failed  in  a 
noble  attempt  to  remedy  the  evils  of  the  time.  His 
father  and  grandfather  both  held  the  praetorship  ; 
but  nothing  further  is  recorded  of  either  than  that 
the  younger  died  suddenly  at  Pisa  in  the  year  84  B.C., 
when  his  great  son  was  just  entering  into  manhood. 
Of  these,  as  of  the  other  Caesars  who  attained  to 
high  office,  we  can  only  conjecture  that  they  were 
ordinary  Romans  of  industry  and  integrity  ;  nothing 
is  recorded  against  them  in  an  age  of  rapidly  increas- 
ing corruption  and  degeneracy.  I 

Caesar's  mother  also  probably  belonged  to  an 
ancient  family  of  high  reputation,  the  Aurelii,  who 
bore  the  surname  of  Cotta.     Of  this  lady  we  are  not 


12  yulius   Ccesar,  no2  B.C.- 

wholly  ignorant,  for  she  survived  her  husband  thirty 
years,  and  hved  to  hear  the  news  of  her  son's  great 
exploits  in  Gaul ;  and  what  little  we  know  of  her  is  such 
as  to  make  us  wish  for  more.  Plutarch  tells  us  that 
she  was  a  discreet  woman  ;  and  it  is  a  pleasing  guess, 
though  no  more  than  a  guess,  that  some  of  those 
personal  traits  in  Caesar's  character,  which  place  him 
as  a  man  so  far  above  the  majority  of  his  contem- 
poraries, were  due  to  her  example  and  precept.  On 
her  fell  the  task  of  completing  his  education,  and 
throughout  his  life  she  seems  to  have  remained  his 
true  friend.  The  story  was  told  that  in  the  year  63, 
when  the  son  was  a  candidate  for  the  office  of  Ponti- 
fex  Maximus,  he  kissed  his  mother  when  he  left  his 
house  on  the  morning  of  the  election,  and  told  her 
that  he  would  return  successful  or  not  at  all.  When 
Clodius  two  years  later  crept  into  Caesar's  house  at 
the  women's  festival  of  the  Bona  Dea,  with  the 
object,  as  it  was  said,  of  corrupting  Caesar's  wife 
Pompeia,  it  was  by  Aurelia's  vigilance  that  he  was 
discovered  and  identified.  We  may  imagine  her  as 
a  Roman  matron  of  the  older  type,  strong,  self- 
repressed,  but  yet  womanly ;  devoted  to  her  only 
son's  best  interests,  and  watching  his  career  with 
anxiety  and  admiration. 

In  this,  if  it  was  indeed  her  aim,  she  was  in  the 
long  run  successful.  Though  Caesar  was  the  fore- 
most man  of  what  must  be  called  a  Graeco-Roman 
age,  there  was  very  little  of  the  Greek  in  him.  As 
it  was  his  special  task  in  life  to  bring  the  western 
peoples  into  prominence  in  the  world's  history,  and 
to  start  them  on  a  career  in  which  they  were  to 


89  B.C.]     Birth,  Family,  and  Education .  13 

leave  behind  them  the  effete  and  effeminate  Hel- 
lenistic world,  so  it  was  also  his  lot  to  fight  down  in 
himself,  with  the  help  of  ten  years'  sojourn  in  the 
West,  the  demoralising  influences  of  a  city  steeped 
in  pseudo-Greek  ways  of  living  and  thinking.  His 
character  never  became  finally  undermined  ;  and  if 
in  this  respect  he  rises  far  above  the  level  of  men 
like  Catilina,  Clodius,  Caelius,  and  many  other  con- 
temporaries who  will  be  mentioned  in  these  pages, 
it  may  not  be  going  too  far  to  attribute  this  in  part 
at  least  to  a  mother's  influence  for  good — the  best 
chance  for  a  youthful  Roman  of  that  unbridled  age. 
Of  Caesar's  education  in  the  ordinary  modern 
sense  of  the  word,  we  know  hardly  anything ;  and 
this  is  only  what  might  be  expected,  for  the  bring- 
ing-up  of  the  Roman  noble  was  not  a  sufficiently 
important  matter  to  invite  a  biographer's  research. 
And  indeed  there  was  probably  little  to  discover. 
Plutarch,  whose  aim  in  writing  his  "  Lives  "  was  an 
ethical  one,  and  who  was  specially  interested  in 
education,  has  recorded  little  or  nothing  of  Caesar's 
early  training.  What  we  learn  from  other  sources 
can  be  very  briefly  summarised.  Suetonius  in  his 
work  "On  Grammarians"  has  given  us  some  inform- 
ation about  the  man  who  was  tutor  to  Caesar  when  a 
boy.  This  man,  Marcus  Antonius  Gnipho,  was  a  Gaul 
by  birth — i,  e.j  probably  from  the  north  of  Italy.  He 
was  not  a  slave,  as  was  usually  the  case  with  the  tutors 
of  the  day  ;  his  ability  and  powers  of  memory  were 
remarkable,  and  he  was  skilled  both  in  the  Latin 
and  Greek  languages  ;  his  manners  were  courteous 
and  his  disposition  a  happy  one.     At  what  time  he 


14  Julius   Caesar.  [102  B.C.- 

began  to  teach  Csesar  we  do  not  know ;  but  as 
Suetonius  expressly  tells  us  that  he  resided  in  the 
family,  and  only  at  a  later  time  opened  a  school  in  a 
house  of  his  own,  it  is  at  least  probable  that  his 
pupil  was  then  quite  a  young  boy. 

It  is  certainly  remarkable  that  Caesar,  at  that  im- 
pressible age,  should  have  been  under  the  charge  of 
a  man  of  Gallic  and  not  of  Greek  extraction.  It  is 
quite  possible  that  his  interest  in  the  Gallic  char- 
acter and  in  Gauls,  whether  within  or  beyond  the 
Alps,  may  have  been  first  stimulated  by  Gnipho. 
The  influence  of  an  able  and  agreeable  tutor  living 
in  the  house  with  his  pupil  must  far  exceed  that  of 
a  master  to  whose  school  the  boy  goes  daily  for 
lessons  only  ;  and  when  we  reflect  that  Gnipho*s 
tutorship  must  have  extended  over  the  very  years 
of  the  Social  and  Civil  wars  and  of  the  settlement 
of  the  great  question  of  the  extension  of  the  citizen- 
ship to  the  Italians  and  the  Gauls  of  northern  Italy, 
we  seem  fairly  entitled  to  assume  that  Caesar's  width 
of  view  in  political  matters  w^as  in  part  at  least  due 
to  the  nationality  and  character  of  his  teacher.  \  That 
he  was  fortunate  in  the  society  of  a  man  of  accom- 
plishments and  good  breeding  admits  of  no  doubt. 

This  is  practically  all  we  knov/  of  his  education  in 
the  strict  sense  of  the  word  ;  for  it  was  not  until  he 
was  probably  twenty-six  years  old  that  he  studied 
rhetoric,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter,  under 
a  famous  Greek  master  of  that  indispensable  art,  in 
the  island  of  Rhodes.  We  do  not  even  know  who 
were  his  boyish  companions.  It  has  indeed  been 
conjectured  that  Cicero  was  one  of  them ;  for  Cicero 


89  B.C.]     BirlJi,  Family y  and  Education.  1 5 

was  a  fellow-townsman  of  Marlus,  who  had  married 
Caesar's  aunt,  and  the  younger  Marius,  Caesar's  first 
cousin,  was  probably  intimate  with  both  lads.  In 
the  year  56  B.C.,  when  supporting  the  renewal  of 
Caesar's  Gallic  command,  Cicero  took  occasion  to 
allude  to  the  early  intimacy  of  himself  and  his 
brother  with  Csesar;  and  though  the  passage  must 
not  be  pressed  too  far  (for  it  was  the  speaker's 
Interest  on  that  occasion  to  make  the  most  of  their 
friendship),  it  is  beyond  doubt  that  a  personal  good- 
will existed  between  the  two  men  throughout  their 
lives,  with,  rare  intervals,  which  may  very  well  have 
originated  in  boyhood.* 

The  reader  cannot  fail  to  be  struck,  at  this  point, 
not  only  with  the  total  want  of  interest  in  the  train- 
ing of  the  great  men  of  that  age  shown  by  contem- 
porary writers,  but  by  the  complete  failure  of  the 
Romans  to  grasp  the  importance  of  education  as  a 
means  of  preparing  their  statesmen  for  their  vast 
duties  and  responsibilities  as  rulers  of  the  civilised 
world.  It  had  not  been  so  in  the  life  of  the  old 
Greek  republics.  Though  seldom  approaching  to  a 
realisation  of  the  ideal  schemes  of  the  philosophers, 
the  education  of  youth  in  a  Greek  state  was  cer- 
tainly intended  to  preserve  the  true  state-character, 
to  fit  the  rising  generation  to  fulfil  the  civic  duties 
which  would  devolve  on  it ;  and  it  is  not  to  be 
doubted  that  human  excellence  and  happiness,  so 
far  as  it  could  be  realised  within  the  narrow  limits 
of  the  city-state,  could  only  be  made  durable  by 
such  means.     Now  even  if  Rome  be  regarded  as  no 

*  Cicero,  l)e  Provinciis  Consularibus,  17, 


1 6  yulius   CcBsar,  [102  B.C. 

more  than  a  city  in  this  sense,  without  taking  into 
account  the  extraordinary  duties  that  devolved 
on  her,  it  must  still  be  allowed  that  she  made  no 
proper  provision  for  the  education  of  her  sons. 
There  had  indeed  been  once  a  strict  traditional 
morality  in  the  old  Roman  family,  in  which  there 
was  much  that  was  worth  keeping  ;  there  was  **  the 
power  of  conduct  "  in  a  high  degree;  there  were  the 
ideas  of  justice,  obedience,  self-sacrifice ;  and  for 
many  generations  the  influence  of  example  and 
habit,  and  the  healthy  discipline  of  the  patria 
potestaSy  were  sufficient  to  maintain  the  reality  of 
these  virtues.  They  were  also  adequate  to  the 
needs  of  Rome  until  she  became  the  arbiter  of  na- 
tions ;  and  even  then  they  might  have  been  of 
infinite  value,  if  they  had  not  melted  away  in  the 
strong  heat  of  power  and  prosperity. 

But, in  Caesar's  day  some  wider  virtues  were  called 
for  than  those  of  a  soldier-citizen ;  some  more  ra- 
tional education  than  the  patria  potestas.  To  use 
the  terms  of  Greek  philosophy,  the  iOiapib?  had 
been  tried,  and  had  been  useful  in  its  day,  but  the 
\6yo?  was  needed  to  make  the  rulers  of  the  world 
into  thinking  beings.  They  dabbled,  it  is  true,  in 
Greek  literature  and  philosophy,  but  only  in  idle 
hours,  or  because  it  was  the  fashion.  Boys  were 
given  into  the  charge  of  slaves,  who  may  have 
taught  them  something,  but  hardly  their  duties  as 
Romans  ;  and  if  these  supplanted  the  Roman  moth- 
ers, they  did  far  more  harm  than  good.  And  the 
"  humaner  letters,'*  the  more  liberal  education  that 
makes  men  gentle  and  generous,  and  which  is  its 


89  B.C.]     Birth,  Family,  and  Education.  1 7 

own  object  and  reward,  was  almost  unknown  at 
Rome.  The  Roman  had  indeed  succeeded  to  his 
world-wide  inheritance  long  before  he  was  intellectu- 
ally of  age.  He  had  not  yet  begun  to  think  when 
he  was  called  upon  to  think  for  the  world  ;  but  his 
nature  was  not  a  thinking  one,  nor  was  his  training 
of  a  kind  to  remedy  his  deficiency.  The  power  of 
grasping  great  political  problems,  the  power  of  self- 
command  in  dealing  with  them,  the  sense  of  justice 
and  duty,  the  love  of  truth  and  right  dealing, — these 
were  not  qualities  easily  to  be  developed  in  a  Roman 
of  the  last  century  of  the  Republic. 

Caesar,  then,  though  apparently  fortunate  in  his 
early  home-life,  in  the  influence  of  mother  and 
tutor,  must  for  the  most  part  have  had  to  educate 
himself.  That  he  did  so,  and  intentionally,  we  may 
regard  as  certain ;  but  the  details  of  the  process, 
which  in  the  biography  of  a  modern  statesman  would 
be  full  of  interest,  are  entirely  hidden  from  us.  In 
one  sense,  however,  his  education  was  a  life-long 
task.  We  can  see  him  steadily  growing,  in  self- 
restraint,  in  humanity,  and  in  the  sense  of  duty  and 
in  the  love  of  work,  as  well  as  in  political  wisdom,  in 
knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  in  the  skilful  adap- 
tation of  means  to  ends.  Up  to  the  time  of  his 
first  consulship,  when  he  was  over  forty  years  of  age, 
we  do  not  see  much  in  him  that  places  him  apart 
from  the  ordinary  Roman  of  his  day,  unless  it  be  a 
certain  tendency  to  reserve  his  strength,  an  apparent 
inclination  to  watch  and  wait ;  and  the  stories  that 
are  told  of  his  conduct  and  morals  by  Suetonius, 
though  utterly  untrustworthy  as  evidence  of   fact, 


1 8  yulius   Ccesar,  [102  B.C.- 

are  at  least  sufficient  to  show  what  the  popular  belief 
ascribed  to  him.  But  from  his  first  campaign  in 
Gaul  to  the  end  of  his  life,  during  fifteen  years  of 
continual  labour,  whether  military  or  administrative, 
he  was  always  learning,  noting,  and  advancing. 
No  one  can  doubt  this  who  reads  his  *'  Commen- 
taries "  carefully,  with  the  object  of  discovering 
something  of  the  nature  of  the  man  who  wrote 
them.  And  he  who  in  middle  life,  and  in  an  age 
so  giddy  and  exciting,  could  turn  to  the  utmost 
advantage  the  opportunities  offered  by  new  duties 
and  new  experiences,  who  could  gather  in  a  harvest 
of  knowledge  from  his  sojourn  among  hitherto  un- 
known peoples,  and  when  absolute  power  was  in  his 
hands,  could  use  it  with  consummate  skill  and  mod- 
eration, must,  in  earlier  life,  however  richly  gifted  by 
nature,  have  spent  some  time  and  thought  on  the 
education  of  his  own  mind. 

It  may  be  convenient  at  once  to  describe  briefly 
the  personal  appearance  of  the  man  whose  life  we 
are  to  trace.  All  such  descriptions  must  rest  solely 
on  the  evidence  of  Suetonius,  which  probably  repre- 
sents the  popular  tradition,  and  on  that  of  the  busts 
and  coins,  which  are  numerous  and  not  self-contra- 
dictory. He  was  tall  for  a  Roman  ;  but  the  Italian 
standard  of  height  was  probably  then,  as  now,  con- 
siderably below  that  of  the  northern  races.  His 
complexion  was  pale  or  fair ;  his  eyes  black  and 
lively ;  his  mouth  somewhat  large  ;  the  lips,  as  they 
are  represented  in  the  coins  and  busts,  being  firmly 
set  together,  with  the  corners  slightly  drawn  down- 
wards. His  forehead  was  high,  and  appeared  still 
higher    in    consequence    of    a   premature    baldness, 


JULIUS  C/tSAR. 
FROM  THE  MARBLE  BUST  IN  THE  BRITISH  MUSEUM. 


69  B.C.I      Birth,  Family,  and  Education.  19 

which  he  is  said  to  have  tried  to  hide  by  combing 
his  hair  forwards.  His  nose  was  aquiUne  and  rather 
large.  The  contour  of  his  head,  as  represented  in 
the  well-known  marble  in  the  British  Museum,  is 
extremely  massive  and  powerful ;  and  the  expression 
of  the  face  is  keen,  thoughtful,  and  somewhat  stern. 
It  is  the  likeness  of  a  severe  schoolmaster  of  the 
world,  whose  tenderer  side,  with  its  capability  of 
affection  for  friends  and  devotion  towards  women, 
is  hardly  traceable  in  the  features. 

His  health  was  good,  though  late  in  life  he  was 
subject  to  some  kind  of  seizure.  He  was  capable  of 
the  most  unremitting  activity  ;  his  limbs  were  big 
and  strongly  made.  Suetonius  tells  us  that  he  was 
an  extremely  skilful  swordsman  and  horseman,  and 
a  good  swimmer.  All  his  contemporaries  agreed 
that  he  was  very  abstemious  in  regard  to  wine, 
though  they  would  not  allow  him  the  virtues  of 
which  such  moderation  is  usually  the  accompani- 
ment. All  were  also  agreed  as  to  the  steadiness 
and  coolness  of  his  temper  and  the  courteousness  of 
his  manner  and  bearing,  indicating  the  possession 
of  that  high  breeding  which  the  Romans  aptly 
termed  ''  humanitas."  On  the  whole  we  may  pic- 
ture him  to  ourselves  as  a  man  the  dignity  of  whose 
bodily  presence  was  in  due  proportion  to  the  great- 
ness of  his  mental  powers ;  and  the  words  which 
Plutarch  employed  of  Gains  Gracchus,  "that  he 
always  maintained  a  certain  seriousness  of  manner 
in  combination  with  a  good  will  towards  his  fellow- 
men,"  seem  to  be  in  the  same  degree  applicable, 
among  the  many  prominent  figures  of  the  Roman 
Revolution,  to  his  great  successor  only. 


CHAPTER  II. 

BOYHOOD     DURING     THE     CIVIL     WARS — EARLIEST 

POLITICAL    EXPERIENCES. 

89-82    B.C. 


E  saw  that  in  the  year  of  Caesar's 
birth,  Marius,  his  aunt's  hus- 
band, was  at  the  height  of 
his  mihtary  glory.  It  was  in 
that  summer  that  he  utterly 
destroyed  a  vast  host  of 
wandering  Germans,  who  for 
several  years  had  been  im- 
perilling the  very  existence 
of  the  Roman  Empire  in  the 
West.  The  battle  was  fought  at  Aquae  Sextiae  (Aix 
in  southern  France),  in  the  same  Gallic  province 
which  Caesar  himself  was  destined  to  rule  so  long, 
and  to  protect,  like  his  uncle,  from  barbarian  inroads. 
Next  year  (loi  B.C.),  in  conjunction  with  the  aristo- 
crat Catulus,  Marius  destroyed  another  army  of 
invaders,  who  had  penetrated  by  the  Brenner  Pass 
into  northern  Italy,  and  were  actually  within  a  few 

20 


82  B.C.]   Boyhood  during  the  Civil  Wars.  21 

days'  march  of  Rome.  Italy  was  saved,  and  the 
conqueror  was  elected  consul  for  the  sixth  succes- 
sive year. 

It  is  hard  for  us  to  appreciate  the  full  value  of 
these  victories.  We  are  apt  to  think  of  the  Roman 
Empire  as  a  system  of  marvellous  stability,  and  of 
Rome  as  the  Eternal  City.  We  do  not  easily  grasp 
the  fact  that,  at  this  time  and  for  many  years  after- 
wards, the  Empire  was  often  in  a  condition  of  the 
utmost  peril.  As  we  shall  see,  the  northern  bar- 
barians were  not  the  only  enemies  of  Rome  who 
seemed  likely  to  change  the  course  of  history. 
Mithridates,  the  great  King  of  Pontus,  was  soon  to 
overrun  her  territory  in  the  East.  Internal  discord 
and  civil  war  were  to  sap  her  material  strength  and 
destroy  what  little  moral  force  was  left  in  her.  He 
who  would  judge  truly  of  Caesar's  place  in  the  history 
of  the  world  must  understand  that  the  Empire, 
during  all  the  earlier  part  of  his  life,  was  terribly 
deficient  both  in  stability  and  unity. 

But  at  the  time  of  his  birth  the  immediate  danger 
was  passing  away.  Two  years  later  (100  B.C.)  the 
wars  were  over,  and  Marius  was  supreme  in  Rome. 
It  turned  out,  however,  that  this  great  master  of 
armies  was  helpless  as  a  statesman.  He  was  a  man 
of  the  people,  and  the  re-assertion  of  democracy 
seemed  inevitable ;  but  he  bungled,  hesitated,  and 
finally  subordinated  himself  to  the  Senate.  After 
his  year  of  office  he  left  Rome,  and  disappeared 
from  politics  for  many  years.  A  senatorial  reactior 
followed ;  and  ten  years  later  there  broke  out  a 
terrible   struggle    between    Rome    and    her    Italian 


22  yulius   CcBsar.  [89  B.C. 

subjects,  who  united  to  obtain  by  force  of  arms  that 
Roman  citizenship  which  they  had  so  long  coveted 
and  sought  for  in  vain.  Once  more  Rome  was  in 
the  direst  extremity.  Face  to  face  with  the  Italians, 
she  was  as  weak  materially  as  her  position  was 
morally  unjust.  By  their  help  she  had  been  adding 
for  more  than  a  century  to  her  dominion  and  her 
wealth,  yet  she  made  no  sign  of  renewing  for  their 
benefit  the  old  policy  of  absorption  which  had  raised 
her  to  her  supremacy  in  Italy.  Nov/  that  her  citi- 
zenship had  far  outstripped  in  value  that  of  all  other 
states,  and  was  indeed  the  only  one  worth  having  in 
the  world  for  men  of  business,  of  pleasure,  or  of 
ambition,  she  would  not  share  it  even  with  those 
who  had  done  so  much  to  make  her  what  she  was. 
Real  statesmen  like  Gains  Gracchus  had  urged  it  on 
her,  but  both  senate  and  people  had  turned  a  deaf 
ear.  Selfish  motives,  which  this  is  not  the  place  to 
examine,  had  prevailed  over  a  large-minded  and 
liberal  policy. 

It  was  soon  shown  how  weak  she  was  without  her 
Italian  supports.  Everywhere  her  armies  were  beaten 
by  their  old  comrades ;  one  disgrace  followed  another. 
At  the  first  gleam  of  returning  fortune,  the  Senate 
seized  the  opportunity  to  yield  the  whole  point  at 
issue  ;  bills  were  passed  which,  in  conjunction  with 
other  measures  taken  later,  had  the  effect  of  enrolling 
the  whole  Italian  population  south  of  the  Po  on  the 
register  of  Roman  citizens. 

f  We  may  not  pause  here  to  consider  the  immense 
importance  of  those  measures  in  the  history  of  Rome 
and  of  the  world.     But  in  a  sketch  of  Caesar's  life,  it 


82  B.C.]     Boyhood  during  the  Civil  Wars.  23 

is  necessary  to  point  out  that  they  were  very  far  from 
removing  all  difficulty  in  the  relations  between  Rome 
and  her  new  citizens.  Though  the  question  of  citi- 
zenship had  been  settled,  other  questions  of  adjust- 
ment and  organisation  at  once  arose.  How  was  the 
local  government  of  these  Italian  communities  to  be 
co-ordinated  with  the  imperial  government  in  the 
city  of  Rome  ?  How  were  the  Italians  to  find  time 
and  means  to  come  and  vote  in  the  elections  of  the 
Roman  magistrates  who  were  now  to  govern  them  ? 
How  were  these  city  magistrates  to  discharge  the 
business  of  all  Italy  ?  A  complete  re-organisation 
was  called  for  ;  a  task  of  great  difficulty,  for  the 
position  was  an  entirely  novel  one,  and  no  such 
problem  had  ever  yet  confronted  either  Greek  or 
Roman  statesman.  Nor  was  it  really  grappled  with 
until  Caesar  himself  put  his  hand  to  it  more  than 
forty  years  later,   f 

The  storm  of  civil  war  broke  out  in  Caesar's  thir- 
teenth year  ;  he  was  therefore  too  young  to  take  any 
part  in  the  struggle.  He  probably  only  assumed  the 
toga  virilis,  or  mark  of  Roman  manhood,  in  87  B.C., 
when  his  older  contemporaries,  Pompeius  and  Cicero, 
had  already  seen  their  first  military  service.  But  if 
his  youth  prevented  his  bearing  arms  in  these  wars, 
whose  mercilessness  must  have  vitiated  many  noble 
natures  and  hardened  many  generous  hearts,  his 
political  instincts  were  now  assuredly  generated  and 
growing  rapidly  into  definite  opinions  resting  on 
principles  never  to  be  abandoned  while  he  lived. 
Boys  were  doubtless  apt,  then  as  now,  to  take  the 
colour  of  their  political  ideas  from  family  tradition. 


24  yulius  CcBsar.  [89  B.c- 

and  from  relations  and  teachers  who  could  win  their 
admiration  and  worship.  Both  these  influences  were 
at  work  on  the  youthfulJCsesar,  and  secured  him  once 
and  for  ever  for  the  cause  of  popular  government  as 
against  the  Senate,  for  the  Many  as  against  the  Few. 
Though  his  relations  were  not  uniformly  *'  Populares," 
the  marriage  of  his  aunt  with  Marius,  which  must 
have  taken  place  long  before  the  outbreak  of  civil 
war,  makes  it  probable  that  in  his  own  family  circle 
the  views  held  were  not  of  the  narrow  oligarchic 
type.  And  when  this  Marius,  who  was  the  greatest 
soldier  Rome  had  yet  produced,  and  the  saviour  of 
his  country  from  barbarian  enemies,  now  became  the 
victim  of  exile,  persecution,  and  degradation,  in  the 
cause  of  Italian  liberty,  he  must  at  once  have  become 
a  hero  in  Caesar's  boyish  mind. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  Caesar  then  fully 
understood  the  principle  of  the  policy  for  which  the 
Marian  party  were  struggling  ;  it  is  indeed  unlikely 
enough  that  Marius  understood  it  himself.  But  as 
Caesar's  later  life  shows  plainly  not  only  that  he 
eventually  came  to  understand  it,  but  that  he  under- 
stood it  more  effectually  than  any  of  his  contempo- 
raries, it  will  be  as  well  once  for  all  to  place  it 
succinctly  before  the  reader,  as  the  solidly  laid  foun- 
dation-stone of  all  Caesar's  political  training. 

Just  as  in  a  modern  state  there  can  be  found, 
underlying  the  varying  phases  of  action  of  a  political 
party,  some  deeply  rooted  principle  which  perma- 
nently but  secretly  governs  them,  so  at  Rome,  even 
in  that  unreasoning  age,  both  sides  in  the  political 
battle  had  a  basis  of  reasoned  conviction,  on  which, 


82  B.C.]     Boyhood  during  the  Civil  Wars,         25 

in  the  minds  of  the  better  men  at  least,  their  imme- 
diate aims  were  supported  and  steadied.  Among 
those  who  were  called  '^  Optimates,"  this  might  almost 
be  described  as  a  definite  rule  of  faith,  inherited 
from  the  fathers  of  their  constitution.  They  be- 
lieved that  the  Senate,  as  embodying  all  the  gathered 
wisdom  and  experience  of  the  State,  and  as  exercis- 
ing supervision  over  the  magistrates  elected  by  the 
people,  was  alone  capable  of  administering  the  busi- 
ness of  the  city  and  her  dependents  in  Italy ;  to  this 
axiom,  which  had  in  former  times  been  proved 
sound,  they  had  naturally  enough  added  the  con- 
viction that  the  vast  territories  which  had  been 
acquired  since  the  war  with  Carthage  could  likewise 
only  be  governed  by  the  same  machinery.  This 
political  creed,  coinciding  with  and  confirming  their 
own  material  interests,  floated  them  on  a  course  of 
dogmatic  selfishness  which  has  rarely  been  equalled 
in  history  ;  but  that  creed  was  a  perfectly  natural 
and  intelligible  one,  and  was  rooted  not  only  in  the 
accumulated  experience  of  their  own  countrymen, 
but  also  in  the  whole  history  and  philosophy  of  the 
ancient  city-state. 

The  views  of  the  Populares,  on  the  other  hand, 
which  were  newer  and  less  definitely  shaped,  were 
based  on  the  conviction  that  in  the  task  of  govern- 
ment which  had  fallen  to  the  lot  of  Rome  the 
material  interests  and  well-being  of  the  governed 
must  be  taken  into  account,  as  well  as  the  con- 
venience and  glory  of  the  governors.  This  party  in 
fact,  or  the  leaders  of  it,  was  dimly  aware  that  Rome 
had  vast  responsibilities  ;    that  the  whole  condition 


26  yulius   CcBsar,  [89  B.c- 

of  the  civilised  world  had  changed,  and  that  it  lay 
with  her  to  accept  the  position,  and  accustom  her- 
self to  the  ideas — new  then  in  the  political  world — 
of  progress  and  development.  Such  views,  unprac- 
tical and  unreasoned  as  they  must  have  been,  and 
often  obscured  by  the  selfish  aims  and  personal  bit- 
terness of  the  leaders  who  held  them,  can  neverthe- 
less be  traced  in  almost  every  great  measure  of 
reform  proposed  by  this  party,  from  the  tribunate  of 
Tiberius  Gracchus  onwards.  Whether  the  question 
of  the  moment  were  the  better  distribution  of  land, 
the  reform  of  corrupt  law-courts,  or  the  extension 
of  the  citizenship  to  the  Italians,  the  true  interests 
of  the  mass  of  the  governed  were  in  the  minds  of 
the  more  thoughtful  of  the  leaders  of  this  party, 
and  guided  their  policy  steadily  in  one  direction,  in 
spite  of  checks  and  back-currents. 

When  Caesar  was  growing  towards  manhood,  and 
beginning  to  understand  politics,  under  the  influence, 
as  we  may  suppose,  of  his  hero  Marius,  a  new  ques- 
tion arose  in  which  the  convictions  of  both  parties,  not 
unadulterated  by  personal  aims,  came  into  such  vio- 
lent collision  that  civil  war  at  once  broke  out  afresh. 

The  two  parties,  forced  into  a  temporary  union 
by  the  death-struggle  of  the  Social  war,  had,  as  we 
saw,  combined  to  bestow  the  full  citizenship  upon 
all  Italians  who  chose  to  claim  it  within  sixty  days 
of  the  passing  of  the  bill.  But  the  Senate  had  been 
strong  enough  to  introduce  a  provision  which  greatly 
modified  the  practical  effect  of  this  resolution.  All 
new  citizens  were  to  be  enrolled,  not  in  the  thirty- 
five  "  tribes  "  into  which  the  whole  Roman  population 


<     o 

O     "13 


82  B.C.]     Boyhood  during  the  Civil  Wars.         2  J 

was  divided,  but  in  eight  new  tribes  ;  and  as  all 
questions  were  decided,  not  by  a  majority  of  the 
whole  citizens,  but  by  a  majority  of  tribe-votes,  their 
influence  both  in  legislation  and  in  elections  would 
be  comparatively  small.  |  It  was  an  insult  to  men 
who  had  fought  so  splendidly  for  the  coveted  privi- 
lege, and  who  had  been  for  generations  serving 
bravely  in  the  Roman  armies,  to  deal  with  them  in 
this  niggardly  spirit ;  and  in  88  B.C.  the  Marian  party 
put  up  Sulpicius,  a  tribune  of  extraordinary  elo- 
quence, to  propose  the  abolition  of  the  new  eight 
tribes,  and  the  distribution  of  the  new  citizens  in  the 
old  thirty-five.  The  result  of  this,  and  of  a  simulta- 
neous proposal  to  give  Marius  the  command  against 
Mithridates,  was  that  the  aristocratic  consul  Sulla 
marched  on  Rome  with  his  army  and  broke  the 
power  of  the  Populares  at  a  single  blow.  Sulpicius 
was  murdered,  Marius  fled  into  exile,  the  laws  were 
abrogated,  and  the  senatorial  constitution  was  set  on 
a  firm  basis  by  Sulla.  |  But  when  Sulla  left  Italy 
early  in  the  following  year  for  the  East,  the  Marians 
returned,  and  re-enacted  the  law  of  Sulpicius,  which 
was  never  again  called  in  question.  The  person  who 
brought  it  forward  on  this  second  occasion  was  the 
consul  of  that  year,  L.  Cornelius  Cinna,  who  on  the 
death  of  Marius  in  January,  86  B.C.,  became  the  leader 
of  the  party,  and  established  himself  for  the  next 
three  years,  not  only  as  self-elected  consul,  but  as 
abgolute  master  of  Rome. 

This  crucial  question,  whether  the  new  Italian 
citizens  should  or  should  not  be  placed  fairly  and 
frankly  on  a  level  with   the   rest,  was  thus  the  first 


28  Julius  CcBsar,  C89  b.c- 

in  which  Caesar's  youthful  mind  must  have  been 
actively  interested.  It  was  he  who,  long  afterwards, 
was  to  put  the  finishing  touch  to  Cinna's  work  by 
extending  the  full  citizenship  to  the  Gauls  living 
north  of  the  river  Po.  That  he  at  once  became  a 
hot  partisan  is  hardly  to  be  doubted,  j  He  had  al- 
ready been  noticed  by  Marius,  who  had  caused  him 
to  be  nominated  Flamen  Dialis  (priest  of  Jupiter)  ; 
and  after  Marius'  death  he  entered  into  the  most  in- 
timate relations  with  Cinna  himself.!  Discarding  the 
project  of  a  wealthy  marriage  which  had  been  ar- 
ranged for  him,  he  boldly  and  successfully  sought 
the  hand  of  Cornelia,  Cinna's  daughter,  who  lived 
with  him,  happily  as  far  as  we  know,  until  her  death 
some  sixteen  years  later. 

Under  the  absolutism  of  his  father-in-law,  and  no 
doubt  in  the  closest  intimacy  with  him,  Caesar  lived 
during  the  three  years  of  comparative  quiet  in  which 
the  Marian  policy  was  supreme,  and  the  Senate 
bowed  to  its  yoke.  But  unfortunately  we  know  as 
little  of  him  at  this  time  as  we  know  of  Cinna 
and  his  rule.  Cinna  is  one  of  the  lost  characters  of 
history ;  these  years  are  hidden  from  us  in  deeper 
shadow  than  any  others  in  the  history  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. But  we  can  at  least  be  sure  that  these  three 
years  familiarised  the  young  Caesar  with  the  sight  of 
power  wielded  by  a  single  man,  and  with  the 
spectacle  of  a  senate  feeble  and  cowardly  enough 
to  submit  to  a  self-appointed  consul.  And  from 
this  time  forward  he  was  bound  with  the  closest 
ties,  personal  and  political,  to  the  party  and  princi- 
ples of  the  Populares. 


82  B.C.]    Earliest  Political  Experiences.  29 

These  ties  were  strengthened  by  the  misfortunes 
that  befell  him  when  in  the  year  82  B.C.,  on  the  tri- 
umphant return  of  Sulla,  the  power  of  the  Marian 
party  melted  rapidly  away,  and  their  enemies  chas- 
tised the  people  with  scorpions.  His  father-in-law 
was  killed  by  his  own  soldiers ;  Sertorius,  the  only 
other  capable  leader  of  the  party,  fled  in  despair  to 
Spain,  to  keep  the  Marian  watch-fires  smouldering 
in  the  far  West  for  many  a  year,  till  Caesar  himself 
had  grown  to  mature  manhood.  In  the  course  of  a 
year  Sulla  had  crushed  all  opposition  in  Italy,  shut 
up  the  younger  Marius  in  Praeneste,  fought  his  way 
into  Rome,  and  as  dictator,  with  absolute  power  so 
long  as  he  chose  to  keep  it,  and  with  a  vast  army  of 
veterans  at  his  beck  and  call,  had  begun  the  grim 
task  of  reprisals  by  killing  off  every  prominent 
Marian. 

Caesar  was  then  barely  twenty,  too  young  to  be  a 
victim.  Sulla  contented  himself  with  ordering  him 
to  put  away  Cinna's  daughter,  as  he  had  made  his 
lieutenant  Pompeius  put  away  his  wife  Antistia. 
Pompeius  obeyed  him  ;  so  did  M.  Piso,  who  had 
just  married  Cinna's  widow.  Caesar  would  not  obey; 
but  he  suffered  for  his  disobedience.  He  lost  his 
wife's  dowry  and  his  own  property,  and  was  de- 
prived of  the  priesthood  of  Jupiter,  to  which  Marius 
had  had  him  appointed.  Then  he  fled  in  disguise 
into  the  mountains  of  Samnium.  Here  he  was  pur- 
sued and  captured  by  the  SuUan  bloodhounds,  who 
were  everywhere ;  and  the  story  ran  that  he  bribed 
his  captor  to  set  him  free  with  a  gift  of  two  talents. 
He  ventured  back  to  Rome,  where  his  friends  were 


30  yiilius   CcEsar.  [89  B.C. 

bringing  influence  to  bear  on  Sulla  on  his  behalf ; 
his  uncle,  Aurelius  Cotta,  and,  as  we  are  told,  the 
college  of  Vestal  Virgins,  who  probably  had  had  re- 
lations with  him  in  his  priesthood,  succeeded  in 
obtaining  his  pardon.  Sulla  was  unwilling  and  un- 
gracious, but  he  yielded.  **  I  grant  you  this  boon," 
he  is  reported  to  have  said  to  the  petitioners,  "  but 
I  charge  you  look  after  this  youth  who  wears  his 
belt  so  loosely." 

By  Sulla's  advent  to  power,  Caesar's  opening  career 
was  suddenly  cut  short.  Sulla  was  absolute,  and 
used  his  absolutism  to  prevent  all  future  possibility 
of  another  democratic  reaction.  He  had  put  to  death 
all  the  prominent  members  of  the  democratic  party 
on  whom  he  could  lay  his  hands ;  he  now  sought  to 
make  it  impossible  for  youthful  aspirants  like  Caesar 
to  set  on  foot  a  fresh  democratic  agitation.  He  saw 
that  the  old  constitution,  which  had  never  been  de- 
fined by  statute,  but  rested  almost  entirely  on  cus- 
tom and  tradition,  held  both  oligarchic  and  demo- 
cratic elements  in  solution.  He  saw  that  so  long  as 
this  was  the  case,  it  might  be  worked  in  an  oligarchic 
or  a  democratic  sense,  as  each  party  happened  to  be 
uppermost.  He  knew  that  the  history  of  the  last 
half  century  had  been  a  history  of  repeated  oscilla- 
tions, from  oligarchy  to  democracy,  and  back  again ; 
that  in  the  course  of  these  struggles,  democracy  had 
shown  a  strong  tendency  to  generate  monarchy,  and 
that  oligarchy  had  degenerated  into  weak  and  corrupt 
government,  while  both  sides  had  lost  all  sense  of 
law  and  order,  of  duty  and  self-restraint,  as  the  bit- 
terness of  the  strife  increased.     He  saw  clearly  that 


82  B.C.]     Earliest  Political  Experiences.  31 

the  constitution   must    be   fixed    once   for  all,  and 
secured  by  legislative  enactment. 

I  Sulla  rejected  monarchy,  though  he  was  himself 
for  the  time  monarch  ;  democracy  he  detested.  By 
birth  and  feeling  an  aristocrat,  he  set  about  recast- 
ing the  constitution  in  an  oligarchic  form,  and  secur- 
ing it  by  definite  legislation.  The  Senate  was  made 
once  more  supreme  by  a  series  of  arrangements 
which  subordinated  to  it  the  ordinary  magistrates, 
the  tribunes  of  the  plebs,  the  popular  assemblies, 
the  administration  of  the  law,  and,  so  far  as  was 
possible,  the  provincial  governors  and  their  armies.  | 
It  was  not  indeed  the  old  Senate,  for  it  was  increased 
in  numbers,  and  was  henceforth  to  be  recruited  from 
ex-magistrates  only,  i.  e.,  indirectly  by  popular  elec- 
tion. But  as  a  working  power  in  the  constitution,  it 
was  now  placed  in  a  far  stronger  position  than  it 
had  ever  occupied  since  its  moral  ascendancy  began 
to  wane.  That  position  was  now  fenced  all  round 
by  a  series  of  legal  enactments,  which  would  have 
to  be  removed  by  legislation  if  the  constitution  was 
to  be  once  more  changed  ;  and  Sulla  so  contrived 
that  neither  popular  agitator  nor  statesman  of 
genius  could  pass  laws  in  a  democratic  sense  with- 
out encountering  obstacles  almost  insurmountable. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  explain  these  arrange- 
ments, or  to  enter  on  a  description  of  this  singular 
man's  work  and  character.  This  much,  however, 
must  be  grasped  by  everyone  who  would  follow 
Caesar's  career  intelligently :  that  Sulla  thus  gave 
the  oligarchy  one  more  chance,  and  that  an  excel- 
lent one,  to  show  what  mettle  they  still  had  in  them. 


32 


yulius   CcBsar. 


[82  B.C. 


He  gave  the  reins  into  their  hands,  and  invited  them 
to  govern  adequately.  He  placed  them  in  an  almost 
impregnable  stronghold,  and  bade  them  make  good 
use  of  their  defences.  Then  he  laid  down  his  abso- 
lute power,  retired  into  private  life,  and  left  the 
machine  he  had  so  elaborately  constructed  to  work 
by  itself.  How  it  did  work,  and  how  the  oligarchy 
acquitted  itself,  we  shall  see  in  the  next  chapter.  As 
our  story  proceeds  we  shall  also  have  occasion  to 
note  that  Sulla's  work  was  in  many  respects  incom- 
plete. Wonderful  as  it  was,  and  however  lasting  its 
contribution  to  the  progress  of  Roman  law  and  to 
the  conduct  of  the  business  of  the  Empire,  it  hardly 
touched  some  of  the  greatest  problems  that  were 
now  urgently  calling  for  solution.  It  needed  a 
greater  than  Sulla  to  see  that  the  problem  of  consti- 
tutional re-organisation  was  only  one  among  many, 
and  that  even  that  needed  to  be  dealt  with  in  a  more 
humane  and  intelligent  spirit. 


CHAPTER  III. 

EARLY  LIFE  UNDER  THE   SULLAN   GOVERNMENT. 

81-70  B.C. 

iESAR  did  not  stay  long  in 
Rome  to  risk  the  Dictator's 
wrath  a  second  time  ;  and  he 
was  indeed  now  old  enough 
to  serve  his  first  campaign, 
a  duty  still  obligatory  on  all 
young  men  of  his  age.  He 
sailed  for  Asia  Minor  in  the 
year  81  B.C.,  and  remained  in 
the  East  until  Sulla's  death. 
The  war  with  Mithridates,  the  formidable  enemy 
whom  Sulla  had  driven  to  a  doubtful  peace,  had 
broken  out  afresh  the  year  before,  and  was  still 
smouldering ;  and  there  was  always  plenty  to  do  on 
the  Asiatic  coasts,  for  the  pirates  of  Cilicia  were 
hovering  round  every  port,  and  as  yet  entirely  un- 
bridled. 

It  was  an  important  part  of  the  military  education 
of  a  young  Roman  of  high  birth,  that  he  should 
3  33 


34  Julius   Ccssar.  [81  B.c- 

serve  his  first  campaign  under  the  immediate  eye  of 
a  commander-in-chief,  living  with  him  in  his  tent  as 
a  kind  of  page  or  youthful  aide-de-camp,  and  learning 
from  him  the  traditions  of  the  arts  of  warfare  and 
provincial  government.  If  the  general  were  a  man 
of  character  and  ability,  much  might  be  learnt  by 
the  youth  thus  pleasantly  associated  with  him, 
besides  the  details  of  business  and  the  military  art. 
But  of  the  character  of  Caesar's  first  military  master 
we  unfortunately  know  nothing.  As  Sulla's  legatus 
it  is  not  likely  that  Minucius  Thermus  was  a  con- 
genial companion  to  the  young  Marian.  I  But  we 
know  that  at  the  siege  of  Mytilene,  the  fast  town 
that  held  out  for  Mithridates,  he  bestowed  on  his 
pupil  the  ^'  civic  crown  "  for  saving  the  life  of  a 
fellow-soldier  ;  and  thus  Caesar  began  his  military 
career  under  no  imputation  of  effeminacy,  such  as 
was  invented  for  him  in  later  times.  I 

This  exploit  was  in  80  B.C. ;  how  he  was  employed 
in  the  following  year  we  are  not  told.  In  78  B.C., 
apparently  in  search  of  active  service,  he  joined  the 
fleet  of  an  able  commander,  Servilius  Isauricus,  who 
was  operating  against  the  pirates  on  the  Cilician 
coast ;  but  he  had  not  been  long  at  sea  when  the 
news  arrived  of  Sulla's  death,  and  he  felt  himself  at 
liberty  to  return  at  once  to  Rome.  There  he  found 
agitation  and  mutiny  already  beginning  to  threaten 
the  constitution  which  Sulla  had  set  up  ;  and  the 
question  which  confronted  him  at  once,  and  con- 
tinued to  confront  him  during  the  next  eight  years, 
was  whether  he  should  openly  join  the  agitators  and 
mutineers. 


70  B.C.]       Under  the  Sullan  Government.  35 

The  reader  has  already  been  made  acquainted 
with  the  leading  features  of  Sulla's  reconstruction 
of  the  senatorial  government.  The  plan  of  his  work 
was  elaborate  and  in  itself  admirable,  but  the  new 
constitution  was  insecure  from  the  outset,  because  it 
had  no  foundation  in  the  good-will  or  moral  force  of 
the  people  either  in  the  city  or  in  Italy.  The  con- 
stitution was  like  an  ingenious  and  complicated  ma- 
chine, whose  inventor  has  died  without  training  a 
successor  to  work  it.  The  true  Sullan  partisans  were 
not  numerous,  and  they  had  no  men  of  real  political 
ability  among  them.  And  nothing  but  the  strength 
and  cohesion  of  the  machinery  itself  could  have 
saved  it  from  the  repeated  efforts  to  pull  it  to 
pieces,  which  were  made  by  the  popular  party 
during  the  eight  years  succeeding  Sulla's  death. 

Almost  before  Sulla  was  in  his  grave,  Lepidus,  the 
Sullan  consul,  began  to  play  his  master  false.  Caesar 
and  his  advisers  did  not  yield  to  the  temptation  to 
join  him.  They  probably  knew  the  man  well :  he 
had  changed  sides  once  before,  and  was  a  mere 
weathercock.  His  proposals,  calculated  to  please 
the  mob  for  the  moment,  had  no  reference  to  the 
constitution,  and  would  not  unlock  the  fetters  that 
Sulla  had  placed  on  all  popular  action.  They  could 
not  impose  on  Caesar,  who,  as  Suetonius  tells  us, 
"  withheld  himself  from  Lepidus'  company,  though 
invited  with  the  most  favourable  promises,  for  he 
distrusted  the  man's  disposition  and  talents."  He 
saw  Lepidus  decline  to  free  the  tribunate  from  its 
bondage — the  one  essential  preliminary  to  the  undo- 
ing of  Sulla's  work, — and  he  probably  guessed  that 


36  yulius   Ccesar,  [81  B.c- 

the  consul's  real  object  was  only  to  turn  himself  into 
a  monarch. 

This  danger  passed  away,  for  Lepidus,  who  through 
the  folly  of  the  Senate  had  been  able  to  raise  an  army 
in  Etruria,  was  defeated  outside  the  walls  of  Rome, 
and  crossed  over  to  Sardinia,  where  he  died.  No 
further  attempt  was  made  to  break  down  Sulla's 
machinery  by  force.  There  remained  the  ordinary 
method  of  legislation,  with  its  accompaniment  of 
popular  oratory ;  and  though  the  Sullan  restrictions 
on  the  tribunate  had  made  it  difficult  either  to  get 
any  law  promulgated,  or  to  obtain  a  hearing  for 
any  would-be  orator  without  the  sanction  of  the 
all  powerful  senate,  it  was  none^the  less  to  these 
expedients  that  the  opposition  now  looked  with 
confidence  for  ultimate  success.  Young  Cicero  had 
already  made  his  mark,  and  had  even  ventured  to 
beard  Sulla  himself  in  the  admirable  speech  for 
Roscius  of  Ameria.  |  Caesar,  too,  now  began  to  turn 
his  attention  seriously  to  oratory.  Perhaps  he  was 
urged  to  this  by  the  example,  possibly  even  by  the 
precept,  of  his  talented  and  versatile  friend,  who  was 
a  few  years  older  than  himself ;  but  in  any  case  it 
was  the  only  course  open  to  a  young  man  who  had 
determined  to  work  his  way  to  the  front  rank.  I 

He  appears  for  the  first  time  this  same  year  {yj 
B.C.)  as  counsel  in  a  criminal  trial,  and  in  the  most 
important  of  the  standing  law-courts  which  Sulla  had 
organised.  |  He  took  charge  of  the  prosecution  of 
Dolabella,  lately  proconsul  of  Macedonia,  for  illegal 
extortion  during  his  government ;  and  though  he 
lost  his  case,  he  is  said  to  have  been  applauded,  and 


70  B.C.]      Under  the  Sullan   Government.  37 

to  have  left  an  impression  on  the  pubhc  mind  that 
the  senatorial  judges  were  corrupt.  The  next  year 
he  tried  his  hand  again,  and  in  the  same  court,  by- 
prosecuting  C.  Antonius,  who  during  the  Mithridatic 
war  had  enriched  himself  in  Greece  by  plunder. 
That  this  man  was  guilty  is  certain,  for  he  was 
ejected  from  the  senate  by  the  censors  six  years  later 
on  the  same  grounds ;  but  again  Caesar's  oratory 
failed  to  move  the  consciences  of  interested  judges. 
Whether  bribed  or  not,  they  had  at  least  to  defend 
the  prestige  of  their  order,  and  to  secure  for  it  an 
advantageous  immunity  from  the  ordinary  conse- 
quences  of  thieving.   I 

After  the  second  failure  Caesar  seems  to  have 
determined  to  learn  the  art  of  rhetoric  from  its  best 
living  master  ;  and  though  this  would  compel  him  to 
leave  Rome  for  some  time,  he  was  probably  not 
unwilling  to  leave  the  political  situation  to  develop 
itself  without  his  aid.  \  He  started  for  Rhodes,  where 
the  great  rhetorician  Molo  was  then  teaching. »  On 
his  way  he  was  caught  by  some  of  the  pirates  who 
were  then  swarming  on  the  seas  and  laughing  at  the 
clumsiness  and  venality  of  the  Roman  naval  com- 
manders ;  and  Plutarch  has  given  us  a  picturesque 
account  of  his  adventures  as  their  prisoner,  which  was 
certainly  not  his  own  invention,  and  probably  repre- 
sents something  like  the  truth.  Suetonius,  who 
wrote  somewhat  later  than  Plutarch,  has  the  same 
story  with  less  detail.  Both  tell  us  that  Caesar  had 
with  him  at  the  time  three  companions ;  either  of 
whom  may  have  preserved  the  recollection  of  what 
happened.    The  rest  of  his  suite  had  been  despatched 


^S  yulius   CcBsar.  [81  B.C.- 

to  obtain  the  necessary  ransom  ;  and  meanwhile, 
during  thirty-eight  days  of  captivity,  ''  he  behaved  to 
them  as  if  they  were  his  body-guard,  rather  than  his 
captors,  and  joined  in  their  games  and  exercises  with 
perfect  unconcern."  He  amused  himself  by  writing 
poems  and  speeches,  and  by  reading  them  to  his 
pirate  audience  ;  and  when  they  were  slow  in 
applauding,  he  called  them  illiterate  barbarians,  and 
threatened  laughingly  to  hang  them  all.  The  story 
runs  that  he  afterwards  carried  out  his  threat  literally. 
For  when  the  ransom  came  and  he  was  set  free,  he 
manned  some  ships  at  Miletus,  and  surprised  and 
captured  most  of  them  ;  and  failing  to  get  the  imme- 
diate sanction  of  the  governor  of  the  province,  he 
took  the  law  into  his  own  hands,  and  crucified  all  the 
prisoners. 

After  this  adventure  he  reached  Rhodes  in  safety, 
and  enrolled  himself  as  a  pupil  of  Molo.  Cicero, 
whose  admiration  for  the  great  teacher  was  unlimited, 
had  also  been  lately  studying  under  him,  not  for 
the  first  time :  it  is  even  possible  that  it  was  by  his 
advice  that  Caesar  took  the  same  step.  Cicero  threw 
himself  into  the  work  with  characteristic  ardour,  and 
turned  out  about  this  time  a  rhetorical  treatise  (the 
"  De  Inventione  ")  which  we  still  possess.  Caesar, 
from  what  we  know  of  his  tastes  and  character,  could 
hardly  have  found  the  same  delight  in  his  studies  at 
Rhodes ;  his  mind  was  too  practical  and  scientific  to 
enjoy  the  tropes  and  figures  of  the  most  artificial  of 
all  arts,  and  he  did  not  stay  long  under  Molo's 
tuition.  But  he  nevertheless  became  one  of  the 
greatest  orators  of  his  day,  and  according  to  some 


70  B.C.I       Under  the  Stdlan   Government.         39 

accounts,  second  only  to  Cicero.  The  purity  and 
force  of  his  style,  the  lucidity  of  his  diction,  and  the 
good  taste  and  courteousness  of  his  manner  are 
praised  not  only  by  later  writers  like  Quinctilian, 
Suetonius,  and  Plutarch,  but  by  the  best  of  all  wit- 
nesses, Cicero  himself.  It  is  characteristic  of  the 
man,  but  unfortunate  for  us,  that  Caesar  never  took 
any  pains  to  collect  and  preserve  his  speeches  ;  even 
in  the  lifetime  of  Augustus  there  was  considerable 
doubt  about  the  correctness  and  authenticity  of 
some  of  them.  They  served  their  purpose,  and  were 
thought  no  more  of. 

Though  we  can  only  guess  that  Molo's  lecture- 
room  was  not  entirely  congenial  to  him,  we  know 
that  he  left  it  on  the  first  chance  of  more  active 
occupation.  The  Roman  dominion  in  Asia  was  at 
this  moment  in  very  serious  peril.  A  great  storm 
was  gathering.  Mithridates,  whom  Sulla  had  but 
half  crushed,  had  long  been  in  correspondence  with 
Tigranes,  the  powerful  King  of  Armenia,  with  Ser- 
torius  in  Spain,  and  even  with  the  pirates  of  Cilicia. 
The  Romans  had  but  a  small  army  in  their  Asiatic 
province,  and  hardly  any  ships,  and  the  king  swooped 
down  on  them  before  they  were  ready  to  resist  him. 
The  position  was  critical  ;  and  Caesar,  though  he  had 
no  official  position,  at  once  left  Rhodes,  collected  a 
few  volunteers,  and  if  Suetonius'  account  is  correct, 
secured  the  loyalty  of  the  provincials,  and  expelled 
Mithridates'  general.  \  But  meanwhile  a  senatorial 
proconsul  of  ability  had  been  sent  out  from  Rome, 
and  Caesar,  who  had  found  himself  for  the  moment 
fighting  against  an  alliance  of  which  his  own  partisan 


40  yulius  CcBsar.  [81  B.c- 

Sertorius  was  an  important  member,  dismissed  his 
levies  and  left  Asia.  He  probably  reached  Rome  in 
the  winter  of  74-73  B.C. 

He  was  now  nearly  thirty,  and  was  of  standing 
and  experience  enough  to  be  listened  to.  He  had 
just  been  elected  in  his  absence  to  a  place  in  the 
college  of  the  pontifices,  vacant  by  the  death  of  his 
uncle,  C.  Aurelius  Cotta,  and  on  his  return/  he  was 
placed,  as  we  should  say,  at  the  head  of  the  poll,  in 
the  yearly  election  of  military  tribunes.! Of  his  serv- 
ice in  this  capacity  our  authorities  tell  us  nothing, 
though  at  this  very  time  Italy  itself  was  the  field  of 
one  of  the  most  dangerous  wars  Rome  had  ever  had 
to  face.  The  honour  of  the  Roman  arms  was  once 
more  at  its  lowest  ebb ;  the  legions  were  being  dis- 
gracefully beaten  by  insurgent  slave-bands  under 
their  briUiant  leader  Spartacus.  It  is  hard  to  believe 
that  Caesar  remained  in  the  capital  while  such  events 
were  passing;  still  harder  to  believe  that  if  he  had 
any  share  in  the  struggle  it  was  not  of  a  kind  to  be 
worth  recording.  But  the  historians  are  silent,  and 
conjecture  is  useless.  They  only  tell  us  that  he 
now  began  to  join  eagerly  in  the  political  agitation 
for  the  overthrow  of  the  SuUan  constitution.  *'  He 
supported  with  the  utmost  vigour,"  says  Suetonius, 
"  those  who  were  agitating  for  the  restoration  of  the 
tribunician  power,  which  Sulla  had  diminished."  As 
this  is  his  first  appearance  in  the  arena  of  politics,  it 
is  as  well  to  take  a  brief  survey  of  the  circumstances 
which  already  were  bringing  about  the  destruction 
of  Sulla's  constitution  and  opening  out  new  resources, 
new  possibilities  of  action,  for  men  who  were  only 


70  B.C.]       Under  the  Sullan   Government.         4 1 

just  beginning  to  set  foot  on  the  ricketty  ladder  of 
political  life  at  Rome. 

What  more  than  anything  else  destroys  the  credit 
of  a  modern  government,  whether  in  the  hands  of  a 
despot  or  a  cabinet,  is  weakness  in  dealing  with  for- 
eign affairs,  and  want  of  readiness  and  resource  in 
coping  with  an  enemy.  Actual  disaster  is  not  neces- 
sarily fatal  to  a  government,  if  anything  like  heroism 
has  been  shown  in  the  effort  to  avert  it  ;  but  the 
popular  mind  rarely  forgives  slackness  or  cowardice 
in  its  rulers.  It  was  the  same  at  Rome ;  and  the 
**  people,"  such  as  they  were,  or  at  least  their  more 
intelligent  leaders,  had  good  reason  to  complain,  not 
only  that  the  Sullan  Senate  was  incompetent  to  take 
charge  of  the  interests  of  the  Empire  and  to  conduct 
foreign  wars,  but  that  they  themselves  had  no  means 
of  bringing  their  rulers  to  book. 

If  it  had  chanced  about  the  time  when  Caesar 
returned  from  Asia  {i.  e.,  at  the  end  of  74  B.C.),  that 
curiosity  had  prompted  an  intelligent  Jew  or  Par- 
thian to  travel  through  the  Roman  Empire  from  east 
to  west,  and  to  record  his  observations,  his  book  must 
have  been  singularly  depressing  to  the  patriotic 
Roman  reader.  The  undertaking  would  have  been 
a  bold  one  ;  the  traveller  in  constant  personal  inse- 
curity. In  Asia  Minor  he  would  find  a  gigantic  war 
just  breaking  out.  He  would  learn  as  he  passed 
through  the  interior  that  the  great  King  of  Pontus 
had  blockaded  Chalcedon,  and  that  a  beaten  Roman 
general  was  with  difiiculty  holding  out  within  its 
walls.  He  would  wonder  that  Tigranes  of  Armenia 
did  not  lend   a  hand  to  his  natural  ally  of  Pontus, 


42  Julius   CcBsar.  [81 B  C- 

and  help  to  sweep  the  vanquished  Romans  once  and 
for  ever  out  of  Asia.  He  might  well  marvel,  as  Plu- 
tarch did  long  afterwards,  at  the  extraordinary  for- 
tune of  these  Romans,  who  lived  down  constant 
disaster  by  the  constant  disunion  of  their  enemies. 
Taking  ship  at  some  port  in  the  Asiatic  province, 
and  witnessing  perhaps  the  arrival  of  troops  and 
stores  for  the  newly  appointed  general,  Lucullus,  he 
would  wonder  at  their  apparent  inadequacy,  and 
mark  the  total  inability  of  the  harassed  and  impov- 
erished provincials  to  make  up  the  deficiency  of 
preparation.  In  his  voyage  to  Italy  he  would  be 
told  thrilling  sailors'  tales  of  the  pirates  ;  of  capture 
and  slavery,  of  ransom  and  ruin.  Even  off  the  port 
of  Brundisium  he  would  be  still  in  danger  ;  he  would 
hear  of  Roman  fleets  unable  to  leave  the  port  except 
under  cover  of  night,  and  of  attacks  made  in  broad 
day  on  the  rich  cities  of  the  western  coast. 

He  might  reasonably  prefer  a  journey  through 
Italy  to  further  risk  of  capture  by  the  masters  of  the 
sea,  and  would  be  warned  against  visiting  Sicily  by 
stories  of  the  insecurity  of  all  life  and  property  under 
the  government  of  the  infamous  Verres.  Nor  would 
such  stories  be  needed  to  convince  him  that  the 
Romans  were  their  own  worst  enemies ;  for  in  Italy 
itself  he  would  see  signs  enough  of  cruelty  and  mis- 
government.  He  would  find  the  roads  occupied  by 
bands  of  armed  slaves  of  powerful  physique  and 
formidable  mien,  fresh  from  victories  over  Roman 
legions,  and  expecting  the  speedy  downfall  of  the 
tyrant  city.  If  he  fell  into  their  hands,  and  were 
lucky  enough  himself  to  escape  the  ignominious  fate 


70  B.C.]       Under  the  Sullan   Government,         43 

of  their  Roman  captives,  he  might  witness  the 
astounding  sight  of  the  conquerors  of  the  world, 
being  forced  to  fight  as  gladiators  at  the  bidding  of 
men  who  a  year  ago  had  been  working  in  chains  on 
their  own  vast  estates.  And  arriving  with  difficulty 
at  Rome,  he  would  see  no  sign  of  prosperity,  vigour, 
or  unanimity ;  he  would  find  an  idle  population 
starving  for  want  of  grain,  and  a  government  without 
a  single  member  whose  character  seemed  to  command 
respect  and  confidence.  He  would  be  told  of  news 
arriving  from  the  East  and  West  at  once,  from  Spain 
and  from  Asia  Minor,  of  serious  defeat  or  at  the  best 
of  doubtful  success  ;  of  demands  for  reinforcements, 
stores,  and  money,  which  could  ill  be  provided  when 
Spartacus  was  master  of  Italy  and  the  revenue  at  the 
mercy  of  the  pirates.  And  last,  not  least,  he  would 
be  amazed  to  find  that  every  other  Roman  with 
whom  he  talked  was  not  only  against  the  senatorial 
government,  but  really  in  sympathy  with  its  enemies ; 
that  in  Further  Spain  there  was  a  great  Roman 
organising  a  new  Rome,  for  whose  victories  over  his 
own  countrymen  one  whole  party  in  the  city  was 
thanking  the  gods  ;  and  that  this  man  in  the  far  West 
was  about  to  join  hands  with  Rome's  great  enemy  in 
the  East,  and  was  hoping  by  his  means  to  crush  the/ 
paralysed  republic,  and  revolutionise  the  Graeco- 
Roman  world. 

I  Such  a  traveller  would  have  seen  quite  enough, 
without  going  farther  westward,  to  assure  himself 
that  the  time  was  at  hand  when  the  Roman  Empire 
must  either  break  up  altogether  or  find  some  one 
strong  enough  to  command    universal    confidence ; 


44  yiilius   Ccesar.  181  B.C.- 

some  one  in  whom  political  ability,  united  with  mili- 
tary skill,  would  be  able  to  bring  the  state  and  its 
government  into  harmonious  relation  with  its  depen- 
dencies and  their  needs.  He  would  seek  in  vain  for 
the  signs  of  such  a  genius.  Three  generals  were  in 
command  of  Roman  armies  :  Pompeius  in  Spain, 
Crassus  in  Italy,  Lucullus  in  Asia.  But  none  of  these 
had  as  yet  achieved  signal  success  in  the  field  ;  even 
Pompeius,  the  youngest  and  most  brilliant,  had  been 
no  match  for  his  able  enemy  in  Spain,  though  he  was 
now  wearing  him  out  by  superior  resources  and  by 
treachery.  All  three  were  men  of  ability,  but  so  far 
had  shown  no  conspicuous  political  skill ;  all  belonged 
to  the  Sullan  party,  and  were  reckoned  as  loyal  ofifi- 
cers  of  the  Sullan  constitution.  Yet  to  each  of  them 
the  chance  was  open  of  saving  Rome  and  relieving 
a  distressed  world.  He  whom  good  fortune  might 
bring  to  the  crest  of  the  wave,  if  the  needful  insight 
also  were  his,  the  width  of  view,  and  the  command 
over  himself,  might  satisfy  a  boundless  ambition  and 
win  the  gratitude  of  posterity.    I 

If  our  imaginary  traveller  haa  inquired,  during  his 
stay  at  Rome,  into  the  aims  and  tactics  of  the  politi- 
cal leaders  of  the  day,  he  would  have  learnt  that  the 
senatorial  government,  to  whose  maladministration 
the  evils  he  had  noticed  were  chiefly  due,  was  con- 
fronted by  an  opposition  with  a  distinct  policy  of  its 
own.  This  policy  was  nothing  less  than  the  altera- 
tion of  the  constitution  set  up  by  Sulla  in  its  two 
most  characteristic  and  vital  points. 

Sulla's  object  had  been,  as  we  saw,  to  make  the 
Senate  once  more  supreme  in  every  department  of 


70  B.C.]      Under  the  Sullan   Government.         45 

government ;  and  in  order  to  effect  this,  he  had  to 
fence  it  from  attack  at  those  points  where  attack  had' 
before  his  time  been  most  successful.  It  had  always 
been  theoretically  possible — and  since  the  days  of 
the  Gracchi  the  thing  had  often  been  done — to  over- 
ride the  Senate  by  direct  popular  legislation.  If  a 
tribune  of  the  plebs  chose  to  introduce  a  measure  to 
the  assembly  of  the  plebs  in  their  tribes,  and  if  he 
succeeded  in  passing  it  without  a  veto  from  a  fellow- 
tribune,  it  became  law  in  spite  of  senatorial  opposi- 
tion. It  was  in  this  way  that  the  popular  feeling  had 
made  itself  felt  in  the  years  of  the  Jugurthine  War, 
when  the  venality  and  misgovernment  of  the  Senate 
had  been  at  least  as  bad  as  at  the  time  we  are  writing 
of;  corrupt  generals  had  been  punished  and  super- 
seded, and  Marius  sent  to  Africa,  through  the 
instrumentality  of  vigorous  and  indignant  tribunes. 
Doubtless  it  was  not  Sulla's  wish  to  shield  bad  rulers 
from  either  criticism  or  punishment.  But  the  powers 
of  the  tribunate  had  so  frequently  been  abused,  to 
the  destruction  not  only  of  bad  government  but  of 
any  government  whatever,  that  he  boldly  determined 
to  reduce  that  anomalous  office  to  a  nullity,  and  to 
trust  to  his  newly  constituted  Senate  to  control  and 
punish  magisterial  shortcomings.  He  let  the  tribu- 
nate survive ;  but  the  tribune  was  no  longer  to  legis- 
late independently,  and  his  veto  was  hedged  about 
so  as  to  be  no  longer  a  fatal  obstacle  to  the  wishes  of 
the  Senate.  Without  leave  from  the  Senate,  no 
tribune  could  even  address  the  people  in  the  forum ; 
and  the  office  was  deprived  of  much  of  its  old  attrac- 
tion by  the  regulation  that  when  once  a  man  had 


46  yulius   CcEsar,  [81  B.C.- 

been  a  tribune,  he  must  aspire  to  no  other  magis- 
tracy, and  end  his  political  career  for  good  and  all  on 
the  day  he  laid  down  that  now  insignificant  office. 
So  far  as  the  tribunate  had  been  the  mouth-piece  of 
genuine  public  opinion  and  the  means  of  legislating 
in  accordance  with  it,  its  use  and  effectiveness  had 
been  entirely  destroyed  ;  it  was  there  still,  but 
gagged  and  bound. 

Sulla  had  fortified  the  senatorial  position  at 
another  point  where  it  was  weak.  He  enacted  that 
the  body  of  judges  selected  to  hear  any  criminal 
case  should  be  taken  exclusively  from  the  members 
of  the  Senate,  as  had  been  the  rule  before  the  tribu- 
nate of  G.  Gracchus.  His  elaborate  re-organisation 
of  criminal  law  and  procedure,  though  in  itself  admi- 
rable, was  thus  rendered  futile  as  a  means  of  check- 
ing misgovernment  either  at  home  or  in  the  provinces ; 
for  such  was  the  condition  of  morals  in  high  places, 
that  senatorial  judges  were  unwilling  to  convict  men 
of  their  own  order  even  on  the  clearest  evidence. 
We  have  seen  this  exemplified  already  in  Caesar's 
failure  to  procure  the  conviction  of  Antonius  and 
Dolabella.  The  corruption  and  partiality  of  these 
judges  had  been  sufficiently  proved  in  other  notable 
cases  ;  it  was  the  common  scandal  of  the  time,  as 
we  may  see  from  Cicero's  language  in  the  Verrine 
orations.  It  was  as  plain  as  possible  that  Sulla, 
who  could  not  himself  have  wished  for  such  a  state 
of  things,  had  entirely  miscalculated  the  character  of 
the  new  Senate  ;  he  had  provided  it  with  an  excellent 
machinery  for  controlling  its  own  unworthy  mem- 
bers, but  had  entirely  failed  to  see  that  independence 


70  B.C.]       Under  the  Sullan   Governme^it.         47 

and  unselfishness  were  not  to  be  looked  for  from  it. 
No  constitution,  no  judicial  system,  can  ever  be 
worked  successfully,  unless  men  can  be  found  to 
work  it  in  a  right  spirit.  And  though  there  may 
have  been  such  men  in  Italy  at  that  time,  they  were 
not  the  majority  among  those  who  came  to  the 
front  in  politics,  and  won  seats  in  the  all-powerful 
Senate. 

At  these  two  points  then,  the  fortress  of  the 
Sullan  constitution  was  most  obviously  open  to 
attack  in  spite  of  Sulla's  fortifications  ;  and  when 
Caesar  returned  to  Rome  in  74-73  B.C.  he  found  the 
battle  going  on,  and  joined  in  it  at  once  vigorously.  In 
each  of  the  three  preceding  years  {j6  to  74  B.C.)  some 
attempt  had  been  made  to  free  the  tribunate  from  its 
bonds ;  but  the  only  success  gained  had  been  the  pass- 
ing of  a  bill  in  75  B.C.,  through  the  agency  of  Caesar's 
uncle  Cotta  (a  moderate  senatorial),  allowing  tribunes 
to  proceed  in  due  course  to  the  higher  magistracies. 
This  removed  a  serious  disqualification,  and  opened 
the  tribunate  again  to  men  of  vigour  and  ambition ; 
but,  as  Cicero  says,  it  restored  to  the  office  not  its 
power,  but  only  a  little  of  its  old  dignity.  In  73  B.C. 
a  vigorous  attempt  was  made  by  the  tribune  C.  Licin- 
ius  Macer,  to  restore  the  tribunate  to  all  its  ancient 
freedom  ;  and  it  was  this  effort  to  which  Caesar  gave 
the  whole  weight  of  his  support,  such  as  it  then  was. 

It  was  not,  however,  by  democratic  agitation  that 
the  Sullan  fortress  was  after  all  to  be  captured.  The 
events  of  the  two  years  following  Caesar's  return  to 
Rome  entirely  changed  the  position  of  affairs.  The 
Slave  war,  which  for  a  time  placed  the  very  existence 


48  Julius   Ccesar.  [81  B.C.- 

ot  the  state  in  peril,  not  only  diverted  men's  minds 
trom  the  orators  of  the  forum, — to  whom  they  prob- 
ably listened  in  these  years  without  much  enthu- 
siasm,— but  eventually  brought  to  the  gates  of  Rome 
two  victorious  generals  and  their  armies.  Pompeius, 
after  a  long  series  of  campaigns  against  Sertorius 
and  the  democratic  state  in  Spain,  had  at  last  re- 
turned in  triumph  to  Italy,  and  was  called  in  to 
assist  Crassus  in  putting  an  end  to  the  war.  This 
was  done  in  the  year  71  B.C.  ;  the  slave-hero  Spar- 
tacus  was  killed,  and  Pompeius  arrived  in  time  to 
help  in  extinguishing  the  embers  of  rebellion.  The 
two  generals,  who  might  claim  the  credit  of  having 
saved  Italy  from  anarchy  and  the  Sullan  government 
from  disgrace,  arrived  at  Rome  with  their  veterans  ; 
and  the  question  on  the  lips  of  every  citizen  was 
whether  they  would  be  content  with  that  credit, 
and  continue  the  obedient  servants  of  the  Senate, 
or  seize  the  tempting  prize  of  supreme  military 
dominion. 

ilt  was  an  extremely  critical  moment.  The  des- 
tinies of  Rome  hung  on  the  action  and  character  of 
these  two  men,  and  Caesar  must  have  been  well . 
aware  that  his  own  future  was  no  less  in  their  hands.f 
Pompeius  was  but  six  years  older  than  himself,  and  had 
no  ancestry,  no  accomplishments,  no  civic  education, 
to  secure  him  influence.  But  he  had  what  was  then 
far  more  important,  the  reputation  of  a  tried  gen- 
eral, and  the  support  of  a  victorious  army.  Though 
he  had  never  yet  filled  even  the  lowest  magisterial 
office,  these  would  make  him  secure  of  absolutism 
if  he  chose  to  demand  it,  and  if  he  could  dispose  of 


BUST  OF  POMPEIUS. 

IN  THE  SPADA  PALACE  IN  ROME. 

{^Bautneister's  '"'' Denkindler  des  Klassisc/ten  A /Ceriums.") 


70  B.C.]      Under  the  Sullan   Government,         49 

Crassus,  who  was  on  bad  terms  with  him.  Crassus 
himself  was  older  and  more  experienced  ;  his  bound- 
less wealth  gave  him  an  immense  secret  influence, 
and  he  too  had  an  army,  which  had  borne  the  brunt 
of  the  struggle  against  the  slaves.  But  he  was  never 
at  any  moment  of  his  life  capable  of  being  made 
into  a  hero.  He  was  not  a  man  to  be  trusted  ;  and 
to  repose  trust  in  some  one  was  just  what  the 
wearied  Roman  world  was  beginning  ardently  to  de- 
sire. If  the  two  came  into  collision,  and  fought  for 
the  possession  of  Rome,  the  best  chance  lay  with 
Pompeius,  as  the  better  soldier  and  the  more  hon- 
ourable man.  He  might  be  vain  and  inexperienced 
in  politics ;  but  of  all  the  men  then  living  of  assured 
reputation  and  power,  he  was  the  only  one  whose 
character  was  really  respected,  and  whom  all  parties 
could  by  any  possibility  agree  in  trusting.  And  in- 
deed this  confidence,  though  not  whole-hearted,  was 
not  entirely  a  mistaken  one  ;  for  in  the  course  of  a 
long  and  varied  career,  Pompeius  never  wholly  lost 
the  reputation  he  had  won. 

iBut  neither  Pompeius  nor  Crassus  was  anxious 
for  a  bloody  civil  war :  the  day  of  military  despot- 
ism was  to  be  postponed  for  a  while,  and  Caesar 
might  feel  that  he  was  not  yet  to  be  shouldered  out 
of  the  race  for  power,  or  to  submit  himself  to  the 
will  of  a  soldier-king.  The  two  rivals  made  up  their 
quarrel,  and  agreed  upon  a  policy.  They  could  not 
combine  to  govern  by  force,  and  they  would  not 
combine  to  serve  a  senate  which  they  both  despised  ; 
but  in  spite   of  the   fact  that  both  had  been  bred 

in  the  school  of  Sulla,  they  could  unite  as  leaders  of 
4 


50  Julius   Ccesar,  [81  B.c- 

the  democratic  party.  They  were  to  be  elected  con- 
suls for  the  year  70  B.C.,  though  Pompeius  was  below 
the  required  age,  and  had  never  held  any  magis- 
tracy. /  The  Sullan  Senate  humbly  sanctioned  the 
illegality,  and  then  had  to  see  its  fortifications 
quietly  demolished.  The  tribunate  was  freed  from 
its  bonds,  and  the  law-courts  were  taken  from  the 
absolute  control  of  the  Senate ;  two-thirds  of  the 
number  of  every  panel  of  judges  were  henceforward 
to  be  men  of  equestrian  and  even  lower  census,  one 
third  only  being  composed  of  senators.  Even  the 
Senate  itself  was  not  left  unpunished ;  the  censor- 
ship which  Sulla  had  let  drop  was  revived,  and  the 
censors  who  were  elected  had  to  deprive  more  than 
sixty  corrupt  senators  of  their  seats,  among  them 
the  Antonius  who  had  escaped  from  Caesar's  prose- 
cution, f  The  work  was  complete  ;  the  Sullan  consti- 
tution was  destroyed.!  What  the  democratic  party 
had  been  for  years  struggling  for  in  vain,  was  carried 
out  at  one  stroke  by  men  whose  armies  were  out- 
side the  walls  of  Rome. 

We  can,  of  course,  only  conjecture  the  motives 
of  these  men  in  performing  this  singular  volte-face, 
which  makes  the  year  70  B.C.  a  landmark  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  period.  Nor  do  we  know  who  were  their 
advisers,  if  they  had  any.  These  questions  have 
been  often  discussed,  and  do  not  specially  concern  us 
here.  But  those  who  would  follow  the  political  life  of 
Caesar  must  pause  here  for  a  moment  and  consider 
how  exactly  the  new  policy  must  have  coincided 
with  his  feelings  and  his  aims.  One  is  almost 
tempted  to  think  that  he  must  have  had  a  hand  in 


70  B.C.]      Under  the  Sullan   Government.         51 

it.  Cicero  undoubtedly  supported  it,  and  Cicero 
was  intimate  with  Caesar,  and  as  yet  politically  at 
one  with  him.  The  man  who,  with  the  approval  of 
the  consuls,  proposed  and  carried  the  bill  for  recon- 
structing the  tribunals,  was  one  of  Csesar's  uncles, 
L.  Aurelius  Cotta.  Caesar  had  most  likely  already 
come  to  know  Crassus  through  the  medium  of 
money  transactions,  and  as  the  ablest  of  the  rising 
democrats  may  have  been  called  by  him  into  con- 
sultation. But  whether  or  not  Caesar  was  behind 
the  scenes,  the  actors  certainly  played  their  parts  in 
a  way  which  he  must  have  approved.  They  pulled 
down  the  Sullan  constitution,  and  gave  the  shat- 
tered Marian  party  another  chance,  f  They  declined 
the  absolutism  that  was  open  to  them,  and  preferred 
to  let  the  old  constitution  have  a  new  lease  of  life. 
They  even  disbanded  their  forces  before  the  year 
was  out,  and  at  the  close  of  it  retired  into  private 
life  without  securing  to  themselves  fresh  provinces 
and  armies.  Thus  they  seemed  to  be  leaving  free 
space  for  younger  aspirants  to  power,  whether  at 
home  or  in  the  provinces ;  for  they  subjected  the 
Senate  and  the  magistrates  once  more  to  public 
opinion  in  the  forum  or  the  law-courts,  and  by  let- 
ting the  military  supremacy  slip  out  of  their  hands 
they  left  at  least  a  chance  to  any  young  genius  in 
whose  way  the  next  great  war  might  come.  Had 
they  done  otherwise  than  they  did,  Caesar  might 
never  have  risen  to  power  ;  the  task  of  solving  the 
great  problems  of  the  age  might  have  fallen  to  men 
of  hardly  more  than  average  ability,  and  wanting 
in  the  breadth    and    generosity    of   view   that   was 


52 


ynlius   Ccesar. 


[70  B.C. 


altogether  indispensable,  f  As  we  now  see  it,  these 
two  men  seem  to  have  been  already  marked  out  by 
destiny  to  act  as  pioneers  to  make  Caesar's  path 
easier  for  him ;  and  though  one  of  them  was  to 
have  his  chance  of  monarchy  once  more  offered 
him,  he  was  once  more  to  refuse  it,  and  to  own  his 
inability  to  rule  the  Republic  and  the  army  at  the 
same  time. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

QUiESTORSHIP  ;     AND    SUPREMACY    OF   POMPEIUS. 

69-66   B.C. 

O  a  superficial  observer,  at  the 
close  of  the  year  70  B.C.,  it 
might  possibly  have  seemed 
that  the  Republic  had  been 
given  a  new  lease  of  life.  The 
constitution  was  again  almost 
in  the  same  condition  as  be- 
fore the  Social  and  Civil  wars, 
and  a  sense  of  past  errors  and 
dangers  might  suggest  to  the 
leaders  of  all  parties  the  desirability  of  trying  to 
work  it  in  harmony  for  the  good  of  the  Empire. 
No  serious  danger  was  imminent  at  the  moment ; 
the  Slave  war  was  at  an  end,  and  the  democratic 
power  in  Spain  had  been  crushed.  LucuUus  seemed 
on  the  point  of  finishing  the  Mithridatic  War.  This 
eminent  member  of  the  senatorial  party  had  shown 
great  vigour  and    military   ability,    had   penetrated 

53 


54  yult7is   CcBsar.  [69  B.C. 

victoriously  into  the  heart  of  Armenia,  and  yet 
might  be  counted  on  as  a  loyal  servant  of  the 
Republic. 

And,  indeed,  for  two  or  three  years  this  promising 
condition  of  things  continued.  The  years  69  and 
68  B.C.  must  have  been  tolerably  quiet  ones,  for  our 
authorities  have  very  little  to  tell  us  of  them.  The 
Mithridatic  War  was  not,  indeed,  brought  to  a  close, 
as  might  have  been  expected,  and  Lucullus  began 
to  have  difficulties  with  his  own  soldiers.  The 
pirates  had  not  been  effectually  checked,  though  a 
senatorial  general,  the  father  of  the  famous  Marcus 
Antonius,  had  been  invested  with  an  extraordinary 
command  with  that  object.  The  economic  condition 
of  Italy  was  also  alarming ;  for  the  long  series  of 
wars,  ending  with  the  Slave  war,  and  the  violent 
displacement  of  landholders  by  Sulla  to  make  room 
for  his  own  veterans,  had  destroyed  all  sense  of  the 
security  of  property,  and  the  material  of  revolution 
was  to  be  found  everywhere.  Still,  had  a  single 
real  statesman  appeared  on  the  scene  at  this  moment, 
or  even  if  the  average  senator  or  citizen  had  been 
possessed  of  some  honesty  and  insight,  it  was  not 
impossible  that  the  government  might  have  been 
carried  on  fairly  well  even  under  republican  forms. 
But  there  was  no  leading  statesman  of  a  character 
suited  to  raise  the  whole  tone  of  politics;  and  there 
was  no  general  disposition  on  the  part  of  either 
Senate  or  people  to  make  the  best  of  the  lull  in  the 
storm,  to  repair  damages,  or  to  set  the  ship  on  her 
only  true  course.  So  the  next  few  years  show  her 
fast  drifting  in  the  direction  of  revolution ;  and  the 


66  B.C.]  QucBstorship.  55 

current  that  bore  her  was  not  a  local  one,  or  visible 
to  the  eye  of  the  ordinary  Roman,  but  one  of 
world-wide  force,  whose  origin  and  direction  could 
only  be  perceived  by  the  highest  political  intelli- 
gence. 

It  was  during  these  years  that  Caesar  was  quietly 
learning  the  business  of  government,  both  at  home 
and  in  the  provinces.  In  the  year  70  B.C.  he  had  been 
still  a  young  and  inexperienced  man,  without  even 
a  seat  in  the  Senate,  and,  as  we  saw,  any  part  he 
took  in  politics  had  been  entirely  unofficial.  Under 
Sulla's  regulations,  the  Senate  could  be  entered  only 
through  the  quaestorship,  the  lowest  step  in  the 
ladder  of  official  life  ;  and  Caesar  was  in  69  B.C.  of  age 
to  become  a  candidate  for  this  office.  Sulla,  whose 
talent  for  organisation  was  great,  had  raised  the 
number  of  quaestors  to  twenty,  and  had  spread  their 
activity  over  the  whole  of  the  minor  business  of  the 
state  ;  so  that  whether  it  fell  to  a  young  man's  lot 
to  preside  over  the  details  of  finance,  or  of  the  water- 
supply,  or  of  the  city  government,  or  of  provincial 
administration,  he  had,  in  spite  of  obvious  tempta- 
tions to  which  he  might  only  too  easily  give  way, 
the  best  of  opportunities  for  learning  the  duties  of  a 
magistrate.  This  was  a  point  by  which  the  old 
Romans  had  set  great  store.  As  in  their  religion, 
so  in  their  government,  they  insisted  that  things 
should  be  done  in  the  traditional  and  therefore  the 
only  right  way,  and  that  the  aspiring  youth  should 
go  through  a  regular  course  of  training  in  minor 
offices  before  he  could  be  a  qualified  candidate  for 
the  highest  of  alL 


56  yidius  Ccesar,  [69  B.C.- 


I  It  was  fortunate  for  Caesar  that,  as  a  patrician, 
he  was  not  eligible  for  the  Tribunate  of  the 
Plebs.  In  every  way  the  quaestorship  was  a  better 
training.  I  The  young  tribune,  when  Sulla's  restric- 
tions on  the  office  were  removed,  was  again  the 
possessor  of  a  great  power ;  but  it  was  a  power 
which  brought  with  it  no  regular  duties,  and  entailed 
no  knowledge  of  the  conduct  of  business.  But  a 
quaestor,  if  he  chose  to  attend  to  his  duties, — and  it 
was  hardly  possible  that  he  should  shirk  them 
entirely, — must  at  the  close  of  his  year  have  learnt 
something,  from  his  experience  of  business,  of  the 
elementary  grammar  of  politics.  He  would  have 
been  brought  face  to  face  with  some  one  at  least  of 
the  many  difficulties  which  went  to  make  up  the 
greater  problems  of  the  age,  and  would  not  be 
carried  at  once  into  the  whirlpool  of  pseudo-legisla- 
tion and  passionate  partisanship.  The  management 
of  the  corn-supply  and  water-supply,  i.  e.,  the  satisfy- 
ing of  the  actual  needs  of  a  vast  city,  or  the  details 
of  finance  at  home  and  in  the  provinces,  would  force 
him  to  understand  how  things  were  actually  done, 
and  would  invite  him  to  reflect  on  the  discomfort 
and  danger  which  even  a  moderate  amount  of  mal- 
administration may  cause. 

/  Caesar  was  elected  quaestor  in  69  B.C.,  and  served  the 
ofilice  in  the  following  year.  It  fell  to  him  to  begin 
his  acquaintance  with  government  in  the  province  of 
Further  Spain,  and  thus  began  his  lifelong  connec- 
tion with  the  peoples  of  the  West.  J  It  must  have 
been  just  before  his  departure  that  he  lost  his  wife, 
the  daughter  of  Cinna,  and  also  his  aunt,  Julia  the 


JULIUS  C/ESAR. 

FROM  FARNESE  BUST  IN  THE  MUSEUM  AT  NAPLES. 


66  B.C.]  QucBstorskip.  57 

widow  of  Marius  |  and  he  seized  the  opportunity  to 
make  an  honourable  demonstration  in  favour  of  the 
memory  of  Marius  and  the  almost  extinct  Marian 
party.  He  caused  the  bust  of  Marius  to  be  carried 
in  the  funeral  procession  of  Julia;  a  sign  that  the 
Sullan  regime  was  actually  at  an  end.  He  delivered 
funeral  orations  over  both  these  ladies,  which  may 
have  been  inspired  by  a  genuine  glow  of  affection. 
But  their  main  object  was  undoubtedly  a  political 
one.  The  languid  and  fickle  population  of  the 
forum  was  forgetting  the  names  of  Marius  and 
Cinna,  and  needed  to  be  reminded  that  there  had 
been  such  men,  and  that  there  was  still  some  one 
who  was  ready  to  carry  on  the  tradition  of  the  party 
they  had  led.  ., 

These  funerals  over,  he  proceeded  to  his  province 
with  the  propraetor,  AntistiusVetus,  a  man  of  whose 
character  we  know  nothing.  The  province  was  one 
which  must  have  been  specially  interesting  to  him, 
for  it  was  there  that  Sertorius  and  the  remnant  of 
the  Marian  party  had  held  out  so  long  and  tri- 
umphantly against  a  succession  of  Sullan  generals. 
It  is  lamentable  that  we  are  left  almost  entirely  in 
the  dark  as  to  Caesar's  thoughts  and  occupations 
this  year.  He  is  said  to  have  been  sent,  as  quaestors 
sometimes  were,  on  a  special  judicial  circuit,  and  to 
have  discharged  his  duties  with  tact  and  industry.* 
Both  in  business  of  this  kind,  and  in  the  manage- 
ment of  the  provincial  finance,  which  was  the 
quaestor's  special  duty,  he  must  have  learnt  much  of 
the  actual  condition  of  the  governed  people,  and  of 

*  Veil,  ii.,  43.     Suet.,  7. 


58  yulius  Ccesar,  [69  B.C.- 

the  nature  of  the  huge  task  of  government  which 
had  fallen  to  the  Roman  people.  But  what  we 
should  chiefly  wish  to  know,  is  the  impression  made 
on  him  by  what  he  heard  and  noticed  of  the  extra- 
ordinary work  of  Sertorius.  It  must  have  been  this 
that  made  him,  as  he  told  the  Spaniards  more  than 
twenty  years  later,*  choose  out  this  province  as  his 
own  peculiar  charge,  and  work  it  all  the  good  in  his 
power  both  now  and  afterwards  in  his  praetorship. 
Sertorius  is,  in  fact,  the  real  connecting  link  between 
the  Gracchi  and  Caesar  in  the  history  of  the  demo- 
cratic party,  r  It  was  he  who  first  actually  put  in 
execution  the  idea,  vaguely  conceived  perhaps  by 
G.  Gracchus,  of  Romanising  and  educating  the  pro- 
vincials ;  of  treating  them  as  members  of  an  empire, 
and  not  merely  as  tax-paying  property.  He  was 
probably  the  first  who  showed  in  his  dealings  with 
them  not  only  an  honest  or  a  generous  mind,  but  a 
really  intelligent  humanity.  His  work — his  schools, 
for  example,  where  the  children  wore  the  toga  and 
learnt  Greek  and  Latin — may  have  been  destroyed 
after  his  murder  and  the  defeat  of  his  generals,  but 
the  memory  of  them  must  have  long  survived,  and 
Caesar  must  have  talked  with  many  who,  like  him- 
self, had  known  the  man  and  felt  his  generous 
influence,    j 

Instead  of  inquiring  into  the  really  interesting 
aspect  of  this  sojourn  of  Caesar  in  the  far  West,  our 
biographers  are  content  to  tell  us  a  story,  of  which 
the  date  is  as  uncertain  as  the  fact.  He  is  said  to 
have  visited  the  temple  of  Hercules  at  Gades,  and 

*  Bell.  Hisp.,  42. 


66  B.C.]  Qucsstorship.  59 

there,  while  gazing  at  a  statue  of  Alexander  the 
Great,  to  have  lamented  his  own  indolence,  which 
had  brought  him  to  an  age  at  which  Alexander  had 
conquered  the  world,  without  having  achieved  a 
single  memorable  action.  Urged  by  this  reflection, 
says  Suetonius,  he  repeatedly  asked  for  his  ''  missioj* 
or  release  from  provincial  duties,  and  hurried  home 
to  Italy  * 

On  his  way  home  by  land,  he  made  his  first 
acquaintance  with  another  people  in  whom  he  ever 
afterwards  took  a  lively  interest,  and  whose  provin- 
cial governor  he  was  destined  to  be  for  no  less  than 
ten  years.  These  were  the  Transpadani,  or  Gauls 
living  north  of  the  river  Po ;  a  lively  and  vigorous 
population,  living  in  a  land  of  great  beauty  and 
fertility,  and  beginning  already  to  produce  men  of 
eminence,  especially  in  literature.  I  Sulla  had  fixed 
the  boundary  of  Italy  proper  at  the  Rubicon,  a  little 
river  flowing  from  the  Apennines  into  the  Adriatic, 
and  had  made  the  whole  of  the  Gallic  country 
watered  by  the  Po  into  a  province  ;  the  dwellers  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river  were,  however,  made  full 
Roman  citizens,  v/hile  to  their  brethren  on  the  north 
side  was  given  only  the  inferior  status  called  the 
Latin  citizenship,  j  This  was  an  anomalous  and 
irrational  arrangement,  and  the  Transpadani  had 
ever  since  been  claiming  to  be  reckoned  full  citizens. 
Caesar  now  went  from  city  to  city,  exhorting  them 
to  further  efforts,  and  promising  aid  ;  and  is   even 

*  The  story  seems  to  be  brought  in  by  Suetonius  to  account  for 
Caesar's  premature  departure  from  his  province.  Plutarch  tells  it  in 
a  different  context. 


6o  yulius  Ccesar.  C69  B.c- 

said — with  what  amount  of  truth  we  cannot  tell — to 
have  been  on  the  point  of  urging  them  to  back  their 
demands  by  forcible  means.  The  consuls,  however, 
so  the  story  runs,  delayed  the  departure  of  the 
legions  which  had  been  raised  for  Cilicia,  and  with 
the  prospect  of  a  military  occupation  of  the  country 
before  them,  the  Transpadani  abandoned  the  project 
of  an  uprising.  It  was  not  till  after  twenty  years  of 
fruitless  effort  to  get  this  piece  of  justice  done,  that 
Caesar  himself  was  able  to  carry  it  out,  in  the  first 
year  of  his  supreme  power. 

On  his  return  to  Rome,  which  must  have  taken 
place  about  the  beginning  of  6^]  B.C.,^  Caesar  was 
drawn  at  once  into  closer  connection  with  the  man 
who  during  the  next  twenty  years  was  to  be  his  friend, 
his  rival,  and  his  enemy.  Pompeius  was  by  this  time 
tired  of  a  quiet  life.  He  had  been  living  in  dignified 
retirement,  rarely  showing  himself  in  the  forum,  and 
when  he  did  so,  surrounded  with  a  train  of  friends,  who 
screened  him  from  the  eye  and  touch  of  the  vulgar. 
By  this  means,  says  Plutarch,  he  contrived  to  keep 
up  his  reputation,  which  was  purely  military.  At 
last,  both  to  him  and  his  friends,  it  seemed  im- 
possible to  be  idle  any  longer.  There  was  real  and 
abundant  reason  for  the  employment  of  the  ablest 
soldier  of  the  day.  The  audacity  of  the  pirates 
was  greater  than  ever.  Lucullus,  too,  in  Asia,  had 
begun  to  meet  with  disasters,  and  was  unable,  with 
his  troops  in  a  mutinous  temper,  to  cope  with  the 
combined  forces  of  the  kings  of  Armenia  and  Pontus. 
To    make    arrangements    for   a   campaign  was  con- 

♦Plut.,  Pomp.,  23. 


66  B.C.]  Supremacy  of  Pompeius.  6i 

stitutionally  the  business  of  the  Senate  ;  but  the 
Senate  was  not  likely  to  recall  its  faithful  and  able 
general,  Lucullus,  nor  to  give  any  single  individual 
the  exclusive  powers  necessary  to  enable  him  to  act 
with  success  against  the  pirates.  But  this  laissez- 
faire  policy,  as  in  the  Jugurthine  War,  was  to  work 
the  ruin  of  the  senatorial  oligarchy.  | 

In  this  year,  6j  B.C.,  a  bill  was  proposed  by  a 
tribune,  Gabinius,  in  the  assembly  of  the  plebs,  in 
spite  of  opposition  in  the  Senate,  giving  Pompeius 
exactly  that  extensive  power  against  the  pirates 
which  he  himself  desired,  and  which  was  really 
necessary  if  the  work  was  to  be  done  swiftly  and 
completely.  A  He  was  to  have  exclusive  command 
for  three  years  over  the  whole  Mediterranean,  and 
over  the  resources  of  the  provinces  and  dependent 
states.  For  fifty  miles  inland  in  every  province 
bordering  on  these  seas — i.  e.,  in  the  whole  Empire — 
he  was  to  exercise  an  authority  equal  to  that  of  the 
existing  provincial  governor.  He  was  to  have  almost 
unlimited  means  of  raising  both  fleets  and  armies, 
and  was  to  nominate  his  own  staff  of  twenty-five 
**  legati "  (lieutenant-generals),  who  were  all  to  have 
the  rank  of  praetor.  Nor  was  this  all ;  for  it  was 
quite  understood  that  this  was  only  part  of  a  plan 
which  was  to  place  him  at  the  head  of  the  armies  in 
Asia  Minor,  superseding  the  able  but  now  discredited 
Lucullus.  In  fact,  by  another  law  of  Gabinius,  Lu- 
cullus was  recalled,  and  his  command  given  to  one 
of  the  consuls  of  the  year,  neither  of  whom,  as  was 
well  known,  was  likely  to  wield  it  with  the  requisite 
ability.     Whichever  consul  it  might  be,  he  would 


62  yulius  CcBsar,  [69  B.C.- 

only  be  recognised  as  keeping  the  place  warm  for 
Pompeius.  And  when,  after  a  brief  and  brilliant 
campaign,  showing  how  much  might  be  done  by  an 
able  organiser  of  unlimited  resources,  Pompeius  had 
rooted  out  the  pirates  in  every  quarter,  it  was  pro- 
posed and  carried  in  the  next  year  by  another 
tribune  that  he  should  have  the  Asiatic  command 
in  addition  to  his  previous  one.  %  Without  delay  he 
set  about  his  new  work,  and  started  on  that  wonder- 
ful career  of  conquest  and  organisation  in  the  East, 
which  not  only  made  him  the  greatest  military 
figure  of  that  day,  but  promised  to  secure  for  him  at 
last  the  position  of  master  of  the  whole  civilised 
world. 

We  need  not  enter  here  into  the  details  of  his 
power  and  his  work.  But  he  who  would  understand 
the  nature  of  the  power  which  Caesar  and  his  suc- 
cessors were  eventually  to  exercise,  and  the  way  in 
which  it  came  into  their  hands,  must  needs  reflect 
for  a  moment  on  this  story  of  the  startling  growth 
of  Pompeius ;  for  it  was  only  the  political  weakness 
of  the  man  himself  that  prevented  his  seizing  the 
opportunity  and  putting  an  end  to  the  Senate's  in- 
capable rule,  as  Caesar  did  later  on. 

Let  us  then  notice,  in  the  first  place,  that  it  was 
the  paralysis  of  constitutional  government  that  pro- 
duced this  unconstitutional,  or  at  least  unprece- 
dented, supremacy  of  a  single  man.  What  ought  to 
have  been  done  long  ago  by  or  through  the  Senate, 
the  Senate  would  not  do.  Perhaps  it  may  be  said 
that  they  could  not  do  it ;  for  they  had  no  member 
of  their  own  political  views  who  was  likely  to  carry 


66  B.C.I  Supremacy  of  Pompeius,  63 

out  these  great  undertakings  with  success.  But  it 
was  quite  as  obvious  that  they  did  not  care  to  do  it. 
The  majority  were  too  far  gone  in  indolence  and 
self-seeking  to  trouble  themselves  about  the  pirates  or 
Mithridates;  with  the  former  it  is  said  that  some  of 
them  actually  did  business.  There  was,  of  course,  a 
minority  of  more  vigorous  men,  including  members 
of  the  popular  party,  like  Caesar  himself,  and  Cicero, 
both  of  whom  supported  the  appointment  of  Pom- 
peius;/but  from  the  Senate  as  a  body  no  energetic 
initiative  or  real  administrative  skill  was  any  longer 
to  be  looked  for.} 

Secondly,  it  should  be  observed  that  the  agents  in 
this  legislation  were  tribunes  of  the  people,  and  that 
they  laid  their  bills — or  at  least  the  second  of  them 
— directly  before  the  sovereign  assembly  of  the 
plebs.  There  was  the  more  apparent  reason  for 
this,  because  the  vast  population  of  the  capital  was 
dependent  for  its  food  supply  on  sea  transport,  and 
was  even  now  in  some  distress  owing  to  the  depre- 
dations of  the  pirates.  But  the  point  is,  that  the 
Senate  and  its  conservative  majority  were  now 
simply  disregarded  by  Pompeius  and  his  tribunes. 
It  was  as  if  the  opposition  in  the  British  House 
of  Commons  were  to  succeed  in  passing  a  bill 
in  the  teeth  of  the  existing  government,  to  recall 
one  Viceroy  of  India  and  appoint  another  with 
extraordinary  powers.  Not  indeed  that  the  Senate 
itself  refrained  from  employing  a  tribune  to  oppose 
Pompeius*  plans,  as  they  were  constitutionally  en- 
titled to  do.  But  this  man,  one  Trebellius,  was 
frightened  into  withdrawing  his  veto  by  a  threat  of 


64  yulius  CcBsar,  [69  B.C.- 

deprivation  ;  and  when  the  second  bill  was  produced, 
in  66  B.C.,  no  tribune  ventured  to  oppose  it.  No  facts 
could  be  more  significant  of  the  direction  in  which 
the  tide  was  running.  {The  tribunate  was  passing 
out  of  the  hands  both  of  the  Senate  and  people,  and 
was  destined  henceforward  to  be  associated  with  the 
power  of  the  preponderant  military  leader  of  the 
day ;  for  the  next  twenty  years  as  his  instrument  in 
dealing  with  affairs  at  Rome,  and  afterwards  as  an 
essential  part  of  the  new  military  monarchy.  | 

Thirdly,  we  must  notice  that  the  prize  aimed  at, 
though  in  appearance  only  a  great  military  com- 
mand, was  in  reality  much  more.  It  was  not  so 
much  an  office,  responsible  and  subordinate  to  the 
state,  that  was  created  by  these  bills,  but  a  power 
independent  of  the  state,  and  quite  incapable  of 
being  controlled  from  Rome  save  by  the  erection  of 
another  power  like  it.  The  hold  that  the  govern- 
ment had  on  its  provincial  governors  was  at  no  time 
a  strong  one ;  and  if  any  of  them  had  had  the  will 
and  ability  to  develop  the  resources  of  his  province, 
he  might  easily  have  erected  his  dominion  into  an 
independent  kingdom.  This  was,  in  fact,  exactly 
what  Sertorius  had  done ;  and  the  efforts  of  the 
Senate  to  crush  Sertorius  had  only  resulted  in  the 
development  of  a  new  military  candidate  for  power. 
Now  if  Sertorius  could  do  so  much  with  a  single 
province  and  scanty  resources,  what  might  not  be 
done  by  the  man  who  now  had  at  his  disposal  the 
military  and  financial  means  of  at  least  half  the 
Empire  ?  It  was  perfectly  plain  that  these  two  tri- 
bunician  bills  were  meant  to  place  in  the  hands  of 


66  B.C.]  Supremacy  of  Pompeius.  65 

Pompeius  the  destinies  of  the  whole  Roman  world ; 
and  that  if  he  chose  to  accept  the  position  A  nothing 
could  save  Rome  from  another  military  despotism 
but  a  general  and  an  army  which  should  be  stronger 
than  he.  f 

Thus  in  whichever  direction  an  intelHgent  Roman 
might  look  in  these  eventful  years  {6'j,  66  B.C.),  the 
signs  of  coming  autocracy  were  too  plain  to  be  mis- 
taken. The  indolence  of  the  Senate ;  the  rehabili- 
tation of  the  tribunate  and  of  its  direct  legislative 
power ;  the  ever-increasing  importance  of  provincial 
commands,  and  the  enormous  preponderance  of  the 
military  element  in  the  state ; — all  pointed  in  the  same 
direction,  warning  the  observer  that  in  some  form  or 
other  absolutism  was  a  necessity.  It  may  even  be 
said,  not  without  much  appearance  of  truth,  that  the 
Republic  practically  ceased  to  exist  when  Pompeius 
received  the  Asiatic  command.  But  the  Roman  was 
essentially  conservative,  and  clung  tenaciously  to  the 
old  forms.  The  prestige  of  the  Senate  was  as  great 
as  its  action  was  weak ;  senatorial  government  was, 
in  fact,  almost  a  necessary  law  of  the  Roman  mind. 
No  formal  revolution  was  effected  for  another  twenty 
years ;  and  even  for  centuries  afterwards  the  Senate, 
as  the  last  survivor  of  republican  forms,  continued  to 
live  and  to  work  side  by  side  with  the  combined  and 
concentrated  powers  of  the  tribune  and  the  provin- 
cial governor.  ^ 


CHAPTER   V. 

iEDILESHIP  ;     CONSPIRACY  OF  CATILINA. 
65-63    B.C. 

OMPEIUS  left  Rome  in  the 
spring  of  6j  B.C.,  rapidly  cleared 
the  seas  of  piracy,  and  in  the 
following  year  superseded  Lu- 
cullus  in  the  command  of  the 
war  against  Mithridates.  He 
did  not  return  till  the  begin- 
ning of  61  B.C. 

At  first  sight  it  might  seem 
as  though  his  absence  should 
have  cleared  the  air,  and  left  the  political  leaders 
at  Rome  a  freer  hand.  But  the  power  and  the 
resources  voted  him,  and  the  unprecedented  suc- 
cess with  which  he  used  them,  made  him  in 
reality  as  formidable  to  the  parties  at  home  as  he 
was  to  the  peoples  of  the  East.  He  put  an  end  at 
last  to  the  power  of  Mithridates,  received  the  sub- 
mission of  Tigranes  of  Armenia,  and  added  to  the 

66 


65  B.C.]  y^dileship.  67 

Roman  dominion  the  greater  part  of  the  possessions 
of  both  these  kings.  The  sphere  of  Roman  influ- 
ence now  for  the  first  time  reached  the  river 
Euphrates,  and  the  Empire  was  brought  into  con- 
tact with  the  great  Parthian  kingdom  beyond  it. 
Asia  Minor  became  wholly  Roman,  with>  the  excep- 
tion of  some  part  of  the  interior,  which  obedient 
kinglets  were  allowed  to  retain.  Syria  was  made  a 
Roman  province.  Pompeius  took  Jerusalem,  and 
added  Judaea  to  Syria.  Such  a  career  of  conquest 
had  not  been  known  for  many  generations  ;  the  credit 
of  the  Roman  name  seemed  everywhere  to  be  re- 
stored, and  her  imperial  destiny  more  amply  con- 
firmed than  ever. 

The  man  to  whom  all  this  was  due  became  at  once 
the  leading  figure  in  the  world.  [  It  became  clear  that 
when  his  career  of  conquest  was  over  yet  another  task 
would  devolve  on  him,  if  he  chose  to  accept  it — the 
re-organisation  of  the  central  government  at  Rome,  j 
It  was  also  obvious  that  he  might  perform  this  task 
without  allying  himself  with  any  political  party ; 
simply  by  seizing  on  the  supreme  power,  and  hold- 
ing it  by  means  of  his  army.  Yet  no  one  could  guess 
what  course  he  would  actually  take,  and  no  political 
leader  could  strike  out  a  path  for  himself  while  this 
remained  uncertain.  His  gathered  power  overhung 
the  state  like  an  avalanche  ready  to  fall ;  and  in  the 
possible  path  of  an  avalanche  it  is  waste  of  time  and 
labour  to  build  any  solid  work. 
\  So  these  years,  for  Caesar  as  for  the  rest,  are  years 
of  plotting  and  intrigue  on  one  side,  and  of  half- 
hearted government  on  the  other ;  a  false  light  dis- 


68  yulius   CcBsar.  L65  B.C.- 

torting  every  object  in  the  political  world,  and  a 
heavy  lowering  atmosphere  making  the  actors  in  it 
either  languid  or  hysterical.  I  For  a  young  statesman 
no  worse  education  can  be  ihiagined.  In  these  five 
years  many  men  were  ruined  for  ever  as  statesmen ; 
both  Cicero  and  Caesar,  now  on  opposite  sides  and 
the  two  most  promising  leaders,  received  serious 
damage  ;  and  Caesar  was  only  able  to  repair  it  be- 
cause he  still  had  the  consulship  before  him,  and 
because  the  thunder-cloud  in  the  East  suddenly 
passed  away. 

^  He  was  elected  to  the  curule  aedileship — the  next 
above  the  quaestorship  in  the  series  of  magistracies — 
and  entered  on  his  ofifice  on  January  i,  65  B.c|  On 
this  very  day  a  plot  was  to  come  into  action  of  which 
there  is  hardly  a  doubt  that  he  had  at  least  some 
knowledge.  What  the  conspirators  wanted  is  tolera- 
bly clear  ;  they  meant  to  provide  the  democracy  with 
an  executive  power,  and  with  the  means  of  arming 
itself  against  Pompeius  on  his  return.  But  how  they 
intended  to  do  it  no  one  knew  for  certain  then,  and 
no  one  can  ever  know.  I  It  was  said  that  the  consuls 
were  to  be  assassinated,  trassus  to  be  made  Dictator, 
and  Caesar  his  Master  of  the  Horse,  or  chief  lieuten- 
ant. The  plot  is  not  represented  as  being  in  the 
hands  of  either  Caesar  or  Crassus,  even  by  the  sena- 
torial writers  from  whom  the  information  comes; 
the  leading  figures  in  it  were  reckless  and  ruined  men 
of  whom  we  shall  hear  more  in  this  chapter,  such  as 
Catilina,  Autronius,  P.  Cornelius  Sulla,  who  had 
belonged  to  the  SuUan  party  and  now  led  the  left 
wing  of  the  democracy.!  Such  a  left  wing  will  always 


63  B.C.]  y^Edilesktp.  69 

attach  itself  to  a  party  of  advance  in  revolutionary 
times ;  and  for  its  blunders  and  misdeeds  the  finer 
spirits  must  necessarily  be  to  some  extent  held  re- 
sponsible. It  was  fortunate  for  Caesar  that  the  plot 
missed  fire ;  it  would  have  certainly  resulted  in  a 
bloody  struggle,  and  probably  in  pure  anarchy, 
neither  Senate  nor  democracy  being  strong  enough  to 
crush  its  enemy  completely.  The  field  would  have 
been  open  to  Pompeius,  and  he  could  not  have  re- 
fused  the  chance. 

I  Caesar's  political  connection  with  Crassus  at  this 
time  is  by  no  means  clear.  The  two  were  sailing  the 
same  course,  and  watching  Pompeius  with  the  same 
anxiety ;  but  there  could  not  have  been  much  in 
common  between  them,  and  they  were  in  fact  rapidly 
getting  in  each  other's  way.  The  great  money- 
lender, however,  must  have  been  in  the  main  respon- 
sible for  the  enormous  expenditure  which  Caesar 
risked  in  this  aedileship  and  the  next  three  years ; 
and  in  fact  he  eventually  covered  it  by  satisfying  the 
actual  creditors  with  a  sum  of  eight  hundred  talents.^ 
A  large  proportion  of  this  sum  was  spent  in  this  year 
65  B.C.  in  performing  the  usual  functions  of  an  aedile 
with  a  lavish  profusion  such  as  had  never  been  known 
before.  Caesar  was  not  content,  says  Suetonius,  with 
building  open  temporary  porticos  in  the  forum,  the 
comitium,  and  the  basilicas,  but  extended  them  even 
to  the  Capitol.  These  acted  as  booths  in  a  grand 
fair,  as  we  should  say,  and  the  lazy  people  of  Rome 
had  a  time  of  thorough  enjoyment  and  cheap  prices. 
On  the  4th  of  April  and  following  days,  being  in 
charge  of  the  games  in  honour  of  the  Great  Mother 


70  Julius  Ccesar.  [65  B.C.- 

(Cybele),  he  gave  this  entertainment,  and  again,  appar- 
ently, in  September  at  the  Roman  games.  He  brought 
on  one  occasion — we  are  not  told  when — no  less  than 
320  pairs  of  gladiators  into  the  arena ;  and  it  is  said 
that  the  number  would  have  been  even  greater  had 
not  the  Senate  interfered  in  alarm  at  the  introduction 
into  the  city  of  such  a  formidable  force.  Amuse- 
ment was,  however,  to  be  combined  with  instruction  ; 
and  great  were  the  astonishment  and  joy  of  the  people 
when  they  discovered  one  morning  that  the  statue  of 
Marius  and  the  trophies  of  his  victories  over  Jugur- 
tha  and  the  Cimbri,  which  had  been  taken  down  by 
Sulla's  order,  weje  once  more  in  their  old  position 
oi)  the  Capitol.  | 

lAll  this  was  meant  to  secure  the  favour  of  the 
democracy,  and  gain  the  position  of  its  leader,  which 
was  in  fact  vacant ;  for  Crassus  was  never  popular, 
Pompeius  was  away  and  fast  becoming  an  object  of 
alarm,  and  there  was  no  other  candidate  sufificiently 
qualified  either  by  his  wealth  or  by  connection  with 
the  memory  of  the  Marians,  j  But  it  seems  that  Caesar 
had  other  and  more  substantial  objects  in  view.  As 
Mommsen  has  pointed  out,  there  are  signs  that  he 
was  now  entertaining  designs  of  a  much  more  far- 
reaching  character  than  the  attraction  of  the  city 
populace.  It  is  Suetonius  again  *  who  tells  us  that 
he  put  up  tribunes  to  propose  for  himself  an  extraor- 
dinary military  command  in  Egypt.  Pretext  was 
not  wanting,  for  Egypt  had  been  bequeathed  to  the 
Romans  by  its  late  king,  Alexander ;  and  the  exist- 
ing king,  Ptolemy  Auletes,  had  been  expelled  from 

*  Suet.,  II. 


63  B.C.]  y&ltleship.  J I 

his  capital  by  a  rebellion  in  defiance  of  the  Roman 
government,  under  whose  protection  he  certainly 
was.  The  Senate  had  taken  no  steps  to  make  Egypt 
a  Roman  province ;  and  it  might  be  reasonably 
argued  that  something  should  now  be  done.  An 
ex-aedile,  with  hardly  any  military  experience,  was 
certainly  not  the  right  person  to  hold  such  a  com- 
mand, and  the  attempt  to  obtain  it  was  a  failure. 
But  the  real  meaning  of  the  design  cannot  be  mis- 
taken. Pompeius  was  at  this  time  in  Syria,  if  not 
himself  at  least  in  the  persons  of  his  lieutenants 
Gabinius  and  Scaurus ;  and  in  the  winter  of  64  B.C.  he 
followed  them,  to  make  the  country  a  Roman  proV' 
ince  and  regulate  the  affairs  of  Judaea.  Only  one 
territory  in  the  Levant  was  as  yet  unoccupied  by  his 
forces — viz., I  the  basin  of  the  Nile;  but  that  was 
strategically  the  strongest  of  all,  and  of  inexhausti- 
ble fertility :  and  if  it  could  be  seized  in  advance  by 
the  rivals  of  Pompeius,  he  would  not  only  be  taken 
in  flank,  but  if  he  returned  to  Italy,  he  would  be 
leaving  an  enemy  strongly  intrenched  in  his  rear 
with  a  magnificent  base  of  operations  to  work  from. J 
It  is  tempting  to  speculate  on  what  would  have  been 
the  result  had  this  audacious  design  been  carried 
out ;  but  we  must  be  content  to  treat  it  as  an  indi- 
cation, and  an  almost  certain  one,  if  the  story  told 
by  Suetonius  be  true,  that  Caesar  was  ready  to  play 
the  part  of  Sertorius  again,  and  to  organise  a  province 
as  a  sl]elter  for  the  democratic  party  in  case  the 
thunder-cloud  in  the  East  should  break  and  Pompeius 
become  a  second  Sulla. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  64  B.C.,  on  the  accession  to 


72  yulitis  CcBsar,  [65  B.c- 

office  of  a  new  board  of  tribunes,  another  attempt 
was  made,  but  this  time  by  means  of  legislation  in- 
stead of  by  violence,  to  set  up  a  power  at  home  that 
should  be  competent  to  counteract  that  of  Pompeius, 
and  should  place  the  resources  of  the  state  in  the 
hands  of  the  democracy  or  its  leaders.  An  agrarian 
bill  on  a  vast  scale  was  promulgated  by  the  tribune 
Servilius  Rullus.  The  two  most  startling  features 
of  this  were  :  first,  the  creation  of  a  board  of  ten  to 
carry  out  its  provisions,  each  member  of  which  was 
to  be  invested  with  military  and  judicial  powers  like 
those  of  the  consuls  and  praetors ;  and  secondly,  the 
clauses  which  entrusted  this  board  with  enormous 
financial  resources,  to  be  raised  by  the  public  sale 
of  all  the  territories  and  property  acquired  since  the 
year  88  B.C.,  together  with  the  booty  and  revenues 
now  in  the  hands  of  Pompeius.  The  bill  included,  as 
its  immediate  object,  a  huge  scheme  of  colonisation 
for  Italy,  on  the  lines  of  the  Gracchan  agrarian  bills ; 
in  which  it  is  not  here  necessary  to  distinguish  the 
good  and  bad  points.  But  it  was  really  an  attack 
on  the  weak  fortress  of  senatorial  government,  in 
order  to  turn  out  its  garrison,  and  occupy  and  fortify 
it  in  the  name  of  the  democratic  or  Marian  party 
against  the  return  of  the  new  Sulla,  which  was  now 
thought  to  be  imminent. 

The  bill  may  also  have  had  another  and  secondary 
object — namely,  to  force  the  hand  of  the  able  and 
ambitious  consul  who  would  come  into  office  on 
January  i,  63  ;  at  any  rate  it  succeeded  in  doing 
this,  though  it  succeeded  in  nothing  else.  Cicero's 
great  talents,  and  the  courage  and  skill  with  which 


CICERO. 

FPiOM  A  BUST  NOW  IN  THE  ROYAL  GALLERY  IN  MADRID. 

{^Bau  vteistcr.') 


63  B.C.]  y^dileship.  "Ji 

he  had  so  far  for  the  most  part  used  them,  had  made 
him  already  a  considerable  power  in  Rome ;  but  no 
one  knew  for  certain  to  which  party  he  would  finally 
attach  himself,  or  in  whose  interest  he  would  use  his 
power  as  consul  and  his  growing  influence  with  the 
Senate.  He  had  spared  no  pains  of  late  to  gain  the 
good-will  of  all  parties.  By  connection  and  tradition 
he  belonged  to  the  Marian  party,  and  had  joined  it  in 
supporting  Pompeius  in  67  and  66  B.C. ;  but  the  con- 
spiracies in  which  that  party  had  engaged  since  then 
were  revolting  to  his  political  temperament,  and  he 
seems  to  have  believed  that  Pompeius  himself  might 
be  kept  true  to  the  Republic,  and  might  become  the 
defender  of  the  constitution,  if  the  senatorial  position 
could  be  held  firmly  until  his  return.  This  position 
Cicero  determined  to  hold  at  all  cost.  On  the  very 
first  day  of  his  office,  he  attacked  the  bill  in  the  Sen- 
ate and  exposed  its  real  intention,  and  showed  plainly 
that  his  policy  was  to  convert  Pompeius  into  a  pillar 
of  the  constitution,  and  to  counteract  all  democratic 
plots  directed  against  him.  He  claimed  for  himself 
in  this  speech  that  he  was  the  true  leader  of  the 
people  (consul  popularis),  and  declared  that  this  bill 
was  really  against  their  interests. 

That  Cicero  had  the  people  of  the  capital  with 
him  at  this  moment  can  hardly  be  doubted  ;  and  he 
also  had  a  strong  following  among  the  voters  of  the 
Italian  towns.  Whether  it  was  his  eloquence,  or  the 
people's  indifference,  that  caused  the  bill  to  be 
dropped,  can  only  be  matter  of  conjecture  ;  but  it 
was  withdrawn  at  once  by  its  proposer,  and  the 
whole  scheme  fell  through.     This  was  Cicero's  first 


74  yulius  Ccesar.  [65  B.C.- 

and  only  real  victory  over  Caesar.  His  position  was 
greatly  strengthened  for  the  moment,  and  the  demo- 
crats for  some  time  abstained  from  further  attack. 
His  resources  were  not  to  be  despised,  for  he  now- 
effected  a  combination  of  which  the  materials  were 
ready  to  his  hand,  between  the  weak  senatorial  party 
on  the  one  side,  and  the  powerful  body  of  equites 
on  the  other,  to  which  he  himself  by  birth  belonged  ; 
i.  e.,  between  the  members  of  the  Senate,  their  fam- 
ilies, clients,  etc.,  and  the  wealthy  men,  who,  without 
being  in  the  Senate,  had  great  influence  both  in 
Rome  and  the  provinces  by  reason  of  their  mercantile 
importance  and  their  position  as  judges  in  the  law 
courts.  This  alliance  Cicero  always  calls  "  the  agree- 
ment of  the  two  orders,"  and  for  the  next  few  years 
he  relied  on  it  as  the  only  safeguard  of  the  constitu- 
tion. It  was  thus  the  watchword  of  his  policy — a 
policy  purely  defensive,  destitute  of  any  active  re- 
generative force — to  make  the  whole  mass  of  the 
respectable  and  comfortable  elements  of  society  into 
a  strong  bulwark,  with  the  aid  of  Pompeius  and  his 
own  eloquence,  against  the  encroachments  of  the 
popular  party  with  its  reckless  and  dangerous  left 
wing. 

As  it  had  now  become  plain  that  the  Senate,  backed 
by  Cicero  and  the  equites,  would  be  strong  enough 
to  have  things  their  own  way  this  year,  Caesar  re- 
sorted, probably  as  a  kind  of  forlorn  hope,  to  a 
curious  device  for  bringing  the  memory  of  Gracchus 
and  Marius  once  more  before  the  eyes  of  the  people, 
and  for  asserting  the  principles  of  popular  liberty  in 
opposition  to  the  theory  of  senatorial  prerogative. 


63  B.C.]  j^dileship.  75 

This  was  clearly  his  own  contrivance,  and  not  merely 
a  design  entrusted  to  the  left  wing,  to  be  repudiated 
if  necessary.  Wherever  he  himself  is  seen  in  open 
action  at  this  period,  he  is  always  at  work  on  the 
strict  lines  of  the  constitutional  theory  of  the  older 
democratic  leaders ;  in  all  unconstitutional  projects, 
he  is  in  the  background,  and  his  connection  with 
them  is  uncertain. 

At  his  instance,  the  tribune  Labienus,  who  had 
served  with  him  under  Servilius  against  the  pirates, 
and  was  afterwards  to  be  his  ablest  general  of  divi. 
sion  in  the  long  Gallic  war,  now  brought  an  impeach- 
ment  against  a  certain  obscure  old  man  named 
Rabirius.  The  victim  was  of  no  importance,  but 
the  questions  involved  in  his  trial  were  vital  to  the 
constitution.  He  was  popularly  believed  to  be 
the  man  who  had  shed  the  blood  of  the  tribune 
Saturninus  thirty-seven  years  before,  in  violation  of 
the  ''  sacrosanctitas  "  of  the  tribunate,  and  of  the 
first  maxim  of  the  Roman  constitution  that  no  citi- 
zen could  be  put  to  death  without  trial.  But  this 
murder  had  been  committed  under  orders  from  the 
consul  Marius,  and  the  consul  was  himself  carrying 
out  a  decree  of  the  Senate,  by  which  the  ordinary 
constitutional  laws  and  guaranties  were  suspended, 
and  what  was  practically  a  state  of  war  was  pro- 
claimed. The  Senate  had  from  time  to  time,  in 
moments  of  extreme  peril,  assumed  the  power  to 
issue  such  a  decree,  and  until  the  era  of  civil  dis- 
turbance began  with  Tiberius  Gracchus,  no  one  had 
thought  of  disputing  it.  But  it  is  obvious  that  when 
once  the  Senate's  authority  had  come  into  serious 


76  JmUus  CcBsar.  [66  b.c- 

collision  with  the  popular  will,  such  a  power  might 
justly  be  regarded  as  a  weapon  of  faction,  and  could 
no  longer  be  used,  as  such  a  resource  always  should 
be  used,  for  the  protection  of  the  majority  of  citi- 
zens, and  with  their  own  tacit  sanction.  G.  Gracchus 
had  therefore  reasserted  by  legislation  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  the  constitution  that  no  citizen 
could  be  put  to  death  without  trial ;  but  the  senate, 
trusting  to  the  immense  prestige  it  had  inherited 
from  earlier  generations,  still  continued  to  assert  its 
right,  and  to  exercise  it  on  occasion,  as  it  did  in  the 
case  of  Saturninus.  And  there  was  every  probability 
that  the  Senate  of  63  B.C.,  under  the  influence  of  its 
vigorous  consul  Cicero,  would  not  hesitate  to  act  as 
the  Senate  of  100  B.C.  had  acted,  and  to  put  down 
democratic  violence  (if  need  were)  by  means  of  this 
tremendous  engine  of  government.  The  consular 
elections  were  approaching ;  it  was  known  that 
there  would  be  a  fierce  struggle  on  the  part  of  the 
democratic  left  wing  to  possess  itself  of  the  consul- 
ship, and  it  might  be  that  a  crisis  would  soon  arise 
in  which  the  government  would  have  to  use  every 
weapon  in  their  armoury. 

It  was  either  in  view  of  such  a  crisis,  or  simply  for 
the  purpose  of  asserting  the  sanctity  of  the  per- 
son of  the  tribune  and  the  leading  axiom  of  Roman 
constitutional  liberty,  that  Caesar  put  up  Labienus 
to  indict  Saturninus'  supposed  murderer.  By  an 
ancient  and  obsolete  form  of  procedure,  the  adop- 
tion of  which  only  illustrates  the  utter  absence  of 
straightforward  dealing  in  this  most  miserable  time, 
Labienus  had  to    nominate  two  judges  to  try  the 


63  B.C.]  j^^ileship.  77 

accused  ;  and  the  two  he  named  were  Caesar  himself 
and  his  relative  L.  Julius  Caesar,  who  had  been  con- 
sul in  64  B.C.  I  These  two  judges  convicted  Rabi- 
rius,  and  sentenced  him  to  death.}  This  sentence 
was,  however,  a  mere  matter  of  form  ;  Rabirius 
could,  and  of  course  did,  appeal  to  the  people  in 
their  centuriate  assembly,  and  with  them  the  ulti- 
mate decision  constitutionally  rested.  They  would 
have  certainly  confirmed  the  sentence,  but  that 
Cicero,  using  a  device  as  antique  and  absurd  as 
that  of  Labienus  himself,  unfurled  the  rqd  flag  on 
the  Janiculan  Hill,  which  had  formerly  been  the 
signal  that  an  enemy  was  at  hand  and  that  the 
assembly  must  be  dissolved.  Thus  this  grotesque 
trial  came  to  an  end  without  any  immediate  result. 
But  Caesar  must  have  felt  that  it  had  in  some  degree 
answered  his  purpose.  The  people  had  been  re- 
minded of  the  sacred  rights  and  liberties  of  them- 
selves and  their  tribunes,  and  the  Senate  had  been 
reminded  that  they  and  their  executive  could  no 
longer  violate  those  rights  and  liberties,  even  under 
the  pretext  of  removing  an  imminent  danger  to  the 
state,  without  running  a  serious  risk  and  exposing 
themselves  to  popular  vengeance. 
I  It  was  about  this  time,  in  the  spring  of  63  B.C.,  that 
the  office  of  Pontifex  Maximus  became  vacant  by 
the  death  of  old  Metellus  Pius,  and  Caesar  at  once 
took  steps  to  secure  it  for  himself.  |  The  chances  in 
his  favour  were  small,  but  the  prize  was  a  tempting 
one.  Success  would  place  him  at  the  head  of  the 
whole  Roman  religious  system.  He  would  have  the 
Vestal  Virgins  and  the  Flamens  under  his  immediate 


yS  yulius  Ccesar.  [65  B.C.- 

control  ;  he  would  be  the  referee  in  all  matters  of 
religious  law,  public  and  private  ;  he  would  have  the 
superintendence  of  the  calendar,  then  a  matter  of 
the  utmost  weight  in  Roman  politics.  It  is  difficult 
to  realise  the  great  importance  of  this  high  priest- 
hood, for  we  are  rarely  able  to  detect  it  actually  at 
work,  and  have  to  be  content  with  what  we  learn  of 
it  in  the  abstract.  We  may  roughly  describe  it  as 
uniting  for  the  term  of  the  holder's  life,  the  powers 
of  a  magistracy  and  a  priesthood,  in  a  state  where 
religion  and  politics  had  always  been  inextricably 
intertwined.  In  an  age  when  the  cultivated  sceptic 
adhered  no  less  closely  to  religious  forms  than  the 
ignorant  masses  to  their  own  superstition,  its  pres- 
tige was  as  great  as  it  had  ever  been,  and  the  man 
who  held  it  must  be  of  necessity  always  before  the 
eyes  of  the  people.  This  was  doubtless  exactly 
what  Caesar  wished  for.  He  probably  little  thought 
at  this  time  that  he  would  live  to  make  his  pontifi- 
cate the  most  famous  and  fruitful  in  Roman  history, 
by  reforming  the  calendar,  and  laying  a  new  and 
solid  basis  for  chronological  calculations. 

He  was  eligible,  for  he  had  already  been  for  sev- 
eral years  one  of  the  college  of  pontifices,  but  as  the 
law  of  election  stood,  a  man  so  young  and  so  demo- 
cratic would  have  no  chance  against  candidates  like 
the  venerable  conservative  leader  Catulus,  and 
Caesar's  own  old  commander  in  the  east,  Servilius 
Isauricus,  both  of  whom  were  standing.  Sulla's 
law,  which  placed  the  election  in  the  hands  of  the 
college  itself — a  law  framed  expressly  to  exclude 
persons  of    Caesar's  stamp — must  be  repealed,  and 


JULIUS  C/ESAR  (?)  AS  PONTIFEX  MAXIMUS. 

FROM  THE  BUST  IN  THE  MUSEO  CHIARAMONTI,   IN  THE  VATICAN. 

Engraved  by  W.  B.  Closson  after  a  Photograph  from  the  Original, 


63  B.C.]  Conspiracy  of  Catilina.  79 

the  choice  vested  once  more  in  the  people.  The 
useful  tribune  Labienus  was  again  set  to  work,  the 
law  was  passed,  and  on  March  6th  Caesar  was  elected 
by  a  large  majority.  The  disgust  of  Catulus  and 
his  friends  must  have  been  real  and  bitter  'X  it  had 
very  seldom  happened  that  a  man  who  had  not  yet 
reached  the  praetorship  had  been  raised  to  the  place 
of  highest  permanent  honor  in  the  state.l  Caesar 
himself  seems  to  have  staked  everything  on  it.  He 
is  said  to  have  refused  a  bribe  from  Catulus,  and  to 
have  added  to  his  already  enormous  debts  for  the 
purpose  of  canvass,  and  it  was  on  the  morning  of 
this  election  that  he  told  his  mother  that  he  should 
return  that  night  successful  or  leave  Rome  for  ever. 
iSoon  after  this  the  people  also  elected  him  praetor 
for  the  following  year.  \ 

The  latter  part  of  this  memorable  year  was  occu- 
pied with  a  last  and  desperate  attempt  of  the  demo- 
cratic party  to  possess  themselves  of  the  state  power 
while  there  was  yet  time  to  forestall  Pompeius. 
This  is  the  famous  conspiracy  of  Catilina  ;  it  was 
an  attack  of  the  left  wing  on  the  senatorial  position, 
and  the  real  leaders  of  the  democracy  took  no  open 
or  active  part  in  it.  It  always  has  been,  and  always 
will  be,  a  debatable  question  how  far  fCaesar  and 
Crassus  were  concerned  in  it  ;  we  incline  here  to 
the  conclusion  that  they  had  some  knowledge  of  it, 
as  of  the  earlier  plot,  but  inwardly  reserved  the 
right  to  betray  it,  if  it  should  seem  good  to  them.  \ 
They  might  use  it,  if  it  were  successful,  for  their  own 
ends ;  when  it  promised  to  be  a  failure,  they  probably 
gave  information  about  it  to  the  government. 


8o  yulius  Ccssar,  t65  B.C.- 

The  story  of  this  conspiracy  more  properly  belongs 
to  the  life  of  Cicero,  who  was  the  chief  agent  in  de- 
tecting it,  and  it  shall  be  told  here  as  briefly  as  possible. 
Catilina,  who  had  already  been  twice  defeated,  was 
to  stand  once  more  for  the  consulship,  in  the  interest 
of  all  the  discontented  classes  in  Italy  ;  of  all  who 
had  nothing  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose  by  the 
advent  of  another  Sulla.  Among  these  were  the 
Sullan  veterans,  who  had  a  precarious  tenure  of  their 
allotments,  and  had  never  taken  kindly  to  agriculture ; 
the  landless  folk  who  had  been  dispossessed  for  their 
benefit ;  the  sons  of  exiled  Marians ;  the  ruined  young 
nobles  of  the  capital,  as  well  as  in  part  its  idle  prole- 
tariate. Then  there  were  the  Transpadani,  urged,  as 
we  have  seen,  by  Caesar  to  assert  their  claim  to  the  full 
citizenship ;  and  some  at  least  of  the  Transalpine  Gauls, 
driven  by  Roman  misgovernment  into  sympathy  with 
any  movement  of  this  kind.  And  as  even  the  vast 
slave  population  seems  to  have  been  prepared  to  rise, 
we  may  look  on  the  scheme  as,  in  some  sense,  what 
we  should  now  call  a  great  uprising  of  labour  against 
capital ;  an  attempt  at  social  revolution,  an  attack  of 
the  uncomfortable  against  the  wealthy  classes,  as 
well  as  a  precautionary  movement  in  view  of  the 
alarming  power  of  Pompeius.  If  Catilina  were  not 
elected,  then  armed  violence  was  to  be  resorted  to ; 
an  army  was  to  be  formed  in  Italy,  the  city,  unpro- 
tected by  police,  was  to  be  set  on  fire,  and,  in  the 
midst  of  a  general  upheaval,  all  debts  were  to  be 
cancelled  and  the  most  radical  programme  of  demo- 
cratic speculation  to  be  realised. 

Catilina    failed  ;    the    senatorial    party    postponed 


63  B.C.]  Conspiracy  of  Catilina.  8i 

the  election,  strained  every  nerve,  and  secured  the 
success  of  their  own  weak  candidates,  Silanus  and 
Murena.  The  conspirators  at  once  began  to  put 
their  further  plans  in  execution,  but  they  were 
already  known  to  too  many.  Information  came  to 
Cicero  in  plenty.  He  knew  that  a  rebel  force  was 
being  concentrated  at  Faesulae,  in  Etruria,  under  a 
vigorous  soldier,  Manlius,  and  that  there  was  to  be 
a  rising  in  the  city  itself,  which  (so  it  was  alleged) 
was  to  be  burnt  down,  while  his  own  assassination 
was  contemplated,  with  that  of  the  other  leading 
optimates.  Early  in  November  the  Senate  un- 
sheathed that  dangerous  weapon  of  which  Caesar 
had  tried  to  rob  it  by  the  prosecution  of  Rabirius, 
and  proclaimed  a  state  of  war,  giving  the  consuls 
unlimited  power  "  for  the  protection  of  the  state 
against  all  harm."  Catilina  left  Rome  to  join  the 
army  at  Faesulae,  leaving  the  plot  in  the  city  in  the 
hands  of  the  other  chief  conspirators — Lentulus, 
Cethegus,  Gabinius,  and  Statilius.  On  December 
4th,  upon  information  given  by  the  envoys  of  the 
Allobroges,  these  four  men,  with  one  Caeparius,  who 
was  believed  to  have  been  planning  a  slave-rising  in 
Apulia,  were  arrested  under  the  powers  conferred  on 
the  consuls  by  the  Senate's  decree,  and  given  into 
the  custody  of  eminent  senators ;  Gabinius  and 
Statilius  were  allotted  to  Crassus  and  Caesar,  without 
doubt  in  order  to  compel  them  either  to  act  with  the 
government  or  openly  to  proclaim  themselves  rebels. 
The  next  morning  Cicero  summoned  the  Senate 
to  advise  him  as  to  what  should  be  done  with  the 

prisoners.     He   presided    as    consul    and,   according 
6 


^H02 


82  yulius   CcBsar,  l65B.C.~ 

to  practice,  called  on  the  senators  in  a  certain  due 
order  to  give  him  their  advice.  The  first  who  spoke 
was  Silanus,  the  consul-elect,  who  proposed  that  the 
prisoners  should  be  put  to  death.  Next  came  the 
members  who  had  already  been  consuls,  and  these 
all  followed  the  lead  of  Silanus.  Tiberius  Nero,  the 
grandfather  of  the  Emperor,  suggested  that  the  pris- 
oners should  be  detained  and  the  question  adjourned. 
Caesar  then  rose  and  delivered  a  speech  which  was 
long  remembered,  and  which  fully  attained  its  object 
of  vindicating  the  democratic  view  of  the  constitu- 
tion, while  at  the  same  time  it  extricated  himself 
from  a  dilemma.  He  was  in  a  difficult  position  ; 
he  could  not  vote  for  the  punishment  of  death 
without  stultifying  his  whole  career,  yet  by  actually 
defending  the  conspirators,  or  even  by  asking  for 
lenient  treatment,  he  would  be  all  but  acknowledging 
himself  an  accomplice. 

He  began  by  deprecating  the  indulgence  at  such 
a  crisis  of  any  passionate  feeling,  whether  hatred, 
affection,  anger,  or  pity  ;  previous  speakers  had  tried 
to  rouse  such  feelings  by  rhetorical  pictures  of  the 
horrors  of  war  and  rebellion,  but  their  eloquence  was 
quite  alien  to  the  matter  in  hand.  The  anger  so  ex- 
cited would  be  inevitably  interpreted  some  day  as 
cruelty.  "  Not  that  Silanus  has  proposed  death  in 
a  cruel  spirit  ;  he  is  himself  a  moderate  and  humane 
man.  And,  indeed,  for  the  crimes  we  have  to  deal 
with,  no  penalty  is  in  itself  too  cruel ;  death  at  least 
cannot  be  so,  for  it  puts  an  end  to  the  misery  of  this 
life  and  brings  no  fresh  torment  in  another.  But  the 
penalty  will  be  looked  on  as  cruel,  simply  because  it 


63  B.C.I  Conspiracy  of  Catilina.  %'^. 

is  unconstitutional.  It  has  been  over  and  over  again 
forbidden  by  express  legislation  to  scourge  or  kill  a 
citizen  without  trial.  You  do  not  propose  to  scourge 
these  men,  presumably  because  the  law  forbids  it ; 
why,  then,  do  you  propose  to  put  them  to  death? 
Both  penalties  are  equally  illegal.  I  must  remind 
you  also  of  the  precedent  your  action  will  create. 
Once  place  such  a  power  as  you  claim  in  the  hands 
of  a  government,  and  you  cannot  put  a  limit  on  its 
use  ;  it  may  and  will  be  used  against  good  and  bad 
alike,  as  it  was  by  the  Thirty  at  Athens,  and  in  our 
own  recollection  by  Sulla.  I  do  not  fear  this  now, 
or  with  Cicero  as  consul ;  but  I  will  not  answer  for 
the  power  of  the  sword  in  the  hands  of  future  con- 
suls. Let  us  abide  by  the  law,  and  not  seek  in  a 
panic  to  overrule  it.  My  advice  is,  not,  indeed,  that 
we  let  these  men  go,  and  thus  increase  the  resources 
of  Catilina ;  but  that  we  commit  them  for  life  to  close 
custody  in  the  largest  Italian  towns,  securing  them 
by  holding  over  each  town  the  heaviest  possible 
penalty  in  case  they  should  escape.  And  I  further 
propose  that  we  pass  a  decree  embodying  our  opinion 
that  no  proposal  touching  them  shall  be  made  hence- 
forward either  in  senate  or  assembly ;  and  that  dis- 
regard of  this  decree  be  treated  by  the  Senate  as  high 
treason  against  the  state."  "^ 

This  is  the  speech  of  a  statesman,   though  of  a 
statesman  in  some  embarrassment.     The  calm  cour- 


*  I  have  given  the  substance  of  the  speech  put  into  Caesar's  mouth 
by  Sallust  in  his  "  Catilina."  Plutarch  tells  us  (Cato,  24)  that  short- 
hand was  used  in  this  debate  ;  and  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that 
in  outline  Caesar's  speech  was  much  as  Sallust  has  represented  it. 


84  yulius   CcBsar.  [65  b.c- 

tesy  and  moderate  tone  of  it  are  quite  in  keeping  with 
what  we  know  from  other  sources  of  Caesar's  style  of 
oratory.  In  its  thorough  grasp  of  the  situation,  and 
its  adhesion  to  the  issue,  it  falls  in  with  all  we  have 
to  learn  of  the  character  and  intellect  of  the  speaker. 
He  fully  accepts  the  proofs  of  the  conspiracy,  and 
fully  acknowledges  the  guilt  of  the  conspirators,  but 
he  declines  to  vote  for  a  punishment  that  would  be 
simply  remedying  one  evil  by  another.  As  always 
in  this  period  of  his  life,  it  is  the  memory  of  the 
long  struggle  for  constitutional  freedom  that  is 
uppermost  in  his  mind  ;  and  he  applies  the  principles 
of  his  party  with  force  and  point  to  the  present 
issue.  The  Senate  cannot  override  the  laws,  without 
risking  the  recoil  of  their  lawlessness  on  their  own 
heads.  "  We  have  confidence  in  the  laws,"  he 
might  have  added,  had  he  been  speaking  in  the 
forum  ;  '*  but  in  these  days  we  have  no  longer  the 
old  confidence  in  the  Senate."  There  is  a  covert 
threat  implied,  but  it  is  expressed  with  tact  and 
delicacy.  ''  The  more  violent  your  measures,"  he 
seems  to  hint,  "  the  more  you  tempt  the  democracy 
and  its  leaders  to  act  with  violence,  in  the  day, 
which  will  surely  come,  when  they  will  be  again  in 
power." 

vThe  weak  point  in  the  speech  is  the  practical 
course  suggested,  as  Cicero  did  not  fail  to  point  out. 
So  powerful,  however,  was  Caesar's  appeal  to  consti- 
tutional law,  that  several  leading  members  of  the 
Senatorial  party  were  strongly  affected  by  it. 
Cicero's  brother  Quintus,  who,  as  a  praetor-elect, 
must   have    followed    close  on  Caesar,  signified    his 


63  B.C.]  Conspiracy  of  Catilina.  85 

agreement  with  it.  Silanus  rose  a  second  time  to 
explain  away  his  former  speech,  and  to  state  his 
intention  to  vote  with  Tiberius  Nero  for  delay. 
Cicero  thought  it  time  to  intervene ;  he  could  do 
this,  as  consul,  at  any  stage  of  the  debate.  He 
criticised  Caesar's  proposal  with  caution,  claiming 
him  cleverly  as  a  loyal  supporter  of  the  constitution  ; 
and  he  let  it  be  seen,  though  without  the  eloquence 
of  conviction,  that  he  preferred  the  penalty  of  death. 
Such  a  speech  could  not  efface  the  impression  Caesar 
had  made,  and  the  minor  penalty  seemed  likely  to 
be  carried.  Then  Cato,  in  a  speech  taken  down 
accurately  at  the  time  by  Cicero's  order,  and  given 
in  abstract  by  Sallust,  warmly  urged  the  Senate  not 
to  be  weak,  but  to  realise  their  danger,  and  save  the 
state,  as  their  fathers  had  so  often  saved  it.  "  The 
prisoners  have  confessed  their  guilt,"  he  concluded. 
"  Our  law  allows  the  criminal  taken  in  the  act  to  be 
punished  without  trial.  These  men  are  in  the  same 
position,  and  we  have  a  right  to  put  them  to  death.'* 
This  legal  quibble,  and  the  appeal  to  act  like  men, 
decided  the  wavering  Senate,  and  a  majority  voted 
for  immediate  execution.  Cicero  and  other  magis- 
trates escorted  the  five  prisoners  through  the  forum, 
to  the  state  dungeon  under  the  Capitol,  where  they 
were  at  once  strangled.  The  consul  was  for  the 
moment  the  idol  of  the  frightened  populace,  who 
had  no  wish  to  see  fire  and  sword  at  work  in  their 
city.  Caesar  was  so  unpopular  that  he  barely 
escaped  with  his  life  in  returning  from  the  Senate  to 
his  own  house.  This  is  not  the  place  to  argue  out 
the  much  debated  question  as  to  which  of  the  two 


86  Julius   Ccesar.  [63  B.C. 

was  right  in  the  abstract.  It  is  obvious  that  Cicero 
held  one  view  of  the  constitution,  and  Caesar  another. 
Cicero  beheved  in  constitutional  practice,  and  in  the 
senatorial  prerogative  which  that  practice  had 
created.  I  Caesar  believed  in  constitutional  law,  and, 
looking  at  the  facts  of  the  case  and  the  history  of 
the  last  sixty  years,  refused  to  repose  confidence  in 
the  use  of  the  senatorial  prerogative.!  The  difference 
of  opinion  was  not  unlike  that  between  Royalist  and 
Roundhead  at  the  outset  of  the  English  Civil  War; 
prerogative  and  the  necessities  of  government  were 
on  one  side,  law  and  distrust  of  rulers  on  the  other. 
In  each  case,  though  much  might  be  said  for  both 
views  in  an  abstract  argument,  no  one  who  read  the 
signs  of  the  times  intelligently  could  doubt  that 
victory  would  eventually  declare  for  that  side  which 
most  accurately  represented  the  feelings  and  tend- 
encies of  the  age.  In  the  Italy  of  that  day,  as  in  the 
England  of  Charles  I.,  peace,  order,  and  comfort 
were  earnestly  desired  by  the  great  mass  of  the 
people ;  but  neither  Senate  nor  King  could  harmonise 
society  under  such  a  strong  government  as  would 
secure  these  blessings.  When  such  a  government 
did  at  last  arise,  it  was  in  each  case  the  government 
of  a  single  man,  resting  on  military  force,  but  ex- 
pressing in  some  degree  the  will  and  the  needs  of  a 
weary  and  distracted  people. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PR^TORSHIP,  AND   FORMATION   OF   TRIUMVIRATE. 

62-60   B.C. 


HE  conspiracy,  quelled  in  the 
city  by  the  execution  of  the 
ringleaders,  was  soon  brought 
to  an  end  by  the  defeat  and 
death  of  Catilina  in  Etruria, 
after  a  struggle  which  showed 
the  finer  qualities  of  the  man 
of  whom  Cicero  afterwards 
allowed  that  he  had  "  the  out- 
lines of  virtue  without  the 
details.'"^  The  two  parties  were  now  compelled  to 
turn  their  attention  again  more  closely  to  Pompeius, 
who  was  expected  in  Italy  at  any  moment.  To  resist 
him  was  hopeless,  if  he  chose  to  come  as  conqueror. 
All  the  democratic  attempts  to  set  up  a  military 
power  against  him  had  failed,  as  we  have  seen  ;  the 
senatorial  party  was  equally  helpless,  for  they  had 

*  When  defending  Caelius  in  56  B.C.      See  Pro  Caelio,  ch.  v.,  ii. 

87 


SS  yulius   Ccesar.  L62  B.C.- 

only  the  one  small  army  in  the  field  which  had  de- 
feated Catilina.  Rome  and  Italy  were  entirely  at 
his  mercy  ;  this  year  was  the  zenith  of  his  greatness, 
and  his  cognomen  of  Magnus,  which  had  been  given 
him  half  in  jest,  must  have  seemed  as  fully  justified 
as  Sulla's  surname,  "  the  Fortunate." 

When  a  conqueror  approaches  whom  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  resist,  the  natural  course  is  to  negotiate  with 
him  ;  where  force  is  wanting,  flattery  and  humility 
may  do  something.  To  this  policy  both  parties 
now  applied  themselves  in  opposition  to  each  other, 
and  to  a  cynical  looker-on  the  game  must  have  been 
sufficiently  amusing.  Cicero  wrote  more  than  once 
to  the  great  man  in  flattering  terms,  telling  him  that 
his  old  friends  the  democrats  were  now  his  enemies, 
and  that  a  great  career  lay  open  to  him  as  the  cham- 
pion of  the  Senate  and  the  constitution  ;  but  Cicero 
mixed  up  his  own  praises  too  much  with  those  of 
Pompeius,  and  he  had  nothing  solid  to  offer  him  but 
the  ''  agreement  of  the  orders  "  (see  p.  74).  Caesar 
and  the  democrats  went  about  the  work  with  better 
resources  and  more  substantial  diplomacy.  On  the 
first  day  of  his  praetorship  Caesar  proposed  to  the 
people  that  the  rebuilding  of  the  great  temple  on 
the  Capitol  (burnt  down  in  83  B.C.),  should  be  taken 
from  the  hands  of  Catulus,  who  had  been  dallying 
with  it  for  many  years,  and  entrusted  to  Pompeius. 
The  proposal  was  not  carried,  but  it  served  excel- 
lently as  a  declaration  of  policy.  Now,  too,  Caesar 
allied  himself  with  Pompeius'  own  agent,  Metellus 
Nepos  (tribune  this  year),  in  an  attempt  to  pass  a 
bill  appointing  the  great  general  to  a  military  com- 


60  B.C.]  PrcBtorship.  89 

mand  in  Italy,  under  the  pretext  of  putting  out  the 
embers  of  Catilina's  rebellion.  This  bill  was  stopped 
by  Cato's  veto,  and  by  an  outbreak  of  rioting,  which 
called  forth  a  fresh  declaration  of  martial  law  from 
the  Senate.  Caesar  and  Nepos  were  deprived  of  their 
offices  under  this  decree  ;  they  refused  to  obey,  and 
more  violence  followed.  |  Caesar,  thus  finding  himself 
in  the  position  of  a  riot-leader,  to  him  utterly  dis- 
tasteful, used  his  influence  with  the  mob  to  quiet  it, 
and  shut  himself  up  in  his  house  ;  the  Senate  then 
cancelled  the  deprivation,  and  peace  was  restored. 
The  affair  was  not  creditable  to  either  party  ;  but 
Caesar's  main  object  was  gained  of  letting  Pompeius 
see  that  their  interests  were  now  again  the  samef  A 
really  free-handed  policy  was  as  impossible  as  ever, 
with  a  military  despotism  impending  ;  the  only  thing 
to  do  was  to  make  the  best  possible  terms  with 
Pompeius,  and  to  wait  and  see  what  he  would  do. 

When  in  December  Pompeius  actually  landed  at 
Brundisium,  the  tension  must  have  been  extreme  ;  a 
very  few  days  might  see  all  political  parties  annihilated, 
and  Rome  at  the  mercy  of  a  dictator.  But  the 
cloud  suddenly  cleared  away.  No  sooner  had  he 
landed  than  Pompeius  dismissed  the  veteran  legions, 
renounced  all  idea  of  a  military  monarchy,  and  pro- 
ceeded slowly  to  Rome  only  to  claim  his  triumph, 
and  the  natural  influence  of  a  mighty  conqueror 
still  loyal  to  the  Republic.  This  act  of  renunciation, 
which  in  these  days  would  excite  no  wonder,  was  to 
the  Romans  of  62  B.C.  a  marvel  rather  of  stupidity 
than  of  self-denial.  There  could  not  have  been 
many,  who,  looking  at  the  events  of  the  last  sixty  or 


90  yulius   Qesar.  162  B.c- 

seventy  years,  really  believed  that  the  Republic  could 
continue  to  exist  without  supporting  itself  on  the 
strength  of  one  man  ;  and  the  majority  undoubtedly 
expected  something  more  than  a  Periclean  presi- 
dency. Great  must  have  been  their  amazement  when 
the  man  to  whom  the  greater  prize  was  offered  passed 
it  by,  and  announced  himself  content  with  the  lesser. 

This  lesser  prize — the  position  of  leader  and 
guardian  without  military  power — was  one  which 
Pompeius  might  honourably  claim ;  and  he  now 
found  a  warm  and  flattering  supporter  in  Cicero. 
But  from  the  first  the  notion  was  a  hopeless  one. 
Pompeius  was  far  too  ignorant  and  unskilful  to  exer- 
cise a  moral  influence  strong  enough  to  enable  him 
to  dispense  with  an  army  ;  Cicero  was  far  too  ego- 
tistic and  clever  to  keep  a  lasting  hold  on  a  man 
like  Pompeius.  And  indeed  the  times  were  utterly 
unsuited  to  any  such  fanciful  combination  of  empty 
prestige  and  versatile  talent.  \The  alliance  lasted 
but  a  few  months,  and  failed  because  neither  Pom- 
peius nor  Cicero  could  see  facts  as  they  were.] 
Within  a  year  from  Pompeius*  return,  both  he  and 
Cicero  were  helpless  and  alone,  and  the  prize  was 
still  open  to  the  next  man  who  should  claim  it. 

There  was  but  one  man  strong  and  bold  enough  to 
do  sp.  From  the  moment  of  Pompeius'  renuncia- 
tion^Caesar  saw  his  way  clearly.  Ambition  entered 
into  his  soul  ;  not  merely  the  old  ambition  of  making 
the  best  of  untoward  circumstances,  or  of  resuscitat- 
ing an  almost  extinct  political  party  ;  nor  yet  the 
mean  ambition  of  a  narrow  mind,  which  seeks  power 
for  its  own  sake  ;  but  an  irresistible  desire  to  get  his 


60  B.C.]  Prcstorship.  91 

hand  on  the  true  springs  of  power,  in  order  to  work 
them  for  the  salvation  of  the  state,  on  the  principles 
he  had  inherited  from  his  family  and  his  party.  So 
far  he  had  been  groping  blindly  for  them,  bafifled  at 
all  points,  and  misled  by  the  false  light  thrown  on 
all  objects  while  Pompeius'  intentions  were  doubtful ; 
now  all  was  clear,  the  levers  were  within  his  reach, 
consulship  and  proconsulship  were  certain,  and  if  all 
went  well,  the  power  would  be  in  his  hands  to  carry 
out  the  ideas  which  the  Gracchan  democracy  had 
initiated  Power  was  to  him,  as  to  Cromwell,  never 
more  than  a  means  to  an  end  ;  it  had  to  be  gained 
and  used  only  because  nothing  could  be  done  with- 
out it.  From  this  time  forward  it  was  the  work  to 
be  done  that  wholly  filled  his  mind  ;  and  till  his 
death,  seventeen  years  later,  he  never  once  slackened 
in  a  life  of  constant  and  unflagging  activity.  The  f 
month  of  December,  62  B.C.,  is  indeed  the  real  turn-  \ 
ing-point  in  his  career,  and  all  the  work  that  has  \ 
made  his  name  so  mighty  was  done  in  the  years  that  ^ 
followed/ 

Of  Caesar's  duties  as  praetor,  which  would  consist 
chiefly  in  the  discharge  of  judicial  business,  we  have 
no  information.  But  every  praetor,  when  his  year  of 
office  was  over,  became  a  propraetor,  and  the  gov- 
ernor of  a  province.  iThe  province  which  had  fallen 
to  Caesar  was  the  same  in  which  he  had  served  as 
quaestor,  viz.,  Further  Spain ;  it  had,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  special  attraction  for  a  man  who  revered  the 
memory  and  the  great  ideas  of  Sertorius,  and  he  had 
probably  used  his  influence  in  the  Senate  to  secure  it 
for  himself.   jThere  were  more  tempting  provinces  to 


92  yulius   CcBsar.  [62  B.C.- 

be  had,  and  nearer  home  ;  but  we  may  conjecture 
that  so  long  as  Pompeius'  intentions  were  doubtful, 
the  idea  in  Caesar's  mind  was  to  follow  in  Sertorius* 
footsteps,  and  make  once  more  of  this  distant  terri- 
tory a  civilised  Roman  home  for  the  oppressed 
democracy.  When  the  impending  absolutism  was 
renounced,  such  a  plan  was  no  longer  necessary ;  it 
was,  in  fact,  rather  inconvenient  than  otherwise  to 
have  to  go  so  far  from  home  at  a  time  when  the 
utmost  vigilance  was  necessary  to  prevent  Pompeius 
from  falling  under  the  influence  of  the  senatorial 
party  and  Cicero.  \  So  we  find  Csesar  postponing  his 
departure  for  some  time  in  the  spring  of  6i  B.C. ;  and 
this  delay  was  caused  not  only  by  his  desire  to  keep 
his  eye  on  Pompeius,  or  by  difficulties  with  his 
creditors,"^  but  by  a  startling  event  in  which  he  was 
himself  involved,  and  which  eventually  proved  to  be 
a  piece  of  good  fortune  for  himself  and  his  party.  | 

On  the  night  of  December  5,  62  B.C.,  there  had 
been,  as  usual,  a  meeting  of  matrons  in  the  house  of 
the  Pontifex  Maximus,  to  celebrate  the  mysteries  of 
an  ancient  Roman  agricultural  deity,  usually  called 
the  Good  Goddess.  Only  women  were  admitted, 
and  Caesar  himself  was  of  course  absent.  His  mother 
Aurelia,  and  his  wife  Pompeia,  were  to  receive  the 
worshippers ;  the  elder  lady,  if  Plutarch  is  right, 
being  at  this  time  in  some  anxiety  as  to  the  conduct 
of  the  younger.  Her  fears  were  justified  ;  for  in  the 
dead  of  night  a  suspected  lover,  a  young  quaestor- 
elect  named  Publius  Clodius,  was  detected  by  a  ser- 
vant-maid   disguised    in    woman's    dress,    and   was 

♦Suet.,  19. 


JULIUS  C/ESAR. 

ENLARGED  FROM  GEM  IN  BRITISH  MUSEUM. 


JULIUS  OESAR. 

FROM   COIN  IN  BRITISH   MUSEUM. 


60  B.C.]  PrcBtorship.  93 

identified  and  detained  by  Aurelia.  Such  sacrilege 
was  a  serious  crime,  even  in  the  eyes  of  educated 
sceptics ;  it  was  committed  in  the  house  of  the  head 
of  the  State-system  of  reHgion,  and  his  wife  was  now 
an  object  of  grave  suspicion.  A  people  who  believed 
so  profoundly  in  good  and  bad  omens  as  the  Romans 
did,  could  not  but  be  greatly  disturbed  ;|'and  Caesar 
at  once  divorced  Pompeia,  saying  that  Caesar's  wife 
ought  not  to  be  even  so  much  as  suspected.  | 

I  The  trial  of  Clodius,  a  few  weeks  later,  raised  a 
commotion  which  well  illustrates  the  petty  nature  of 
party  spirit  at  the  time,  but  does  not  specially  con- 
cern us  here.  ^  After  much  squabbling  as  to  the 
method  of  empanelling  the  special  jury  (for  there 
was  no  standing  court  for  cases  of  sacrilege),  Clodius 
was  finally  acquitted,  in  spite  of  the  clearest  evi- 
dence, by  the  usual  method  of  bribing  the  judges. 
Cicero  appeared  as  a  witness  for  the  prosecution, 
and  gained  the  lasting  enmity  of  the  accused. 
Caesar  was  also  called,  and  is  said  to  have  denied 
any  certain  knowledge  of  the  truth  of  the  matter, 
but  to  have  pointed  to  his  divorce  of  Pompeia  as  an 
indication  of  his  suspicions.  The  result,  according 
to  Cicero,  was  a  complete  defeat  for  the  senatorial 
party,  arising  from  their  own  weakness  and  want  of 
union,  and  a  severe  blow  to  the  *'  agreement  of  the 
orders,"  since  they  could  not  act  together  honestly 
even  as  judges  without  betraying  the  best  public 
interests  for  gold.  Pompeius,  too,  had  arrived  in 
Rome  during  the  excitement,  and  was  a  witness, 
himself  helpless,  of  the  helplessness  of  Cicero  and 
the  Senate. 


94  ytdius   CcBsar.  [62  B.C.- 

Caesar might  now  depart  for  Spain  without  any- 
serious  anxiety  as  to  an  alliance  between  Pompeius 
and  his  own  political  opponents.  The  two  men 
must  have  met  frequently  in  the  early  months  of 
this  year,  and  the  younger  had  probably  taken  a 
more  accurate  measure  of  his  future  rival's  calibre 
than  had  been  possible  before.  Pompeius,  for  those 
who  knew  him  well,  was  an  amiable  and  engaging 
man,  honest  and  simple  even  to  awkwardness  ;  and 
Caesar,  with  his  courteous  and  conciliating  manner, 
his  genuine  admiration  for  the  other's  great  career, 
and  his  own  splendid  gifts  and  high  birth,  was  surely 
a  much  more  welcome  ally  than  Cicero,  who  was 
always  tutoring  Pompeiu^  to  his  face,  and  laughing 
at  him  behind  his  back.  |  Before  Caesar  left  Rome, 
the  two  had  no  doubt  already  made  some  way  in  the 
direction  of  friendship,  or  at  least  of  mutual  regard. 
With  Crassus,  whose  mind,  unlike  his  own,  was  small 
enough  to  harbour  jealousy  of  Pompeius,  he  was 
also  on  good  terms  ;  and  it  was  now  that  he  borrowed 
from  him  the  enormous  sum  of  eight  hundred  talents, 
in  order  to  satisfy  his  creditors  before  leaving  Italy.! 
Of  his  work  in  Spain  we  only  have  a  meagre 
account,  contained  in  two  short  chapters  of  Dio 
Cassius'  history.  Here  certainly  he  first  seriously 
addressed  himself  to  the  art  of  war.  War,  we  are 
told,  was  not  forced  on  him  in  the  province  ;  but 
he  undertook  two  campaigns  against  the  hill  tribes 
of  the  far  West,  which  may  have  been  making  raids 
on  the  civilised  Romans  and  their  subjects  in  the 
valleys  of  the  Tagus  and  Guadalquiver.  The  first 
field   of  operations  was  the  south   of  what    is   now 


60  B.C.]  Prcetorship,  95 

Portugal ;  the  second  was  the  mountain  tract  of 
Galicia,  where  his  army  seems  to  have  penetrated  to 
the  Atlantic.  In  each  case  the  land  force  was 
assisted  by  a  fleet.  He  was  everywhere  successful, 
and  he  must  have  learnt  many  lessons  in  the  art  of 
dealing  with  barbarian  enemies,  and  of  coping  with 
the  difficulties  of  warfare  in  a  country  as  yet  almost 
entirely  unknown. 

Of  his  civil  government  we  get  one  or  two  valua- 
ble glimpses.  The  provincials  were,  as  was  usual, 
deep  in  debt  ;  they  had  had  to  support  large  Roman 
armies  for  several  years  in  the  Sertorian  wars,  as  well 
as  to  pay  their  usual  tribute.  Caesar  ordered  each 
debtor  to  pay  two  thirds  of  his  income  to  the  credit, 
ors,  and  forbade  the  latter  to  seize  on  the  land  or 
capital  of  the  debtors  ;  thus  fairly  satisfying  the  one, 
and  saving  for  the  other  such  little  property  as  he 
possessed.  We  do  not  know  how  the  expedient 
answered  ;  but  it  would  seem  to  have  been  sug- 
gested by  the  same  rare  combination  of  practical 
justice  and  good-will  which  was  brought  to  bear, 
many  years  later,  on  the  economical  troubles  of  Italy. 

In  the  case  of  one  particular  city  we  incidentally 
get  a  glimpse  of  Caesar's  work  from  a  later  speech  of 
Cicero's.  The  ancient  Phoenician  city  of  Gades  (now 
Cadiz)  had  been,  ever  since  the  destruction  of  Car- 
thage, the  most  flourishing  port  of  the  western  seas. 
It  was  one  of  those  towns,  like  Massilia,  which  were 
nominally  free,  and  had  entered  into  alliance  with 
Rome.  It  had  its  own  local  government,  and  Caesar 
could  not  legally  interfere  with  it  except  within  the 
terms  of  its  treaty,  and   by  express  invitation.     It 


96  Julius   Ccesar.  L62  B.c- 

happened  that  a  wealthy  inhabitant  of  Gades,  who 
had  served  with  distinction  in  the  Roman  armies  in 
the  Sertorian  war,  had  been  made  a  Roman  citizen 
by  Pompeius  ;  this  man  had  taken  up  his  residence 
in  Rome  when  the  war  came  to  an  end,  and  had 
there  made  the  acquaintance  of  Caesar,  and  of  most 
of  the  leading  men  of  the  time.  Lucius  Cornelius 
Balbus,  as  he  had  been  called  since  his  admission  to 
the  Roman  citizenship,  had  now  returned  to  his 
native  country  as  C^S3.y's  prcefectus  fabrum  (chief  of 
engineers),  and  it  was  through  his  influence  with  the 
people  of  Gades  that  his  chief  was  called  in  to  reform 
their  laws  and  settle  their  internal  disputes.  We 
are  unluckily  in  the  dark  as  to  the  details  of  his 
reforms.  Cicero,  when  defending  Balbus  in  55  B.C., 
in  an  attack  brought  against  the  validity  of  his  en- 
franchisement, had  no  need  to  refer  to  them  except 
in  general  terms.  But  from  the  language  he  uses, 
and  from  what  we  know  of  the  extraordinary  pros- 
perity of  the  city  under  Augustus,  we  may  safely 
conclude  that  Caesar  and  Balbus  did  their  work  at 
once  thoroughly  and  judiciously.  The  laws,  Cicero 
says,  were  revised,  quarrels  were  settled,  certain  bar- 
barian practices  were  abolished,  and  honours  and  privi- 
leges conferred  on  the  citizens.  Twelve  years  later 
they  received  the  full  Roman  franchise  at  the  hands 
of  Caesar  ;  a  singular  token  not  only  of  his  regard 
for  themselves  and  Balbus,  but  of  the  breadth  of  his 
policy  towards  provincials,  and  of  his  faithfulness  to 
the  principles  of  the  democratic  party. 

The  man  who  was  thus  so  loyal  to  the  best  inter- 
ests of  his  native  city  remained  no  less  loyal  to   his 


60  B.C.]  Prcetorship.  97 

friend  and  commander.  From  this  time  to  the  day 
of  Caesar's  death,  he  acted  as  his  confidential  secre- 
tary and  agent,  and,  so  far  as  we  know,  there  never 
was  a  moment's  break  in  their  friendship.  Balbus 
must  have  been  a  man  of  singularly  happy  tempera- 
ment. He  knew  every  one,  and  he  quarrelled  with 
no  one.  He  was  ready  to  do  any  amount  of  work, 
to  travel  any  distance,  for  the  man  to  whom  he  had 
so  closely  attached  himself,  and  who  reposed  in  him 
such  unlimited  confidence.  He  inherited  an  excel- 
lent faculty  for  business  from  his  Phoenician  ances- 
tors, and  he  probably  understood  the  art  of  war 
thoroughly,  especially  in  the  department  of  mechan- 
ics and  engineering.  How  much  Caesar  owed  to  him 
in  military  matters  we  cannot  conjecture ;  but  we 
have  certain  evidence  of  his  invaluable  services  in 
delicate  negotiations,  and  in  the  management  of 
property ;  and  it  is  likely  enough  that  to  his  cool 
head  and  supple  disposition  Caesar  was  indebted  for 
something  at  least  of  that  singular  facility  for  sur- 
mounting difficulties  which  was  due  no  doubt  in  the 
first  place  to  his  own  firm  will.  Such  a  man  as 
Balbus  was  of  course  the  object  of  much  envy  and 
ill-will,  and  doubtless  he  looked  after  his  own  inter- 
ests as  well  as  those  of  Caesar ;  but  he  gained  and 
deserved  his  reward  for  faithful  service,  for  he 
eventually  rose,  though  not  in  Caesar's  lifetime,  to 
be  praetor  and  consul,  and  was  the  first  enfranchised 
foreigner  who  attained  to  the  highest  magistracy. 

Caesar  must  have  been  hard  at  work  in  the  spring 
of  60  B.C.,  to  carry  out  a  campaign  in  Galicia,  wind 
up  the  affairs  of  his  government,  and  travel  back  to 


gS  Julius   CcBsar,  [62  B.C.- 


Rome before  the  consular  election,  which  took  place 
usually  in  the  summer.  He  was,  however,  in  time  ; 
but  not  in  time  to  combine  the  triumph  which  the 
Senate  had  voted  him  with  the  personal  canvass  in 
the  city  which  was  at  this  time  necessary  for  a 
candidate.  |He  could  not  legally  pass  within  the 
walls  without  giving  up  his  imperium  or  military 
command,  with  his  lictors  and  insignia  ;  and  without 
these  no  triumph  was  possible.  He  was  placed  in  a 
dilemma,  and  one  which  was  evidently  carefully 
prepared  for  him  by  his  opponents  ;  either  he  must 
submit  to  be  disqualified  as  a  candidate,  or  he  must 
give  up  the  triumph.  {  Unhesitatingly  he  chose  the 
latter  alternative,  and  showed  his  enemies  at  once 
what  stuff  he  was  made  of.  I  There  were  two  other 
candidates :  Bibulus,  his  old  colleague  and  opponent 
as  aedile  and  praetor,  now  the  representative  of  the 
ultra-senatorial  party  ;  and  Lucceius,  a  man  of 
wealth  and  ability,  with  whom,  though  he  was  a 
moderate  optimate,  Caesar  had  formed  an  agreement 
for  common  action  and  common  expenditure  before 
he  left  Italy  for  Spain.  Caesar  was  himself  elected, 
but  the  Senate  was  strong  enough  to  bring  in  Bibu- 
lus, who  is  said  to  have  spent  as  much  money  on 
the  election  as  the  other  two  together. 

There  had  never  been  any  real  doubt  about  this 
result.  The  ultra-senatorial  party,  by  a  suicidal 
policy  of  spitefulness,  had  made  Caesar's  election 
more  certain  than  that  of  their  own  candidate. 
They  had  checked  and  worried  Pompeius  by  refus- 
ing to  ratify  his  arrangements  in  the  East,  by  dis- 
couraging his  expectation  of  a  second  consulship,  by 


60  B.C.]  Prcetorship.  99 

criticising  and  opposing  his  plans  for  rewarding  his 
veterans  by  allotments  of  lands  in  Italy;  and  thus 
they  deliberately  drove  him  once  more  into  the  arms 
of  Caesar  and  the  democracy.  Bitterly  must  he 
have  rued  the  day  when  he  gave  up  his  army  in 
loyalty  to  such  a  set  of  meddling  ingrates  ;  and  in 
sore  vexation  of  spirit,  he  brought  all  his  influence 
to  bear  in  Caesar's  favour.  And  another  powerful 
interest  was  exerted  unexpectedly  on  his  behalf — 
that  of  the  equites,  including  the  whole  of  the  pub- 
licani,  or  farmers  of  the  taxes.  The  agreement  of 
the  orders  had  lately  gone  quite  to  pieces,  and  with 
it  all  Cicero's  hopes  of  a  really  strong  conservative 
party.  We  have  already  seen  that  in  his  opinion 
the  acquittal  of  Clodius  had  done  much  to  damage 
this  highly  valued  alliance  ;  since  then  war  had 
openly  broken  out  between  the  two  orders.  The 
publicani  had  demanded  a  reduction  of  their  con- 
tract for  the  revenue  due  from  the  province  of  Asia; 
the  Senate,  urged  by  Cato,  refused  it.  "  The  equites 
have  declared  war  against  the  Senate,"  wrote  Cicero, 
sadly.  They  were  disgracefully  wrong,  he  tells  us, 
and  Cato  unquestionably  right ;  but  in  this  case  rec- 
titude should  be  sacrificed  to  keep  alive  the  indis- 
pensable alliance.  Cato  destroyed  it  in  the  cause  of 
rectitude  ;  and  the  equites  transferred  their  support 
tp  the  Senate's  political  enemies. 
\  So  Caesar  was  elected  without  difificulty,  and  now 
had  only  to  secure  his  position  and  strengthen  his 
influence  by  what  was  to  him  the  thoroughly  con- 
genial task  of  conciliation.  \.  The  springs  of  action 
were  now  under  his  hands,  and  the  democracy  had 


lOO  yulius   CcBsar,  [62  B.c- 

at  last  a  consul  who  would  not  hesitate  to  use  them. 
But  every  statesman  who  pursues  a  daring  policy  in 
a  weak  and  selfish  age  must  expect  to  be  hampered 
and  opposed  at  every  step  ;  and  he  must  prepare 
not  only  for  vexatious  opposition,  but  for  hatred 
and  treachery.  Caesar  knew  indeed  that  he  could 
not  altogether  escape  either  opposition  or  hatred ; 
but  he  set  himself  to  defeat  the  one  and  neutralise 
the  other  by  recruiting  his  own  political  forces  with 
every  possible  interest  and  influence  that  could  be 
brought  into  any  kind  of  an  alliance  with  him.  And 
he  did  succeed  in  bringing  together  a  combination 
of  forces  which  for  the  time  constituted  a  really 
strong  government ;  a  combination  which  left  its 
mark  for  ever  on  the  history  of  Rome  and  of  the 
world./ 

First,  it  was  absolutely  essential  that  he  should 
have  on  his  side  the  immense  reputation  and  the 
dormant  military  strength  of  Pompeius.  It  was 
not  so  difficult  to  achieve  this  end  ;  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  Pompeius  had  been  slighted  and  irritated  by 
the  senatorial  party,  and  was  at  this  moment  in 
sore  need  of  help  to  carry  out  his  promises  to  his 
veterans  and  to  get  the  sanction  of  the  Senate  for 
his  arrangements  in  the  East.  Under  the  circum- 
stances, then,  his  best  course  was  clearly  to  swallow 
all  jealous  feeling,  and  to  ally  himself  with  the  only 
man  who  was  likely  to  help  him  out  of  his  difficul- 
ties ;  whether  he  looked  further  ahead,  or  realised  in 
any  sense  what  this  coalition  might  result  in,  we 
cannot  even  conjecture.  But  we  may  be  sure  that 
he  needed  delicate  management  in  such  a  negotia- 


60  B.C.]        Formation  of  Triumvirate.  loi 

tion  ;  and  it  was  fortunate  for  both  parties  in  it  that 
they  had  a  common  friend  and  a  faithful  servant  in 
the  patient  and  astute  Balbus. 

A  much  harder  task  lay  before  Caesar  in  his  dealings 
with  the  other  personage  who  was  indispensable  to 
him.  He  must  still  have  been  deep  in  debt  to  Crassus, 
and  might  yet  need  both  his  purse  and  his  good- 
will. He  had  been  for  many  years  in  close  political 
alliance  with  him,  but  it  was  unlucky  that  one  chief 
object  of  that  alliance  had  been  to  defeat  the  sup- 
posed ends  of  Pompeius.  |  For  Caesar  it  was  easy 
enough  to  combine  with  the  old  enemy  ;  here  his  in- 
terest and  his  generous  temper  were  entirely  at  one. 
But  Crassus  had  never  really  been  on  cordial  terms 
with  Pompeius,  and  his  disposition  seems  to  have 
been  a  narrow  if  not  a  mean  one.  Still,  he  too  was 
looking  for  a  second  consulship,  and  dreaming  of 
military  commands  which  should  enable  him  to  outdo 
even  the  mighty  deeds  of  his  rival ;  and  rather  than 
fall  out  of  the  race  altogether,  he  would  consent  to  a 
second  reconciliation.  It  was  possible  that  he  and 
Pompeius  might  act  in  some  sort  of  harmony,  with 
the  courteous  Caesar  at  hand  to  charm  away  their 
rising  irritation. | 

There  was  one  other  person  whom  it  was  most 
desirable  not  to  have  as  an  antagonist,  and  whose 
adhesion  to  the  new  power  would  give  it  the  aid  of 
a  brilliant  intellect  and  an  influence  not  to  be  de- 
spised. That  Cicero,  even  in  a  minority,  was  a  real 
power  in  the  Senate,  is  beyond  all  question.  He 
was  no  less  powerful  in  the  law-courts ;  and  then  his 
circle  of  acquaintance  was  large  and  influential,  and 


I02  yulius   Ccesar.  [62  B.c- 

his  fame  widely  spread  in  the  country  towns  of 
Italy.  His  policy  of  the  agreement  of  the  orders 
had  indeed  broken  down  of  late,  but  he  was  clever 
enough  to  repair  the  damage  on  the  first  chance 
that  offered.  Their  old  friendship,  and  Cicero's 
former  connection  with  the  anti-Sullan  party,  made 
it  quite  natural  for  Caesar  to  ask  for  his  support ;  and 
the  invaluable  Balbus  was  entrusted  with  the  mes- 
sage. Cicero  tells  Atticus  "^  that  Balbus  had  been 
with  him,  and  had  promised  that  Caesar  in  his  con- 
sulship would  consult  him  equally  with  Pompeius, 
and  would  undertake  that  Crassus  should  not  be  a 
difficulty  in  the  way  of  either.  But  Cicero  had  his 
suspicions  that  these  men  would  not^abide  by  those 
traditions  of  the  constitution  which  had  become 
sacred  to  him  since  his  consulship  ;  he  would  not 
compromise  himself,  and  this  attempt  at  negotiation 
failed. 

There  was  no  other  man  of  mark  strong  enough 
to  be  an  object  of  solicitude,  for  Cato  was  of  course 
hopeless.  So  the  coalition  was  composed  of  the 
three,  Caesar,  Pompeius,  and  Crassus.  There  is  noth- 
ing, except  the  evidence  of  much  later  writers,  to 
show  that  it  was  a  conspiracy  to  override  the  consti- 
tution. ^  It  was  at  first  in  fact  no  more  than  the 
attempt  of  a  strong  man,  just  succeeding  to  the 
highest  magistracy,  to  turn  that  magistracy  to 
thoroughly  good  account  by  uniting  v/ith  his  own 
interests  those  of  the  most  influential  persons  in 
the  state.  It  was  an  expedient  to  prevent  useless 
squabbling,  waste  of  time,   and   obstruction,  when 

*  Ad  Att.,  ii.,  2. 


60  B.C.]        Forfnation  of  Triumvirate. 


103 


matters  of  vital  importance  had  to  be  settled  ;  to 
secure,  as  we  should  say,  a  working  majority  for  a 
vigorous  democratic  policyj  Naturally  enough,  when 
that  policy  took  a  definite  shape  in  the  following 
year,  it  suffered  from  the  very  nature  of  a  coalition, 
as  well  as  from  the  bitter  opposition  brought  against 
it ;  and  the  bitterness  of  its  enemies  transformed  the 
coalition  itself  from  an  honourable  union  into  the 
semblance  of  a  three-headed  tyranny.  There  were 
of  course  personal  ambitions  in  the  minds  of  each 
of  the  three  ;  there  were  provinces  to  be  ruled,  and 
armies  to  be  commanded.  But  such  prospects  were 
equally  before  every  Roman  who  was  mounting  the 
ladder  of  political  fame  ;  and  it  cannot  be  proved 
that  either  Caesar,  Pompeius,  or  Crassus,  any  more 
than  the  rest,  seriously  thought  as  yet  of  using  such 
power  to  destroy  an  ancient  constitution. 


^C;r^^-:i 


THREE-HEADED   TYRRANY 


CHAPTER  VII. 

CiESAR'S  FIRST  CONSULSHIP. 
59  B.C. 

E  have  now  to  see  how  Caesar 
used  the  opportunity  for 
which  he  had  been  looking 
so  long.  So  far  he  has  had 
no  fair  chance  of  showing 
his  real  character  as  a  states- 
man ;  but  in  this  year,  59 
B.C.,  we  watch  his  every  act 
with  the  utmost  interest,  and 
with  the  feeling  that  our 
judgment  of  the  rest  of  his  great  career  must  inevit- 
ably be  influenced  by  the  result  of  our  examination. 
We  have  to  determine  whether  he  was  true  to  his 
own  political  principles,  as  well  as  to  his  political 
allies  ;  whether  he  did  his  best  to  overcome  diffi- 
culties wisely ;  whether  he  yielded  to  the  obvious 
temptation  of  imitating  Marius  and  Cinna,  the  last 
democratic  holders  of  power,  and  of  making  himself 
and  his  party  secure  by  measures  of  violence. 

104 


59  B.C.]         CcBsar  s  First  Consulship.  105 

Appian  and  Dio  Cassius  are  agreed  that  he  began 
his  work  with  studied  moderation.  He  treated  the 
Senate  with  marked  respect  ;  he  appealed  in  its 
presence  to  his  colleague  Bibulus  to  act  in  harmony 
with  him  for  the  public  interest  ;  and  he  revived  an 
old  practice  which  gave  to  Bibulus,  as  the  senior 
consul,  the  advantage  of  being  preceded  by  his  lie- 
tors  during  the  first  month  of  the  year,  while  he 
himself  had  only  a  single  servant  to  go  before  him, 
his  lictors  following  behind.  All  this  we  may  inter- 
pret, with  Appian,  if  we  please,  as  a  piece  of  fine 
acting  ;  but  it  is  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
Caesar  was  quite  in  earnest,  though  probably  without 
much  hope  of  success.  The  history  of  his  party  sup- 
plied him  with  an  admirable  model  for  such  a  policy. 
Gains  Gracchus  was  by  far  the  ablest  leader  that  party 
had  as  yet  produced  ;  and  there  is  such  a  striking 
resemblance  between  his  use  of  power  and  Caesar's 
that  we  are  strongly  tempted  to  believe  that  it  was 
not  wholly  accidental.  Gracchus  worked  by  using 
his  unrivalled  personal  charm,  by  his  eloquence,  by 
his  indefatigable  industry  ;  these  were  qualities  which 
Caesar  too  possessed,  and  it  is  only  natural  to  sup- 
pose that  he  was  ready  to  make  the  most  of  them. 

His  first  act  was  democratic  in  its  tendency,  but 
in  itself  reasonable  and  suited  to  the  needs  of  the 
age.  Hitherto  the  proceedings  of  the  Senate  had 
been  strictly  private  •;  more  so  by  far  than  those  of 
the  English  Houses  of  Parliament  before  the  author- 
ised publication  of  debates.  Any  one  who  chose 
might  publish  his  own  speeches,  and  a  record  of  de- 
bate was  kept  in  the  Senate's  archives  ;  but  all  that 


io6  yulius    CcBSM ,  [59  B.C. 


the  outside  world  knew  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
assembly  which  had  so  long  ruled  their  destinies  was 
derived  from  informal  harangues  of  the  senators  in 
the  forum,  or  from  the  publication  of  the  senatorial 
decrees  which  had  been  passed.  I  Through  Caesar's 
influence,  a  summary  of  each  debate,  containing  a 
list  of  the  various  proposals  made,  was  now  exposed 
to  view  in  the  forum,  and  could  be  copied  by  any 
one  who  wished  to  do  so.  This  must  have  been  a 
great  convenience  to  absentees  in  the  provinces,  who 
could  now  get  accurate  information  as  to  what  was 
doing  at  home ;  but  it  had  more  important  results. 
/It  was  part  of  a  deliberate  attempt  to  make  the 
/Senate  feel  itself  at  once  more  representative  and 
[more  responsible.!  Neither  Caesar  nor  any  other 
Roman  statesman  ever  thought  of  doing  without 
the  Senate ;  but  the  Senate,  if  it  were  really  to  do 
good  work  in  an  imperial  state,  must  be  felt,  under- 
stood, and  criticised.  It  must  be  in  touch  with  the 
worldwide  interests  over  which  it  ought  to  watch.  It 
must  cease  to  be  the  mere  council  of  a  city-state, 
and  must  begin  to  recognise  the  fact  that  the  eyes 
of  the  whole  civilised  world  are  fixed  upon  it. 

But  this  was  only  a  preliminary  step.  The  first 
piece  of  real  work  to  be  done  was  to  fulfil  the  en- 
gagement entered  into  with  Pompeius,  and  to  make 
some  settlement  for  his  veterans,  who  had  now  been 
hanging  about  the  capital  for  quite  two  years,  and 
increasing  the  number  of  those  who  lived  on  the 
public  distribution  of  cheap  corn.  It  is  not  easy  for 
us  to  realise  the  economical  difficulties  which  had 
arisen  since  these  great  armies  of  professional  soldiers 


JULIUS  C/ESAR. 

FROM   BUST  NUMBERED  107  IN  THE  VATICAN   MUSEUM,   ROME. 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship,  107 

had  taken  the  place  of  the  simple  citizen  soldiery  of 
the  older  Roman  system.  That  system  had  been 
proved  quite  unequal  to  the  needs  of  an  imperial 
state.  The  Roman  and  ItaHan  citizen  could  not 
endure  prolonged  service  in  the  provinces.  Disci- 
pline had  broken  down,  defeat  and  even  surrender 
were  becoming  ominously  frequent,  when  Marius  rev- 
olutionised the  whole  recruiting  system,  and  began  to 
pick  up  soldiers  wherever  he  could  lay  hands  on 
them,  disdaining  neither  the  very  poorest  Italians, 
nor  even  freedmen  and  slaves,  and  welcoming  the 
natives  of  the  provinces,  who  had  already  for  some 
time  been  serving  in  certain  special  capacities.  The 
result  was  avast  improvement  both  indiscipline  and 
organisation,  and  these  again  produced  a  marked 
rise  in  the  standard  of  generalship  and  in  the  whole 
art  of  war.  But  every  reform  creates  some  new  diffi- 
culty of  adjustment ;  and  long  before  Caesar's  consul- 
ship the  formidable  question  had  arisen,  what  was  to 
be  done  with  the  disbanded  warriors  from  the  long 
wars,  who  had  little  or  nothing  to  live  upon  but  the 
booty  they  rapidly  squandered,  and  who  had  lost  the 
taste  for  any  occupation  they  might  ever  have  had? 
These  were  not  men  like  Cromwell's  Ironsides,  stout 
yeomen  or  labourers,  whom  a  strong  sense  of  duty  to 
God  and  man  could  compel  to  lay  down  their  arms  and 
return  to  their  fields  when  the  word  was  given  them 
that  their  work  was  done.  The  difficulty  was  indeed 
a  most  serious  one,  and  would  in  a  healthy  state  have 
received  most  earnest  attention  from  the  govern- 
ment. But  the  Roman  state  was  no  longer  a  healthy 
one,  and  the  fact  that  each  great  general  had  been 


io8  yulius   Ccesar,  [59  B.C. 

left  to  shift  for  himself  and  his  veterans  as  he  best 
could,  is  one  of  the  most  striking  proofs  of  the  utter 
incapacity  of  the  Senate  to  administer  the  business 
of  a  vast  empire.  Marius  had  tried  to  combine  with 
a  tribune  for  the  passing  of  an  agrarian  law  which 
should  settle  his  soldiers"  on  the  land.  Sulla  had 
imitated  the  principle,  but  with  his  usual  high-hand- 
edness had  turned  a  peaceful  population  out  of  their 
homesteads  in  order  to  make  room  for  his  own  vet- 
erans, thus  remedying  one  evil  by  another.  Already 
the  bad  effects  of  such  expedients  had  been  felt  in  the 
appearance  of  an  idle  and  discontented  population, 
ready  to  serve  under  a  Lepidus  or  a  Catilina,  or  to 
find  its  way  back  to  the  overcrowded  city,  and  swell 
the  numbers  of  dangerous  banditti  who  thronged 
its  unprotected  streets.  And  yet  here  was  another 
army  to  be  disposed  of  somehow,  and  there  seemed 
to  be  no  other  way  of  dealing  with  it  than  by  trying 
once  more  to  find  sufficient  land  to  be  distributed  to 
the  men  in  allotments. 

Here  was  really  the  difficulty.  There  was  no 
longer  any  land  available  in  Italy  without  disturbing 
private  rights,  except  one  valuable  public  estate  in 
Campania,  and  one  or  two  other  smaller  properties 
These  public  lands  were  leased  to  tenants,  and  unless 
these  tenants  were  to  be  ejected  no  use  could  be 
made  of  the  land  for  distribution.  It  had  already 
been  proposed  to  eject  them  in  the  bill  of  RuUus, 
four  years  before  this  ;  and  Cicero  then  argued  with 
force  that  such  a  course  would  be  only  to  get  rid  of 
good  cultivators  in  order  to  put  in  men  who  were 
quite  unused  to  agriculture.     It  had  again  been  in 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship,  109 

part  proposed  in  60  B.C.,  in  the  bill  drawn  up  for 
Pompeius  by  a  tribune  Flavius  ;  and  again  Cicero 
had  opposed  himself  to  the  policy  of  using  the  little 
remaining  public  land  for  allotments.  If  this,  how- 
ever, were  not  done|  the  only  way  in  which  the  state 
could  procure  land  ivas  by  buying  it  from  private 
owners. 

This  was  what  Caesar  now  proposed  to  do.f  The 
purchase-money  was  not  difficult  to  find,  for  the 
incomings  from  Pompeius'  conquests  in  the  East  had 
greatly  enriched  the  treasury.  Dio  Cassius  states 
distinctly  that  the  Campanian  estate  was  excluded 
from  the  action  of  the  bill,  and  Cicero's  letters  show 
no  anxiety  about  this  property  until  the  end  of  April. 
The  general  object  of  the  measure,  as  it  was  first 
introduced  early  in  the  year,  must  have  been  to 
invite  private  owners  to  sell  their  lands  in  good  time, 
and  for  the  sum  at  which  they  were  valued  in  the 
registers  of  the  censors.  The  bill  was  to  be  carried 
out  by  a  commission  of  twenty,  including  Pompeius 
and  Crassus,  who  were  also  to  be  members  of  an 
inner  executive  of  five,  charged  with  general  super- 
vision. From  this  commission  Caesar  expressly 
excluded  himself. 

But  the  irreconcilables  in  the  Senate  would  simply 
have  nothing  to  say  to  the  bill.  |  It  was  to  be  re- 
sisted simply  because  it  was  an  agrarian  bill,  and  the 
work  of  a  democratic  consul.  J  Cato  himself  said  that 
he  had  no  objection  to  the  bill  in  itself;  but  he  ob- 
structed it  by  speaking  for  hour  after  hour,  until 
Caesar,  using  a  method  which  has  been  found  neces- 
sary of  late  years  in  coping  with  such  tactics,  ordered 


no  yulius   CcBsar,  [59  B.C. 

him  into  arrest,  releasing  him,  however,  in  deference 
to  a  demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  Senate.  It  be- 
came at  once  obvious  that  it  would  be  hopeless  to  get 
the  bill  through  the  Senate  in  the  ordinary  course ; 
either  it  must  be  abandoned  altogether,  or  Caesar 
must  fall  back  on  the  democratic  method  of  present- 
ing it  to  the  people  without  the  senatorial  authorisa- 
tion which  was  constitutionally  proper  in  practice. 

This  was  a  course  which  was  perfectly  legal,  and 
it  had  often  been  resorted  to  since  Tiberius  Gracchus 
first  found  it  impossible  for  a  reformer  to  work  with 
the  Senate.  But  it  was  an  ominous  act  to  dispense 
with  the  sanction  of  the  collective  wisdom  of  the 
Roman  world,  and  nothing  could  have  justified  it 
but  the  absolute  impossibility  of  getting  anything 
done  without  it.  To  put  complicated  bills  before  a 
vast  assembly  of  voters,  without  any  discussion  of 
details  except  from  the  orator's  platform  in  the 
forum,  was  a  deplorable  method  of  legislation,  and 
had  already  had  most  mischievous  results.  But  if 
the  council,  whose  constitutional  business  is  to  dis- 
cuss these  details,  entirely  refuses  to  play  its  part, 
it  simply  drives  the  legislator  to  dispense  with  it. 
Caesar  now  learnt,  if  he  had  not  learnt  it  before,  that 
the  Senate  was  not  willing  to  deliberate,  nor  the 
sovereign  people  fit  to  legislate.  Some  new  way 
must  eventually  be  found  to  get  the  work  of  the 
Empire  done ;  but  for  the  present  he  had  no  choice 
but  to  face  the  facts  as  they  were  and  make  the 
best  of  them.  If  the  people  refused  the  bill,  there 
was  an  end  of  the  matter;  but  to  the  people  it  must 
certainly  go. 


59  B.C.]         Ccesars  First  Considship.  1 1 1 

In  the  form  in  which  it  was  presented  to  the  peo- 
ple, it  contained  a  clause  compelling  the  senators 
and  the  candidates  for  office  in  the  ensuing  elections 
to  swear  to  observe  its  provisions.  This  clause  is 
most  significant  of  the  political  temper  of  the  age. 
It  was  well  known  that  in  one  way  or  other  the  bill 
would  be  repealed  next  year ;  probably  by  means  of 
a  senatorial  prerogative,  by  which  obnoxious  meas- 
ures had  from  time  to  time  been  declared  invalid. 
Caesar  was  only  attempting  by  this  provision  to  se- 
cure his  law  from  such  treatment ;  and  if  the  method 
seems  to  us  in  these  days  a  harsh  one,  we  must  re- 
member that  he  had  to  deal  with  men  who,  repre- 
senting only  themselves,  had  no  intention  of  abiding 
by  a  law  to  which  they  had  not  consented.  They 
had  declared  open  war  against  it,  and  for  the  conse- 
quences they  alone  were  responsible. 

The  bill  was  now  brought  before  the  assembly  of 
the  people  after  preliminary  informal  meetings,  in 
one  of  which  Caesar  appealed  to  Pompeius  to  sup- 
port it  against  violence,  if  necessary,  by  the  arms  of 
his  veterans  ;  showing  that  his  anger  was  roused,  his 
will  firm,  and  his  mind  made  up  not  to  be  defeated 
by  any  methods  but  legitimate  rejection.  There  was 
reason  both  for  the  anger  and  obstinacy  of  a  resolute 
and  masterful  spirit ;  and  the  Senate  now  learnt  that 
they  had  to  do  with  a  man  who  would  no  longer 
bear  with  constitutional  trifling  and  unreasoning  ob- 
struction. They  used  every  rusty  weapon  in  their 
armoury.  A  tribune  was  as  usual  found  to  exercise 
his  veto  ;  it  was  simply  disregarded.  Bibulus  used 
the  power  of  summary  interference  which  each  con- 


112  yulius   CcBsar.  [59  B.C. 

sul  could  bring  to  bear  on  the  actions  of  the  other ; 
but  Pompeius'  old  soldiers  drove  him  from  the 
forum.  He  then  announced  his  intention  to  "watch 
the  heavens  "  on  every  day  of  assembly  for  the  rest 
of  the  year,  and  thus  stop  all  legislation  ;  but  he 
might  as  well  have  tried  to  stop  the  tide.  Finally, 
on  the  day  after  the  passing  of  the  bill,  he  summoned 
the  Senate  and  proposed  to  declare  it  null  and  void  ; 
but  the  senators  were  by  this  time  fairly  frightened 
and  would  give  him  no  support.  He  then  shut  him- 
self up  in  his  house  and  sulked  there  for  the  remain- 
ing eight  months  of  the  year  like  an  angry  infant, 
showing  us  beyond  all  doubt  the  manner  of  man 
he  was. 

Caesar  troubled  himself  no  more  about  the  Senate 
and  its  irrational  use  of  constitutional  methods  of 
obstruction  ;  the  rest  of  his  laws  were  taken  directly 
to  the  people.  We  may  here  follow  his  example 
and  leave  Bibulus  and  his  friends  for  the  rest  of  the 
year,  in  the  assurance  that,  however  much  a  consti- 
tutional lawyer  might  be  hurt  by  Caesar's  conduct, 
every  man  whose  mental  vision  could  take  in  the 
necessities  of  the  Empire,  as  well  as  the  history  of 
the  city,  must  have  felt  that  some  such  rigorous 
dealing  was  necessary.  We  will  simply  note  that 
those  who  in  this  year  so  obstinately  stood  in 
Caesar's  way  are  the  very  men  of  whose  narrowness 
and  selfishness  even  Cicero  so  often  and  bitterly 
complains  in  his  letters  of  the  next  few  years.  They 
were  the  men  whose  jealousy  eventually  drove  the 
most  brilliant  advocate  of  constitutionalism  to  ally 
himself  with   their   enemies,  thus  bringing  on  him 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship.  113 

a  charge  of  time-serving,  which  has  done  much  to 
damage  an  honourable  name.  As  they  did  their  best 
in  56  B.C.  to  annoy  their  best  friend,  so  in  59  B.C.  they 
did  all  they  could  to  destroy  their  most  rational 
opponent ;  and  the  result  was  only  to  make  Caesar 
absolute  master  of  the  situation,  so  that  the  joke- 
loving  Roman  mob  used  to  speak  of  the  consuls  of 
the  year  as  Julius  and  Caesar,  instead  of  Caesar  and 
Bibulus. 

At  one  of  the  later  stages  in  the  progress  of  the 
bill,  when  the  Senate's  inexorable  hostility  had  been 
declared,  or  more  probably  by  a  new  bill  altogether, 
the  Campanian  land,  which  had  been  originally  left  un- 
touched, was  now  finally  dealt  with.  Combined  with 
the  distribution  of  this  rich  territory  was  another 
scheme  which  had  for  years  been  a  part  of  the  policy 
of  the  Marian  party,  and  was  in  every  way  just  and 
reasonable.  The  famous  town  of  Capua,  the  centre 
of  this  fertile  land,  had  been  punished  for  its  disloy- 
alty in  the  war  with  Hannibal  by  the  loss  of  its 
territory,  and  of  its  privilege  of  local  self-govern- 
ment, and  had  ever  since  been  ruled  by  an  ofHcer 
appointed  yearly  by  the  Roman  Senate.  1  Every  at- 
tempt to  make  it  a  "  colonia,'*  /.  e.,  to  people  it  with 
Roman  citizens,  and  to  give  it  municipal  rights,  had 
been  a  failure.  Caesar  now  took  up  the  plan,  and 
carried  it  through  successfully.  \ 

Though  this  bill  was  quite  of  a  piece  with  Caesar's 
political  views,  the  fierce  battle  he  had  fought  for  it 
had  been  undertaken  immediately  in  the  interest  of 
Pompeius.  He  still  had  engagements  to  fulfil  of  the 
same  kind,  and  he  set  about  them  now  with  his 
8 


114  yulius   CcBsar.  [59  B.C. 

hands  free.  We  find  it  hard  to  believe  in  these  days 
that  the  Senate,  to  whom  by  wise  constitutional 
practice  all  such  business  had  been  for  centuries  en- 
trusted, had  for  two  years  refused  to  ratify  or  even 
to  modify  the  long  list  of  regulations  by  which 
Pompeius  had  sought  to  place  the  results  of  his  vast 
conquests  in  the  East  on  a  permanent  and  satisfac- 
tory basis.  Frontiers  had  been  laid  down,  kings 
received  into  vassalage,  towns  punished  or  privileged, 
new  cities  founded,  tributes  imposed  ;  but  not  one 
of  these  arrangements  had  any  legal  force  until  the 
Senate  should  have  taken  them  in  hand.  The  person 
chiefly  to  blame  seems  to  have  been  Lucullus,  who 
was  jealous  of  his  rival's  successes.  Cicero  was  also 
to  blame  for  not  using  his  senatorial  influence  to 
help  his  friend  and  hero  ;  but  Cicero  was  never 
greatly  interested  in  foreign  or  provincial  affairs. 
Pompeius  was  himself  to  blame  ;  for  the  immense 
prestige  he  enjoyed  at  the  moment  of  his  return 
should  have  enabled  him  to  insist  on  the  great  work 
of  his  life  being  completed.  And  it  w^as  a  just  and 
wholesome  retribution,  when  Caesar,  strong  just 
where  Pompeius  was  weak,  again  passed  the  Senate 
by,  and  brought  the  necessary  measures  before  the 
people.  Thus,  though  it  is  with  the  West  that 
Caesar's  name  will  be  always  indissolubly  linked,  it 
needed  his  force  of  will  to  put  the  coping  stone  on 
his  great  rival's  work  in  the  East. 

He  had  now  fulfilled  his  promises  to  Pompeius, 
who  was  doubtless  duly  grateful.  The  friendship 
which  had  begun  two  years  before  was  now  cemented 
by  the  marriage  of  the  elder  man  with  the  daughter 


69  B.C.]  Ccssars  First   Consulship.  1 1 5 

of  the  younger,  at  this  time  about  twenty-two 
years  old,  and  gifted  with  every  charm.  JuHa  is 
said  to  have  been  a  faithful  wife,  and  to  have  won 
the  passionate  affection  of  her  husband.  Her  father, 
too,  was  devoted  to  her ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  for  the  few  remaining  years  of  her  short  life  she 
found  a  noble  vocation  in  harmonising,  whether  con- 
sciously or  not,  the  views  and  interests  of  the  two  most 
powerful  men  then  living.  Few  women  in  history 
have  had  a  weightier  part  to  play  ;  few  have  in  their 
death  been  so  bitterly  and  universally  lamented. 

Caesar  had  next  to  undertake  a  task,  which,  if  we 
understand  him  rightly,  could  hardly  have  been  a 
grateful  one.  It  seems  likely  that  in  order  to  secure 
the  adhesion  of  Crassus  to  the  triple  league,  he  had 
been  obliged  to  make  a  promise  which  was  not,  so  far 
as  we  know,  in  itself  an  honourable  one,  though  it 
is  characteristic  enough  of  the  political  morals  of 
the  age.  The  tax-farmers  of  the  province  of  Asia 
had  in  61  B.C.  (see  p.  99)  applied  for  a  reduction  of 
their  contract,  at  Crassus*  instigation ;  the  great 
capitalist  probably  had  some  personal  reason  for  this 
step,  and  continued  to  urge  their  demand.  Cicero 
himself  had  warmly  supported  it  in  the  Senate, 
though  he  privately  told  Atticus  that  it  was  a 
shameful  one.  ^     Cato,  the  financier  of  the  day,  and 

*  We  have  no  positive  knowledge  of  the  justice  or  injustice  of  this 
demand  ;  Cicero  was  often  hasty  and  inaccurate  in  his  conclusions. 
But  in  this  case,  as  he  was  the  representative  of  the  equestrian  order, 
and  was  writing  in  confidence  to  one  of  its  most  important  members, 
his  opinion  may  be  regarded  as  free  from  bias,  and  it  falls  in  with 
what  else  we  know  of  the  public  morality  of  the  publicani.  See  Cic. 
Ad  Att.,  i.,  19,  and  ii.,  i. 


Ii6  yulius  Ccesar.  [59  B.C. 

the  enemy  of  all  injustice,  had  opposed  it  with  all 
his  vehemence.  It  was  not  carried,  and  the  failure, 
as  we  saw,  had  produced  a  breach  between  the  Sen- 
ate and  equites, — a  fatal  blow  to  Cicero's  "  agreement 
of  the  orders."  Caesar  now  laid  a  bill  before  the 
people,  by  which  the  contract  was  reduced  by  one 
third  ;  a  masterly  piece  of  policy,  for  it  not  only 
put  the  final  touch  to  the  discord  which  Cato's 
severity  had  begun,  but  it  brought  the  whole  mer- 
cantile class  with  one  stroke  over  to  the  side  of  the 
triumvirs.  Here,  however,  we  may  prefer  to  side 
with  Cato  and  his  ideal  standard  of  right  and  wrong, 
rather  than  with  either  Cicero  or  Caesar,  who  yielded 
to  political  exigencies.  Every  practical  statesman 
has  indeed  occasionally  to  consent  to  that  which  he 
cannot  approve  ;  his  life  is  spent  rather  in  choosing 
between  evils,  than  in  pursuing  the  ideal  good.  But 
actively  to  advocate  what  you  know  to  be  wrong, 
even  though  it  seem  necessary  to  a  policy  which 
you  believe  to  be  the  true  one,  is  not  to  be  defended 
by  any  appeal  to  expediency  ;  and  this  is  exactly 
what  the  two  ablest  men  of  the  time  were  each  of 
them  ready  to  do,  though  for  different  objects. 

This  blot  in  Caesar's  work  was  in  some  degree 
made  up  for  by  another  law  of  far  wider  scope,  which 
remained  on  the  statute-book  for  centuries.  This 
was  the  famous  law  against  official  extortion  in  the 
provinces. 

It  was  by  no  means  the  first  of  its  kind.  At  least 
five  others  had  been  passed  during  the  preceding 
ninety  years  ;  and  since  149  B.C.,  a  standing  com- 
mission had  been  at  work  on  the  trial  of  offences 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship.  117 

under  these  laws.  But  extortion  had  become  a  habit 
and  almost  a  necessity  with  the  governors  of  prov- 
inces ;  they  spent  so  much  on  bribery  in  their  efforts 
to  rise  to  high  office,  that  they  looked  on  their  pro- 
praetorship  or  proconsulship  as  a  perfectly  fair  chance 
of  recouping  themselves.  The  two  great  evils  of  the 
day  worked  together — corruption  at  home,  and  cru- 
elty in  the  provinces ;  and  there  was  a  continual 
drain  on  the  exhausted  provincials  to  supply  the 
exorbitant  demands  of  the  greedy  Roman  voter. 
And  it  was  not  only  the  governor  himself  who 
was  guilty;  with  him  went  a  numerous  staff,  all 
eager  to  be  let  loose  on  the  province.  No  legislation 
seemed  capable  of  putting  a  check  on  an  evil  which 
the  legislators  themselves  did  their  best  to  encour- 
age ;  there  was  hardly  a  Roman  who  was  not  inter- 
ested in  keeping  it  up,  hardly  a  public  man  who 
had  not  profited  by  it,  or  who  did  not  expect  one 
day  to  do  so.  iThe  whole  spirit  of  government  was 
bad,  as  well  as  the  system ;  not  only  were  there  no 
adequate  checks  on  the  governors,  but  there  was 
no  real  desire  to  impose  any.  I  Nothing  but  a 
wholly  new  system,  which  should  make  it  the 
interest  of  rulers  to  rule  justly,  could  have  the  least 
permanent  effect  in  saving  from  ruin  either  the  re- 
sources of  the  provinces,  or  the  morality  of  the 
Roman  people. 

At  a  later  time  Csesar  was  able  to  carry  into  exe- 
cution the  dimly  conceived  projects  of  the  demo- 
cratic party,  by  inventing  such  a  system  and  working 
it  in  a  new  spirit  ;  as  yet  his  contribution  could  only 
be  another  law,  though  it  was  one  the  excellence  of 


1 1 8  Julius   CcBsar.  L59  B.C. 

which  won  strong  praise  even  from  Cicero  himself."* 
It  extended  the  action  of  previous  laws,  or  in  other 
words  the  jurisdiction  of  the  existing  court  for  cases 
of  provincial  extortion,  in  respect  not  only  of  the 
definition  of  crime,  but  of  the  persons  liable,  and  of 
the  penalties  that  could  be  imposed.  The  resources 
of  the  bad  provincial  governor  in  the  way  of  extor- 
tion were  boundless,  as  we  know  from  Cicero's  Ver- 
rine  orations.  This  law  seems  to  have  covered  all 
that  had  so  far  been  in  use  ;  illegal  taxes  and  tolls, 
the  selling  of  privileges,  the  acceptance  of  presents 
except  within  narrow  limits,  and  the  use  of  Roman 
soldiery  (for  a  ""  consideration  ")  to  help  in  the  recov- 
ery of  debts.  The  whole  of  the  retinue,  as  well  as  the 
governor,  were  made  liable,  the  equites  alone  being 
for  the  present  excepted,  as  had  always  been  the 
case.  The  penalties,  which  originally  had  been  of 
the  nature  rather  of  damages  than  punishment,  were 
now  made  very  serious  :  restitution  to  four  times  the 
amount  of  the  value  extorted,  which  Sulla  had  im- 
posed, was  now  the  mildest  of  them.  Intestabilitas^ 
or  deprivation  of  power  to  bequeath  property  by 
will,  together  with  expulsion  from  the  Senate,  fol- 
lowed on  conviction  as  a  matter  of  course ;  exile 
was  reserved  for  very  serious  cases. 

The  legislation  that  has  been  thus  briefly  sketched 
was  a  fair  allowance  for  one  year,  great  part  of  which 
had  been  occupied  by  overcoming  obstinate  and  irra- 
tional obstruction  ;  and  it  would  probably  have  been 
impossible  to  accomplish  even  so  much  as  this,  if 
agrarian  laws  and  laws    against  extortion  had   not 

*  Pro  Sest.,  64. 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship.  119 

frequently  been  framed  before,  making  the  work  of 
the  later  legislator  and  draughtsman  a  compara- 
tively easy  one.  As  the  year  wore  on,  however,  there 
was  still  much  to  be  done.  The  three  leaders  knew 
well,  and  Caesar  knew  better  than  his  allies,  that  all 
this  work  would  be  thrown  away,  unless  they  took 
further  steps  to  secure  their  own  position  for  at 
least  the  next  year  or  two.  j  If  the  senatorial  party 
came  again  into  power,  these  laws  would  be  at 
once  declared  null  and  void ;  Caesar  himself  would 
be  attacked  in  the  law-courts  ;  the  legions  and  the 
provinces  would  be  given  to  senatorial  incapables  ; 
and  by  abundant  bribery,  the  city  populace  itself 
might  be  persuaded  to  restore  the  Sullan  constitu- 
tion. In  fact  the  battle  was  by  i;io  means  at  an  end, 
though  for  the  moment  the  Senate  was  beaten  all 
along  the  line,  f 

It  was  necessary  in  the  first  place  to  put  Caesar  not 
only  out  of  danger,  but  in  a  position  whence  he 
might  continue  to  watch  over  Italy  and  Rome,  and 
to  give  his  weaker  allies  both  moral  and  material  sup- 
port. In  the  previous  year,  the  Senate,  using  a  con- 
stitutional right  secured  to  them  by  Gains  Gracchus 
himself,  had  set  apart  for  both  consuls  of  59  B.C., 
as  soon  as  their  year  of  ofifice  should  expire,  the 
duty  of  attending  to  the  internal  condition  of  Italy ; 
and  if  this  arrangement  held  good,  Caesar's  ''  prov- 
ince "  as  proconsul  would  have  meant  no  more  than 
the  supervision  of  roads,  forests,  and  public  works, 
without  legions,  without  freedom,  and  without  ad- 
venture. Doubtless  there  was  plenty  of  good  work 
to  be  done  In  Italy  ;   in  such  work  Gaius  Gracchus 


1 20  Julius   CcEsar.  [59  B.C. 

had  voluntarily  busied  himself.  But  that  was  before 
the  military  arm  had  become  the  mainspring  of  ac- 
tion in  the  political  world  ;  and  Caesar  could  no  more 
dispense  with  that  arm,  if  he  wished  himself  and  his 
work  to  survive,  than  Cromwell  could  dispense  with 
his  Ironsides.  It  was  of  course  known  to  every  one 
that  the  Senate  had  made  this  arrangement  with  the 
express  object  of  destroying  him. 

There  was,  however,  a  part  of  what  we  now  call 
Italy,  the  most  fertile,  populous,  and  flourishing  dis- 
trict south  of  the  Alps,  the  possession  of  which  would 
give  him  at  least  three  legions,  the  necessary  proxim- 
ity to  the  capital,  and  a  magnificent  base  of  operations, 
if  he  should  be  attacked,  or  should  find  himself 
driven  to  become  himself  the  aggressor.  And  apart 
from  its  resources  and  its  strategical  strength,  Cisal- 
pine Gaul  had  long  been  peculiarly  attached  to  Caesar 
himself  and  the  democratic  party.  The  eager  and 
intellectual  Celtic  population  north  of  the  Padus  were 
still  without  the  full  Roman  citizenship  ;  and  we  have 
seen  how  Caesar  on  his  return  from  his  quaestorship 
in  Spain  had  visited  them  and  encouraged  them  to 
agitate  for  it  (see  p.  59).  How  justly  founded  were 
their  desires,  we  may  see  at  a  glance  when  we  reflect 
that  Catullus,  Virgil,  Livy,  and  the  elder  and  younger 
Pliny,  among  many  others,  were  all  natives  of  this 
district,  which  long  continued  to  present  in  its  purity 
and  simplicity  of  manners,  as  well  as  in  the  health 
and  vigour  of  its  culture,  a  marked  contrast  to  the 
selfish  and  worn-out  population  of  the  capital. 

This  basin  of  the  Padus  was  not  politically  a  part 
of  Italy  at  this   time,  and  had  been  governed  by  an 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship.  121 

ex-magistrate,  like  any  other  province,  since  the 
time  of  Sulla,  j  It  was  now  proposed  to  set  aside  the 
Senate's  arrangements  for  the  consular  provinces, 
and  to  give  Cisalpine  Gaul  to  Caesar,  together  with 
the  adjoining  less  important  province  of  Illyria,  for 
five  years  by  a  vote  of  the  people.  The  tribune 
Vatinius,  who  was  the  proposer,  had  several  important 
precedents  to  go  upon  ;  but  there  was  wanting  a 
sufficient  pretext  for  the  unusual  procedure.  No 
immediate  danger  threatened  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and 
Caesar  was  not  to  be  called  on  to  crush  an  inveterate 
enemy  like  Mithridates  or  Jugurtha.  But  at  this 
juncture  the  Senate  itself  came  to  the  rescue,  and  re- 
lieved Caesar  and  his  agents  of  all  responsibility  for 
their  action.!  'On  the  motion  of  Pompeius,  they 
added  to  Cesar's  government  the  Gallic  province 
beyond  the  Alps,  together  with  an  army  and  an  am- 
ple staff,  and  directed  him  to  take  measures  for  the 
defence  of  that  province  against  invasion  from  the 
north  and  east.  No  one  at  the  moment  could  have 
been  aware — not  even  Caesar  himself — that  this  was 
to  open  up  for  him  a  career  of  conquest  more  last- 
ing in  its  results  than  the  uncompleted  projects  of 
Alexander.  \  But  it  was  known  that  there  was  work 
to  be  done  there ;  the  Alpine  peoples  to  the  east- 
wards, and  on  the  north  the  Germans  beyond  the 
Rhine,  were  alike  threatening  the  fair  province  on 
the  lower  Rhone  ;  the  Senate  had  as  usual  let  the 
danger  approach  without  due  provision,  and  were 
even  now  quite  unaware  that  no  one  but  a  consum- 
mate commander  could  save  them  from  grievous 
damage  and  disgrace. 


122  ytdius   Ccesar,  [59  B.C. 

When  Caesar  laid  down  his  office  at  the  end  of  the 
year,  and  left  the  city  as  proconsul  to  prepare  for 
the  campaign  that  was  impending,  he  offered  Cicero 
the  chance  of  accompanying  him  in  the  honourable 
position  of  staff  officer.  There  was  nothing  unusual 
in  this,  though  Cicero  was  entirely  ignorant  of  war- 
fare. Every  public  man  was  still  expected  to  be 
able  to  discharge  military  duties,  and,  as  we  have 
just  seen,  such  an  offer  held  out  prospects  of  mate- 
rial advantage.  |  But  Caesar's  immediate  object  was 
to  get  Cicero  away  from  the  capital,  and  to  keep 
him  under  his  own  eye.|  Though  Cicero  had  not  ac- 
tively opposed  the  triumvirate,  it  was  perfectly  well 
known  that  he  would  seize  the  first  chance  of  undo- 
ing their  work  ;  and  Caesar  was  aware  that  his  first 
efforts  would  be  to  renew  his  old  attempt  to  flatter 
Pompeius  into  an  alliance  with  him  (see  p.  102),  to 
re-establish  the  agreement  of  the  orders,  and  to 
patch  up  the  old  republican  forms  in  which  he  so 
profoundly  believed.  It  was  indispensable,  from 
Caesar's  point  of  view,  that  he  should  be  induced 
to  leave  Rome,  and  the  prospect  of  the  companion- 
ship of  an  old  friend  so  congenial  and  so  gifted 
must  have  influenced  Caesar  in  his  offer  hardly  less 
than  political  necessity. 

Cicero  hesitated  for  a  moment,  but  then  decidedly 
rejected  the  proposal.  "■  I  prefer  to  fight  y'  he  wrote 
to  his  friend  Atticus, — to  fight,  that  is,  with  an  ene- 
my who  would  shortly  be  let  loose  on  him  if  he  re- 
mained. Caesar  was  not  content  with  his  first  offer  ; 
he  made  others  ;  he  left  no  stone  unturned  to  get 
that  dangerous  genius  out   of  the  way  of  doing  mis- 


59  B.C.]         CcBsars  First  Consulship,  123 

chief  to  himself  and  others.  He  asked  him  to  be< 
come  a  member  of  the  commission  under  the  agra- 
rian bill.  Cicero  laughed  at  the  idea.  He  suggested 
a  "  legatio  libera''  which  would  have  enabled  him  to 
travel  in  his  favourite  Greece  and  elsewhere,  with 
dignity  and  leisure.  But  it  was  all  in  vain  ;  and 
Cicero  had  reason  to  regret  most  bitterly,  but  two  or 
three  months  later,  that  he  had  recklessly  determined 
to  run  every  risk,  rather  than  take  the  smallest  favour 
at  the  hands  of  political  adversaries. 

The  melancholy  story  of  Cicero's  exile,  and  of  the 
violence  of  his  personal  enemy  Clodius,  does  not 
fall  within  the  scope  of  this  volume.  Caesar's  part 
in  it  was  simply  a  negative  one  ;  he  might  probably 
have  saved  Cicero  even  then  if  he  had  chosen,  and 
he  did  not  do  so.  He  had  tried  to  give  him  the 
means  of  securing  his  own  safety,  but  without  suc- 
cess ;  and  he  was  hardly  to  be  expected  to  go  fur- 
ther out  of  his  way  to  save  a  man  who,  if  rescued, 
would  do  him  all  the  damage  in  his  power. 

In  whatever  way  we  may  judge  the  conduct  of 
either  of  these  men,  at  this  moment  so  critical  for 
both  (and  we  shall  always  form  different  judgments 
according  to  our  views  of  the  political  condition  of 
Rome  at  the  time),  we  may  perhaps  all  agree  in  re- 
gretting that  Cicero  did  not  see  his  way  to  accept- 
ing Caesar's  first  offer.  It  would  have  taken  him 
out  of  danger,  without  seriously  compromising  his 
political  position  ;  and  it  might  have  had  a  result  far 
more  important,  in  introducing  a  brilliant  mind,  nar- 
rowed by  continued  city  life,  to  fresh  scenes  and 
peoples,  to  new  responsibilities  and  new  aspirations, 


124  Julius   CcBsar.  [59  B.C. 

to  a  new  sense  of  what  the  Roman  dominion  was, 
and  of  its  vast  possibiHties  and  inherent  weaknesses. 
From  such  a  man,  too,  Caesar  himself  could  not  but 
have  learnt  much  ;  and  if  the  two  finest  intellects  of 
that  day, — the  man  of  action  and  the  man  of  letters, 
the  man  who  saw  facts  and  the  man  who  saw  visions, 
— could  have  grown  to  a  mutual  understanding  as 
well  as  a  mutual  respect,  it  is  possible  that,  even 
though  the  march  of  events  towards  absolutism 
could  probably  not  have  been  stayed,  the  lives  of 
each  might  at  least  have  been  smoothed,  and  each 
might  have  been  spared  at  the  last  the  fatal  blow 
of  the  assassin. 

Let  us  return  for  a  moment  to  the  questions  sug- 
gested at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  JHow  did 
Caesar  use  power  when  it  was  first  placed  in  his 
hands  ?  Was  he  true  to  his  political  faith  ?  Can  we 
trace  the  hand  of  a  real  statesman  in  the  work  he 
did  this  year  ?    \ 

The  history  of  affairs  in  the  city  during  the  next 
two  years  would  seem  to  show  that  Caesar,  departing 
for  Gaul,  had  left  nothing  but  confusion  behind  him. 
We  have  now  to  follow  his  military  career,  and  can- 
not dwell  on  this  period  of  anarchy.  But  it  is  true 
that  such  influence  as  the  Senate  possessed  had  beer> 
undermined  during  Caesar's  consulship  /  that  Pom 
peius  and  Crassus  were  helpless  without  Caesarf, 
that  Clodius'  attempts  to  legislate  for  the  demo- 
cratic party  were  ill-judged  and  violent,  and  that  it 
was  a  mistake  of  Caesar's  to  allow  him  to  slip  into 
the  position  of  a  legislator.!  If  some  strong  authority 
were  needed  before  59  B.C.,  it  was  still  more  needed 
when  the  year  was  over.  ■• 


59  B.C.]  Ccesars  First   Consulship.  125 

[  Yet  all  this  is  in  itself  evidence  that  Caesar,  during 
his  term  of  power,  had  done  what  no  one  else  could 
do.  The  Senate  had  failed  to  perform  the  most 
pressing  duties  of  government  ;  he  carried  them 
through  successfully,  without  violence,  and  without 
more  hurt  to  a  constitution  which  could  not  work 
than  might  be  expected  sooner  or  later  to  befall  it. 
He  did  his  best  to  avoid  any  violence,  and  by  a 
union  of  political  leaders  and  interests  to  make  the 
clumsy  Republic  into  a  working  constitution  ;  and  in 
these  efforts  he  even  once  or  twice  allowed  concilia- 
tion to  get  the  better  of  political  principle.  Work 
had  to  be  done  ;  there  was  but  a  year  to  do  it  in ; 
obstruction  and  opposition  confronted  him  at  every 
turn  ;  yet  that  work  was  done,  and  done  on  the 
whole  by  the  hand  of  a  real  statesman,  true  to  the 
principles  of  a  great  party.l 

And  indeed,  as  we  look  back  on  the  work  of  this 
year,  with  the  map  of  the  Roman  Empire  before  us, 
and  with  the  subsequent  history  of  that  Empire  in 
our  minds,  we  see  the  consulship  of  Caesar  in  a  new 
light.  His  legislation  affected  the  world  from  the 
Euphrates  to  the  Tagus.  It  showed  how  far-reach- 
ing were  the  duties  of  the  Roman  government,  and 
how  impossible  it  was  to  fulfil  them,  with  discord 
reigning  in  the  city.  To  banish  such  discord  per- 
manently, there  was  but  one  resource  left — the 
military  arm,  wielded  by  an  intelligent  statesman. 
Caesar  was  beginning  to  understand  this  in  the  year 
of  his  consulship  ;  seven  years  later,  the  Senate  began 
to  understand  it  also. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE  DEFENCE   OF  TRANSALPINE  GAUL. 
58  B.C. 

ROM  the  time  when  Caesar 
took  possession  of  his  pro- 
vinces in  March,  58  B.C.,  we 
have  a  detailed  record  of  his 
active  life,  with  the  exception 
of  the  few  brief  intervals  when 
he  was  at  Rome  in  the  years 
of  his  supreme  power.  It  is 
true  indeed  that  we  know 
hardly  anything  of  the  busi- 
ness and  the  studies  in  which  he  was  engaged  winter 
after  winter  in  Cisalpine  Gaul  and  Illyria,  while  mili- 
tary operations  were  impracticable ;  it  is  true  that  the 
man's  real  thoughts  and  aims,  as  well  as  his  pursuits 
and  methods  of  government,  are  thus  entirely  hidden 
from  us.  That  inner  life  of  the  mind,  which  in  the 
nineteenth  century  we  fancy  we  ought  to  discover 
in  a  biography,  is  in  Caesar's  case  not  to  be  explored. 
But  where  Fortune  has  been  singularly  gracious  to 

126 


68  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  GauL    1 2  7 

us  in  one  particular,  it  is  well  not  to  call  her  nig- 
gard in  another ;  the  more  so,  as  we  are  apt  alto- 
gether to  undervalue  the  gift  we  already  possess. 
It  takes  a  scholar, — one,  that  is,  who  knows  how 
precious  is  every  fragment  of  the  best  authors  of 
antiquity,  how  great  the  perils  attending  the  trans- 
mission of  ancient  books,  and  how  vast  and  varied 
were  the  writings  that  are  now  irrecoverabl}''  lost, — 
to  appreciate  the  singular  good  luck  that  has  pre-j 
served  all  Caesar's  military  writings  to  our  own  time! 
in  a  tolerably  sound  condition.  And  it  is  only  when 
we  have  ranged  freely  over  Latin  literature,  and  are 
familiar  with  all  the  great  Roman  writers  of  prose, 
that  we  can  turn  back  to  Caesar's  "  Commentaries," 
which  most  of  us  forsake  after  our  earliest  boyhood, 
and  feel  the  truth  of  Cicero's  judgment,  that  no  his- 
torical writing  could  surpass  them  in  the  charm  ofj 
their  pure  and  lucid  brevity. "^  I 

We  may  indeed  with  justice  lament  that  in  writing; 
his  three  books  of  the  Civil  Wars  he  did  not  tell  us 
more  of  his  acts  and  views  of  government,  and  that 
his  lieutenants  who  composed  the  extant  histories 
of  his  later  wars  in  Africa  and  Spain  should  have 
limited  themselves  entirely  to  his  military  opera- 
tions. The  result  is,  as  will  be  seen  later  on,  that 
we  are  much  in  the  dark  as  to  the  very  details  we 
most  need  to  know,  while  we  have  full  information 
on  events  which  are  not  really  of  world-wide  inter- 
est. But  we  are  concerned  at  present  with  the  Gallic 
War  only,  and  here  it  is  impossible  to  appraise  our 
good  fortune  too  highly.     No  great   conqueror  has 

*  Cic. ,  Brutus,  xxxv.,  262. 


^ 


128  yulius   Ccesar,  [58  B.C- 

left  behind  him  such  a  perfect  record  of  his  work; 
no  war  so  far-reaching  in  its  consequences  has  ever 
been  so  well  described.  Though  never  quite  com- 
pleted by  Caesar  himself,  it  yet  forms  a  complete 
whole,  containing  almost  every  element  which  is 
even  now  looked  for  in  a  military  history.  It  places 
the  reader  in  possession,  with  little  trouble  to  him- 
self, of  an  account,  from  Caesar's  own  point  of  view, 
of  the  reason  and  justification  of  the  war,  of  military 
details  in  every  important  district,  of  the  nature  of 
the  country  and  its  inhabitants,  of  the  character  of 
the  peoples  who  lay  beyond  it  and  were  in  contact 
with  it  as  enemies  or  as  traders.  iWe  gain  also  a 
perfect  picture  of  the  tactics  and  the  mechanism  of 
a  Roman  army;  we  become  familiar  with  its  engi- 
neering resources,  its  methods  and  difficulties  of 
supply.  And  if  to-day  we  are  apt  to  reckon  lightly 
of  military  history,  we  shall  do  well  to  reflect  that  it 
is  precisely  in  war  that  the  practical  ability  of  a 
people  is  best  seen,  their  true  temper  tested,  their 
scientific  intelligence  discovered,  j 

But  this  invaluable  work  is  much  more  than  a 
mere  account  of  military  operations.  Caesar's  book 
is  at  once  a  record  of  war  and  administration  and  a 
tale  of  adventure  and  discovery  ;  it  is  not  only  the 
work  of  a  consummate  general,  but  of  a  m.an  of  lit- 
erary and  scientific  tastes,  and  of  an  unerring  artistic 
feeling  for  what  was  pure  and  suitable  in  language. 
*  It  was  written  In  haste,"^  and  probably  with  the  im- 

*  Probably  in  the  winter  of  52-51  B.C.,  when  the  rupture  with  Pom- 
peius  was  beginning.  The  haste  is  expressly  alluded  to  in  Hirtius' 
preface  to  Book  viii.  (ch.  1.,  sec.  6). 


58  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    1 29 

mediate  political  purpose  of  justifying  the  conquests 
it  describes,  and  of  explaining  to  the  Roman  people 
the  independence  of  home  authority  which  its  author 
had  allowed  himself ;  but  neither  hurry  nor  policy 
was  suffered  to  affect  either  its  literary  or  its  scien- 
tific value.  Caesar's  inquiries  into  the  social  and 
political  condition  of  this  new  world  of  which  he 
threw  open  the  gates,  though  confined  to  a  few  brief 
chapters,  are  still  the  chief  basis  of  our  knowledge 
of  the  subject  ;  every  sentence  is  valuable,  and  the 
whole  has  been  proved  to  be  as  correct  a  picture  as 
the  best  observer  of  that  day  could  be  expected  to 
produce.  This  constitutes  what  may  be  called  its  sci- 
entific merit ;  its  literary  merit  is  still  more  obvious. 
In  spite  of  the  fact, — known  to  us  not  only  from  the 
passage  of  Cicero  quoted  above,  but  from  the 
testimony  of  the  author  of  the  eighth  book, — that 
it  was  not  intended  as  a  finished  historical  treatise, 
but  rather  as  material  for  others  to  work  upon,  it 
remains  the  most  perfect  specimen  we  possess  of 
pure  and  unaffected  Latin  prose.  It  Is  as  far  re- 
moved from  the  roughness  of  Varro  on  the  one 
hand,  as  it  is  from  the  refinements  and  artistic  de- 
vices of  Cicero  on  the  other.  Its  Latin  is  in  itself 
perfect,  a  genuine  Roman  product,  with  the  neatness 
of  the  best  Attic  Greek,  but  wholly  independent  of 
Hellenic  adornment.  It  may  give  the  reader  some 
idea  of  its  position  in  Roman  literature,  if  we  com- 
pare  it  with  that  stratum  of  pure  English  writing 
which  lies  between  the  **  learned  "  English  of  Milton 
and  Sir  Thomas  Browne,  and  the  Latinised  English 
of  Johnson.  Swift,  Defoe,  Addison,  and  Bolingbroke 
9 


130  yulius   CcBsar.  t58  B.C. 

are  our  best  examples  of  the  happy  adaptation  of  a 
genuine  native  tongue  in  the  purest  form  to  the  vari- 
ous purposes  required  of  it.  Their  language,  like 
Caesar's,  is  uniformly  simple  and  natural ;  it  is  appro- 
priate rather  than  choice,  so  that  while  no  individual 
sentence  may  linger  long  in  our  memory,  the  whole 
composition  has  exactly  the  desired  effect. 

One  word  more  must  needs  be  said  before  we  pass 
to  a  summary  of  the  operations  by  which  Caesar 
secured  the  Transalpine  province  against  invasion 
from  the  north.  What  idea  does  his  book  give  us 
of  his  own  character  and  personality  ? 

The  answer  seems  paradoxical,  but  is  none  the  less 
true.  Though  Caesar  keeps  himself,  his  personal 
feelings  and  experiences,  most  carefully  in  the  back- 
ground while  he  tells  his  story,  his  book  is  yet  far 
the  most  valuable  evidence  we  possess  as  to  his 
character  and  intellect.  He  is  there,  indeed,  insep- 
arable from  his  army — an  individual  unit,  though  the 
chief  and  guiding  one,  in  an  irresistible  combination 
of  forces.  In  reading  the  book  we  are  placed,  as  it 
were,  on  some  commanding  height,  looking  down  on 
the  plains  of  Gaul,  and  seeing  armies  in  motion  be- 
low ;  we  rarely  get  a  glimpse  of  the  personal  details 
of  military  life,  the  hardships,  the  anxieties,  the  in- 
cessant vigilance  and  toil.  The  one  cool  head  which 
guides  all  operations  seems  untroubled  by  any  obsta- 
,cles,  and  lifted  clear  above  the  petty  details  either 
jof  disappointment  or  success.  The  tale  moves  on, 
jwith  hardly  an  attempt  to  rouse  the  imagination 
jor  stir  the  blood,  even  in  an  age  when  all  rhetori- 
cal devices  were  at  the  command  of  every  educated 


58  B.C.]      The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    131 

man.  But  it  is  this  very  quality  of  the  book  which 
shows  us  the  nature  of  the  man  far  better  than  the 
biographies  of  later  generations,  confirming  the  little 
we  know  of  him  from  the  writings  of  his  own  con- 
temporaries, j  The  absence  of  sensitiveness,  of  ego- 
ism, and  of  passion,  are  characteristic  both  of  the 
book  and  the  man,  |  Even  in  the  most  perilous  mo- 
ments, and  in  the  most  adventurous  undertakings, 
we  can  see  as  we  read  that  he  was  a  man  of  facts  and 
not  of  imagination  ;  or  at  least  that  the  special  kind 
of  imaginative  power  which  every  great  conqueror 
and  explorer  has  in  some  degree  possessed — Alexan- 
der, Hannibal,  Cortes,  Clive,  Napoleon, — was  in  him 
kept  in  strict  subordination  to  reason  and  to  the  exi- 
gencies of  every  day. 

Other  features,  some  of  which  have  been  already 
incidentally  noticed,  will  be  apparent  to  the  careful 
reader.  The  language,  almost  always  clear  as  crystal, 
reveals  an  unclouded  intellect  and  an  unhesitating 
will.  The  courtesy  and  kindness  for  which  he  was 
noted,  are  seen  here  in  the  absence  of  all  severe 
comment  on  the  mistakes  of  his  officers.  In  his 
very  first  campaign,  a  decisive  victory  was  snatched 
from  his  grasp  by  the  blunder  of  an  old  soldier  in 
whose  experience  he  had  confided  ;  but  he  contents 
himself  with  noting  that  Considius  was  frightened, 
and  had  reported  what  was  fancy  and  not  fact.  In 
telling  the  story  of  the  most  terrible  disaster  that 
ever  befell  his  troops,  he  does  not  bear  hardly  on 
the  unfortunate  officer  who  was  responsible.  He 
comments  briefly  on  the  mistakes  liable  to  be  made 
by  all  men  who  are  forced  to  take  counsel  at  the 


132  yulius  Ccesar.  [58  B.C. 

critical  moment  instead  of  beforehand,  and  on  the 
necessity  in  warfare  of  keeping  in  mind  not  only  the 
rules  of  the  military  art,  but  the  moral  effect  on 
your  own  troops  and  on  the  enemy  of  every  step 
you  take  in  an  emergency.  And  lastly,  it  will  be 
admitted  that,  on  the  whole,  the  book  carries  convic- 
tion with  it,  and  bears  the  stamp  of  truth.  It  must 
be  judged  on  this  score  almost  entirely  by  internal 
evidence,  for  there  is  hardly  any  other  means  of 
criticising  it.  Written  indeed  as  it  was  with  an  im- 
mediate political  purpose,  it  was  inevitable  that  some 
things  should  be  suppressed  which  would  give  a  han- 
dle to  his  enemies  at  home,  and  others  perhaps  of 
which  it  might  be  impolitic  to  remind  his  own  ofifi- 
cers  :  for  that  Caesar  was  blameless  throughout  so 
long  and  so  trying  a  command  was  neither  possible 
nor  true.  But  what  he  does  tell  us,  we  may  believe 
to  be  true,  in  perhaps  a  greater  degree  than  we  can 
trust  any  historical  work  of  antiquity  ;  and  in  their 
clearness,  their  force,  their  self-restraint,  the  "  Com- 
mentaries "  remain  an  imperishable  monument  of  the 
true  Roman  type  of  mind,  of  which,  as  was  hinted 
earlier  in  this  volume,  Caesar  was  perhaps  the  last 
and  certainly  the  greatest  example. 

We  may  now  turn  our  attention  for  a  brief  space 
to  the  state  of  affairs  in  Gaul,  which  called  for  active 
and  instant  measures  in  the  spring  of  58  B.C.  To 
give  an  account  of  the  inhabitants  of  Gaul,  their 
religious,  social,  and  political  organisation,  would 
occupy  a  whole  chapter,  and  is  not  possible  in  this 
volume.  We  must  be  content  here  with  a  summary 
of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  Gallic  War. 


58  B.C.]      The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    133 

With  the  Celtic  race,  to  which  the  inhabitants  of 
Gaul  for  the  most  part  belonged,  the  Romans  had 
come  into  contact  at  a  very  early  period.     A  con- 
siderable part  of  Italy  had  probably  at  one  time  been 
peopled  by  them,  and  their  settlements   remained 
in   Umbria  and  the  valley  of  the   Padus.     In  the 
fourth  century  B.C.  they  had  overrun  Italy,  and  taken 
and  burnt  Rome  itself;  but  before  the  end  of  the 
third  century  almost  all  the  Gallic  tribes  south  of  the 
Alps  had  passed  under  Roman  dominion,  and  so  re- 
mained, in  spite  of  their  temporary  defection  during 
the  invasion  of   Hannibal.     Since  then  their  terri- 
tories in  north  Italy   had  been  regularly  governed 
from    Rome;   they   served    in    Roman   armies,   and 
their  strong  and  weak  points  were  well  known  to 
Roman  generals  and  authors.     But  the  great  mass 
of  the  Celtic  stock  inhabited  at  this  time  the  mag- 
nificent territory  which  we  now  call  France,  together 
with   the   Netherlands   up    to    the    Rhine,   and   the 
greater  part  of  Britain  ;  and  no  part  of  this  popula- 
tion had  been  disturbed  by  the  Romans  until  less 
than   a  century  before   Caesar's  consulship.M  Rome 
had  been  too  fully  occupied  in  Spain  and  in  the  East 
to  seek  for  complications  elsewhere.     And  she  had  a 
very  real  interest  in  keeping  on  good  terms  with  the 
people  of  southern  Gaul,  for  her  land  communication 
with  her  Spanish  provinces  depended  largely  on  the 
good-will  of   these  tribes  towards  herself  and   also 
towards  her  old  and  faithful  ally,  the  powerful  Greek 
city  of  Massilia.     It  was,  in  fact,  this  alliance  which 
was  the  primary  cause  of  the  movements  leading  to 
the  formation  of  a  Roman  province  beyond  the  Alps. 


1 34  yulius   CcBsar,  [58  B.C. 

It  was  inevitable  that  Massilia  should  come  into  col- 
lision with  the  people  whose  seaboard  was  occupied 
by  herself  and  her  colonies  on  the  coast ;  and  she 
drew  the  Romans  into  her  quarrels  without  any  un- 
willingness on  their  part./ 

The  first  collision  with  the  Gallic  tribes  in  this  dis- 
trict took  place  in  the  year  154  B.C.,  but  it  was  not 
till  125  B.C.  that  any  definite  policy  was  adopted  at 
Rome.  In  that  year  the  consul  Flaccus,  a  leading 
member  of  the  Gracchan.  party,  was  sent  to  operate 
against  the  hill  tribes  of  the  Salyes,  of  whom  the 
Massiliots  were  then  rightly  or  wrongly  complaining. 
After  defeating  these  he  was  easily  led  farther,  and 
his  work  was  carried  on  by  other  generals  of  the 
Gracchan  period  :  Sextius,  who  founded  Aquae  Sex- 
tiae  (Aix)  ;  Fabius  Maximus,  who  first  defeated  the 
Allobroges  and  the  powerful  Arverni ;  and  Domitius, 
the  constructor  of  the  great  road  from  Massilia  to 
the  Pyrenees.  In  1 18  B.C.  was  founded,  on  the  coast 
west  of  the  mouth  of  the  Rhone,  the  colonia  of 
Narbo,  which  was  destined  to  be  the  capital  of  the 
newly  acquired  territory  and  to  supersede  Massilia  ; 
and  about  this  time  or  somewhat  later  the  whole 
district  was  formed  into  a  Roman  province.  The 
communication  with  Spain  was  secured  ;  a  vast  and 
wealthy  trade-route  was  opened  up  ;  while  the  prov- 
ince was  protected  by  the  Rhone  from  Geneva  to 
Vienne,  and  by  the  chain  of  the  Cevennes,  which 
stretch  from  the  basin  of  the  Rhone  in  a  south- 
westerly direction  towards  the  Pyrenees.  Its  fron- 
tier town  on  the  west  was  Tolosa  (Toulouse).  Its 
shape  was  like  that  of  a  boot,  of  which  Tolosa  was 


58  B.C.]     The  Defe7Lce  of  Transalpine  GauL    135 

the  toe,  the  Pennine  Alps  the  heel,  Geneva  the  top, 
and  the  Gulf  of  Marseilles  the  instep. 

But  this  new  province,  even  guarded  as  it  was  by 
the  usual  Roman  methods — the  colonia^  fortress,  and 
military  road — was  for  several  reasons  in  a  very  in- 
secure state..  Its  wealth  and  fertility  laid  it  con- 
stantly open  to  the  envy  of  the  tribes  to  the  north 
of  it ;  and  these  tribes  were  at  this  time  continually 
threatened  with  invasion  from  the  wilder  German 
people  of  the  far  north  and  west.  Vast  hordes  of 
these  had  already,  within  the  memory  of  men  still 
living,  descended  upon  the  plains  of  Gaul,  pierced 
the  Pyrenees,  beaten  and  destroyed  Roman  armies 
within  the  boundaries  of  the  province,  forced  the 
barrier  of  the  Alps,  and  only  succumbed  at  last 
within  a  few  days'  march  of  Rome.  The  panic 
which  the  Cimbri  and  Teutones  had  caused  had  long 
ago  passed  away,  but  these  peoples  of  the  north 
were  still  restless,  and  no  adequate  measures  of  per- 
manent defence  had  been  taken.  Torn  by  internal 
conflict,  harassed  by  the  pirates  and  by  Mithridates, 
the  incapable  Roman  government  had  allowed  the 
Transalpine  province  to  develop  itself  in  its  own  way 
without  paying  any  real  attention  to  its  precarious 
situation.  It  was  now  fast  becoming  Romanised  ; 
it  swarmed  with  Roman  traders  and  money-lenders ; 
it  had  been  the  refuge  of  the  democratic  party  in  the 
Civil  Wars,  and  contained,  perhaps,  a  greater  number 
of  Latin-speaking  persons  than  most  of  the  provinces 
of  earlier  origin.  Yet  in  spite  of  all  this,  it  had  been 
not  only  neglected  but  ill-treated.  The  democratic 
party  had  tried   to  hold   it   under  the   influence  of 


136  yulius   Ccesar.  [58  B.C. 

Sertorius,  but  had  been  rudely  driven  out  by  Pom- 
peius ;  and  Pompeius  had  left  behind  him  a  governor, 
Fonteius,  whose  savage  cruelty  is  perfectly  apparent 
to  us  even  from  the  fragments  of  the  unworthy 
speech  in  which  Cicero  afterwards  defended  him. 
The  Allobroges,  the  most  powerful  Gallic  people 
within  the  limits  of  the  province,  had  been  shame- 
fully oppressed.  All  their  efforts  to  get  reparation 
had  been  in  vain,  and  after  rising  in  open  rebellion 
in  61  B.C.,  they  had  only  been  put  down  by  force  of 
arms.  The  two  chief  towns  of  Massilia  and  Narbo 
were  indeed  comfortable  and  contented ;  but  the 
whole  native  population  was  in  a  state  of  suppressed 
mutiny,  and  this,  added  to  the  danger  from  the 
north,  made  the  position  here  a  very  critical  one  in 
the  two  years  immediately  preceding  Caesar's  ap- 
pointment as  governor. 

Throughout  the  year  of  his  consulship,  Caesar 
must  in  fact  have  been  aware  that  there  was  likely 
to  be  a  severe  struggle  for  Roman  supremacy  beyond 
the  Alps.  The  alarming  nature  of  the  news  that 
was  coming  in  from  that  quarter  is  hinted  at  in 
Cicero's  letters  of  the  period,  though  neither  Cicero 
nor  the  ordinary  Roman  of  the  day,  perhaps  not 
even  Caesar  himself,  really  understood  how  grave  it 
was.  The  reader  will  be  able  to  appreciate  it  if  he 
will  study  the  accompanying  map,  with  the  following 
brief  account  of  the  causes  and  events  of  the  cam- 
paign of  58  B.C. 

The  map  will  show  that  the  Roman  frontier  was 
closed  in  by  three  Gallic  tribes  ;  the  Arverni  beyond 
the  Cevennes  to  the  north-west,  who  had  once  been 


f^s  B.C.      The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    137 

the  most  powerful  people  in  Gaul ;  the  ^dui  to  the 
north,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Saone  ;  and  the 
Sequani  between  the  Rhone  and  the  Saone,  in  the 
rich  plains  of  what  we  now  call  Burgundy,  ff  The 
Arverni  had,  as  we  have  seen,  been  in  conflict  with 
Rome,  and  had  been  partially  subdued  ;  with  the 
Sequani  the  Romans  had  had  no  direct  dealings  of 
importance.  But  the  yEdui,  as  lying  between  these 
two  formidable  peoples,  and  because  they  could  be 
successfully  played  off  against  the  beaten  but  dan- 
gerous Arverni,  had  been  taken  into  a  close  alliance 
and  "  friendship,'  and,  backed  by  Roman  influence, 
had  attained  a  power  beyond  their  natural  strength, 
and  claimed  now  to  be  the  leading  state  in  Gaulf 
I  The  result  was  just  what  might  have  been  ex- 
pected. The  Arverni,  ever  jealous  of  the  ^Edui, 
allied  with  the  Sequani  to  crush  them,  and  called  in 
the  aid  ot  a  German  tribe,  the  Suebi,  v/hich,  under 
its  energetic  chief  Ariovistus,  had  already  crossed 
the  Rhine,  and  was  seeking  a  settlement  to  the 
southward.  If  the  Roman  government  had  been  as 
energetic  as  the  German  chief,  they  would  have 
succoured  their  clients  the  ^dui,  and  either  declared 
war  on  Ariovistus,  or  at  least  strengthened  their  own 
defences  in  that  direction.  As  it  was,  they  left 
their  allies  in  the  lurch,  the  ^dui  were  conquered, 
and  the  province  was  practically  open  to  an  invasion 
at  any  moment  by  a  combination  of  Gauls  and  Ger- 
mans. It  was  thought  at  Rome  that  the  German 
chief  could  be  put  off  by  flattery  and  negotiation  ; 
and  at  Caesar's  own  suggestion  (so  it  is  said)  he  was 
recognised  as  king,  and  declared  "  the  friend  and  ally 


138  yidius    CcEsar.  [58  B.C. 

of  the  Roman  people."!  It  is  needless  to  say  that, 
once  established  in  Gaul,  he  declined  to  give  up  his 
advantage ;  and  then  the  Sequani,  in  whose  territory- 
he  was,  as  much  perplexed  as  their  former  enemies 
the  ^dui,  had  no  resource  but  to  appeal  to  Rome. 
Thus,  in  the  beginning  of  58  B.C.,  Rome  and  the 
Germans  were  brought  actually  face  to  face.  Ario- 
vistus  was  beginning  to  be  felt  at  Rome  as  a  really 
formidable  enemy.  The  Transalpine  province  was 
in  danger,  for  there  was  but  a  single  legion  stationed 
in  it ;  and  once  in  possession  of  the  province,  Ario- 
vistus  might  cross  the  Alps,  like  Hannibal,  and  work 
havoc  within-  the  very  bounds  of  Italy. 

It  was  with  this  enemy  that  Caesar  was  expecting 
to  have  to  grapple,  when  news  suddenly  arrived  of  a 
danger  still  more  pressing.  For  two  years  past  the 
inhabitants  of  what  is  now  northern  and  western 
Switzerland,  the  beautiful  country  between  the 
Rhine,  the  Rhone,  and  the  Jura,  had  been  meditating 
a  complete  migration  into  the  warmer  and  roomier 
plains  of  Gaul.  ]|The  Helvetii,  themselves  appar- 
ently a  people  of  Celtic  race,  were  suffering,  like  the 
yEdui,  from  inroads  of  the  restless  Germans,  and 
probably  from  other  causes  unknown  to  us.  They 
had  heard  that  far  away  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenees 
there  was  a  splendid  territory  where  they  might  find 
a  home,  and  they  resolved  to  make  their  way  thither, 
peacefully  if  possible,  through  the  tribes  that  lay 
between,  f  The  modern  traveller  in  Switzerland  may 
well  be  astonished  that  any  people  should  be  dis- 
satisfied with  such  a  land  as  that  which  he  passes 
through  on  his  way  from  Basle  to  Lucerne,  or  from 


58  B.C.]      The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    139 

Geneva  to  Berne,  But  much  of  this  was  in  those 
days  probably  forest  and  swamp  ;  and  in  any  case 
these  vast  migrations  are  the  most  striking  historical 
features  of  the  age,  and  constituted  the  most  real 
and  urgent  danger  for  the  Roman  Empire,  and  for 
civilisation.  I  If  the  Helvetii  were  allowed  to  migrate 
as  they  wished,  the  disturbance  among  the  other 
Gallic  peoples  on  the  Roman  frontier  would  be  very 
serious  ;  the  Aquitanian  territory,  which  they  wished 
to  occupy,  was  divided  from  the  province  by  no 
natural  defence  :  and  the  country  vacated  by  them 
would  be  at  once  occupied  by  the  Germans,  who 
would  thereby  be  brought  into  immec^ate  contact 
with  the  Roman  frontier  at  Geneva.  ■  It  was  the 
moment  for  a  soldier-statesman  to  act  with  rapid  and 
unhesitating  energy,  and  to  show  the  real  strength 
of  the  Roman  state.  That  strength  had  never  really 
been  shown  in  this  quarter  since  the  days  of  Marius. 
It  was,  indeed,  rather  the  weakness  and  disunion  of 
Rome  that  was  known  to  the  barbarians.  If  the 
Empire  was  to  enjoy  quiet  on  her  frontiers,  some 
decisive  blow  must  be  struck  at  once :  and  such 
quiet  was  now  absolutely  necessary  to  the  re-organi- 
sation and  development  of  the  wearied  and  worn-out 
Republic. 

How  far  these  weighty  considerations  were  in 
Caesar's  mind  at  the  outset  of  his  command,  does 
not  appear  from  his  own  concise  narrative.  Prob- 
ably they  grew  upon  him  in  the  course  of  his  first 
campaign,  and  as  he  found  them  falling  in  with  his 
own  interests  and  love  of  enterprise.  But  for  the 
moment  there  was  no  question  as  to  what  was  to 


140  Julius    CcBsar.  [58  B.C. 

be  done.  The  Helvetii  must  be  stopped,  at  all 
hazards,  and  the  German  invader  must  also  be 
watched  and  checked.  Whatever  question  may  arise 
later  on  as  to  the  political  morality  of  Caesar's  deal- 
ings in  Gaul,  no  reasonable  man  will  deny  that  in  this 
year  58  B.C.,  his  activity  was  justified  and  necessary. 

The  story  of  the  campaign  must  be  told  here  even 
more  briefly  than  he  tells  it  himself.  The  Helvetii 
would  leave  their  own  land  at  Geneva,  the  only  point 
where  it  was  then  possible  for  so  great  a  host  to 
penetrate  into  southern  France ;  for  the  Jura  moun- 
tains, which  bound  Switzerland  to  the  west,  offer  no 
other  easy  passage  but  that  which  is  formed  by  the 
issue  of  the  Rhone  between  this  chain  and  the 
mountains  of  Savoy.  The  left  bank  of  the  river 
was  the  boundary  of  the  Roman  province  ;  the  right 
bank  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Sequani.  There  was  a 
route  skirting  each  bank  ;  but  that  through  the  land 
of  the  Sequani  was  very  narrow  and  difficult,  and  the 
Helvetii  decided  to  take  the  other,  and  to  force  their 
way  through  the  Roman  province,  relying  on  the 
good-will  of  the  Allobroges,  who  occupied  the  coun- 
try, and  had  much  reason  to  hate  their  Roman 
rulers.  They  burnt  their  twelve  towns  and  all  their 
villages,  and  were  to  concentrate  at  Geneva  on  a 
certain  day  about  the  middle  of  April. 

With  that  rapidity  which  was  so  often  to  strike 
terror  into  his  enemies,  Caesar  hastened  to  the 
threatened  spot,  ordering  a  general  levy  throughout 
the  province.  He  cut  down  the  bridge  which  crossed 
the  Rhone  below  Geneva,  gained  a  short  delay  by 
giving  an  evasive  answer  to  a  Helvetian   embassy 


1.  SLINQER.     2.  LIQHT-ARMED  TROOPS.     3.   SOLDIERS  OF  THE  LEGION. 

4.  CAVALRY. 


98  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    141 

which  came  to  ask  his  leave  for  passage  through 
the  province,  and  instantly  set  the  one  legion  he' 
had  with  him  to  fortify  the  Roman  bank  of  the  river 
for  a  distance  of  some  ten  miles  south-west  of 
Geneva.  The  object  of  this  work  will  be  apparent 
to  any  one  who  has  travelled  by  rail  from  Paris 
or  Lyons  to  Geneva,  or  who  will  study  the  map  and 
text  of  ''  Badeker's  Switzerland  "  which  relate  to 
this  district.  For  these  ten  miles  the  river  is  here 
and  there  fordable,  and  the  left  bank  is  not  pro- 
tected by  rocks  ;  but  beyond  this  the  hills  close 
in  upon  it,  and  it  begins  to  run  in  rapids.  If  the 
Helvetii  were  to  cross  it  at  all  into  the  Roman  prov- 
vince,  they  must  cross  it  at  some  point  above  the 
rocks  and  rapids  ;  and  Caesar's  fortification  would 
enable  the  Romans  to  defeat  any  such  attempt. 
This  work  completed,  he  was  in  a  position  to  tell 
the  invaders,  when  their  envoys  returned  according 
to  agreement,  that  he  could  not  permit  them  to 
cross,  and  would  resist  any  attempt  to  do  so.  Sev- 
eral times  they  essayed  to  break  through  his  de- 
fences, but  were  in  each  case  beaten  back  with  loss ; 
and  then,  giving  up  the  attempt,  they  began  to 
negotiate  with  the  Sequani  for  permission  to  use 
the  more  difificult  route  which  led  through  the  terri- 
tory of  that  people  between  the  Jura  and  the  Rhone. 
The  negotiation  succeeded,  through  the  mediation 
of  Dumnorix,  the  ambitious  leader  of  the  anti- 
Roman  party  among  the  neighbouring  ^Edui ;  and 
there  was  nothing  now  but  the  difficulty  of  the 
route  to  delay  the  migrants  in  forcing  their  way 
into  the  very  heart  of  Gaul. 


142  Julius   CcBsar.  [58  B.C. 

The  crisis  was  an  exceedingly  urgent  one ;  and  in 
order  to  understand  it  the  reader  should  grasp,  as 
Csesar  did,  not  only  the  military  danger  of  the 
moment,  but  the  political  situation  which  resulted 
from  the  laissez-faire  policy  of  recent  years.  The 
map  will  show  that  there  was  nothing  to  protect  the 
Roman  province  from  the  invaders,  when  once  they 
had  passed  the  defiles  of  the  Jura,  but  the  river 
Rhone,  there  flowing  with  a  gentler  stream ;  and 
rivers,  as  is  well  known,  if  undefended,  are  no 
serious  obstacle  even  to  barbarian  armies.  There 
was  no  force  in  that  part  of  the  province ;  the 
Helvetii  might  be  expected  in  a  very  few  weeks, 
and  nothing  but  the  fact  that  they  were  a  whole 
people,  as  well  as  an  army,  could  prevent  their 
arriving  there  much  sooner,  j  The  Sequani  were  now 
on  friendly  terms  with  them  ;  the  ^dui  farther  to 
the  west  were  divided  into  two  factions,  one  of  them 
hostile  to  Rome  ;  and  both  these  tribes,  as  well  as  the 
Arverni,  the  ancient  enemies  of  the  Romans,  were 
more  or  less  under  the  influence  of  the  German  Ario- 
vistus,  whose  star  was  now  in  the  ascendant  in  Gaul. 

The  position  of  this  great  foreign  chieftain  is  in 
fact  the  real  key  to  the  situation.  He  was  in  Gaul 
as  a  conqueror  ;  the  Romans  were  weak  and  on  the 
defensive.  Only  the  ^dui  and  Sequani  lay  between 
him  and  the  province,  and  as  Rome  had  given  these 
tribes  no  help  against  him,  his  prestige  with  them 
was  naturally  overwhelming.  IThey  accordingly  now 
showed  their  readiness  to  neglect  Roman  interests 
by  allowing  the  Helvetii  to  pass  through  their  terri- 
tories. jThus  the  almost   defenceless   province  was 


5  5  5  5  7  IJ 

1.   IMPERATOR.     2.   LEGATUS.     3.  CENTURIO.     4.   LICTOR.     5.   SIQNIFERI. 
6.   BUCINATOR.     7.  TUBICEN.     8.  VEXILLUM.      9.    AQUILA. 


58  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    143 

confronted  along  its  whole  boundary  by  disaffected 
and  hostile  tribes,  backed  up  by  a  northern  invader 
whom  they  no  longer  dared  to  challenge.  No  won- 
der that  they  were  unwilling  to  stop  the  migrating 
Helvetii,  in  spite  of  Caesar's  decision,  of  which  they 
must  have  been  well  aware,  that  this  people  could 
not  be  suffered  to  settle  on  the  Roman  border!  '^It 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  restore  the  weight  of 
Roman  influence  ;  and  this  could  only  be  done  either 
by  a  strong  defensive  policy,  i.  e.,  by  strengthening 
the  frontier  in  its  whole  extent,  and  massing  forces 
at  all  weak  points  ;  or  by  boldly  taking  the  offensive, 
stopping  the  Helvetii,  re-establishing  Roman  in- 
fluence among  the  ^dui  and  Sequani,  and  letting 
it  be  seen  that  Ariovistus  was  not  to  have  it  all 
his  own  way.  V 

This  latter  policy  was  practically  forced  on  Caesar, 
though  it  doubtless  also  fully  coincided  with  his 
own  active  and  adventurous  nature.  There  was  no 
time  to  build  up  an  elaborate  system  of  defence  ;  he 
had  given  his  word  that  the  Helvetii  were  not  to  be 
allowed  to  carry  out  their  intentions  ;  and  he  had  no 
choice  but  to  pursue  them  with  all  the  forces  he 
could  raise  and  turn  them  back  to  the  country  they 
had  left.  By  this  plan,  if  successful,  the  frontier 
tribes  would  in  any  case  be  quieted  for  the  present, 
and  Caesar  might  be  free  to  check  Ariovistus  him- 
self, should  he  still  prove  formidable  and  aggressive. 

Leaving  his  able  lieutenant  Labienus  with  the  sin- 
gle legion  ^  in  charge  of  the  works  at  Geneva,  he 
returned  with   all  possible  speed   to  Cisalpine  Gaul, 

*  This  was  the  famous  tenth,  of  which  we  shall  hear  more. 


/ 


144  yulius   Qesar.  [58  B.c 

to  bring  up  the  three  other  legions  which  had  been 
granted  him  with  his  province.  At  the  same  time, 
in  view  of  the  immediate  danger,  he  anticipated  the 
senatorial  sanction,  and  ordered  two  new  ones  to  be 
levied.  With  these  recruits,  and  with  the  three 
legions  which  had  wintered  at  Aquileia  (near  Venice), 
he  hurried  back  over  the  Alps,  probably  by  the  pass 
of  the  Mount  Gen^vre,  the  best  known  and  most 
direct  route  to  the  Transalpine  province,  and  in  spite 
of  sharp  opposition  from  the  Alpine  tribes,  made 
his  way  to  the  Rhone  while  it  was  still  early  sum- 
mer. Then  without  hesitation  he  took  the  impor- 
tant step  of  crossing  the  river  and  thus  passing 
beyond  the  limits  of  his  province.  He  was  joined 
here  by  Labienus  and  the  tenth  legion  ;  and  thus 
every  available  trained  soldier  under  his  command 
was  brought  to  bear  upon  the  threatened  point. 
The  rapidity  with  which  this  concentration  was 
effected  was  then  almost  unprecedented  in  miHtary 
history,  and  would  be  remarkable  even  at  the  present 
day.  [Its  boldness,  too,  was  only  justified  by  suc- 
cess, tor  it  left  the  whole  of  the  Alpine  frontier  of 
Italy  bare  of  troops.  jBut  just  as  the  political  cam- 
paign of  the  previous  year  had  shown  the  idlers  of 
the  forum  that  a  man  had  arisen  who  would  not  be 
turned  aside  from  his  path  by  any  petty  obstacles, 
so  this  campaign  against  the  Helvetii  taught  the 
whole  body  of  disaffected  Gauls  that  they  had  a 
Roman  to  deal  with  whose  like  had  not  been  seen 
since  Marius.    f 

The  operations  which  followed,  and  the  final  defeat 
of  the  Helvetii,  are  described  by  Caesar  in  chapters 


cc 

.  I 

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< 

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O 

o 

li 

C/J 

o 

58  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul.    145 

twelve  to  twenty-nine  of  his  first  book,  with  self- 
evident  candour  and  modesty.  Both  he  himself,  his 
lieutenants,  and  his  troops  were  only  learning  the 
business  of  really  critical  warfare,  and  when  he 
wrote  this  account  some  years  later  he  must  have 
looked  back  on  these  few  weeks  as  a  time  of  re- 
peated danger  and  disappointment.  His  officers 
were  many  of  them  quite  worthless  and  inexperi- 
enced, and  even  some  who  were  old  soldiers  were 
frightened  by  the  new  and  formidable  enemies  they 
had  to  face.  His  troops  were  unseasoned,  and  the 
real  brunt  of  the  work  had  to  be  often  borne  by 
the  one  legion  on  which  he  could  wholly  rely  ;  in 
cavalry  in  particular  he  was  very  weak,  and  the  raw 
levies  which  he  raised  in  the  province  and  among 
the  Gallic  tribes  were  at  first  of  little  use.  His 
enemy,  though  encumbered  by  women,  children,  and 
baggage,  was  reckoned  at  more  than  90,000  men 
capable  of  fighting  ;  and  perhaps  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty of  all  was  the  arduous  task  of  feeding  his  troops 
in  the  disaffected  country  into  which  he  now  had  to 
plunge. 

The  Helvetii  had  moved  very  slowly,  and  had  oc- 
cupied twenty  days  in  bridging  the  Saone,  which 
was  the  first  considerable  obstacle  they  met  with  in 
their  progress  westwards.  They  had  not  all  crossed^ 
when  Caesar  overtook  them  and  destroyed  one  of 
their  tribes,  the  Tigurini,  who  had  in  former  years 
signalised  themselves  by  defeating  and  capturing  a 
Roman  army  under  L.  Cassius.  He  then  threw  a 
bridge  over  the   river  in   a  single   day,  turned  the 

enemy  in  a  northerly  direction,  and  pursued  them 
10 


146  yulius   CcBsar.  L58  B.C. 

with  great  caution  into  the  interior  of  the  country. 
A  cavalry  skirmish,  and  a  cleverly  conceived  ambush 
were  alike  failures  ;  provisions  began  to  fail  ;  time 
was  spent  in  negotiations,  both  with  the  enemy  and 
with  the  ^dui,  in  whose  territory  Caesar  now  was. 
He  had  been  all  this  time  marching  northward 
through  the  plains  of  Burgundy,  to  the  west  of  the 
familiar  line  of  railway  now  running  between  Dijon 
and  Macon  ;  and  finding  himself  within  a  few  miles 
of  the  yEduan  capital  Bibracte  (now  Autun),  he  felt 
compelled  to  leave  the  pursuit  and  turn  to  the  city 
for  supplies.  The  Helvetii,  emboldened  by  what 
they  fancied  was  a  retreat,  became  the  attacking 
party  ;  Caesar  was  forced  to  take  up  a  strong  posi- 
tion in  three  lines  on  a  hill  not  far  from  the  town 
and  await  their  assault.  The  critical  nature  of  his 
position,  and  his  want  of  absolute  confidence  in 
his  troops,  are  indicated  by  the  fact,  recorded  by 
himself,  that  he  had  his  own  horse  and  those  of  all 
his  chief  ofificers  taken  to  the  rear,  in  order  to  show 
the  legionaries  that  they  were  to  conquer  or  to  die 
together.  The  battle  began  about  midday  and 
ended  at  sunset.  The  attack  of  the  Helvetii  was 
repulsed,  and  the  Romans  followed  them  down  into 
the  plain  ;  but  here  they  were  themselves  taken  in 
flank  and  rear  by  some  15,000  of  the  enemy's  rear- 
guard, who  had  only  just  arrived  on  the  scene  of 
action.  Against  these,  like  Napoleon  at  Waterloo 
against  the  Prussians,  Caesar  had  to  form  a  new 
front  with  his  third  line,  and  to  fight  the  rest  of  the 
battle  without  reserves.  The  struggle  was  intense 
and  prolonged  ;  not  one  Helvetian,  Caesar  expressly 


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THE  CAMP  OF  A  LEGION. 


58  B.C.]     The  Defence  of  Transalpine  Gaul,    147 

tells  us,  was  seen  to  turn  his  back  throughout  it. 
Far  into  the  night  the  enemy  sustained  all  attacks 
on  the  fortress  of  wagons  to  which  they  had  at  last 
retreated  ;  but  by  daylight  this  too  was  carried,  and 
the  whole  host  was  flying. 

This  great  battle  of  Bibracte,  in  which  some 
130,000  men  were  engaged,  had  an  instant  and  deci- 
sive effect  on  the  whole  political  and  military  situation. 
None  of  the  Gauls  dared  to  disobey  Caesar's  order, 
now  at  once  issued,  that  no  support  was  to  be  given 
to  the  fugitives ;  and  the  result  of  this  was  that  the 
vanquished  lost  no  time  in  submitting  themselves  to 
the  Roman  whom  they  had  defied.  The  main  body 
was  sent  back  to  its  old  home  in  Switzerland,  hence- 
forward to  be  the  obedient  clients  of  the  Roman  state 
on  the  German  frontier ;  and  the  Allobroges  were 
ordered  to  supply  them  with  provision  on  their 
journey.  The  tribe  of  the  Boii,  who  had  been  long 
wandering  homeless,"*  were  settled  among  the 
^dui  at  the  request  of  the  latter,  and  were  in  due 
time  incorporated  with  them.  Thus  long  before 
the  summer  was  over  every  danger  seemed  to  have 
vanished  on  the  frontier ;  the  enemies  who  had 
menaced  the  very  existence  of  the  Transalpine 
province  were  converted  into  bulwarks  against  the 
barbarians  of  the  regions  farther  north.  Caesar's 
genius,  showing  itself  no  less  in  diplomacy  than  in 
the  combined  daring  and  caution  of  his  warfare, 
had  made  him  in  three  short  months  the  arbiter  of 
southern  Gaul. 

*  B.  G.,  i.,  6  and  28. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   DEFEAT    OF   THE    GERMANS. 
58    B.C. 


f^^5^ss^==iSy*^^:«S2^^^HS^*;^lHE  position  in  which  Caesar  now 

found  himself,  at  the  head  of 
a  victorious  army  in  the  heart 
of  Gaul  and  out  of  reach  of 
all  immediate  control  by  the 
Senate,  could  not  but  suggest 
to  him  the  advantage  of  com- 
pleting without  delay  the 
work  he  had  begun.  It  was 
pointed  out  in  the  last  chapter 
that  it  was  not  only  the  attempted  migration  of  the 
Helvetii — an  accidental  circumstance,  though  one  of 
a  kind  liable  to  occur  at  any  time, — which  placed  the 
Roman  province  in  jeopardy.  The  real  and  perma- 
nent danger  was  the  attitude  and  temper  of  the 
Gallic  tribes  on  the  frontier — the  Arverni,  ^dui,  and 
Sequani.  These  would  become  friendly  so  soon  as 
the    Roman    power   was   felt    and    understood,   and 

148 


58  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the  Germans.  149 

would  be  hostile  so  long  as  they  were  witnesses  of  a 
feeble  frontier-policy,  and  believed  Rome  itself  to  be 
hopelessly  weakened  by  internal  strife.  Thus  they 
had  encouraged  the  Helvetii,  and  given  no  aid  to 
Caesar  until  they  found  out  his  strength  ;  and  before 
this,  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  the  Arverni 
and  Sequani  had  turned  upon  the  Roman  party 
among  the  ^dui,  and  had  called  in  Ariovistus  and 
the  Germans  to  help  in  crushing  them. 

But  Caesar's  victory  had  again  revolutionised  their 
policy.  Like  all  semi-civilised  peoples,  they  followed 
in  the  wake  of  the  victor  of  the  day.  Among  the 
iEdui  the  Roman  party,  with  its  able  chief  Divitia- 
cus,  at  once  resumed  the  lead  ;  and  it  was  probably  by 
their  influence  that  a  proposal  was  made  to  hold 
a  general  representative  council  of  Gallic  peoples 
to  deliberate  on  the  state  of  affairs.  As  a  mark  of 
deference  to  Caesar,  and  in  recognition  of  his  supreme 
position  among  them  at  the  moment,  an  embassy  of 
notables  came  to  ask  his  sanction  to  this  step,  which 
was  readily  granted.* 

When  the  council  had  been  held  the  same  embassy 
returned  and  with  much  show  of  humility  laid  before 
Caesar  a  definite  statement  of  their  unenviable  posi- 
tion. Divitiacus  was  the  speaker,  and  he  more 
especially  represented  the  feeling  of  the  ^dui  and 
the  Sequani.  Both  these  tribes  had  been  beaten 
and  ill-treated  by  Ariovistus  the  German  invader  ; 
they  were  indeed  themselves  chiefly  to  blame,  and 
they  seem  to  have  been  well  aware  of  it.  But  there 
were  other  facts  of  which  a  victorious  Roman  general 

*  This  at  least  is  Caesar's  account,  B.  G.,  i.,  30. 


1 50  Julius  CcBsar.  [58  B.C. 

could  hardly  fail  to  take  advantage.  The  ^Edui, 
allies  of  the  Roman  people,  had  been  forced  to  give 
hostages  to  an  invading  enemy,  and  to  swear  that 
they  would  in  future  ask  for  no  aid  from  Rome  ;  the 
Sequani,  whose  territory  bordered  the  province  for 
the  whole  distance  from  Geneva  to  Lyons,  had  had 
one  third  of  their  land  confiscated,  and  were  now 
called  on  to  show  their  obedience  still  further  by 
giving  up  another  third  to  a  German  tribe  which  had 
lately  joined  Ariovistus  from  beyond  the  Rhine.  They 
declared  that  this  rude  and  cruel  German  was  treating 
them  as  his  slaves,  and  that  they  had  no  recourse  but 
to  submit  unless  Csesar  chose  to  interfere ;  that  the 
whole  of  Gaul  would  ere  long  fall  a  prey  to  the  bar- 
barians, who  had  long  wished  to  exchange  their  own 
forests  for  the  rich  and  cultivated  plains  of  the  south. 
[^The  question  then  immediately  before  Caesar  at 
the  moment  was  whether  he  or  Ariovistus  was  to  be 
obeyed  by  the  Gallic  tribes  which  lay  between  them  ; 
and  to  that  question  at  least  there  was  only  one 
possible  answer.  [  Rome  had  indeed  hardly  more 
claim  to  their  obedience  than  the  German  ;  but  a 
civilised  state  will  always  claim  rights  over  uncivilised 
states,  and  conceive  of  its  own  interests  as  the  inter- 
ests of  humanity.  Whether  or  not  such  ideas  are 
consciously  entertained  by  the  civilised  state,  or 
justified  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  is  at 
least  certain  that  they  are  habitually  acted  upon. 
We  may  aptly  remember  that  one  of  the  gentlest 
and  most  righteous  of  British  provincial  governors 
did  not  hesitate  a  few  years  ago  to  make  demands 
on  a   Zulu   king  more  exacting  by    far  than  those 


58  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the   Germans.  151 

which  Caesar  was  now  to  address  to  Ariovistus,  and 
that  they  were  applauded  at  the  time  by  the  majority 
of  the  English  people. 

Yet,  in  Csesar's  account  of  his  action  in  this  crisis, 
it  is  very  plain  that  he  was  not  only  ready,  but  anx- 
ious, to  gain  his  object  without  an  appeal  to  arms.  It 
was  not  his  interest  to  run  another  serious  risk  with- 
out due  cause  ;  he  had  done  quite  enough  for  one 
summer,  and  his  army,  as  events  showed,  was  not 
yet  thoroughly  to  be  depended  on.  He  must  have 
wished  to  keep  up  the  continuity  of  the  diplomatic 
policy  adopted  towards  the  king  during  his  consul- 
ship ;  for  the  Germans  were  well  known  to  be  most 
formidable  warriors,  but  possessed  of  certain  frank 
and  chivalrous  qualities  which  might  render  them 
open  to  honourable  negotiation.  He  therefore  sent 
to  Ariovistus,  asking  for  a  personal  interview.  To 
this  message  a  curt  answer  was  returned  :  ''  Caesar 
might  come  to  him,  if  he  pleased  ;  it  was  not  con- 
venient for  him  to  go  to  Caesar,  nor  did  he  under- 
stand what  the  Romans  were  doing  in  a  country 
which  he  had  himself  lately  conquered."  Caesar 
now  formulated  his  demands;  Ariovistus  must  bring 
no  more  Germans  across  the  Rhine,  and  must  return 
the  hostages  which  he  had  taken  from  the  ^dui  and 
Sequani. 

A  personal  interview  might  have  smoothed  down 
the  unpleasantness  of  such  an  ultimatum,  and  have 
ended  in  mutual  admiration  and  at  least  a  temporary 
adjustment ;  but  Caesar's  envoys  were  not  Caesar,  and 
the  answer  they  brought  back  was  no  more  than  he 
could  have  expected.     It  was  a  point-blank-  refusal, 


152  yulius  CcBsar,  [58  B.C. 

a  direct  claim  to  rule  over  the  two  Gallic  tribes,  and 
a  challenge  to  try  the  valour  of  troops  who  for  four- 
teen years  had  never  passed  a  night  under  a  roof. 
Further  intelligence  of  German  progress  southwards 
came  in  at  the  same  time  with  his  answer ;  a  hun- 
dred Suebic  communities  were  ready  to  cross  the 
Rhine  into  northern  Gaul,  and  the  Harudes,  who 
had  been  already  complained  of  by  the  -^dui,  were 
now  actually  ravaging  their  territory.  Caesar  in- 
stantly provisioned  his  army,  and  hastened  to  meet 
Ariovistus. 

Where  the  German  king  then  was,  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  known  when  he  started  ;  but  after 
three  days*  march  news  came  in  that  the  enemy  was 
pushing  in  full  force  for  Vesontio  (now  Besangon), 
the  capital  of  the  Sequani.  Well  aware  that  which- 
ever army  reached  this  town  first,  would  have  a 
great  advantage  in  the  abundant  supplies  stored 
there,  as  well  as  in  the  strength  of  its  position, 
Csesar  marched  day  and  night  till  he  reached  it ;  and 
occupying  it  without  hearing  anything  more  of  the 
enemy,  he  devoted  a  few  days  to  completing  his 
commissariat.  Throughout  his  military  life  his 
vigilant  care  for  the  physical  well-being  of  his  sol- 
diers is  most  striking ;  and  he  writes  of  it  as  if  he 
fully  realised  what  was  then  far  more  than  now  a 
leading  principle  in  all  such  warfare,  that  civilised 
troops  are  at  an  immense  disadvantage  in  fighting 
with  barbarians,  unless  they  are  in  the  best  possible 
condition.  At  the  present  day  inequality  in  weapons 
may  lessen  this  disadvantage  ;  but  in  the  hand-to- 
hand  fighting  of  antiquity  the  Italian  soldiery  was 


€m 


CATAPULT. 

USED    IN   SIEGE   OPERATIONS. 

{Bauineister.') 


68  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the   Germans.  153 

naturally  ill-matched  against  the  hardy  and  powerful 
German,  and  even  against  the  more  civilised  and  less 
vigorous  Gaul. 

i  And  Caesar  had  now  to  learn  that  his  soldiers  were 
only  too  well  aware  of  their  physical  inferiority.  At 
Vesontio  the  army  was  stricken  with  a  panic,  caused 
by  the  novelty  of  their  position  in  a  country  hitherto 
utterly  unknown  to  them,  and  by  the  exaggerated 
accounts  of  the  enemy  brought  in  by  native  traders 
from  the  north.  It  seems  to  have  begun  with  the 
effeminate  officers  who  had  followed  the  general  to 
Gaul  simply  in  expectation  of  spoil,  after  the  com- 
mon Roman  fashion ;  many  of  these  made  excuses 
and  departed,  while  others  who  had  a  remnant  of 
shame  in  their  degenerate  minds  remained  to  weep 
in  their  tents  over  their  miserable  lot.^  The  picture 
^that  their  general  has  left  us  of  this  panic,  contained 
in  a  very  few  sentences  of  suppressed  scorn,  is  one  of 
the  most  striking  in  his  whole  work,  and  every  word 
of  it,  as  well  as  of  Caesar's  own  speech,  which  follows, 
should  be  studied  by  all  who  wish  to  understand  how 
one  man's  genius  can  breathe  fresh  life  into  a  decay- 
ing civilisation.  What  Caesar  achieved  on  this  occa- 
sion with  his  army  is  a  type  of  what  he  did  afterwards 
with  the  Roman  state. 

The  panic  spread  and  threatened  to  affect  the  cen- 
turions and  the  rank  and  file ;  throughout  the  army 
vsx^xv^^xQ  making  their  wills ;  it  was  even  expected 
that  the  soldiers  would  refuse  to  march  when  ordered 
to  do  so.  He  took  the  unusual  step  of  calling  a 
council,  which  included  not  only  the  higher  officers, 
but  the  whole  of  the  centurions  ;  and  made  them  a 


154  yulius  CcEsar,  [58  B.C. 

speech  in  which  there  is  not  a  single  harsh  note,  and 
every  point  of  which  must  have  gone  home.  The 
words  cannot,  indeed,  be  exactly  those  he  used  at 
the  time,  but  the  concluding  sentence  must  have 
been  held  fast  in  his  own  memory  and  in  the  minds 
of  all  who  heard  him.  "  If  no  one  else  will  follow 
me,  I  will  go  on  with  the  tenth  legion  alone ;  on  that 
legion  at  least  I  can  depend,  and  I  will  entrust  my- 
self to  it  as  a  body-guard.'*  These  words  must  have 
been  speedily  communicated  to  the  whole  army,  and 
their  effect  was  instantaneous.  The  tenth  legion  sent 
to  thank  him,  the  rest  to  explain  and  repudiate  their 
shortcomings.  The  spirit  of  mutiny  vanished  with- 
out the  infliction  of  a  single  punishment,  and  Caesar 
was  able  to  march  at  once  with  greater  confidence 
than  he  had  felt  since  he  crossed  the  Alps. 

The  country  they  were  now  traversing,  in  which 
the  battle  was  to  be  fought  which  put  a  stop  to  Ger- 
man invasion  and  made  Caesar  master  of  eastern 
Gaul,  is  not  unfamiliar  to  many  Englishmen  and 
Americans.  The  traveller  from  London  to  Basle, 
when  he  wakes  in  the  early  morning,  finds  himself 
passing  through  a  rich  undulating  plain  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  the  great  stronghold  of  Belfort.  To  the 
north  he  may  see  the  outskirts  of  the  Vosges,  and  to 
the  south  the  range  of  the  Jura,  the  two  great  natural 
ramparts  which  defend  the  plains  of  France  from  an 
invader ;  but  between  these  two  walls  of  mountain 
there  is  a  gap, — a  weak  point  in  the  line  of  defence  ; 
and  it  is  this  gap  that  the  fortress  commands.  This 
opening  Ariovistus  must  naturally  use  in  entering 
Gaul  from  the  valley  of  the  Rhine  ;  and  this  too  at 


58  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the   Germans,  155 

the  present  day  has  offered  easy  access  to  railways, 
which  can  only  be  constructed  with  difficulty  through 
the  defiles  of  the  two  mountain  ranges.  To-day,  the 
express  trains,  soon  after  passing  Belfort,  leave  the 
open  country  and  enter  the  picturesque  valley  of  the 
Doubs,  in  order  to  strike  the  Rhine  at  Basle  by  a 
shorter  though  more  difficult  route ;  and  this  route 
was  open  to  Caesar  also,  had  he  chosen  to  avail  him- 
self of  it.  But  it  was  for  several  reasons  a  hazardous 
one,  and  offered  great  advantages  to  an  enemy  well 
acquainted  with  the  ground.  He  therefore  took  a 
longer  route  in  the  open  country  which  lies  around 
Belfort,  and  stretches  northwards  towards  Miihl- 
hausen  and  the  Rhine.  The  modern  traveller  can 
follow  closely  on  his  track  by  taking  the  railway 
from  Belfort  to  Miihlhausen  ;  on  his  left  lies  the  scene 
of  the  movements  that  ensued,  in  the  comparatively 
narrow  space  between  the  Rhine  and  the  outskirts 
of  the  Vosges. 

After  seven  days'  continuous  march,  Caesar's  scouts 
discovered  the  German  army  about  fifteen  miles 
distant,  near  the  Rhine,  not  far  from  Miihlhausen. 
Ariovistus  now  sent  to  propose  a  conference  ;  an 
offer  which,  as  Caesar  clearly  means  us  to  understand, 
was  intended  to  cover  a  treacherous  design.  If  he 
tells  the  truth,  Ariovistus  had  even  been  tampered 
with  by  certain  enemies  of  Caesar  in  Rome,  and  did 
not  hesitate  to  own  it  at  the  conference.  The  inter- 
view was  a  failure,  for  by  this  time  things  had 
gone  too  far  for  accommodation.  If  there  had  ever 
been  a  chance  of  agreement,  it  was  now  destroyed  ; 
for  the  conversation  was  cut  short  by  the  threatening 


156  yulius  Ccesar.  [58  B.C. 

attitude  of  the  German  cavalry,  which  compelled 
Caesar  to  retreat  to  his  own  guard.  It  was  well  for 
him  that  this  guard  was  composed  of  his  own  legion- 
aries, mounted  on  horseback,  instead  of  the  Gallic 
horse  which  Ariovistus  evidently  expected.  What 
followed  showed  how  foolhardy  it  would  have 
been  to  trust  his  person  to  the  good  faith  of 
barbarians  with  no  escort  but  one  composed  of 
new  and  doubtful  allies.  Ariovistus  sent  to  ask 
for  a  second  interview.  Caesar  naturally  declined  it, 
but  sent  a  young  officer,  a  Roman  citizen  though  by 
birth  a  Gaul,  to  negotiate  with  the  king  in  the  Gallic 
tongue,  with  which  the  latter  was  well  acquainted. 
No  sooner  had  he  entered  the  king's  presence  than 
he  and  the  comrade  sent  with  him  were  instantly 
seized  and  put  in  chains  as  spies.  It  was  now  obvi- 
ous that  nothing  but  a  pitched  battle  could  decide 
the  quarrel  ;  and  Ariovistus  appeared  to  challenge 
such  an  issue  by  moving  his  army  along  the  spurs  of 
the  Vosges,  until  it  was  within  an  hour's  march  of 
Caesar's  camp.  Next  day,  still  apparently  keeping 
under  shelter  of  the  hills,  where  he  could  not  be 
attacked  but  at  disadvantage,  he  marched  past  the 
Roman  camp,  with  the  obvious  intention  of  cut- 
ting off  Caesar's  communication  with  the  corn- 
supplying  country  to  the  south.  This  Caesar  allowed 
him  to  do  unhindered  ;  probably  because  the  nature 
of  the  ground  forbade  him  to  risk  a  general  action  at 
that  moment. 

But  in  order  to  place  himself  in  Caesar's  rear,  Ario- 
vistus must  have  descended  to  the  more  open  ground 
towards  the  Rhine  ;  and  battle  was  at  once  offered 


68  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the   Germans.  157 

him.  He  declined  it  for  five  successive  days,  and 
with  the  instinct  of  a  true  general,  tried  to  wear  out 
Caesar  by  constant  attacks  of  his  cavalry,  mingled 
with  swift-running  esquires  on  foot.  The  situation 
was  becoming  awkward  for  the  Romans  ;  not  only 
would  their  supplies  soon  begin  to  fail,  but  (though 
Caesar  does  not  tell  us  this)  they  must  have  beep- 
aware  that  on  the  first  rumour  of  a  reverse,  the  Gallic 
tribes  would  go  over  to  Ariovistus.  Caesar  accord- 
ingly on  the  sixth  day  marched  out  with  his  whole 
force,  and  using  his  two  front  lines  to  ward  off  attack, 
succeeded  in  forming  another  smaller  camp  close  to 
that  of  the  enemy  ;  here  he  left  two  legions  and  a 
force  of  auxiliaries,  and  with  his  other  four  legions 
returned  to  the  larger  camp.  Next  day  he  again 
offered  battle  in  vain  ;  only  the  smaller  camp  was 
attacked,  and  no  general  engagement  could  be 
brought   on. 

Prisoners  had  told  Caesar  that  the  reason  why 
Ariovistus  would  not  fight  was  that  the  German 
women,  who  were  regarded  as  having  prophetic 
power,  would  not  promise  a  successful  issue  before 
the  new  moon.  But  it  was  becoming  hazardous  to 
wait  ;  the  enemy  must  be  frightened,  and  forced 
into  an  action.  With  this  object  Caesar  adopted  a 
ruse  which  showed  his  resource  as  a  commander. 
With  his  six  legions,  each  at  the  most  but  5,000 
strong,  he  could  not  venture  to  attack  a  greatly 
superior  force,  so  long  as  that  force  remained  in  its 
camp  ;  but  he  now  made  use  of  his  light-armed 
troops,  recruited  probably  from  the  Gallic  population 
of  the  Transalpine  province,  and  dispensing  for  the 


158  yulius  CcBsar.  [58  B.C. 

time  with  their  aid  as  skirmishers,  drew  them  up  in 
front  of  his  lesser  camp  in  battle  array,  and  in  two 
divisions,  so  as  to  resemble  two  regular  legions. 
With  the  whole  of  the  rest  of  his  forces  he  then 
marched  straight  for  the  enemy's  camp.  Ariovistus 
thus  found  himself  menaced  in  front  by  Caesar's 
main  force,  while  two  entire  legions  appeared  to 
threaten  his  right  flank  and  rear.  At  last  he  ac- 
cepted battle,  and  drew  out  his  forces  in  order  of 
tribes,  with  regular  intervals  between  each  tribe.  In 
the  rear  and  on  the  flanks  were  ranged  the  carts  and 
waggons,  with  the  women  placed  upon  them,  weep- 
ing and  imploring  the  warriors  not  to  abandon  them 
to  the  enemy. 

Caesar  had  alarmed  Ariovistus  by  the  ruse  of  the 
two  supposed  legions  on  his  left  wing,  and  knew 
that  the  German  right  was  on  this  account  unduly 
strengthened,  while  their  left  was  proportionately 
weak.  He  accordingly  fell  with  overwhelming 
force  upon  this  left  wing,  and  after  a  hard  struggle 
put  it  to  flight.  The  quality  of  his  soldiers  was  fast 
improving.  He  has  put  it  on  record,  that  when  the 
Germans  locked  their  great  shields  together,  and  so 
formed  an  apparently  impenetrable  defence,  there 
were  legionaries  bold  enough  to  spring  upon  this 
shield-wall  and  tear  it  down  with  their  hands.  The 
battle  was  now  won  on  his  left,  but  on  the  right  the 
numbers  of  the  enemy  were  beginning  to  tell;  and 
the  third  line  or  reserve  had  to  be  brought  up.  This 
was  done  by  young  Crassus,  the  son  of  the  triumvir, 
who  now  and  afterwards  showed  himself  a  capable 
ofiicer,  worth  a  better  fate  than  to  perish  miserably 


cc 
o 

I- 
<o 

uJ    . 

I    z 

»-  i  ^ 

DC     ^      k 

O    o    ^ 

^    a,     .5 
v;    <     tS 

HI      U. 

I- 


co 
o 


58  B.C.]       The  Defeat  of  the   Germajis.  159 


in  his  father's  ill-starred  invasion  of  Parthia.  He 
was  in  command  of  the  cavalry,  and  was  better  able 
than  the  general  to  perceive  what  was  needed  ;  for 
Csesar,  so  far  as  we  can  gather  from  his  account,  had 
dismounted  as  at  Bibracte,  and  was  again  giving  the 
)ral  force  of  his  presence  to  the  main  attack.  To 
le  gives  the  full  credit  of  restoring  the  ac- 
)ringing  up  the  reserve,  feeling  perhaps  that 
but  for  the  young  officer's  prompt  action  without 
orders,  the  result  of  the  battle  might  have  been 
different.  As  it  was,  the  victory  was  complete  ;  the 
Roman  cavalry,  whose  services  had  not  been  needed 
in  the  battle,  cut  the  Germans  to  pieces  as  they  fled 
to  the  Rhine,  which  was  about  five  miles  distant, 
and  but  few  escaped  across  the  river.  Among  the 
latter  was  Ariovistus  himself ;  but  two  of  his  wives 
and  one  daughter  perished,  and  another  daughter 
was  taken  alive.  The  German  king  disappears  from 
history,  the  German  pretensions  to  the  possession 
of  Gaul  were  put  an  end  to  for  several  centuries, 
and  Ccnesar,  representing  Rome,  remained  the  sole 
arbiter  in  the  politics  of  the  eastern  Celts. 

It  is  not  often  that  Caesar  in  his  "  Commentaries  " 
alludes  to  his  own  personal  feelings  ;  he  appears  in 
them,  as  we  have  already  said,  rather  as  a  great 
governing  force,  than  as  a  human  being  with  feelings 
and  affections.  But  he  finds  a  place  at  the  close  of 
his  account  of  this  battle,  to  refer  to  an  incident 
which,  as  he  tells  us,  gave  him  as  much  pleasure  as 
the  victory  itself.  This  was  the  recovery  of  the 
young  Romanised  Gaul  Valerius  Procillus,  whom  he 
had  entrusted  with  his  last  message  to  Ariovistus,  in 


i6o 


Julius  CcBsar, 


[58  B.C. 


full  confidence  that  he  would  not  be  ill-used.  The 
king  had  loaded  him  with  fetters,  and  in  this  condi- 
tion he  was  being  dragged  along  in  the  flight  of  his 
captors,  when  Caesar  himself,  pursuing  with  the  cav- 
alry, accidentally  came  upon  him.  jThe  genuine 
feeling  with  which  he  tells  the  story,  though  it  oc- 
cupies but  a  few  lines,  helps  us  to  understand  the 
secret  of  Caesar's  wonderful  influence  over  other 
He  felt  himself  responsible  for  the  fate  of  his 


men. 


own  envoy,  in  this  case  evidently  a  personal  friend, 
and  tells  almost  with  a  shudder  how  the  prisoner 
had  three  times  escaped  a  terrible  death  at  the 
hands  of  his  captors,  while  the  lots,  which  were 
drawn  in  his  presence,  each  time  decided  that  his 
fate  was  to  be  reserved  for  another  occasion.  \ 

No  further  trouble  being  expected  on  the  Khine, 
the  army  was  sent  into  winter  quarters  in  the 
territory  of  the  Sequani,  probably  at  Besangon ; 
and  Caesar  himself,  indefatigable  as  ever,  set  out 
to  perform  the  work  of  a  peaceful  administrator 
in  his  other  province  of  Cisalpine  Gaul. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE  CONQUEST   OF  NORTH-WESTERN   GAUL. 
57  B.C. 

||HE  troops  were  withdrawn  for 
if  winter-quarters  into  the  coun- 
try of  the  Sequani."  Caesar 
wrote  these  few  words  in  his 
usualquiet  and  matter-of-fact 
way,  at  the  end  of  his  first 
book  on  the  GalHc  War,  as  if 
there  were  no  special  signifi- 
cance about  them.  Yet  he 
must  have  very  well  known 
that  this  act  of  his  was  the  declaration  of  a  new 
policy,  and  full  of  meaning  alike  for  Gauls,  Germans, 
and  Italians.  So  far  he  had  been  acting  as  the 
champion  of  Gallic  tribes  against  barbarian  invaders, 
in  order  to  secure  the  Roman  frontier,  and  to  push 
back  the  elements  of  discord.  But  to  keep  an  army 
for  a  whole  winter  in  territory  which  was  not  Roman, 
meant  something  more  than  this — it  meant  that  he 
II  l6i 


1 62  yulius   Ccesar,  [57  B.C. 

was  going  to  extend  the  frontier  permanently,  and  to 
trust  no  longer  to  the  weak  and  crumbling  barrier  of 
Gallic  population  which  separated  him  from  the  Rhine 
and  the  Germans. 

The  very  sight  of  the  Rhine,  never  till  then  seen 
by  Roman  soldiers,  must  have  acted  strongly  on  his 
adventurous  spirit,  and  have  suggested  that  new  and 
useful  strategic  frontier  which  he  bequeathed  to  a 
long  line  of  Roman  emperors.  But  still  more  irre- 
sistible, we  may  imagine,  was  his  new  experience  of 
those  undulating  plains  of  eastern  Gaul,  in  which  the 
greater  part  of  the  summer  had  been  spent.  This 
was  not  aland  of  swamp  and  forest,  like  the  Germany 
into  which  he  afterwards  penetrated,  but  one  flowing 
with  milk  and  honey,  a  veritable  land  of  promise ; 
inhabited  by  a  settled  and  industrious  people,  active 
and  intelligent,  good  traders,  and,  with  the  necessary 
training,  good  soldiers  also.  Caesar  had  already 
begun  to  note  the  characteristics  of  this  people,  their 
strong  and  weak  points,  their  political  and  religious 
institutions.  He  saw  that  they  were  hopelessly 
divided  amongst  themselves,  and  that  their  disunion 
would  render  their  conquest  easy  and  certain.  He 
saw  that  the  mass  of  the  people  were  oppressed  by 
an  upper  class  of  priests  and  princes,  that  they  were 
little  better  than  serfs,  deep  in  debt,  and  ready  for 
''  new  things."  And  above  all  he  saw  that  in  this 
splendid  country — such  a  country  as  the  Romans 
had  never  yet  reached  in  their  career  of  conquest, — 
there  was  a  new  and  boundless  field  for  the  better 
side  of  Roman  civilisation.  What  his  predecessor 
Sertorius  had   done  in  Spain,  might  be  done  even 


57  B.C.]     Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul,        163 

better  in  Gaul.  In  the  plains  of  Burgundy,  far  re- 
moved from  the  petty  strife  of  the  forum  and  the 
senate-house,  Caesar  breathed  in  fact  a  fresher  air ; 
his  mental  vision  was  quickened,  the  range  of  his 
ideas  widened  ;  the  great  chance  he  had  been  look- 
ing for  so  long  seemed  at  last  to  have  come.  He 
was  free  to  act  as  he  pleased  ;  no  one  at  Rome  inter- 
fered with  him.  He  was  no  more  troubled  by  re- 
strictions from  a  home  government  than  was  Cortes 
in  Mexico  ;  his  army  was  now  ready  to  go  with  him 
anywhere  and  do  anything  at  his  orders  ;  it  was  as 
impossible  for  him  to  stay  where  he  was,  as  it  was 
for  the  British  in  India  in  the  last  century,  and  for 
the  Russians  in  Central  Asia  at  the  present  day.  So 
he  planted  his  army  unhesitatingly  on  Gallic  soil, 
and  passed  the  winter  in  the  assurance  of  some  fresh 
chance  occurring  for  further  enterprise  and  advance. 
The  Sequani  well  deserved  to  have  the  legions 
quartered  on  them.  They  were  really  to  blame  for 
all  that  had  happened  in  the  last  two  years  ;  they 
had  conspired  with  the  Arverni  to  crush  the  Roman- 
ising ^dui,  they  had  called  in  the  Germans  to  help 
them,  they  had  allowed  the  Helvetii  to  pass  through 
their  territory,  and  had  finally  turned  again  to  wor- 
ship the  rising  star  of  Caesar.  They  now  did  what 
they  could  to  make  amends.  Through  them  and 
the  ^dui  it  must  have  been  that  in  the  course  of 
the  winter  news  came  to  Labienus,  who  had  been 
left  in  command  of  the  army,  that  the  powerful  race 
of  the  Belgae,  occupying  the  whole  territory  to  the 
north-west  of  them,  was  in  confederation  against 
Caesar.     Labienus  at   once  wrote  to  his  chief,  who 


164  yulitcs   Ccesar.  [57  B.C. 

raised  two  new  legions  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  sent 
them  in  the  spring  under  a  legatus  across  the  Alps. 
He  had  already  heard  enough  about  these  Belgae  to 
be  sure  that  they  would  be  formidable  antagonists, 
and  that  if  he  was  to  conquer  Gaul,  they  must  be 
the  first  people  to  be  dealt  with.  They  boasted,  he 
tells  us,  of  German  descent ;  a  fact  which,  though  in 
itself  apparently  improbable,  shows  at  once  their 
contempt  for  other  Gauls,  and  the  reputation  in 
which  the  Germans  were  held.  They  owned  the 
whole  country  from  the  Seine  on  the  south  to  the 
Rhine  on  the  north,  and  had  crossed  the  sea  and 
occupied  a  large  part  of  southern  Britain.  They 
were  divided  into  a  great  number  of  tribes  or  can- 
tons, and  the  disunion  which  was  so  fatal  to  the 
other  Gauls  might  be  expected  to  work  their  ruin 
also  ;  but  this  winter  they  were  engaged  (so  Caesar 
learnt)  in  patching  up  a  strong  alliance,  and  in  ex- 
changing hostages  for  the  observance  of  good  faith. 
When  Caesar  arrived  in  camp,  he  was  informed  that 
their  forces  were  being  concentrated ;  and  with  his 
usual  rapidity,  after  organising  his  commissariat,  he 
was  on  the  borders  of  their  territory  in  a  fortnight. 

His  march  was  direct  and  unopposed  from  Besan- 
9on  to  what  is  now  the  famous  Champagne  country 
lying  to  the  south  and  east  of  Rheims  ;  here  dwelt 
the  Remi,  the  most  easterly  of  the  Belgian  cantons. 
Caesar's  swiftness,  now  as  so  often,  had  its  due  effect 
in  striking  terror  and  saving  effusion  of  blood.  The 
Remi  forthwith  surrendered  themselves,  and  gave 
valuable  information.  They  put  Caesar  in  possession 
of  a  complete  list  of  the  forces  of  the  Belgae,  and 


57  B.C.]    Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul.        165 

told  him  of  a  rumour  that  the  Germans  in  the  far 
north  had  crossed  the  Rhine  to  assist  them.  The 
two  most  powerful  Belgic  peoples  were  the  Sues- 
siones  (round  Soissons),  and  the  Bellovaci  (about 
Beauvais),  and  between  these  two  there  appeared  to 
be  some  kind  of  rivalry.  Acting  on  this  information 
of  the  Remi,  Caesar  persuaded  his  friend  Divitiacus 
the  ^duan  to  make  an  inroad  with  his  people  into 
the  country  of  the  Bellovaci,  and  so  to  keep  them 
occupied  ;  while  he  himself  went  straight  on  with 
the  whole  army  until  he  struck  the  river  Aisne  at  a 
point  half-way  between  Rheims  and  Laon,  just  where 
is  now  the  village  of  Berry-au-Bac.  Here,  as  in  the 
former  campaign,  the  Anglo-Saxon  tourist  may  still 
easily  follow  him  ;  for  the  now  favourite  route  from 
Calais  to  Basle  crosses  the  Aisne  near  this  village, 
which  lies  on  the  present  high-road  connecting  the 
two  principal  towns  of  the  district. 

At  this  point  there  was  a  bridge,  of  which  Caesar 
took  possession.  He  then  crossed  and  entrenched 
himself  in  a  camp  on  the  other  side.  Sabinus,  one 
of  his  legati,  who,  like  young  Crassus,  was  after- 
wards to  meet  with  a  sad  fate,  was  left  in  charge  of 
the  bridge  with  a  strong  detachment.  Caesar  is 
careful  to  tell  us  that  he  fortified  his  camp  strongly ; 
this  alone  would  have  justified  him  in  taking  up  a 
position  with  a  river  in  his  rear  crossed  by  a  single 
bridge.  The  reader  of  his  ''  Commentaries  "  must 
bear  in  mind  that  in  the  Roman  system  of  warfare 
a  well-fortified  camp  was  all  but  inexpugnable,  and 
that  with  a  well-organised  commissariat,  an  army  so 
entrenched    could    for   some   time   dispense   with    a 


1 66  yulius   Ccesar.  [57  B.C. 

regular  base  of  operations.  But  in  this  case  the  com- 
munications also  were  secured  by  the  bridge,  and  the 
river  protected  the  camp  from  an  attack  in  the  rear. 
Some  few  miles  to  the  north-west,  on  a  lofty  ridge, 
which  in  1814  was  the  scene  of  the  bloody  battle  of 
Craonne,  was  a  frontier  fortress  of  the  Remi,  called 
Bibrax.  The  whole  Belgic  army,  now  on  their  way 
to  meet  the  Romans,  fell  upon  this  place,  and  all 
but  took  it  ;  word  of  this  was  sent  to  Caesar,  who 
despatched  thither  by  night  his  most  valued  light- 
armed  troops,  from  Crete,  Numidia,  and  the  Bale- 
aric Islands.  He  wisely  refrained  from  dividing 
his  main  force,  and  these  skirmishers  proved  suffi- 
cient to  divert  the  enemy  from  the  town.  The  Belgae 
now  came  on  against  Caesar,  burning  and  ravaging 
on  their  way,  and  encamped  opposite  him  on  the 
other  side  of  a  little  marshy  stream,  now  called  the 
Miette  ;  "  their  encampment,"  he  says,  "  appeared  to 
be  several  miles  in  length."  Caesar  was  never  given 
to  despising  his  enemy,  and  his  tactics  here  show 
admirably  that  combination  of  caution  with  confi- 
dence and  daring  which  marks  the  consummate 
general.  He  would  not  at  once  offer  to  fight  a 
pitched  battle,  but  contented  himself  with  feeling 
the  strength  and  valour  of  the  Belgae  in  cavalry 
combats,  until  he  was  assured  that  he  was  a  match 
for  them.  Then  he  drew  out  his  six  old  legions  on 
a  hill  which  sloped  gently  to  the  swampy  ground, 
leaving  his  two  new  legions  as  a  reserve  in  the  camp. 
The  enemy,  however,  declined  to  fight,  but  made  a 
vigorous  attempt  to  cross  the  Aisne  and  take  him  in 
the  rear.     This  attempt  was  checked  without  much 


57  B.C.]     Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul,        167 

difficulty ;  and  then,  finding  the  Roman  position 
impregnable  and  their  own  supplies  failing,  the  Bel- 
gic  chiefs  decided  at  a  council  of  war  to  return  to 
their  several  cantons,  and  to  re-unite  for  the  defence 
of  whichever  should  be  first  attacked.  They  broke 
up,  therefore,  and  their  forces  ceased  to  be  a  united 
army.  The  retreat  began  in  the  night,  and  it  was 
daybreak  before  Caesar  appreciated  its  meaning ;  he 
instantly  despatched  his  cavalry  after  them,  followed 
by  three  legions  under  Labienus.  The  result  was 
the  total  discomfiture,  with  terrible  slaughter,  of  at 
least  a  large  portion  of  the  Belgic  force,  the  whole 
of  which  was  thus  broken  up  and  dispersed  with 
hardly  any  loss  to  the  Romans. 

Before  the  cantons  could  concentrate  their 
strength  a  second  time,  their  untiring  enemy  bore 
down  upon  them  one  by  one.  He  swooped  upon 
Noviodunum,  the  fortress  of  the  Suessiones ;  though 
its  entrenchments  were  too  strong  to  be  carried  at  a 
first  assault,  the  appearance  of  his  artillery  *  effected 
an  immediate  surrender.  From  Noviodunum,  the 
modern  Soissons,  he  went  on  to  Bratuspantium 
(Beauvais),  and  received  a  like  submission  from  the 
Bellovaci  ;  thence  to  the  citadel  of  the  Ambiani 
(Amiens),  who  surrendered  themselves  as  readily. 
He  does  not  tell  how  he  dealt  with  this  last  people  ; 
but  the  Suessiones  and  the  Bellovaci  were  treated 
with  equal  clemency  and  firmness.    The  one  tribe  had 


*  By  this  word  are  to  be  understood  the  various  siege  appliances  in 
use  at  the  time,  which  the  Roman  engineers  had  brought  to  a  high 
degree  of  perfection  ;  e.  g.^  the  tormentum  and  ballista  (catapults), 
and  the  aries  or  battering-ram. 


1 68  Julius  CcBsar,  [57  B.C. 

been  the  allies  of  the  Remi,  the  other  of  the  ^dui, 
and  their  cause  was  pleaded  in  each  case  by  the 
representatives  of  the  friendly  canton.  No  cruelty 
was  used ;  but  their  arms  had  to  be  given  up,  and 
hostages  handed  over  as  pledges  for  their  obedience. 
The  Suessiones  gave  among  others  the  two  sons  of 
their  chief,  and  the  Bellovaci,  the  most  powerful 
among  the  more  civilised  of  the  Belgic  tribes,  had 
to  surrender  six  hundred  of  their  citizens.  In  the 
case  of  this  latter  people,  Caesar  made  a  point  of 
insisting  that  his  clemency  was  due  to  the  influence 
of  Divitiacus  and  the  ^dui,  whose  ancient  renown 
in  Gaul  it  was  a  part  of  his  policy  to  re-establish. 

The  reader  of  the  ''  Commentaries  "  may  be  dis- 
posed to  ask  how  it  was  that  Caesar,  with  a  force  of 
little  more  than  40,000  men,  could  effect  even  a 
temporary  conquest  by  simply  marching  through 
the  country  of  the  Belgse.  4lt  was  done,  no  doubt, 
in  the  first  place  by  the  very  rapidity  of  his  progress 
and  the  perfect  organisation  of  his  material ;  but 
also  in  part  by  the  demand  for  the  surrender  of 
arms,  and  chiefly  by  the  pfclicy  of  taking  hostages 
as  a  pledge  of  good  faith.  iThis  policy,  now  obso- 
lete in  civilised  warfare,  had  a  force  which  can  only  be 
understood  by  the  careful  student  of  antiquity.  It 
is  only  when  we  have  learnt  to  appreciate  the 
strength  of  the  ties  that  bound  men  together  in 
groups  of  kin,  and  the  troubles  that  might  arise 
from  a  failure  of  heirs  in  those  groups,  that  we  can 
feel  the  binding  force  of  a  compulsory  surrender  of 
hostages.  The  claim  of  blood  was  the  strongest 
that   the  ancient    Celts   knew,  and    the  feeling  sur- 


BALLISTA  OR  STONE-THROWER. 
(Baumeister.) 


57  B.C.]    Conquest  of  North-western  GauL        169 

vives  among  them  to  the  present  day.  To  place  in 
the  hands  of  their  enemies  those  on  whom  the 
future  of  their  race  and  their  religious  rites  de- 
pended, was  to  let  themselves  be  fettered  by  bonds 
which  only  the  most  desperate  would  ever  attempt 
to  break. 

From  the  country  round  Amiens  Caesar  turned  in 
a  north-easterly  direction,  and  soon  found  himself  in 
the  territory  of  a  people  wilder  and  more  warlike 
than  any  he  had  encountered  this  year.  The  Nervii 
were  not  to  be  cowed  by  the  easy  submission  of 
their  kinsmen,  whom  they  regarded  with  contempt 
as  traitors  and  cowards,  demoralised  by  luxury  and 
self-indulgence.  They  themselves  drank  no  wine, 
and  gave  no  admission  to  the  traders  in  such  lux- 
uries, who  swarmed  in  every  other  part  of  GauL 
They  fought  on  foot  only,  and  were  protected  from 
raids  of  hostile  horsemen  by  the  dense  wall-like 
hedges  of  their  country — a  feature  absent,  then  as 
now,  from  the  open  plains  of  central  Gaul.  This 
hardy  people  was  now  destined  to  win  immortal 
glory,  and  to  have  its  valour  honourably  recorded  by 
the  very  man  whom  it  so  nearly  overthrew. 

After  three  days'  march  without  coming  in  touch 
with  the  enemy,  Caesar  learnt  from  prisoners  that  he 
was  but  a  short  march  from  the  river  Sabis  (Sambre) 
and  that  the  enemy  were  concentrated  on  the  far- 
ther bank.*     He  at  once  altered  his  order  of  march. 


*  The  scene  of  this  famous  battle  has  been  placed  with  great  prob- 
ability on  the  Sambre  near  the  Belgian  frontier,  a  few  miles  above 
Maubeuge.  The  main  line  from  Paris  to  Brussels  skirts  the  battle- 
field as  it  passes  the  station  of  Hautmont. 


1 70  yulius   Ccesar.  L57  B.C. 

and  instead  of  advancing  by  successive  legions  sep- 
arated from  each  other  by  their  baggage,  he  placed 
the  whole  baggage  in  the  rear,  protected  by  the  two 
newly  raised  legions,  and  led  the  way  with  the  cav- 
alry, followed  by  his  six  other  legions  under  arms 
and  ready  to  form  for  battle.  It  was  well  he  did  so : 
for  Gallic  informers  had  given  the  Nervii  a  hint  that 
they  might  surprise  him  in  the  former  order,  and 
destroy  his  army,  legion  by  legion,  as  they  came 
successively  up  to  camp. 

When  the  cavalry  came  in  sight  of  the  river,  they 
found  it  flowing  at  the  foot  of  a  gradual  descent ;  on 
the  other  side  the  ground  rose  again  at  about  the 
same  gradient,  open  for  a  short  space,  and  covered 
with  wood  higher  up.  A  few  horsemen  were  seen 
on  the  lower  open  ground ;  these  were  quickly 
brushed  away  by  the  Roman  cavalry  and  light- 
armed,  who  easily  crossed  a  stream  not  more  than 
three  feet  in  depth.  The  enemy  disappeared  into 
the  wood,  but  as  quickly  reappeared,  and  a  desul- 
tory combat  went  on  while  the  six  legions  came  up, 
marked  out  their  camp,  and  set  to  work  upon  it. 
While  they  were  thus  engaged  with  spade  and  mat- 
tock, or  in  search  of  the  brushwood  needed  to  con- 
struct the  defences,  their  helmets  laid  aside,  their 
shields  hanging  loose  on  their  backs,  there  emerged 
from  the  wood  opposite  them  the  whole  force  of  the 
enemy,  sweeping  the  Roman  cavalry  before  them, 
and  making  with  prodigious  speed  for  the  river  and 
the  unfinished  camp. 

The  struggle  that  ensued  was  one  of  the  most 
terrible  that  Roman  soldiers  ever  had  to  go  through. 


BATTLE  OF  THE  SAMBRE,  57  B.C. 

A.     C/ESAR'S  CAMP.        B.    CAMP    OF    NERVIl.       C.     LABIENUS   WITH    TENTH    LEGION. 


57  B.C.]     Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul,        171 

The  memory  of  It  lived  in  Caesar's  mind  so  vividly 
that  he  seems  to  fight  the  battle  over  again  as  he 
describes  it,  in  language  for  him  unusually  strong 
and  intense.  ''  There  was  no  time  to  think,"  he 
says ;  '*  the  enemy  were  no  sooner  out  of  the  wood 
than  they  seemed  to  be  upon  us ;  the  general  had 
but  a  moment  to  go  through  the  whole  process  of 
getting  thirty  thousand  men  into  such  order  as  the 
hurry  allowed. 'B  And  it  is  plain  from  his  narrative  that 
two  things  alone  saved  that  army  from  total  destruc- 
tion :  the  excellent  discipline  and  intelligence  of  the 
individual  soldier,  and  the  coolness  and  personal  valour 
of  the  wonderful  man  who  led  them.l  Every  man  did 
his  part ;  each  legion  was  got  into  some  sort  of  fighting 
array  by  its  commander  ;  as  the  men  hurried  in  they 
took  station  where  they  could,  and  wasted  no  time 
in  seeking  their  own  companies.  Caesar  after  giving 
the  first  few  necessary  orders  and  signals,  gave  up 
all  attempt  to  govern  the  battle,  and  hurried  round 
cheering  and  urging  his  men,  well  knowing  that  all 
tactics  were  both  useless  and  impossible,  and  that 
the  day  would  be  decided  by  sheer  hard  fighting. 

On  the  left  was  the  famous  tenth  legion,  to  which 
Caesar  had  found  time  to  give  a  few  hurried  words 
of  exhortation  ;  and  these  veterans,  with  the  ninth 
legion,  resisted  and  broke  the  enemy  in  front  of 
them,  and  pursued  them  down  the  slope  and  across 
the  river.  Two  legions  in  the  centre  also  stood  firm 
and  even  gained  ground.  But  on  the  right  there 
seems  to  have  been  a  gap  in  the  line,  caused  partly, 
perhaps,  by  the  nature  of  the  ground,  partly  by  the 
advance   of  the  two  legions  in  the  centre ;  and  this 


1/2  yulius   Ccesar,  [57  B.C. 

gap  caused  the  camp  itself  to  be  exposed  in  front 
and  flank.  To  this  point  Caesar  now  hurried,  for 
the  main  force  of  the  Nervii  was  being  pushed  into 
the  vacant  space,  and  was  beginning  to  surround  the 
two  legions  on  the  right.  When  he  arrived  defeat 
must  have  seemed  inevitable  ;  the  cavalry  and  light- 
armed  had  taken  to  flight,  the  camp-followers  had 
vanished  in  a  general  stampede,  and  spread  the  news 
of  a  disaster  in  every  direction.  The  two  legions  were 
huddled  in  a  narrow  space,  without  room  to  fight 
freely  ;  the  twelfth  had  lost  almost  all  its  officers  and 
the  standard  belonging  to  one  of  its  cohorts.  There 
was  no  reserve  available,  and  the  fight  threatened 
every  moment  to  become  a  second  Cannae.  Caesar 
seeing  this  as  he  rode  round  in  the  rear,  seized  a 
shield  from  a  common  soldier,  rushed  with  it  to  the 
front,  shouting  encouragement,  and  calling  on  the 
centurions  by  name  ;  and  by  thus  steadying  the  men 
for  a  few  minutes,  and  restoring  something  of  their 
ardour  to  do  well  in  the  eyes  of  their  general,  he 
found  an  opportunity  of  disentangling  the  crowded 
companies,  so  as  to  give  them  space  to  use  their 
swords.  This  done,  he  contrived  to  bring  the  two 
legions  together,  so  that  they  could  not  be  sur- 
rounded separately,  and  further  formed  them  back 
to  back,  enabling  them  to  fight  at  once  in  front  and 
rear.  The  dread  of  being  cut  off,  which  often  para- 
lyses even  the  best  soldiers,  gradually  left  them,  and 
they  began  to  fight  with  greater  freedom  and  pluck. 
And  now  the  whole  aspect  of  the  battle  suddenly 
changed  ;  discipline  had  done  its  work,  and  was  to 
be  rewarded.     Labienus,  who  had  pursued  the  right 


57  B.C.]     Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul.         173 

wing  of  the  enemy  to  their  camp  in  the  wood,  sent 
back  the  tenth  legion  in  hot  haste  to  the  rescue. 
The  Nervii  were  thus  themselves  taken  in  the  rear; 
and  no  sooner  had  the  tide  turned,  than  the  cavalry 
and  even  the  camp-followers  began  to  return,  and 
did  their  best  to  re-establish  their  credit.  Even  the 
wounded  struggled  and  fought,  leaning  on  their 
shields,  and  adding  their  quota  to  the  heaps  of  dead 
bodies.  Behind  these  heaps  the  undaunted  enemy 
still  strove  to  fight,  snatching  up  the  Roman  spears 
as  they  fell  among  them,  and  hurling  them  back 
at  their  owners.  Their  heroism  won  Caesar's  un- 
bounded admiration  ;  an  attack  like  theirs,  he  says, 
on  such  difficult  ground,  showed  plainly  that  they 
fully  merited  their  reputation  for  extraordinary 
valour.  It  is  no  disgrace  to  the  Roman  soldiers 
that  after  such  an  awful  struggle  and  escape,  they 
should  have  indulged  in  indiscriminate  slaughter  ; 
the  enemy  indeed  invited  it  by  the  desperate  way  in 
which  they  fought.  When  the  Nervian  women  sent 
to  implore  Caesar's  mercy  after  the  news  of  the 
battle  reached  them,  they  told  him  that  but  three 
**  counsellors  "  survived  out  of  six  hundred,  and  but 
five  hundred  warriors  out  of  a  total  of  sixty  thou- 
sand. This  was  of  course  an  exaggeration  ;  but  it 
shows  well  how  this  famous  battle  might  be  regarded 
by  the  Gauls  as  making  further  resistance  hopeless. 
In  vain  the  flower  of  the  Gallic  warriors  had  fought 
against  the  small  Italians,  with  their  rigid  discipline, 
and  their  wonderful  commander.  And  as  Caesar  was 
ready  to  receive  all  into  submission,  on  condition  of 
their  giving  hostages  and  surrendering  all  their  arms, 


174  Julius  CcBsar.  [57  B.C. 

the  whole  Gallic  population  accepted  the  position 
that  was  forced  on  them.  One  tribe  alone,  the 
Aduatuci,  living  probably  around  Charleroi  to  the 
north  of  the  Nervii,  though  accepting  the  condi- 
tions, rescued  secretly  a  part  of  their  weapons,  and 
made  a  desperate  attempt  to  destroy  their  enemy 
by  a  night  attack.  Caesar,  who  half  suspected  them, 
drove  them  back  into  their  town,  from  which  he  had 
the  previous  night  (with  singular  humanity  for  that 
age)  withdrawn  all  his  soldiers  lest  they  should  be 
tempted  to  do  violence  to  the  conquered  ;  and  taking 
easy  possession  the  next  day,  he  sold  the  whole 
population  into  slavery,  to  the  number  of  fifty-three 
thousand. 

In  such  an  act  he  is  but  the  embodiment  of  the 
proud  Roman  policy  of  the  Republic 

Parcere  subjeciis  et  debellare  superbos. 

But  it  was  indeed  only  treachery  and  rebellion  that 
he  punished,  not  mere  resistance.  J  Courage  always 
won  his  esteem,  and  it  is  clear  that  he  admired  and 
esteemed  the  Gauls,  for  their  courage  as  for  their 
many  gifts.  But  as  a  conqueror  with  a  definite 
object  before  him,  he  never  relaxed  his  firmness  or 
shrank  from  exacting  what  he  thought  due  ;  and  his 
firmness  is  apt  to  become  hardness  in  our  eyes,  as 
our  sympathy  is  roused  for  a  brave  and  struggling 
people. 

Publius  Crassus  had  been  sent  early  in  the  sum- 
mer with  one  legion  to  the  tribes  bordering  on  the 
ocean,  whose  warlike  reputation  was  not  supposed  to 
be  such  as  would  render  a  larger  force  necessary  ;  and 


57  B.C.]     Conquest  of  North-western  Gaul.        175 


he  now  reported  to  Caesar  that  a  number  of  these  can- 
tons had  submitted  and  given  hostages.  The  news 
of  Caesar's  progress  and  final  victory  must  have  sped 
very  swiftly  in  a  country  where  news  of  any  kind 
was  the  thing  most  desired  and  enjoyed  in  every 
town  and  hamlet.  Even  from  beyond  the  Rhine 
came  envoys,  promising  obedience  and  hostages 
from  the  renowned  Germans.  But  with  a  lordliness 
of  spirit  that  showed  how  clear  the  way  now  was 
before  him,  and  how  confidently  he  could  tread  it, 
he  ordered  them  to  return  home,  and  come  to  him 
again  the  following  spring.  He  then  distributed 
the  army  in  winter-quarters  over  the  conquered 
territory,  and  left  for  his  Cisalpine  province,  where 
the  news  reached  him  that  the  Senate  had  voted 
him  the  unprecedented  honour  of  a  supplicatio  or 
thanksgiving  to  last  fifteen  days. 
I  So  ended  the  memorable  year  57  B.C.;  when  the 
first  foundation  was  laid  of  that  fruitful  civilisation 
of  Gaul,  of  which  it  has  been  said  by  one  of  its  own 
heirs  in  this  century,  that  it  has  contributed  more  to 
the  education  of  the  European  world  than  any  other 
save  that  of  Greece. 


J 


CHAPTER    XL 

CONFERENCE   AT   LUCCA,   AND    CAMPAIGN   IN 

BRITTANY. 

56    B.C. 

yESAR  was  fully  occupied  both 
in  the  winter  of  57-56  B.C., 
and  in  the  spring  which  fol- 
lowed. I  Each  winter,  when  he 
had  accomplished  the  long 
and  wearisome  journey  to 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  general 
had  to  take  up  the  role  of 
judge,  and  go  his  circuits, 
settling  all  the  arrears  of 
jurisdiction  which  had  been  accumulating  during 
the  summer.  /  And  there  was  one  of  his  provinces 
which  he  had  not  as  yet  even  visited  ;  that  of 
lUyria,  which  had  been  given  him  along  with  Cis- 
alpine Gaul  by  the  Lex  Vatinia.  This  was  the 
coast-district  east  of  the  Adriatic,  the  ancient  home 
of   pirates   and    robbers  ;    the    Roman    government 

176  . 


56  B.C.]  Conference  at  Lucca-  177 

had  never  as  yet  taken  the  trouble  thoroughly 
to  reduce  and  organise  it,  and  it  is  probable  that 
Cssar  himself  was  its  first  regular  provincial  govern- 
or. While  engaged  here  this  winter,  his  attention 
was  distracted  by  events  occurring  in  the  farthest 
districts  of  Gaul.  News  arrived  from  young  Crassus, 
who  had  been  left  with  the  seventh  legion  on  the 
lower  Loire,  that  officers  sent  by  him  to  collect  pro. 
visions  from  the  neighbouring  tribes  had  been  de 
tained  and  imprisoned,  and  that  a  general  rebellion 
was  being  fomented  in  the  districts  bordering  on  the 
ocean.  Caesar,  at  a  distance  of  some  eight  hundred 
miles  from  the  scene  of  these  events,  at  once  sent 
orders  for  the  equipment  of  a  fleet  on  the  Loire,  and 
made  up  his  mind  to  complete  his  work  in  western  Gaul 
the  following  summer  by  carrying  on  the  war  by  sea 
as  well  as  on  land.  The  Veneti,  inhabiting  part  of 
modern  Brittany,  were  known  to  him  already  as  the 
most  formidable  of  the  peoples  on  the  coast,  and 
the  most  skilled  in  naval  warfare.  He  knew  also 
that  they  kept  up  a  close  relation  with  the  Celts  of 
Britain,  the  island  beyond  the  ocean  which,  as  Caesar 
was  well  aware,  served  as  a  refuge  for  the  more  in- 
dependent spirits  among  the  conquered  Gauls,  and 
as  the  hotbed  in  which  fresh  rebellions  were  nour- 
ished."^ Already,  we  may  fairly  guess,  he  was  pro- 
jecting an  invasion  of  this  island ;  not  only  from 
reasons  of  policy,  but  stimulated  doubtless  by  the 
spirit  of  adventure  and  discovery  which  had  been 
growing  in  him  since  he  had  first  touched  the  Rhine 
and  the  ocean. 


*  See  e.  g.,  B.  G.,  iii.,  9. 
12 


1 78  Julius  Ccesar.  [56  B.C. 

^  But  during  the  spring  of  56  B.C.  events  at  Rome 
made  it  obvious  that  he  would  be  this  year  later 
than  usual  in  getting  to  his  distant  army.  Ever 
since  the  one  real  leader  of  men  had  left  Rome,  the 
influence  of  the  triumvirate  had  been  growing 
weaker. /(In  58  B.C.,  Clodius  as  tribune  had  reigned 
supreme  in  the  streets,  while  Pompeius,  who  should 
have  controlled  him,  was  living  in  retirement  with 
his  new  wife  Julia,  to  whom,  as  we  saw,  he  was 
passionately  devoted.  Crassus,  who  had  never  had 
any  cordiality  to  spare  for  his  former  rival,  was 
rapidly  becoming  estranged  from  him,  and  did  noth- 
ing whatever  to  restore  order  in  the  capital.  That 
year  Cicero  had  been  exiled,  and  all  attempts  to 
secure  his  return  had  been  baffled,  in  spite  of  an 
opposition  street-rabble  under  the  leadership  of 
Milo  and  others,  whose  frequent  collisions  with  the 
Clodian  mob  must  have  made  life  almost  intolerable 
for  decent  and  orderly  Romans.  The  hopelessness 
of  realising  any  of  the  blessings  of  order  and 
security  which  we  are  used  to  associate  with  civili- 
sation, except  under  a  new  and  stronger  form  of 
government,  must  be  apparent  to  everyone  who 
wades  through  the  wretched  story  of  the  anarchy  and 
confusion  of  these  two  years.  \ 

In  August  57  B.C.,  after  many  fruitless  efforts, 
Cicero  was  recalled  from  exile ;  a  step  which  was 
brought  about  with  the  consent  of  the  triumvirate, 
after  they  had  exacted  a  promise  from  Quintus 
Cicero  that  he  would  be  responsible  for  his  brother's 
conduct.  Cicero  at  once  attached  himself  to  Pom- 
peius, acting  (as  he  himself  put  it  on  record),*  on  the 

*  Ad  Fam.,  i.,  9,  14. 


55  B.C.]  Conference  at  Lucca.  179 

old  vain  hope  that  he  might  guide  the  counsels  of 
this  witless  politician,  and  might  even,  through  his 
influence,  transform  Caesar  himself  into  a  good  ser- 
vant of  the  Senate.  But  such  a  hope  was  from  the 
outset  fallacious;  and  Cicero,  who  ought  to  have 
known  this  already,  failed  to  understand  it  till  after 
the  bitter  experience  of  many  years.  To  support 
the  republican  constitution  from  genuine  conviction 
of  its  excellence,  never  had  been,  and  never  could 
be,  the  interest  or  the  policy  of  Pompeius.  At  this 
very  moment  his  thoughts  were  turned  in  quite  a 
different  direction  ;  he  was  a  soldier  tired  of  inaction, 
and  anxious  to  get  some  work  to  do  by  which  he 
might  counterbalance  the  enormous  prestige  Caesar 
had  been  acquiring  in  Gaul.  To  this  desire  Cicero 
could  only  respond  by  supporting  a  law  which  gave 
him  a  five  years'  commission  for  supplying  the  capi- 
tal with  corn  ;  and  this  Pompeius  accepted,  but  it 
was  not  what  he  wanted.  A  project  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  Egypt,  under  pretext  of  restoring  the  ban- 
ished kin^,  Ptolemy  Auletes,  was  more  to  his 
purpose  ;  but  this  Cicero  was  forced  to  resist,  for  it 
would  have  probably  ended  in  the  division  of  the 
Roman  world  into  two  great  military  powers  in 
East  and  West,  and  would  have  precipitated  the 
result  that  came  about  seven  years  later.  It  was 
evident  that  Cicero  and  Pompeius  could  never  work 
together,  and  for  the  time  Cicero  seems  to  have 
abandoned  the  idea.  The  only  other  policy  open  to 
him  was  to  try  and  reconstitute  a  republican  party ; 
and  this  was  just  as  hopeless  as  the  attempt  to  re- 
duce Pompeius  to  orthodoxy.  The  fact  was  that 
the  republican  party,  so  far  as  it  existed  or  deserved 


i8o  yulius  CcBsar.  [66  B.C. 

the  name,  entirely  declined  to  be  reconstituted  by- 
Cicero.  There  was  no  hope  for  him  of  renewing 
the  former  policy  of  the  agreement  of  the  orders. 
The  triumvirs  had  won  over  the  equites  in  59  B.C.  ; 
and  even  if  this  had  not  been  so,  Cicero  could  not 
have  gathered  a  senatorial  party  together  to  combine 
with  them.  Again  and  again  in  his  private  letters 
of  this  period  he  complains  of  hostility  and  jealousy 
on  the  part  of  those  degenerate  nobles  who  would 
not  act  themselves  nor  allow  another  to  act  for  them. 
They  hated  him  as  narrow  aristocrats  are  always 
liable  to  hate  new  men  ;  they  hated  him  because  he 
was  clever,  witty,  sarcastic,  and  pushing,  and  more 
than  all  because  he  was  so  firmly  convinced,  and 
never  scrupled  to  let  them  know  his  conviction,  that 
neither  they  nor  the  Republic  could  possibly  get  on 
without  him. 

\  In  spite,  however,  of  his  lack  of  any  hearty  fol- 
lowing, Cicero  did  not  scruple  to  attack  the  trium- 
virate with  all  the  vigour  he  was  capable  of,  and 
thereby  rushed  upon  his  fate.  I  In  defending  Sestius, 
a  tribune  who  had  rioted  on  his  behalf  during  his 
exile,  he  set  himself  to  review  the  political  history 
of  recent  years  in  a  sense  unfavourable  to  the  trium- 
virs ;  and  in  cross-examining  the  witness  Vatinius, 
one  of  Caesar's  agents,  he  let  fly  all  his  pent-up 
wrath,  not  so  much  at  the  individual  rulers,  as  at 
their  instruments  and  methods.  Sestius  was  acquit- 
ted early  in  March,  56  B.C. ;  and  he  now  thought  he 
might  venture  even  further.  At  the  beginning  of 
April,  he  asked  leave,  as  we  should  say,  to  bring  the 
question  of  the  Campanian  land  before  the  Senate  on 


56  B.C.]  Conference  at  Lucca.  1 8 1 

the  Ides  of  May,  i.  e.,  to  reconsider  the  settlement  of 
Pompeius'  veterans,  and,  in  his  own  language,  to 
attack  the  very  centre  and  citadel  of  the  enemy's 
position. 

jTo  this  the  Senate  consented.  Crassus  went  at 
once  to  Lucca,  a  frontier  town  of  Cisalpine  Gaul, 
whence  Caesar  was  watching  affairs  at  Rome ;  Pom- 
peius went  to  Sardinia  and  Africa  on  business  con- 
nected with  the  corn-supply,  and  then  hastened  to 
join  Caesar  and  Crassus  at  Lucc^  Thither  all  the 
^lite  of  the  popular  party  were  assembled  ;  200  sena- 
tors are  said  to  have  been  in  the  town,  and  120 
lictors,  attending  Roman  magistrates,  showed  the 
world  what  it  had  to  learn  a  few  years  later  as  a  per- 
manent lesson,  that  the  unmanageable  capital  was 
no  longer  the  only  place  in  which  the  powers  of  gov- 
ernment could  be  exercised.  fCaesar  entertained  his 
guests  with  magnificence ;  the  wealth  of  Gaul  was 
exhibited  to  their  wondering  eyes ;  and  from  this 
time  forward  it  became  evident  to  all  that  in  the 
material  resources  of  power,  as  well  as  in  the  quali- 
ties that  make  a  ruler  of  men,  Caesar  had  far  out- 
stripped both  his  antagonists  and  his  alliesJP 

A  few  days  sufificed  to  change  the  whole  situation 
of  affairs,  lit  was  arranged  that  bills  should  be 
brought  before  Senate  and  people,  ist,  to  give 
Caesar  a  new  term  of  five  years'  government  to  com- 
plete his  work  in  Gaul  ;  2d,  to  give  Pompeius  the 
government  of  both  Spanish  provinces  for  five  years 
also ;  3d,  to  secure  the  succession  of  Crassus  to  the 
government  of  Syria,  in  order  to  make  war  on  the 
growing  strength  of  the  Parthian  Empire  beyond  the 


182  yulius  CcBsar.  [56  B.C. 

Euphrates.  I  lit  was  also  agreed  that  the  two  latter 
should  have  the  consulship  for  55  B.C.,  a  result  which 
could  easily  be  secured  by  Caesar's  wealth  and  by  the 
votes  of  his  veterans ;  and  that  the  utmost  pressure 
should  be  put  upon  Cicero  to  prevent  his  bringing 
up  the  question  of  the  Campanian  land  in  the  Senate.j 
Pompeius  went  off  to  Sardinia,  where  Q.  Cicero  was 
acting  for  him  in  the  matter  of  the  corn-supply  ;  they 
had  along  interview,  which  resulted  in  a  promise  from 
Quintus  to  secure  his  brother's  support  for  the  new  ar- 
rangements ;  and,  strange  as  it  seems  to  us  now,  Cicero 
himself  yielded  without  a  struggle.  This  is  not  a  life 
of  Cicero,  and  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  explain  this 
sudden  and  complete  submission  to  the  power  which 
for  months  he  had  been  doing  his  best  to  overthrow. 
It  is  sufficient  to  notice  that  for  some  time  to  come 
the  old  and  natural  friendship  between  him  and  Caesar 
was  allowed  to  re-assert  itself;  that  they  corre- 
sponded in  affectionate  terms ;  and  that  Caesar  lent 
him  the  money  he  had  been  sorely  in  need  of  since 
his  exile.  A  few  weeks  later  he  signalised  his  con- 
version by  a  vigorous  speech  in  the  Senate,  in  which 
we  still  admire  the  glowing  tribute  to  Caesar's  great 
work  in  the  West,  and  the  singular  grace  and  tact 
with  which  he  sketches  the  history  of  his  relations 
with  a  friend  whose  acts  had  often  strained,  but 
never  destroyed,  his  good-will  and  esteem.* 
\  The  proceedings  at  the  conference  of  Lucca  are 
differently  explained  by  the  historians  and  biogra- 
phers, for  the  obvious  reason  that  they  were  secret 
in  so  far  at  least   as  the  three   principals  were  con- 

*  This  was  the  speech  "  de  provinciis  consularibus." 


66  B.C.I  Conference  at  Lucca.  183 

cerned.  What  astonishes  us  in  them  is  that  Caesar 
should  have  so  readily  consented  to  arrangements 
which  might  seriously  prejudice  his  position  ere 
many  years  had  passed,  and  might  turn  his  coadju- 
tors, who  had  so  far  been  quiescent  if  inactive,  into 
dangerous  military  rivals.  But  we  may  interpret 
Caesar's  action  with  confidence  by  the  light  of  his  one 
leading  characteristic  as  a  man  of  action.  He  never 
put  his  hand  to  a  piece  of  work  without  carrying  it 
through  to  the  end ;  work  was  to  him  so  absorbing 
and  so  necessary  that  he  could  entertain  no  visionary 
plans  while  it  was  still  unfinished,  and  was  content 
to  let  things  take  their  course  elsewhere,  provided 
he  himself  were  allowed  to  go  through  with  what 
was  before  him.  To  some,  and  even  to  the  penetrat- 
ing genius  of  Mommsen,  the  astonishing  career  of 
Caesar  mounting  upwards  step  by  step,  and  mapped 
out  before  us  as  we  look  on  it  as  a  whole,  suggests 
the  irresistible  temptation  of  accounting  for  it  by 
ascribing  to  him  a  clear,  far-reaching  vision  capable 
of  planning  out  his  whole  route,  from  the  base  to  the 
summit  of  the  difficult  crags  that  must  be  scaled. 
But  this,  we  may  venture  to  believe,  is  wholly  to 
mistake  the  character  of  the  man.  He  may  have  be- 
lieved in  his  destiny,  but  assuredly  he  took  no  great 
trouble  to  control  it.  He  was  a  climber  who  doubt- 
less believed  that  he  might  reach  the  highest  peak; 
but  his  whole  energy  as  he  climbed  was  given  to 
making  his  footing  firm  where  he  stood.  Leaving 
the  future  of  his  relations  with  his  rivals  and  enemies 
to  take  care  of  itself,  he  turned  back  to  join  his 
legions  on  the  inhospitable  coast  of  Brittany.,  f 


184  Julius  CcBsar.  [56  B.C. 

The  campaign  of  56  B.C.  is  not  one  that  need 
detain  us.  His  own  part  in  it  was  not  a  personally 
successful  one,  and  he  contents  himself  in  his  third 
book  with  giving  an  account,  accompanied  by  un- 
grudging praise,  of  the  more  fortunate  efforts  of  the 
lieutenants  under  his  direction.  Labienus  in  the  far 
distant  country  of  the  Rhine  and  Moselle,  young 
Crassus  in  Aquitania  under  the  Pyrenees,  and  Titu- 
rius  Sabinus  in  what  is  now  Normandy, — all  had  their 
successes  chronicled  by  the  general-in-chief.  But  the 
chief  merit  lay  with  the  energetic  young  ofificer  whom 
Caesar  had  placed  in  command  of  his  fleet  on  the 
Loire,  and  left  to  his  own  resources  in  grappling 
with  the  formidable  navy  of  the  Veneti  in  the  open 
ocean.  Decimus  Brutus  was  one  of  those  active  and 
single-minded  officers  in  whom  Caesar  came  to  repose 
entire  confidence,  and  who  followed  their  master*s 
fortunes  with  unswerving  loyalty  and  friendship 
until  the  last  few  weeks  of  his  life.  On  this  occasion, 
fighting  through  a  long  summer's  day  against  a 
vastly  superior  fleet,  under  the  cliffs  whence  Caesar 
and  his  army  were  watching  the  unequal  combat 
with  anxiety,  he  succeeded  in  totally  destroying  his 
enemy  by  means  of  a  new  invention  for  cutting  their 
rigging,  and  so  disabling  them  as  to  make  them  an 
easy  prey.  J  The  Veneti,  who  were  almost  wholly 
relying  on  their  navy  as  a  defence,  surrendered 
themselves  unconditionally,  and  had  to  pay  a 
heavy  penalty  for  imprisoning  Roman  envoys  ; 
all  the  members  of  their  council  were  put  to  death, 
and  the  rest  of  the  male  population  were  sold  as 
slaves.   I 


56  B.C.]  Campaign  in  Brittany.  185 

This  is  the  first  example  we  meet  with  of  what 
must  seem  to  us  deliberate  cruelty  on  Caesar's  part 
towards  a  population  struggling  bravely  for  liberty  ; 
hitherto  we  have  only  had  to  remark  his  singular 
clemency,  and  the  protection  he  extended  to  defence- 
less women  and  children.  His  own  explanation  is 
clear  and  brief.*  He  decided  that  a  heavy  punish- 
ment must  be  inflicted,  in  order  that  the  barbarians 
might  learn  for  the  future  to  be  more  careful  of  the 
inviolability  of  envoys.  On  this  it  has  been  remarked, 
that  the  military  tribunes  who  had  been  detained  in 
chains  by  these  tribes  during  Caesar's  absence,  were 
not  ambassadors  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  but 
only  officers  sent  to  make  requisitions  for  corn.  It  is 
possible  of  course  that  they  may  have  been  arrogant 
in  their  mission,  though  that  is  a  conjecture  for 
which  we  have  no  evidence ;  but  from  Caesar's  point 
of  view,  whether  or  no  they  were  wanting  in  tact  and 
courtesy,  they  were  at  least  his  legati,  dealing  with 
people  who  had  nominally  submitted  to  the  Roman 
power,  and  who  had  given  hostages  as  a  pledge  of 
obedience.  And  more  than  this,  the  corn-supply  was 
a  matter  of  the  most  vital  importance  to  Caesar,  as 
has  been  already  pointed  out  ;  he  was  entirely  de- 
pendent on  it  for  the  very  existence  of  his  army,  and 
the  only  way  in  which  he  could  make  it  secure  was 
by  vigorously  holding  the  conquered  to  their  pledges, 
and  by  maintaining  the  inviolabiHty  of  his  foraging 
parties.  Lastly,  the  violation  had  been  followed  by 
an  open  rebellion  and  an  extremely  dangerous  and 
difficult  campaign  ;  and  Caesar  was  now  beginning  to 

*  B.  G.,  iii.,  16. 


i86  yulius    CcBsar.  L56  B.C. 

feel  that  dread  anxiety  of  revolt,  which  has  so  often 
driven  conquerors  to  make  a  terrible  example  in 
order  to  save  themselves  from  repeated  annoyance 
and  continuous  bloodshed.  These  were  Caesar's 
reasons  for  an  act  which  is  abhorrent  to  our  modern 
feeling  of  justice,  and  which  enlists  all  our  sympa- 
thies on  the  side  of  the  struggling  victims  of  Roman 
conquest. 

By  the  end  of  the  summer,  Caesar  and  his  generals 
had  been  everywhere  victorious,  and  Gaul  from  the 
Pyrenees  to  the  Rhine  appeared  to  be  reduced  to 
obedience.  Two  tribes,  the  Morini  and  Menapii, 
dwelling  on  the  coast  of  modern  Picardy  and  Flan- 
ders, were  indeed  still  in  arms  and  had  made  no  sub- 
mission ;  and  to  these  Caesar  turned  his  attention  for 
a  while  in  the  early  autumn.  His  expedition  was  not 
a  success,  for  the  country  was  covered  with  wood  and 
swamp,  and  these  wild  people  fled  Into  the  forest, 
leaving  their  empty  dwellings  at  his  mercy.  Heavy 
rains  also  checked  his  progress  ;  and  after  ravaging 
their  cultivated  land,  and  burning  their  villages,  he 
gave  up  the  attempt  to  reduce  them,  led  his  army 
back  to  Normandy  and  Brittany  for  the  winter,  and 
returned  himself  to  Cisalpine  Gaul,  in  order  to  dis- 
charge his  civil  duties.* 

*B.  G..iv.,6,  L 


CHAPTER    XII. 

INVASIONS    OF    GERMANY    AND    BRITAIN. 

55-54  B.C. 


War  is  of  far  greater  interest 
than  the  third.     It  introduces 
us  for  the  first  time  in  history 
to  two  hitherto  unknown  peo- 
ples, the  Germans  of  the  lower 
Rhine,  and  the  inhabitants  of 
Britain.     In  this  year,  55  B.C.» 
these  barbarians  first  saw  the 
army  of  a  civilised  power  in 
their  land,  and  learnt  that  science  and  perseverance 
can  overcome  all    natural  obstacles,   and  defeat  un- 
trained courage. 

Caesar  begins  with  an  account  of  the  manners  and 
customs  of  the  Suebi,  to  whose  power  and  perti- 
nacity the  German  campaign  was  due.  He  starts 
with  their  social  economy,  as  we  should  call  it,  and 
in   a  few   condensed    sentences    gives   his    reader   a 

187 


iS8  Julius   Ccesar.  [55  B.C.- 

rational  explanation  of  their  formidable  character  as 
neighbours,  based  on  what  he  had  observed  or  learnt 
of  their  agricultural  system,  their  mode  of  life,  and 
their  education.  A  modern  writer  would  have  spread 
this  information  over  half  a  volume  ;  Caesar  tells  it 
in  two  very  short  chapters,  and  subordinates  it 
strictly  to  the  matter  he  has  in  hand.  These  chap- 
ters, and  those  more  famous  ones  in  the  sixth  book 
which  describe  the  social  state  of  the  Gauls,  are  the 
very  choicest  product  of  the  best  type  of  Roman 
mind,  and  stand  out  in  striking  contrast  to  the  dreari- 
ness of  the  Greek  professed  historian  of  this  and 
later  ages,  and  even  to  the  long-winded  wordiness  of 
the  modern  traveller. 

These  two  chapters  seem  by  Caesar  to  be  meant 
to  explain  the  events  which  followed,  by  showing 
his  reader  the  really  formidable  nature  of  the  Ger- 
man peoples  ;  their  hardihood,  abstinence,  courage, 
and  above  all  their  refusal  to  admit  traders,  and  dis- 
like of  all  neighbours.  He  wishes  it  to  be  seen  that 
an  invasion  of  Gaul  by  a  whole  German  tribe  was  a 
thing  he  could  not  possibly  permit,  and  had  firmly 
determined  to  resist,  ever  since  he  had  rolled  back 
Ariovistus  and  the  Suebi  across  the  upper  Rhine. 
Examining  carefully  his  account  of  this  people,  we 
see  that  he  looked  upon  the  Suebi  as  at  the  bottom 
of  all  disturbance  along  his  new  frontier  of  the  Rhine  ; 
it  was  they  who  set  other  tribes  in  motion,  by  re- 
fusing to  have  them  as  neighbours,  turning  them 
bag  and  baggage  out  of  their  homes,  and  destroying 
their  crops  wherever  the  unfortunates  settled.  The 
Ubii,  a  powerful   people  on   their  northern  border. 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Gerfnany  and  Britain.     1 89 

could  not  be  thus  rooted  out  of  their  settlements, 
though  they  were  forced  to  pay  tribute ;  but  two 
other  tribes,  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  were  en- 
tirely dislodged  by  the  Suebi,  and  sent  wandering 
hopelessly  about  Germany,  to  find  a  home  at  last, 
as  they  thought,  on  the  lower  Rhine,  not  far  from 
its  mouth.  Caesar  in  fact  plainly  means  to  impress 
on  us  that  he  had  a  series  of  hornets*  nests  on  his 
frontier  ready  to  swarm  upon  the  plains  of  Gaul  when- 
ever the  strongest  among  them  should  drive  the 
others  out ;  that  they  would  give  the  milder  Gauls 
no  peace  if  once  they  settled  in  Gaul ;  and  that  these 
Gauls  themselves,  with  their  love  of  news  and  of 
change,  their  mobile  and  uncertain  temperament, 
would  inevitably  be  shaken  in  their  allegiance  to 
Rome  by  any  such  event. 

The  two  homeless  tribes,  victims  of  Suebian  bully- 
ing, succeeded  by  a  ruse  in  crossing  the  Rhine  and 
occupying  part  of  the  territory  of  the  Gallic  Menapii 
in  what  is  now  northern  Belgium.  This  drew  Caesar 
upon  them  at  once.  As  he  had  expected,  the  Gauls 
of  the  valley  of  the  Meuse  invited  them  to  advance, 
doubtless  as  future  auxiliaries  against  the  Roman 
power.  He  therefore  advanced  rapidly  along  that 
river  (the  course  of  which  he  pauses  for  a  moment 
to  describe),  after  summoning  a  meeting  of  Gallic 
chieftains  and  assuming  the  position  of  their  pro- 
tector and  champion.  Soon  an  embassy  met  him 
from  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  demanding  free- 
dom to  settle  in  the  lands  they  had  won.  Caesar 
answered  that  he  could  not  permit  it,  adding  that 
he  would  use  his  authority  with  the  Ubii  beyond  the 


190  j-'ulius   Caesar.  [55  B.C.- 

Rhine to  allot  the  wanderers  a  portion  of  their  own 
territory.  At  the  same  time  he  refused  to  stay  his 
own  advance  as  they  requested,  because  he  knew 
that  they  had  sent  a  large  force  of  cavalry  away  to 
forage  and  merely  wished  to  delay  the  inevitable 
struggle  till  the  return  of  this  detachment.  The}' 
were  to  return  in  three  days ;  meanwhile  he  would 
continue  his  march. 

On  the  third  day  they  met  him  on  his  nmrch  and 
begged  for  a  further  three  days  to  ascertain  whether 
the  Ubii  would  be  willing  to  receive  them.  This 
demand  Caesar  again  chose  to  consider  as  a  subter- 
fuge, and  it  may  be  that  he  was  right ;  for  if  we  are 
to  accept  as  correct  his  statement  that  he  was  still 
on  or  near  the  Meuse,  it  must  have  been  impossible 
for  envoys  to  go  to  the  Ubii  and  return  in  the  short 
space  of  three  days.  He  declined  their  request,  but 
promised  only  to  advance  a  short  distance  that  day 
to  a  spot  where  there  was  water,  and  bade  them 
come  again  next  day  in  larger  numbers  to  consider 
the  whole  matter.  This  was  equivalent  to  a  suspen- 
sion of  arms;  and  Caesar  sent  express  orders  to  his 
cavalry  in  front  not  to  attack  the  enemy. 

Upon  this  unsuspecting  Gallic  cavalry  of  his,  how- 
ever, the  Germans  made  a  sudden  treacherous  attack 
with  a  much  smaller  force,  and  utterly  routed  them, 
killing  seventy-four,  and  among  them  a  valued 
Gallic  officer,  whose  sacrifice  of  his  own  life  to  save 
his  brother  is  related  by  his  chief  with  evident 
admiration  and  sympathy.  After  this  reverse  Caesar 
determined  to  strike  at  once.  A  whole  German 
tribe,  in   all  (as  he  says)  430,000  strong,  was  in  his 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.     1 9 1 

front,  the  impressionable  Gallic  population  ready  to 
rise  in  his  rear.  To  negotiate  further  with  a  people 
who  had  already  tricked  the  Menapii,  and  were  now 
plainly  trying  to  deceive  himself,  was  "  the  height  of 
folly,"  nor  could  he  wait  till  they  had  gathered  their 
whole  strength.  When  next  day  a  numerous  em- 
bassy of  chiefs  and  others  came  into  his  camp,  as  he 
had  requested,  for  further  negotiations,  he  detained 
them  as  prisoners  on  account  of  the  late  breach  of 
truce  ;  and  then  making  a  forced  march  upon  the 
German  camp,  where  the  whole  mass  of  men,  women, 
and  children  were  unsuspectingly  awaiting  the  return 
of  their  leaders,  he  let  loose  his  legions  upon  them, 
slaughtered  a  great  multitude,  and  drove  the  rest 
into  the  Rhine,  near  the  angle  of  its  confluence  with 
the  Meuse.  His  narrative  seems  to  imply  that  the 
whole  430,000  perished  in  various  ways,  and  this  has 
been  the  general  inference  of  historians  ;  he  does  not, 
however,  say  this  directly,  and  it  is  not  In  itself 
probable.  But  it  is  certain  that  he  repaid  treachery 
in  its  own  coin  ;  and  though  this  was  done  under 
great  provocation,  and  in  circumstances  of  greater 
danger  than  we  can  probably  estimate  correctly,  yet 
we  must  lament  that  he  should  here  for  once  have 
violated  his  own  honourable  nature/  His  enemies  at 
home  did  not  lose  the  chance  thus  offered  them,  and 
Cato  as  their  mouthpiece  actually  proposed  in  the 
Senate  that  the  conqueror  of  Gaul  should  be  given 
up  to  the  Germans,  as  a  reparation  for  the  crime  com- 
mitted against  them.  /However  we  ourselves  may 
judge  of  Caesar  in  this  matter,  we  may  be  quite  sure 
that  Cato's  was  a  bitterly  prejudiced  opinion  ;  and  it 


192  yulius   CcBsar.  [55  B.C. 

is  as  well  to  remember  that  this  purist  had  but  lately 
returned  from  carrying  out,  as  a  rigorous  agent  of 
Roman  unscrupulousness,  one  of  the  most  unjustifia- 
ble acts  of  robbery  ever  committed  by  the  Roman 
government.*      Quis  c  us  to  diet  ipsos  custodes  f 

Not  content  with  the  destruction  of  this  invading 
host,  Caesar  now  determined  to  turn  the  tables  on 
the  Germans,  and  show  them  that  a  Roman  army 
could  not  only  defend  Gaul,  but  carry  the  war  into 
the  country  of  the  invaders.  The  German  cavalry, 
which  had  been  absent  foraging  on  the  day  of  the 
battle,  had  escaped  across  the  Rhine  to  the  territory 
of  the  Sugambri,  which  we  may  place  with  tolerable 
certainty  in  the  country  to  the  east  of  Cologne  and 
Dusseldorf.  Caesar  sent  to  the  Sugambri,  demanding 
the  surrender  of  the  refugees  who  had  dared  to  in- 
vade Gaul,  and  received  a  haughty  answer  ;  the 
Ubii,  on  the  other  hand,  who  were  wedged  in  be- 
tween the  Sugambri  on  the  north  and  the  Suebl  on 
the  south,  asked  him  for  support  against  their  un- 
toward neighbours.  He  decided  to  cross  the  Rhine, 
to  frighten  the  Sugambri,  and  to  give  a  moral  sup- 
port to  the  more  civilised  and  friendly  Ubii.  The 
latter  promised  him  a  supply  of  boats  ;  but,  to  use 
his  own  words,  ''  he  did  not  think  that  method  of 
crossing  sufficiently  secure,  or  in  keeping  with  his 
own  dignity  or  that  of  the  Roman  people."  He 
wanted  in  fact  to  impress  these  wild  peoples  with  a 
sense  of  the  vast  power  which  the  arts  of  civilisation 
place  in  the  hands  of  a  determined  man,  and  at  the 

*  The  plundering  of  Ptolemy,  King  of  Cyprus. — Plutarch,  Cato, 
34  foil. 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.     193 

same  time  to  run  no  risk  from  the  treachery  with 

which  he  clearly  credited  his  German  enemies. 

In  ten  days  a  bridge  was  completed,  probably  not 

far  from  the  modern  Bonn,  where  the  river-bed  is 

softer  and  the  current  less  strong  than  higher  up  the 

stream.     It  was  a  triumph  both  of  engineering  and 

industry.     Caesar  does  not  mention  the  names  of  his 

engineers,  nor  does  he  say  how  far  he  himself  had  a 

hand  in  the  design  ;  but  he  was  able  more  than  three 

years  later  to   write   an   exact   account   of  it,  from 

which  the  nature  of  the  structure  can  be  understood, 

even  without  the  help  of  diagrams,  by  any   careful 

and  intelligent  reader.     The  interest  for  us  perhaps 

lies  not  so  much  in  the  simplicity  of  the  design,  or 

the  care  taken  to  reckon  duly  with  the  force  of  the 

current,  but  in  the  extraordinary  speed  with  which 

the   execution   followed  on  the  plan.     Nothing  can 

better  show  us  what  an  admirably  organised  body 

Caesar's    army    must    have    been  ;     able    and    ready 

literally  ''  to  go  anywhere  and  do  anything"  at  the 

bidding  of  a  chief  who  devoted  all  his  energies  to 

their  well-being,  safety,  and  comfort.     The  Roman 

legionary  was  always  trained  to  turn  his  hand  to  any 

kind  of  work ;  but  to  build  such  a  bridge  in  ten  days 

— to  hew  the  timber  from  the  forest,  to  bring  it  to 

the  spot,  to   work  it  into  shape,  to  drive  the  piles 

into  the  river-bed,  must  have  called  for  an  amount 

of  labour  and  patience   on   the  part   of  the    whole 

force,  which  could  only  have  been  cheerfully  given 

to  a  commander  in  whose  star  and  genius  every  man 

believed.    The  military  art  is  seen  here  at  its  highest 

point  of  perfection  ;  where  the  army  works,  not  as  a 
13 


194  Julius   CcBsar,  [55  B.C.- 

machine,  but  as  an  intelligent  organism,  guided  and 
inspired  in  the  movement  of  each  minutest  member 
by  a  single  master-mind. 

Ceesar's  object  being  not  to  conquer  new  territory, 
but  to  impress  the  Germans  with  his  power,  he  only 
spent  eighteen  days  on  the  farther  side  of  the  Rhine. 
The  Sugambri  vanished  in  their  forests,  and  he  did 
not  attempt  to  pursue  them.  After  destroying  their 
crops  and  burning  their  villages,  he  turned  to  the 
land  of  the  Ubii,  and  promised  them  aid  against  the 
Suebi  ;  but  he  was  not  to  be  induced  to  attack  that 
formidable  people,  who  had  concentrated  their  forces 
in  their  own  territory  in  expectation  of  invasion.  He 
had  other  designs  in  hand  ;  and  returning  to  the 
bridge,  which  he  had  left  strongly  guarded  on  both 
banks,  he  recrossed  it,  broke  it  down,  and  turned  his 
back  on  the  Rhine  with  a  full  sense  that  he  had  done 
all  that  he  had  intended  to  do. 

He  had  seen  the  white  cliffs  of  Britain  the  year 
before  in  his  expedition  against  the  Morini.  He 
had  been  hearing  of  the  island  ever  since  he  came  to 
Gaul,  and  knew  it  to  be  a  refuge  for  his  enemies  and 
a  secret  source  of  their  strength.'^  He  had  now  a 
fleet  which  could  navigate  the  ocean  ;  and  as  he 
failed  to  obtain  any  satisfactory  information  about 
the  nature  and  inhabitants  of  the  country  from  the 
traders  and  merchants  Avho  alone  were  acquainted 
with  it,  he  determined  to  go  and  reconnoitre  it 
for  himself.  Every  precaution  was  taken,  for  the 
enterprise  was  perhaps  the  most  hazardous  ever  yet 
undertaken  by  a  Roman  general.  Volusenus,  an 
officer  whose  command  of  the  Gallic  cavalry  made 

*B.  G.  iv.,  20. 


BRIDGE  BUILT  BY  C/ESAR  ACROSS  THE  RHINE. 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.     195 

him  a  fit  person  to  land  on  a  strange  Celtic  shore, 
had  been  sent  with  a  ship  of  war  to  discover  a  suita- 
ble harbour,  and  to  make  inquiries  as  to  the  strength 
and  warlike  capacity  of  the  natives.  Envoys  sent 
by  British  tribes  to  whom  the  rumour  of  Caesar's 
coming  had  floated,  were  warmly  received,  and  sent 
back  with  promises  of  his  good-will  and  protection  ; 
and  a  Gaul  of  distinction  was  sent  with  them,  who 
was  already  known  in  the  island  and  in  some  degree 
influential  there.  This  person  was  one  Commlus, 
of  whom  we  shall  hear  more  hereafter.  Caesar  had 
made  him  King  of  the  Atrebates,  and  could  rely  upon 
his  intelligence  and  fidelity. 

Volusenus  returned  without  having  ventured  to 
land,  and  therefore  without  any  very  useful  informa- 
tion. Caesar  had  by  this  time  assembled  eighty 
merchant  ships  in  one  port,  to  transport  two  legions, 
and  eighteen  in  another  a  few  miles  farther  up  the 
coast,  to  carry  a  detachment  of  cavalry.  The  last 
dispositions  for  the  protection  of  the  ports  and  the 
movements  of  the  rest  of  the  army  were  completed 
by  August  26th  ;  and  on  that  night,  with  a  favouring 
breeze,  he  set  sail  shortly  after  midnight  with  the 
two  legions,  having  sent  orders  to  the  cavalry  to  fol- 
low him  from  the  upper  port. 

Where  was  it  that  this  famous  crossing  of  our 
familiar  Channel  took  place  ?  Whence  did  Caesar 
sail,  and  where  did  he  land  ?  These  are  questions 
that  have  been  discussed  with  all  the  aid  of  classical 
learning,  mediaeval  history,  geology,  hydrography, 
and  with  a  fair  admixture  of  reason  and  good  tem- 
per. But  in  spite  of  the  confidence  of  some  writers 
on  the  subject,  the  questions  will  perhaps  never  be 


196  yulius   CcBsar.  155  B.C.- 

finally  solved  ;  and  fortunately  they  do  not  admit  of 
being  discussed  here.  It  is,  however,  much  easier  to 
guess  at  the  port  from  which  he  sailed  than  to  make 
out  with  any  certainty  the  point  on  the  English  coast 
where  he  succeeded  in  forcing  a  landing.  We  may 
fairly  assume  that  both  in  this  and  in  next  year's  ex- 
pedition, he  set  sail  from  the  harbour  of  Wissant, 
now  sand-choked  and  disused.  This  harbour,  which 
Caesar  calls  the  Portus  Itius,  lay  some  twelve  miles 
west  of  Calais,  and  was  sheltered  from  the  prevailing 
south-west  winds  by  Cape  Grisnez,  the  Itian  prom- 
ontory, as  it  was  then  named.  After  a  slow  and 
cautious  voyage,  he  found  himself  at  about  9  A.M. 
under  some  abrupt  cliffs,  which  we  may  suppose  to 
have  been  those  between  Dover  and  Folkestone. 
Only  his  fastest  ships  had  kept  up  with  him  ;  and 
as  the  Britons  occupied  the  summits  of  the  cliffs, 
whence  they  could  hurl  missiles  onto  the  beach 
below,  he  waited  here  for  some  hours  for  the  rest  of 
his  fleet,  and  then,  finding  the  tide  flowing  west- 
wards, turned  towards  the  low  shore  of  Romney 
marsh,  and  prepared  to  effect  a  landing  there.  The 
old  belief  that  he  turned  eastwards  and  landed  at 
Deal,  cannot,  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge 
of  the  tides,  be  any  longer  maintained.  But  another 
view  of  his  movements  takes  him  from  Boulogne,  or 
some  port  west  of  Wissant,  and  brings  him  to  the  cliffs 
of  Hastings,  and  so  to  the  level  shore  of  Pevensey.** 

*  Much  can  be  said  in  favour  of  this  opinion  ;  but  if  both  invasions 
be  taken  into  consideration,  the  route  by  Wissant  and  Romney  seems 
the  most  probaWe.  See  the  controversy  between  Messrs.  Maiden 
and  Ridgway  in  recent  numbers  of  the  Journal  of  Philology. 


SECTION  OF  THE  BRIDGE,   SHOWING  METHOD  OF  CONSTRUCTION. 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain,     197 

The  scene  at  the  landing  is  graphically  described 
by  Caesar,  and  is  familiar  to  most  of  us.  The  difficulty 
was  very  great,  for  the  Britons  were  on  the  beach 
with  their  formidable  war-chariots,  and  the  ships 
drew  too  much  water  to  be  brought  in  close  to  the 
shore.  But  Caesar  had  employed  the  delay  near  Dover 
in  collecting  his  principal  officers,  and  warning  them 
of  the  quick  obedience  and  intelligence  needed  in 
such  operations  as  he  had  now  in  hand  ;  and  it  was 
probably  owing  to  this  exhortation  that  he  had  forced 
his  way  to  shore  before  the  August  day  had  ended. 
The  standard-bearer  of  the  famous  tenth  legion,  who 
was  the  first  to  set  the  example  of  leaping  into  the 
water  to  his  hesitating  comrades,  has  had  his  words 
immortalized  by  his  chief  :  ''  Come  leap  ashore,  sol- 
diers, unless  you  would  betray  this  eagle  to  the 
enemy.  I  at  least  will  do  my  duty  to  the  Republic 
and  my  general."  When  once  the  example  had  been 
set,  every  ship  quickly  discharged  its  soldiery  :  and 
Caesar,  by  manoeuvring  with  his  lighter  ships  and  the 
boats  attached  to  the  heavier  ones,  was  able  to  give 
them  support,  and  to  help  them  to  get  into  some  kind 
of  order.  No  sooner  were  they  on  dry  land  than  the 
Britons  fled  at  once,  and  soon  afterwards  sent  envoys 
to  beg  for  peace  and  to  promise  obedience.  Caesar 
upbraided  them  for  attacking ,  him,  since  they  had 
already  sent  their  submission  to  him  in  Gaul ;  but  he 
merely  demanded  hostages  as  usual  (some  of  whom 
they  handed  over  at  once),  and  affected  to  pardon 
their  rash  conduct. 

So  far  so  good  ;  but  after  this  everything  began  to 
go  wrong.     The  eighteen   ships  with    the    cavalry, 


1 98  yulius  Ccesar,  [55B.C..- 

which  had  been  detained  by  adverse  winds,  were  on 
the  fourth  day  caught  by  a  storm  in  mid-channel ; 
some  put  back  to  port,  others  were  carried  away  to 
the  west,  and  only  reached  the  Gallic  coast  again 
with  great  difficulty.  The  same  night  the  gale  and 
a  high  tide  did  great  damage  to  the  fleet  which 
had  carried  Caesar  across,  as  it  lay  off  the  landing- 
place,  and  swamped  the  war-ships  which  had  been 
drawn  up  on  the  beach.  Ignorance  of  the  nature  of 
the  tides  had  prevented  the  general  from  anticipat- 
ing this  disaster,  and  now  he  was  unable  to  stir  hand 
or  foot  to  stay  it,  as  he  watched  the  wreckage  from 
the  shore.  He  must  have  felt  himself  in  a  very 
awkward  plight ;  cut  off  from  all  retreat,  destitute  of 
provisions,  without  cavalry,  and  with  an  infantry 
force  of  no  more  than  seven  or  eight  thousand  men. 
And  these,  though  old  and  ripe  soldiers,  were,  as  he 
says,  of  necessity  alarmed  by  the  predicament  they 
were  in  ;  for  besides  the  ominous  fact  that  they  were 
cut  off  from  retreat,  they  soon  became  aware  that  the 
Britons  had  discovered  their  disaster,  and  were 
hoping  to  put  an  end  to  this  and  all  future  invasion 
by  the  utter  destruction  of  the  little  army. 

For  averting  a  panic  there  is  nothing  so  good  as 
hard  work,  and  this  remedy  could  be  applied  at 
once.  One  legion  was  employed  in  refitting  the 
broken  ships  with  the  timber  of  those  which  were 
hopelessly  damaged,  and  the  men  worked  with  such 
good  will  that  all  but  twelve  were  soon  once  more 
ready  to  be  floated.  Meanwhile,  the  other  legion 
was  sent  out  every  day  to  bring  in  corn,  which  would 
at  this  time  be  just  ready  for  cutting.     This  legion 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.     1 99 

was  much  harassed  by  the  enemy,  who  had  now 
gathered  in  great  numbers  to  fall  upon  their  prey, 
hiding  in  the  woods,  and  then  bearing  down  sud- 
denly on  the  scattered  foragers  with  their  chariots. 
Caesar  at  length  withdrew  the  legion  into  camp,  and 
waited  his  opportunity  during  some  days  of  con- 
tinuous rain.  Then,  when  the  foe  had  gathered 
round  him  in  still  greater  numbers,  he  drew  out  his 
force  and  offered  them  battle;  they  were,  of  course, 
broken  at  the  first  charge  of  Roman  infantry,  fled  in 
every  direction,  and  again  sent  to  beg  for  peace. 
Caesar  ordered  them  to  send  to  him  in  Gaul  double 
the  number  of  hostages  he  had  required  before  ;  and 
then,  as  the  equinox  was  at  hand,  set  sail  by  night 
and  reached  the  Portus  Itius  safely  with  all  his  force 
but  two  ships.  The  soldiers  in  these  landed  farther 
to  the  west,  and  though  attacked  by  the  Morini  and 
put  to  great  peril,  were  eventually  rescued. 

As  a  reconnoitring  expedition,  this  bold  adventure 
of  Caesar's  had  not  been  without  result.  He  had 
learnt  where  and  how  to  land,  and  had  noted  the 
British  methods  of  fighting ;  above  all  he  had  accus- 
tomed his  men  to  the  sight  of  the  sea  and  of  the 
painted  barbarians,  and  had  taught  them  to  believe 
more  firmly  than  ever  in  his  own  boundless  resource 
and  good  fortune.  He  had  seen  enough  to  make 
him  wish  to  see  more.  Before  quitting  his  legions 
in  their  winter-quarters  in  Belgica,  he  gave  explicit 
orders  to  his  staff  for  the  preparation  of  a  large  new 
fleet  and  the  repair  of  the  old  vessels ;  they  were 
now  to  be  built  on  a  new  model,  low  and  with  flat 
bottoms,  and  broad  in  the  beam,  so  as  to  suit  the 


200  yulius    CcBsar.  [55  B.C.-- 

requirements  of  transport  and  landing  in  a  sea  sub- 
ject to  strong  tidal  influences.  The  work  was  carried 
out  so  thoroughly  that  when  he  returned  from  Cisal- 
pine Gaul,  after  putting  an  end  to  the  predatory 
incursions  of  a  barbarous  tribe  on  the  frontiers  of 
Illyria,  he  found  the  fleet  almost  ready ;  and  he  did 
not  omit  to  praise  the  indefatigable  willingness  of 
the  soldiery  who  spent  their  winter  in  thus  toiling 
for  him.  All  the  ships,  some  of  which  were  built  in 
the  interior  and  had  to  be  conveyed  overland,  were 
to  assemble  at  the  Portus  Itius,  the  most  convenient 
starting-place  for  the  crossing,  as  he  here  tells  us. 

Whether  Caesar's  judgment  was  not  seriously  at 
fault  in  thus  concentrating  his  whole  strength  on 
another  doubtful  adventure,  may  very  well  be  matter 
of  question.  He  knew  well  enough  that  the  Gaul  he 
had  conquered  was  not  yet  reconciled  to  his  con- 
quest. He  had  evidence  on  the  very  eve  of  setting 
out  that  disaffection  was  abroad,  and  had  himself  to 
take  four  legions  in  all  haste  into  the  country  of  the 
Treveri,  who  were  disobedient  and  said  to  be  invit- 
ing a  new  German  invasion.  The  dangerous  ^duan 
Dumnorix  (see  p.  141 ),  whom  he  was  taking  with 
him  to  Britain,  escaped  at  the  last  moment,  and  had 
to  be  pursued  and  killed  lest  he  should  foment  rebel- 
lion in  Caesar's  absence.  He  had  as  yet  had  little 
time  to  organise  the  newly  acquired  territory,  to 
show  himself  in  all  parts  of  it,  and  to  exercise  his 
wonderful  personal  influence  in  the  work  of  concilia- 
tion. All  that  he  seems  to  have  done  as  yet  in  this 
direction,  besides  fixing  the  tribute  to  be  paid,  or 
setting  up  a  new  king  here  and  there,  was  to  sum- 


54  B.C.I  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.     201 

mon  a  general  meeting  of  the  Gallic  chiefs  from  time 
to  time,  at  which  he  no  doubt  presided  himself, 
directed  the  proceedings,  and,  as  master  of  the  whole 
country,  demanded  supplies  or  ordered  auxiliary 
troops  * ;  and  those  who  failed  to  come  were,  like 
the  Treveri,  punished  as  rebels.  The  Gauls  must 
have  so  far  looked  on  those  assemblies  as  no  more 
than  proofs  of  their  own  subjection,  and  they  might 
even  serve  as  centres  of  conspiracy.  But  before  dis- 
affection came  to  a  head,  it  might  surely  have  been 
possible  to  avert  it  by  spending  at  least  one  whole 
summer  in  a  general  inspection,  with  a  view  to  more 
definite  organisation,  based  on  the  habits  and  needs 
of  the  people  themselves. 

But  Caesar  was  induced  to  put  all  such  considera- 
tions aside,  if  he  ever  entertained  them,  by  an 
irresistible  desire  for  further  adventure  and  dis- 
covery. The  story  of  this  second  expedition  must 
be  told  very  briefly.  After  a  delay  of  twenty-five 
days,  occasioned  by  continued  winds  from  the  north- 
west, Caesar  set  sail  at  last  at  sunset  with  more 
than  six  hundred  vessels  before  a  southerly  breeze. 
It  dropped  in  mid-channel  ;  and  when  day  dawned 
he  found  ''  that  he  had  left  Britain  behind  him  on  his 
left  " — i.  c,  that  the  tide  had  carried  him  to  the 
north-east,  and  that  the  Kentish  coast  was  now  in 
his  rear.  The  soldiers  set  to  work,  with  a  vigour 
which  called  forth  warm  praise  from  the  general,  to 
row  back  to  the  landing-place  of  last  year  ;  the  speed 
they  attained  with  the  transports  equalled  that  of 
the  war-galleys  with  their  trained  crews.    Every  man 

*  See  B.  G.,  v.,  2,  4  ;  vi..  3,  4,  4,  6. 


202  yulhts  Ccssar,  [55  B.C.- 

in  the  army  seems  to  have  given  himself  up,  body 
and  mind,  to  the  service  of  Caesar ;  again  and  again 
this  year  he  pauses  in  his  narrative  to  note  their 
marvellous  activity. 

The  landing  was  effected  this  time  without  oppo- 
sition ;  no  enemy  was  to  be  seen.  It  was  about 
midday  when  they  arrived  ;  a  site  for  a  camp  was 
marked  out,  but  the  men  must  have  needed  some 
rest,  and  the  actual  spade-work  seems  to  have  been 
postponed.  At  midnight,  or  soon  after,  having 
received  some  intelligence  of  the  enemy,  Caesar 
marched  with  his  main  body  in  search  of  them, 
found  them  in  force  on  a  certain  river,  and  dis- 
lodged them  from  a  strong  position  ;  but  forbade 
pursuit  in  a  country  entirely  unknown  to  him.  Next 
day  he  despatched  three  columns  of  mixed  infantry 
and  cavalry  in  the  direction  of  the  fugitives  ;  but  no 
sooner  had  they  started  than  a  messenger  arrived 
with  the  news  that  his  fleet  had  a  second  time  been 
caught  in  a  storm  and  that  nearly  every  ship  had 
been  seriously  damaged.  Recalling  the  columns,  he 
halted  them  in  position,  and  instantly  rode  off  him- 
self to  the  coast.  There  was  nothing  to  be  done, 
he  found,  but  to  repair  the  damage,  and  haul  the 
ships  ashore.  Contingents  from  all  five  legion?  were 
sent  for,  and  worked  night  and  day  for  ten  da5'S' 
Labienus,  commanding  at  the  Tortus  Itius,  was  or- 
dered to  set  his  men  to  build  new  ships.  And  thui 
this  indefatigable  man,  with  his  patient  and  devot<^d 
army,  made  their  line  of  retreat  secure  at  the  .cost  of 
infinite  labour. 

Once   more   free  to   advance,  he    found   that   the 


54  B.C.]  Invasions  of  Gei^many  and  Brttahi.    203 

Britons  had  gathered  in  great  numbers  under  Cas- 
sivelaunus,  King  of  the  Catuvellauni  north  of  the 
Thames,  to  whom  the  other  chiefs  had  entrusted  for 
the  time  a  general  power.  Desultory  fighting  fol- 
lowed, as  the  army  advanced  inland  ;  and  much 
damage  was  done  to  foragers  and  camp-makers  by 
clever  and  sudden  attacks  of  the  enemy,  and  by 
their  cavalry  and  war-chariots.  Caesar  clearly  con- 
sidered these  Britons  a  more  dangerous  foe  than  the 
Gauls,  and  is  at  considerable  pains  to  explain  the 
difficulties  of  his  advance.  The  legions  however 
never  flinched,  and  reached  at  last  that  point  on  the 
river  beyond  which  lay  the  territory  of  Cassive- 
launus.  Here  they  crossed  the  only  available  ford 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy  by  a  rush,  and  drove  him 
from  his  position  on  the  opposite  bank,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  the  passage  was  carefully  guarded  by 
stakes,  both  on  the  farther  side  and  in  the  bed  of  the 
river  itself,  and  that  the  water  was  so  deep  as  to  leave 
only  the  men's  heads  above  the  surface.  After  this 
defeat  Cassivelaunus  contented  himself  with  retiring 
into  his  forests,  and  breaking  out  on  the  Romans 
with  his  chariots  whenever  a  chance  was  given  him. 
Caesar  must  have  now  made  up  his  mind  that  it 
was  no  easy  matter  to  conquer  Britain,  and  probably 
also  that  it  was  not  worth  conquering.  He  received 
at  this  time  an  embassy  from  the  Trinobantes,  in- 
habiting what  is  now  Essex,  which  gave  him  a  good 
excuse  for  retreat  and  departure.  A  young  chief- 
tain of  this  tribe,  whose  father  had  been  a  victim  of 
a  feud  with  Cassivelaunus,  and  had  formerly  escaped 
to    Caesar  in  Gaul,  was  with  him  at  this  moment. 


204  yulius   CcBsar.  [55  B.C.- 

The  Trinobantes  asked  to  have  the  young  chief 
back,  and  promised  in  return  entire  submission  to 
Caesar,  who  graciously  acceded,  with  the  usual  de- 
mand for  hostages.  The  example  once  set,  other 
tribes  followed  suit ;  and  from  these  Caesar  learnt 
that  Cassivelaunus  had  retired  to  a  fortified  camp  in 
the  midst  of  forest  and  marsh.  He  at  once  hastened 
thither,  stormed  it  easily,  and  carried  off  a  quantity 
of  cattle  and  many  prisoners.  But  this  powerful 
chief  had  meanwhile  taken  another  step,  which  might 
have  had  serious  consequences ;  he  had  sent  a  force 
into  Cantium  (Kent)  to  attack  the  Roman  naval 
camp,  and  cut  off  Caesar's  retreat.  The  force  that 
had  been  left  there  as  a  garrison  was  strong  enough 
however  to  repel  this  attack ;  and  Cassivelaunus, 
foiled  again,  sent  to  offer  his  submission.  Enough 
had  now  been  done  to  retire  with  the  appearance  of 
success  ;  and  after  imposing  a  tribute  on  the  country 
(as  a  matter  of  form,  we  may  presume),  and  giving 
Cassivelaunus  the  most  positive  commands  not  to 
molest  the  young  chief  of  the  Trinobantes,  Caesar 
returned  to  the  naval  camp  before  the  summer  was 
quite  over,  and  transporting  his  army  across  the 
Channel  in  two  successive  voyages,  arrived  safely 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  ship  at  the  Portus  Itius. 
It  was  nearly  a  century  before  another  Roman 
army  crossed  to  our  island.  The  idea  of  annexing 
it  was  not  wholly  abandoned  ;  for  as  Caesar  clearly 
perceived,  the  connection  between  the  continental 
and  insular  Celts  was  too  intimate  to  allow  the 
Romans  to  hold  the  former  in  subjection  without 
at  least  keeping  a  check  on  the  latter.     But  neither 


54  B.C.J  Invasions  of  Germany  and  Britain.    205 

Caesar  nor  Augustus  could  afford  to  wage  so  distant 
and  difficult  a  war,  without  a  more  ample  return, 
political  and  material,  than  could  then  be  expected 
from  it.  Unlike  Gaul,  Britain  had  yielded  little 
spoil ;  and  soldiers  who  adventured  themselves  in 
distant  lands  could  no  more  be  expected  to  give 
their  best  years  to  warfare  without  hope  of  booty, 
than  the  Spaniards  who  followed  Cortes  or  Pizarro, 
or  the  Devonshire  seamen  who  sailed  for  El  Dorado 
with  Drake  or  Raleigh. 

But  Caesar  himself,  if  we  can  trust  the  evidence 
of  his  own  memoirs,  had  other  objects  in  view  be- 
sides conquest  and  booty.  As  has  been  already 
pointed  out,  the  scientific  habit  of  mind  was  strong 
in  him  ;  he  went  to  Britain  not  only  to  acquire 
wealth,  but  to  extend  his  knowledge.  Of  booty  he 
says  hardly  a  word,  though  writing  for  a  public  in 
whom  avarice  was  a  much  stronger  motive  than  curi- 
osity ;  but  of  the  geography  and  inhabitants  of 
Britain  he  sets  down  carefully  all  the  knowledge 
he  had  collected.  It  was  scanty  enough  ;  it  occupies 
but  two  chapters  ;  but  it  comprises  almost  all  we 
know  of  Britain,  except  from  coins,  down  to  the 
time  of  its  final  conquest  under  Claudius.  He  gained 
a  rough  idea  of  the  shape  and  size  of  our  island. 
He  has  preserved  the  names  of  several  of  the  tribes 
inhabiting  it, — no  easy  matter,  save  for  a  careful 
note-taker.  On  a  single  sentence  of  his  rests  our 
knowledge  of  the  early  invasion  of  our  southern 
coast  by  the  Belgae  of  the  continent.  He  noted  the 
mild  temperature  of  the  island,  and  by  means  of  a 
water  clock  discovered  that  the  nights  were  longer 


2o6  Julius   CcBsar,  [54  B.C. 

there  than  on  the  continent.  Of  the  coinages  he  met 
with  he  had  something  to  say,  but  unluckily  his  text 
is  at  this  point  corrupt,  and  we  cannot  be  sure  of 
what  he  wrote.  He  knew  of  the  tin  mines  in  Corn- 
wall, and  of  iron  ore  found  on  the  south  coast,  e,  g.^ 
in  Sussex,  and  notes  the  abundance  of  timber,  and 
the  absence  of  the  pine  and  the  beech. ^  Of  the  in- 
habitants he  says  that  the  Cantii  were  the  most  civ- 
ilised, having  constant  intercourse  with  Gaul ;  and 
that  in  the  interior  there  was  little  cultivation  of  the 
land,  but  an  abundance  of  cattle.  He  describes  the 
men  as  painting  themselves  with  woad,  as  clothed  in 
skins,  and  as  wearing  moustaches  but  no  beards.f 

These  notes  of  his  are  reproduced  here,  not  be- 
cause the  ancient  Britons  are  any  part  of  the  subject 
matter  of  this  volume,  but  to  show  that  their  first 
discoverer,  in  a  measure  beyond  any  ancient  con- 
queror of  whom  we  have  knowledge,  was  possessed 
of  the  desire  to  know,  and  of  the  ability  to  record 
his  knowledge  carefully. 


*  It  is,  however,  almost  certain  that  the  beech  was  indigenous  in 
Britain  ;  and  Caesar  may  have  meant  some  other  tree  by  fagus^  or  set 
it  down  by  an  error  of  memory. 

f  He  adds  one  or  two  other  particulars,  e.  g.,  the  practice  of  poly- 
andry ;  for  a  criticism  of  these,  see  Professor  Rhys*  ' '  Celtic 
Britain,"  p.   52  foil. 


#^ 


-r 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

THE   GALLIC    REBELLIONS. 

54-52    B.C. 


iJHE  retreat  from  Britain  in  Sep- 
tember, 54  B.C.,  marks  a  turn- 


ing point  in  Caesar's  life.  His 
happiest  and  brightest  years 
were  surely  the  first  four  that 
he  spent  in  Gaul,  when  he  was 
far  removed  from  the  hurly- 
burly  of  party  strife  in  Rome, 
free  to  indulge  his  own  love  of 
glory  and  of  adventure,  and 
free  to  use  exactly  as  ne  pleased  the  services  of  an 
admirable  and  devoted  army.  Hardly  a  check  had 
occurred  to  mar  the  brilliancy  of  his  career ;  his  star 
seemed  ever  in  the  ascendant,  his  good  fortune  unfail- 
ing. He  worked  and  travelled  indefatigably  winter 
and  summer  in  all  his  three  provinces  ;  he  was  in  the 
full  vigour  of  the  ripest  manhood,  and  his  bodily 
i^e^lth  seems  to  have  answered  all  the  calls  made  on  it, 

207 


2o8  JmUus   Ccesar.  t54  B.C- 

and  to  have  profited  by  the  constant  change  of  scene, 
and  by  the   unbroken   activity  of  a  healthy  nimd. 
And  lastly,  a  splendid  hope  lay  before  him  ;    that 
when  his  new  conquests  were  completed  and  organ-  \ 
ised,  he  might  return  home  to  a  second  consulship,     \ 
and  finish  the  work  he  had  begun  in  his  first.     He       \ 
would  once  more  attempt  to  consolidate  all  parties 
in  a  rational  and  active  government,  to  teach  men 
what  the  Roman   Empire  had  become,  and  to  dis- 
cover for  them  the  principles  on  which  alone  it  could 
be  intelligently  and  happily  governed. 

But  just  as  in  the  early  afternoon  of  a  brilliant 
summer  day,  the  face  of  the  heaven  will  suddenly 
appear  flecked  with  the  clouds  that  tell  of  the  storm 
to  come,  so  at  this  point  in  Caesar's  life,  he  became 
aware  of  the  first  warnings  of  serious  trouble.  We 
need  not  speak  yet  of  his  relations  with  Pompeius, 
of  the  death  of  Crassus  in  Asia,  or  of  the  loss  of  his 
only  daughter  Julia  ;  even  in  Gaul  itself  the  trouble 
was  beginning,  and  it  is  this  that  must  be  dealt  with 
in  this  chapter.  But  we  may  say,  not  without  truth, 
that  from  this  time  forwards  his  life,  like  that  of 
Cromwell  after  Naseby,  was  one  long  series  of  strug- 
gles against  disappointment  and  vexation.  In  all 
these  struggles  he  was  victorious,  like  Cromwell ;  but 
in  each  case  the  heroic  man  was  carried  by  them  out 
of  the  course  he  would  have  chosen  for  himself,  and 
each  life  was  worn  out  in  the  long  unwearied  effort. 

The  northern  Gauls  had  taken  advantage  of 
Caesar's  absence  in  Britain  to  organise  something 
like  a  general  rebellion  '^  ;  they  only  waited  to  see 

*  B.  G.,  V.  27,  5. 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  209 

how  his  forces  would  be  disposed  in  winter-quarters. 
Unaware  of  what  had  been  going  on,  and  urged  by 
the  necessities  of  a  bad  harvest,  which  made  it 
difficult  to  feed  a  large  force  in  one  district,  he 
unwittingly  played  into  their  hands.  The  several 
legions  were  settled  for  the  winter  at  a  considerable 
distance  from  each  other  ;  though,  with  one  excep- 
tion, they  were  all  within  a  circuit  of  a  hundred 
Roman  miles.*  Three  of  them  were  in  what  is  now 
Belgium  :  one,  under  Q.  Cicero,  at  Charleroi ;  an- 
other, under  Labienus,  in  the  country  of  the  Treveri, 
not  far  from  Luxemburg  ;  the  third  was  still  farther 
north,  at  Aduatuca,  which  is  believed  to  be  Tongres, 
a  few  miles  north  of  Liege.  This  last  was  a  newly 
raised  legion  from  the  Transalpine  province  ;  but  to 
make  up  for  this,  five  extra  cohorts,  or  half  a  legion, 
were  attached  to  it.  Caesar  himself  remained  with 
one  legion  at  Samarobriva  (Amiens)  until  he  should 
hear  that  all  were  established  and  entrenched  for 
the  winter  ;  three  other  legions,  under  Fabius,  Plan- 
cus,  and  Marcus  Crassus,  were  within  a  day  or  two's 
march  of  him.  When  once  all  these  legions  were 
entrenched  and  provisioned,  he  might  leave  for 
Cisalpine  Gaul  as  usual,  without  misgivings  as  to 
their  safety. 

It  was  fortunate  for  him  that  he  did  not  hurry. 
The  troops  at  Aduatuca  had  hardly  been  a  fortnight 
in  winter  quarters,  when  they  were  furiously  attacked 
by  the  Eburones,  the  people  of  that  district,  under 
their  chiefs  Ambiorix  and  Catuvolcus.  Such  attacks 
against  Roman  entrenched  camps  were  sure  to  fail, 

*  See  the  map  in  Napoleon's  "  Jules  Cesar,"  pi.  15. 
14 


5IO  jfuliMs   CcBsar,  [54  B.C.- 

and  this  was  no  exception ;  but  Ambiorix  was  a  man 
of  many  wiles.  He  asked  for  a  parley,  explained 
that  the  attack  had  been  forced  on  him  by  his  army, 
that  he  was  himself  bound  to  Caesar's  interest  by 
many  benefits,  and  that  he  felt  compelled  to  inform 
the  Romans  that  the  whole  country  was  rising  and 
the  Germans  crossing  the  Rhine,  that  each  legion 
would  be  attacked  separately,  and  that  their  only 
chance  of  safety  lay  in  joining  Labienus,  who  was 
some  fifty  miles  to  the  south  of  them.  Unluckily 
Caesar  had  in  this  solitary  instance  divided  the  com- 
mand, doubtless  for  some  reason  at  which  we  can 
only  guess,  between  two  legati :  Titurius  Sabinus, 
who  had  done  him  excellent  service,  and  Auruncu- 
leius  Cotta,  who  had  also  been  with  him  from  his 
first  campaign.  These  now  took  different  views  of 
their  situation.  Cotta  showed  himself  the  better 
general ;  he  refused  to  take  his  measures  on  the 
recommendation  of  an  armed  enemy.  Sabinus  took 
the  other  view,  and  urged  a  concentration  with 
Labienus.  Ambiorix  offered  himself  as  guide.  At 
last  Cotta  gave  in,  after  a  long  argument,  which 
Caesar,  who  saw  the  difficulties  of  the  position  as 
clearly  as  he  saw  the  right  way  to  surmount  them, 
has  described  from  reports  for  the  benefit  of  young 
officers  in  a  responsible  station.  The  little  force, 
some  five  or  six  thousand  men,  left  its  entrench- 
ments at  daybreak,  and  when  night  fell  only  a  few 
stragglers  were  left  alive.  Ambiorix  led  them  into 
a  trap,  from  which  escape  was  hopeless.  All  day 
long  they  struggled  for  life,  and  not  a  man,  writes 
Caesar  with  feeling,  did  anything  unworthy  of  him- 


\ 


52  B.C.J  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  211 


self.  At  last  Cotta  was  badly  wounded,  and  Sabinus 
determined  to  capitulate.  Amblorix  received  him 
and  his  centurions,  ordered  them  to  disarm,  and  in- 
stantly slew  them.  The  attack  on  the  legion  was  re- 
newed ;  Cotta  was  killed  with  the  majority  of  his 
men  ;  the  rest  fled  at  night  to  the  camp  they  had 
left,  and,  after  holding  it  heroically  for  a  while,  slew 
themselves  in  despair.  A  few  stragglers  only  escaped 
to  carry  the  terrible  news  to  Labienus.  I  Such  was 
the  first  disaster  that  had  befallen  Caesar%  arms  ;  in 
which  the  man  who  was  to  blame  was  one  of  his  most 
trusted  generals,  and  the  heroes  who  died  rather 
than  surrender  were  chiefly  raw  recruits  of  Gallic 
birth.  ^ 

Had  all  his  commanders  been  as  weak  as  Sabinus, 
Caesar's  army  might  have  been  now  destroyed  piece- 
meal. Ambiorix,  after  his  victory,  gathered  con- 
tingents from  all  the  neighbouring  clans,  and  flung 
himself  with  a  vast  host  upon  Q.  Cicero  at  Charleroi. 
Cicero  was  ill  at  the  time,  and  his  force  was  surprised ; 
it  was  with  difficulty,  even  behind  entrenchments, 
that  they  held  their  ground  at  first.  But  the  legion 
was  a  tried  one,  and  its  commander,  though  not  an 
ideal  officer,  had  a  certain  pertinacity  and  obstinacy 
of  character  that  served  him  well  now.  He  worked 
night  and  day  without  rest  till  his  men  compelled 
him  to  take  it.  He  urged  them  to  superhuman  ex- 
ertions ;  a  hundred  and  twenty  wooden  towers  were 
run  up  in  a  single  night.  When  Ambiorix,  foiled  in 
his  first  attack  and  indisposed  for  a  long  siege,  tried 
the  same  trick  with  which  he  had  deceived  Sabinus, 
and   offered  the  legion  a  free  passage  through  the 


2 1 2  yulius    CcEsar,  [54  B.C. 

country,  Cicero  simply  answered  that  the  Romans 
were  not  used  to  negotiate  with  an  armed  foe.  He 
held  on  to  his  position  with  the  grip  of  a  bulldog 
until  nine  men  out  of  ten  in  his  little  force  had  been 
killed  or  wounded,  and  the  huts  and  all  the  baggage 
burnt  by  fireballs  thrown  into  the  camp  by  the  enemy. 
Meanwhile  he  sent  messenger  after  messenger  to 
Caesar  at  Amiens  ;  but  day  after  day  passed  and  no 
succour  appeared.  At  last  a  javelin  was  found  stuck 
in  one  of  the  towers,  to  which  was  fastened  a  paper 
with  a  few  words  in  Greek :  "  Take  courage ;  aid  is  at 
hand."  Cicero's  last  messenger,  a  Gallic  slave,  had 
escaped  detection  and  reached  Caesar  when  the  siege 
had  already  lasted  more  than  a  week.  The  same  day 
smoke  was  seen  rising  in  the  distance,  and  the  be- 
leaguered force  knew  that  Caesar  was  burning  the 
villages  to  draw  the  enemy  away  from  their  prey. 
In  a  few  hours  the  siege  was  raised  ;  they  had  been 
saved  by  the  marvellous  swiftness  of  their  chief. 

Caesar  had  received  Cicero's  letter  one  day  late 
in  the  afternoon  ;  he  instantly  sent  orders  to  Crassus, 
who  was  twenty  Roman  miles  away,  to  join  him  by 
next  morning,  to  Fabius,  who  was  some  distance  to 
the  north,  to  meet  him  with  his  legion  on  the  march, 
and  to  Labienus,  to  advance  towards  Cicero,  if  he 
could  do  so  with  safety.  Next  morning  he  started  on 
the  news  of  Crassus'  approach,  leaving  orders  that 
he  should  remain  with  his  legion  at  Amiens  to  take 
charge  of  the  baggage,  stores,  and  documents  which 
were  housed  there.  Caesar  was  joined  by  Fabius,  and 
thus  with  two  legions  only  (for  Labienus  found  it 
wiser  to  keep  in  his  entrenchments)  he  made  a  series 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions,  213 

of  forced  marches  towards  Charleroi.  The  distance 
is  about  eighty  English  miles ;  he  arrived  in  the 
vicinity  on  the  fifth  day  from  starting,  and  on  that 
day  was  confronted  by  the  vast  host  which  had 
just  raised  the  siege. 

To  fight  a  battle  with  only  eight  thousand  men  was 
impossible ;  but  Cicero  was  now  safe,  and  his  res- 
cuer could  renounce  speed  for  caution.  He  tried 
a  plan  which  the  impetuous  Gallic  character  readily 
invited,  and  succeeded  in  inducing  the  enemy  to  at- 
tack his  camp  under  disadvantageous  circumstances  ; 
waiting  till  they  were  on  his  very  ramparts,  and  even 
tearing  up  his  palisades,  he  threw  all  the  gates  open, 
dashed  out  on  them  on  every  side,  and  dispersed 
them  in  hopeless  panic.  Then  he  set  out,  arrived  at 
Charleroi  at  three  that  day,  and  spent  the  rest  of  it 
in  inspecting  the  defensive  works,  and  in  thanking 
and  praising  Cicero  and  his  officers.  Every  cen- 
turion was  addressed  singly,  and  their  heroism  is 
glowingly  recorded  in  their  chiefs  own  words.  Cicero 
wrote  warmly  to  his  brother  in  Rome  of  the  reception 
he  had  from  Caesar,  and  the  immense  energy  which 
had  saved  him  from  destruction. 

It  was  here  that  he  first  heard  certain  news  of  the 
disaster  of  Sabinus,  which  is  said  to  have  caused  him 
the  most  intense  pain.  But  the  very  next  day, 
when  he  made  it  known  to  his  army,  he  so  far  hid 
his  own  grief  as  to  tell  them  "  that  they  must  not 
lose  heart  at  a  disaster  which  had  been  caused  purely 
by  the  fault  of  a  subordinate  commander,  that  the 
favour  of  the  gods  and  their  own  valour  had  already 
wiped  out  the  defeat,  and  that  the  enemy  would  not 


2  14  yulius  Ccesar.  [54  b.c- 

be  allowed  to  exult  long  over  his  victory."  He  then 
concentrated  three  legions,  his  own  and  those  of 
Cicero  and  Crassus,  round  Amiens  ;  sent  orders  to 
raise  three  new  ones  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  prepared, 
for  the  first  time  since  he  took  the  command,  to 
spend  the  whole  winter  with  his  troops. 

During  that  winter,  he  says,  he  was  never  for  a 
moment  free  from  anxiety.  One  after  another  re- 
ports came  in  of  rebellious  designs  and  open  out- 
breaks. At  length  he  summoned  a  meeting  of  the 
chiefs  of  all  the  tribes,  showed  them  that  he  knew 
what  they  were  about,  and  succeeded  in  frightening 
some  and  conciliating  others.  But  yet,  as  spring 
approached,  the  rumours  of  mutiny  did  not  die  away ; 
every  tribe  was  under  suspicion  of  disaffection,  ex- 
cept the  faithful  yEdui  and  the  useful  Remi.  The 
Senones  on  the  upper  Seine  expelled  a  king  whom 
Caesar  had  given  them  ;  the  Treveri  stirred  up  all 
north-east  Gaul,  called  on  the  Germans  for  aid,  and 
attacked  Labienus  furiously  in  his  winter-quarters. 
Caesar's  ablest  Icgatus  was  able  to  defeat  his  enemy, 
and  even  to  slay  their  valiant  chief  Indutiomarus; 
but  yet  everything  pointed  to  the  approach  of  a 
stormy  summer. 

The  events  of  that  summer  are  told  by  Caesar  in 
his  sixth  book.  They  are  of  comparatively  slight  in- 
terest to  the  reader  as  compared  with  the  stirring 
adventures  of  the  earlier  campaigns.  No  new  ground 
was  broken ;  the  season  was  spent  in  avenging  the 
late  rebellion  and  in  once  more  crossing  the  Rhine  to 
overawe  the  Ubii  and  Suebi,  and  to  secure  the  Gallic 
frontier  on  that  side.     Caesar  himself  felt  that  the 


52  B.c.\  The  Gallic  Rebellions,  2 1 5 

interest  of  his  Roman  reader  would  flag  at  this  point. 
Each  book  so  far  had  had  a  fresh  and  stirring  tale 
to  tell ;  the  defeat  of  the  Helvetii,  the  first  sight 
of  the  Rhine,  and  the  overthrow  of  Ariovistus,  the 
novel  campaign  on  the  great  western  ocean,  the 
bridging  of  the  Rhine,  the  two  invasions  of  Britain, 
the  terrible  disaster  at  Aduatuca,  and  the  gallant 
defence  and  rescue  of  Quintus  Cicero.  And  now  there 
was  nothing  to  tell  of  the  summer  of  53  B.C.  but  the 
reconquest  of  the  Senones,  Carnutes,  Treveri,  and 
others,  tribes  which  had  long  ago  been  conquered,  but 
never  yet  conciliated/  It  was  to  be  a  tale  as  much  of 
failure  as  of  triumph,  for  it  showed  how  easily  the 
work  done  in  any  district  by  force  of  arms  only,  could 
be  undone  on  the  appearance  of  a  single  energetic 
patriot.  {  Not  even  the  second  invasion  of  Germany, 
or  the  story  of  a  second  calamity  at  Aduatuca,  where 
Q.  Cicero's  disobedience  of  orders  lost  him  the  repu- 
tation he  had  won  at  Charleroi,  could  rescue  this 
book  from  falling  flat  in  comparison  with  its  stirring 
predecessors. 

And  yet  this  very  sixth  book  is,  for  the  modern 
reader  at  least,  the  most  interesting  and  valuable 
of  them  all.  With  the  true  feeling  of  an  artist 
Caesar  inserted  in  it,  at  exactly  the  right  point, 
a  digression  of  some  length  on  the  life  and  man- 
ners of  the  Gauls  and  the  Germans,  which  not 
only  most  happily  diverts  the  reader's  attention 
through  eighteen  chapters,  but  is  still  the  foundation 
of  all  our  knowledge  of  the  religion,  the  social  state, 
the  political  institutions  of  our  Celtic  and  Teutonic 
ancestors.     It  is  introduced  with  some  abruptness,  in 


2i6  yulius  CcBsar,  t54  B.c- 

his  straightforward,  soldierly  manner,  just  at  the 
point  where  he  has  reached  his  farthest  in  his  in- 
cursion into  Germany ;  and  when  it  is  concluded  he 
resumes  his  narrative  by  giving  his  reasons  for  re- 
treating. Some  critics — Germans,  it  need  hardly  be 
said — have  insisted  that  the  digression  was  inserted 
here  simply  as  it  were  to  cover  his  retreat  from  the 
eyes  of  the  Roman  public  :  "  I  invaded  and  I  retreated 
— these  must  not  stand  too  close  to  each  other."  ^ 
But  there  is  no  need  to  have  recourse  to  a  motive 
which  might  not  be  unnatural  in  Napoleon,  but  is 
utterly  unlike  Caesar ;  who  never  scrupled  to  tell  a 
plain  tale  of  defeat  when  it  had  to  be  told,  and 
knew  well  that  a  great  commander  is  never  so  great 
as  when  he  recognises  his  own  failure  and  prepares 
calmly  to  retrieve  it. 

These  chapters  show  us  how  lively  was  the  interest 
he  took  not  only  in  the  Gauls  he  had  subdued,  but 
in  the  more  warlike  race  beyond  the  Rhine  whose 
conquest  of  Gaul  he  had  frustrated.  He  seems  here 
to  claim  the  attention  of  the  Romans  for  these  great 
peoples,  as  those  with  whom  their  future  would  in- 
evitably henceforward  be  bound  up.  In  comparing  the 
Gauls  and  Germans  he  even  seems  to  hint  the  belief, 
to  which  his  policy  bears  witness,  that  the  one  might 
be  a  tower  of  strength,  the  other  a  standing  danger  to 
the  Empire.  He  saw  that  the  Gauls  were  on  the  road 
to  civilisation,  and  might  be  met  half-way  by  Rome, 
absorbed  into  the  Roman  state  and  army,  converted 
into  a  powerful  bulwark  of  the  Empire ;  he  saw  also 
that  the  Germans  were  still  in  a  condition  of  hearty 

*  Drumann,  iii.,  330. 


62  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  2 1 7 

and  healthy  barbarism,  that  their  conquest  and  ab- 
sorption were  hopeless,  and  that  the  only  available 
policy  was  to  keep  them  firmly  and  strictly  within 
their  own  territory.  I  Thus  it  was  that  he  marked 
out  the  Rhine  as  the  boundary  on  which  the  eyes  of 
all  Roman  rulers  must  henceforward  be  fixed  ;  a  boun- 
dary within  which  Gallic  civilisation  must  be  devel- 
oped to  the  utmost,  and  beyond  which  German 
barbarism  must  be  left  to  its  own  devices.  |  This  at 
any  rate  is  the  political  lesson  of  these  chapters,  and 
this  was  the  policy  which  Caesar's  successors  ulti- 
mately adopted. 

His  second  expedition  across  the  Rhine  at  once  con- 
firmed him  in  his  policy  towards  the  Germans,  and  put 
an  end  to  all  their  hopes  of  breaking  through  this  boun- 
dary. He  never  again  came  in  contact  with  them 
as  enemies,  and  all  his  activity  for  the  next  two  years 
was  spent  in  securing  his  Gallic  conquests — a  work 
which  turned  out  to  be  the  most  formidable  he  had 
ever  yet  had  to  face.  In  the  winter  of  53-52  B.C., 
during  his  absence  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  disaffection 
which  he  had  extinguished  in  the  north  broke  out 
again  with  far  greater  obstinacy  in  the  central  and 
southern  tribes.  A  real  leader  at  last  appeared  ;  a 
man  who  had  doubtless  learnt  much  from  the  Ro- 
mans, and  who  knew  the  hopelessness  of  rebellion 
without  discipline  and  organisation.  Vercingetorix, 
the  hero  of  Caesar's  seventh  book,  is  also  the  hero  of 
the  whole  Gallic  race.  He  was  a  young  Arvernian  of 
a  noble  family,  whose  father  had  held  the  chieftain- 
ship of  the  whole  of  Gaul.  Though  the  fatal  jealousy 
of  his  countrymen  had  caused  the    father's   death, 


2i8  Julius   CcBsar,  [54B.c.~ 

his  prestige  descended  to  his  son.  His  family  would 
not  listen  to  his  anti-Roman  designs,  and  expelled 
him  from  their  capital  city.  Thus  Vercingetorix 
became  a  soldier  of  fortune,  enlisted  numbers  of  the 
broken  and  discontented  who  swarmed  in  Gaul,  and 
so  gathered  a  force  far  more  formidable  in  quality 
than  the  comfortable  Gallic  citizens  to  whom  Caesar 
was  accustomed  in  the  south.  He  marched  in  every 
direction  recruiting,  and  when  once  the  impulsive 
people  had  recognised  his  strength,  he  showed  himself 
a  master  both  of  organisation  and  strategy.  He  was 
made  supreme  commander ;  he  exercised  his  power 
to  the  full,  reduced  the  Gallic  methods  of  warfare  to 
a  system,  and  punished  insubordination  with  extreme 
severity.  While  it  was  still  winter  he  had  thought 
out  a  plan  of  campaign,  and  at  once  fell  to  executing 
it  with  a  swiftness  and  secrecy  worthy  of  Caesar 
himself.  "^ 

««This  plan  was  simply  to  prevent  Caesar  from  reach- 
ing his  legions,  most  of  which  were  quartered  on  the 
upper  Seine,  by  barring  his  way  out  of  the  Roman 
province.  Before  he  could  force  his  way  through, 
if  he  succeeded  in  doing  so,  Vercingetorix  would 
have  raised  the  whole  country,  and  swooping  on  the 
legions  in  their  chief's  absence,  would  put  an  end 
for  ever  to  the  Roman  occupation.!  We  have  no 
better  testimony  than  this  to  the  power  of  Caesar's 
name  and  presence.  \  Rumours  had  already  reached 
the  Gauls  that  affairs  at  Rome  were  likely  to  embar- 

*  Caesar  does  not  attribute  this  plan  to  Vercingetorix  himself  (B. 
G.,  vii.,  I  foil.)  ;  but  if  it  was  not  his  own  it  was  admirably  developed 
by  him. 


62  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebelliojis.  219 

rass  and  detain  their  conqueror  ;f  and  the  powerful 
tribe  of  the  Carnutes  had  gone  so  far  on  the  strength 
of  these  as  to  rise  and  massacre  the  Roman  men  of 
business  who  were  already  pushing  their  way  every- 
where in  the  country.  Enthusiasm  was  aglow 
in  every  direction  ;  even  the  faithful  .^dui  were  giv- 
ing way  to  it,  and  if  Vercingetorix  could  secure  the 
defection  of  these,  the  legions  would  be  entirely 
surrounded  and  cut  off  from  their  general  and  from 
all  succour. 

The  Gallic  forces  were  divided :  one  division  was 
sent  southward  to  act  on  the  frontier  of  the  Roman 
province,  and  to  combine  with  the  snow-covered 
mountains  of  the  Cevennes  in  preventing  Caesar  or 
any  Roman  army  from  forcing  a  way  to  the  legions. 
Vercingetorix  himself  turned  his  attention  to  the 
-^dui,  and  first  of  all  to  their  clients  the  Bituriges. 
The  plot  was  growing  to  completion  when  Caesar 
heard  of  it.  1  It  was  still  winter,  but  he  set  out 
instantly  frorn  Italy,  after  learning  that  Pompeius 
had  been  made  sole  consul,  and  that  affairs  in  Rome 
were  quieting  down.  He  saw  the  dilemma  he  was 
in ;  either  the  legions  would  have  to  fight  without 
their  general,  or  his  own  safety  would  be  imperilled 
if  he  attempted  to  join  themj  Never  were  the 
resources  of  his  genius  shown  to  greater  advantage. 
He  had  brought  a  few  troops  with  him  ;  he  collected 
some  cavalry  in  the  province  and  sent  part  of  it  to 
the  northern  frontier  at  Vienne.  Then  he  garrisoned 
the  stations  on  the  western  frontier,  and  with  what 
troops  remained  he  cut  his  way  through  the  deep 
snow  still   lying   on  the  Cevennes,   and  descended 


2  20  yulius  CcBsar,  [54  b.C- 

into  the  plain  of  the  Arverni  (Auvergne).  This  was 
utterly  undefended ;  no  one  dreamed  that  he  could 
force  the  passes  at  such  a  season.  For  two  days  he 
advanced  ;  then,  leaving  D.  Brutus  in  command,  with 
orders  to  scour  the  country  and  so  draw  Vercingeto- 
rix  southward  to  the  rescue,  he  slipped  off  almost 
alone  to  Vienne.  Secrecy  was  so  indispensable  that 
not  even  Brutus  knew  his  real  intentions ;  he  gave 
out  that  he  was  going  for  re-inforcements  and  would 
be  back  in  three  days. 

At  Vienne  he  picked  up  the  horsemen  he  had  sent 
there,  and  rode  with  them  day  and  night  to  the  two 
nearest  legions,  which  were  quartered  nearly  two 
hundred  miles  to  the  northwards.  He  reached  them 
safely,  and  felt  himself  once  more  on  firm  ground. 
Messengers  flew  to  the  other  legions,  and  the  whole 
army  was  concentrated  once  more  under  their  chief, 
before  the  enemy  was  even  aware  that  he  was  in  the 
neighbourhood.  I  He  had  completely  beaten  Ver- 
cingetorix  at  his  own  game  of  strategy.  The  Gallic 
chief  had  gone  southwards,  just  as  Caesar  intended 
he  should,  to  protect  his  own  people,  the  Arverni, 
from  the  force  which  had  crossed  the  Cevennes ;  and 
now  central  Gaul  was  occupied,  not  by  an  enthusias- 
tic host  of  rebels,  but  by  Caesar  himself  at  the  head 
of  ten  admirable  legions. 

When  the  news  of  his  presence  spread  abroad, 
Vercingetorix  turned  once  more  northwards,  and 
attacked  a  small  settlement  of  Boii  who  were  under 
obligations  to  the  Romans.  In  spite  of  the  serious 
difficulties  of  supply  which  he  knew  he  would  have 
to  face  at  that  season,  Caesar  marched  at  once  to  the 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  221 


rescue,  took  three  towns  in  rapid  succession,  and 
threatened  Avaricum  (Bourges),  the  capital  of  the 
Bituriges.  Vercingetorix  had  now  to  leave  the  Boii 
alone,  and  do  all  he  could  to  stay  Caesar's  course. 
He  showed  his  genius  for  war  by  the  new  policy  he 
persuaded  his  desperate  countrymen  to  adopt. 
Caesar  must  be  beaten  by  famine.  He  depended  on 
the  towns  for  his  supplies,  and  the  towns  and  all 
their  stores  must  be  burnt ;  even  every  village  and 
farm  that  could  give  him  aid  was  to  share  the  same 
fate.  Only  Avaricum  was  to  be  spared  ;  it  was  the 
finest  city  in  Gaul,  and  Vercingetorix  yielded  to  the 
popular  feeling.  It  was  thought  to  be  impregnable, 
and  Caesar  could  be  starved  during  the  siege.  But 
the  young  chieftain  did  not  even  yet  know  what 
stuff  the  Roman  legions  were  made  of,  or  the  end- 
less resources  of  their  engineers.  In  a  few  days 
Caesar  had  laid  his  grip  upon  the  devoted  city. 

The  siege  which  followed  lasted  nearly  four  weeks. 
Caesar  has  described  it  with  even  more  than  his  usual 
care,  and  recorded  with  equal  admiration  the  endur- 
ance of  his  own  men,  and  the  heroism  of  his  enemy. 
His  strong  dislike  to  operate  with  an  ill-provisioned 
army  made  him  soon  give  his  men  the  option  of 
abandoning  the  siege.  So  impossible  was  it  to  ob- 
tain the  ordinary  supplies  with  Vercingetorix  hang- 
ing in  his  rear,  that  he  took  the  famished  men  into 
confidence,  and  tells  with  just  pride  their  unanimous 
refusal  to  retreat.  They  begged  him  to  persevere ; 
they  had  never  yet  acknowledged  a  failure,  and  they 
must  avenge  the  blood  of  the  Romans  who  had  been 
so  cruelly  massacred  by  the  Carnutes.     The  siege 


222  yulius  Cc^sar,  [54  B.C.- 

went  on ;  the  engineers  pushed  their  embankment, 
built  of  beams  and  fascines  covered  with  earth, 
almost  to  the  wall  of  the  city,  at  the  only  point 
where  it  was  not  rendered  impregnable  by  streams 
and  marshes.  At  the  end  of  the  embankment  were 
wooden  towers  from  which  missiles  could  be  thrown 
at  the  defenders ;  covered  ways  protected  the  sol- 
diers who  passed  to  and  from  the  front  of  the  works. 
Every  resource  of  engineering  was  employed  ;  but 
the  quick  intellect  of  the  Gauls,  says  Caesar,  had 
already  learnt  many  of  the  devices  of  their  enemy. 
One  night  when  Caesar  was  going  his  rounds,  inspect- 
ing the  works  and  cheering  his  men,  the  timber-work 
was  seen  to  be  in  flames ;  the  embankment  had  been 
fired  by  a  mine  from  the  city.  A  furious  sortie  fol- 
lowed Instantly,  which  was  with  difficulty  checked  by 
the  two  legions  on  guard  ;  the  Gauls  were  pushed 
back,  but  never  ceased  fighting.  Here  it  was  that 
Caesar  saw  a  scene  of  heroism,  which  wonder  com- 
pelled him  to  hand  down  to  posterity.  A  Gaul 
stood  before  the  city  gate,  throwing  lumps  of  pitch 
into  the  fire  in  the  -Roman  works,  to  keep  it  burning; 
he  was  killed  by  a  missile  from  a  Roman  engine.  A 
second  took  his  place,  and  shared  the  same  fate,  then 
a  third,  and  then  a  fourth,  and  so  on  till  the  struggle 
Avas  ended,  and  the  Gauls  driven  back  into  the  city. 

These  heroes  now  proposed  to  evacuate  Avarlcum, 
and  join  Vercingetorix,  who  was  not  far  off,  but  they 
gave  way  to  the  tears  and  prayers  of  the  women, 
who  would  thus  have  been  left  to  their  fate.  They 
manned  the  walls  again,  but  with  less  vigour  than 
usual ;  and  the  ever-watchful  Caesar  saw  his  oppor- 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions,  223 

tunity.  He  ordered  a  general  assault  ;  the  city  wall 
was  carried  by  storm ;  the  Romans  spread  them- 
selves round  the  ramparts,  and  blocked  the  gates 
from  without.  None,  says  Caesar,  thought  of  plun- 
der; maddened  with  privation  and  the  thirst  for 
vengeance,  like  the  English  at  Badajoz,  they  spared 
neither  man,  Woman,  nor  child.  Scarcely  eight  hun- 
dred, out  of  a  population  of  forty  thousand  souls, 
lived  to  remember  that  awful  day. 

The  scene  changes  to  Auvergne,  that  rich  volcanic 
country  lying  below  the  northern  slopes  of  the 
Cevennes,  which  was  the  home  of  Vercingetorix, 
and  of  the  hereditary  enemies  of  the  Romans.  Caesar, 
though  much  hindered  by  dissensions  among  the 
^dul,  who  had  so  far  been  of  Infinite  service  to  him, 
and  by  the  obvious  growth  of  an  anti-Roman  party 
among  them,  determined  to  strike  a  blow  for  the 
possession  of  the  Arvernian  capital  Gergovia,  in 
hopes  of  destroying  Vercingetorix  and  ending  the 
war.  The  Gallic  chief,  unsuccessful  in  his  operations 
against  Caesar  at  Avarlcum,  set  out  by  forced  marches 
to  throw  himself  into  his  native  stronghold  ;  he  knew 
that  he  was  no  match  for  his  enemy  in  the  open 
field,  and  that  Gergovia  was  all  but  impregnable. 
He  hurried  along  the  western  bank  of  the  river 
Alller,  which  flows  from  the  Cevennes  to  join  the 
Loire  ;  he  broke  down  all  the  bridges,  and  Caesar, 
who  had  been  detained  by  the  affairs  of  the  yEdui, 
was  too  late  to  overtake  him.  When  the  legions 
arrived  before  Gergovia,  it  was  already  occupied  by 
a  vast  array  from  all  parts  of  Gaul,  and  a  single 
reconnaissance  convinced  Caesar  that  it  could  not  be 


2  24  yulius   CcBsar,  [54  B.C. - 

taken  by  storm.  He  resolved  to  try  a  blockade, 
though  his  troops  were  not  really  numerous  enough 
for  his  purpose. 

This  famous  stronghold,  which  is  still  called  by 
its  ancient  name,  consists  of  a  single  lofty  and  almost 
isolated  hill,  nearly  an  English  mile  in  length,  flat  at 
the  top,  oblong  in  shape,  and  descending  steeply  on 
all  sides  but  one  to  the  lower  ground.  On  its  west- 
ern side  only  it  is  joined  to  outlying  hills  by  a  ridge, 
lower  in  elevation  than  its  own  level,  and  offering 
no  easy  opportunity  of  assault.  Caesar's  only  hope 
seems  to  have  lain  in  the  possibility  of  cutting  off 
the  besieged  from  water  and  provisions  ;  for  there  is 
but  little  water  at  the  top,  and  some  at  least  would 
have  to  be  fetched  from  one  of  the  two  streams 
which  flow  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  Between  the 
southern  stream  and  Gergovia  there  is  a  lowep-  hill, 
with  steep  sides,  now  called  La  Roche  Blanche, 
which  was  occupied  by  the  Gauls.  This  was  taken 
by  assault,  and  two  legions  were  at  once  entrenched 
upon  it.  It  was  then  connected  with  the  larger  camp, 
which  had  been  pitched  on  the  eastern  side  of  the 
fortress,  by  a  double  entrenchment.  But  this  plan 
did  not  immediately  succeed.  The  blockading  force 
was  clearly  too  small  to  cut  off  all  the  water  supply. 
Caesar  had,  in  fact,  only  six  legions,  some  25,000 
men,  with  him  ;  the  other  four  were  operating  under 
Labienus  against  the  rebellious  tribes  on  the  Seine. 

Meanwhile,  the  expected  defection  among  the 
iEdui  had  taken  place,  and  a  force  of  10,000  men, 
whom  Caesar  had  ordered  them  to  send  him,  had 
renounced   their   fidelity    on    the   march,   and  were 


52  B.C.J  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  225 

intending  to  join  his  enemies.  Caesar  had  to  leave 
Gergovia  with  four  legions  and  all  his  cavalry,  and 
catch  them  on  their  way.  He  was  but  twenty-four 
hours  absent,  but  he  returned  with  the  ^duan  army 
penitent  and  obedient,  and  the  news  of  their  sub- 
mission decided  the  fate  of  the  hostile  ^duan 
faction.  /  But  it  was  clear  that  he  could  not  stay  at 
Gergovia  while  such  perilous  intrigues  were  hatching 
elsewhere;  and  finding  on  his  return  that  his  camp 
on  the  Roche  Blanche  had  barely  escaped  from  a 
vigorous  sortie  by  the  enemy,  he  began  to  consider 
whether  it  would  not  be  advisable  to  abandon  the 
siege.  But  a  sudden  movement  of  the  enemy  de- 
cided him  to  make  one  last  effort  to  get  at  least  a 
tighter  hold  upon  his  prey.  { 

The  ridge  which  connected  Gergovia  with  the 
neighbouring  heights  was  felt  by  the  besieged  to  be 
a  weak  point  in  their  defence  * ;  and  as  they  had 
failed  to  recover  the  Roche  Blanche,  they  feared  that 
Caesar  might  seize  this  in  addition,  and  shut  them  up 
on  all  sides.  The  reason  why  he  had  not  already 
seized  it  was,  no  doubt,  want  of  sufificient  troops  ; 
but  they  determined  in  any  case  to  forestall  him, 
and  moved  large  bodies  in  that  direction  from  the 
slope  of  the  hill  where  they  were  encamped.  Caesar 
saw  this,  and  made  a  strong  demonstration  towards 
the  ridge  in  order  to  complete  their  illusion.     Ger- 


*  The  English  reader  who  happens  to  have  visited  the  great 
entrenched  camp  called  Maiden  Castle,  near  Dorchester,  will  be  able 
to  realise  not  only  this  weak  point,  but  the  whole  position  of  Ger- 
govia, by  simply  doubling  the  height,  length,  and  breadth  of  the  hill 
which  it  occupies. 


2  26  yulitcs   CcEsar.  [54  B.C.- 

govia  Itself  seemed  bared  of  troops.  The  enemy's 
attention  was  fixed  on  the  ridge  and  the  supposed 
attack  on  it.  Meanwhile  the  two  legions  on  the 
Roche  Blanche  had  been  strengthened  stealthily  by 
parties  of  men  ordered  to  steal  quietly  over  from  the 
larger  camp ;  and  when  a  sufficient  force  was  col- 
lected there,  it  was  sent  swiftly  up  the  only  part  of 
the  hill  where  the  ascent  is  possible  for  soldiers.  A 
wall,  which  had  been  built  half-way  up  by  the  Gauls, 
was  reached  and  surmounted  ;  three  almost  empty 
camps  of  Gallic  contingents  were  captured.  The  wall 
of  the  city  itself  was  now  not  far  ahead  ;  and  the  ex- 
cited legionaries  pressed  on,  regardless  of  the  efforts 
of  their  officers  to  restrain  them,  and  unable  to  hear 
the  trumpet-call  by  which  Caesar,  who  was  with  the 
tenth  legion  below,  endeavoured  to  stay  their  advance. 
Some  few  actually  got  within  the  ramparts ;  but 
they  sacrificed  their  lives  by  their  temerity.  Sud- 
denly the  enemy  poured  out  on  the  breathless 
Romans,  forced  them  down  the  hill,  and  pursuing 
them  into  the  plain,  were  only  checked  by  the  veteran 
tenth  legion.  So  complete  was  the  melee,  that  Caesar 
himself  is  said  to  have  been  for  an  instant  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  He  does  not  mention  this  himself, 
nor  does  he  describe  the  moment  as  a  critical  one ; 
but  he  owns  to  the  loss  of  forty-six  centurions  and 
nearly  700  men,  and  implies  the  complete  failure 
of  his  combinations.  I  The  fact  was  that  on  this 
occasion,  chiefly  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  ground 
and  their  own  ardour,  his  men  were  not  well  in  hand. 
The  fault  was  doubtless  partly  his  ;  but  in  addressing 
them  next  day,  as  became   a   general  who  must  be 


5^  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions,  227 

wholly  trusted  by  his  men,  he  laid  it  chiefly  upon 
them,  blaming  them  for  rashness  while  he  praised 
their  valour.  He  ended  by  cheering  and  consoling 
them  ;  and  then  drawing  up  the  whole  army  in  a 
good  position,  offered  Vercingetorix  battle.  But 
this  was,  of  course,  declined  ;  and  next  day  he  set 
out,  defeated  for  the  first  time,  on  his  retreat  to  the 
wavering  ^dui.  / 

Never  were  his  prospects  at  a  lower  ebb.  The 
work  of  eight  years  must  have  seemed  wholly 
undone.  He  was  far  away  from  his  four  legions  on 
the  Seine,  under  Labienus,  and  the  intervening 
country  was  in  open  insurrection.  The  news  from 
Gergovia,  too,  had  produced  a  new  revolution  among 
the  ^dui ;  they  revolted,  armed,  and  seized  the 
town  of  Noviodunum  in  their  territory,  where  Caesar 
had  left  all  his  hostages  and  prisoners,  his  munitions 
of  war,  and  supplies.  The  hostages  were  released, 
and  all  the  magazines  plundered  or  destroyed.  Even 
the  Roman  province  itself  was  open  to  attack,  and 
the  troops  there  were  few  in  number.  A  weaker 
general  would  have  retreated  to  protect  it,  and 
Caesar  says  that  the  thought  passed  through  his 
mind  ;  but  he  could  not  desert  Labienus,  whose 
position  gave  him  grave  anxiety.  He  contrived 
with  difficulty  to  ford  the  Loire,  the  frontier  of  the 
^dui,  who  had  destroyed  all  the  bridges.  He 
found  ample  supplies  on  the  right  bank,  provisioned 
his  army,  and  set  out  to  effect,  if  possible,  a  speedy 
junction  with  Labienus.  It  was  in  this  district  that 
eight  years  before  he  had  won  his  first  great  victory 
over  the  Helvetii  ;  and  he  must  have  felt  with  chagrin 


2  28  yulius  Ccesar.  [64  B.C.- 

as  he  traversed  it,  that  the  conquest  of  Gaul  was  no 
nearer  to  completion  than  it  was  on  that  eventful 
day  of  triumph. 

But  he  had  taken  the  right  step,  and  in  spite 
of  the  universal  spread  of  insurrection,  and  of  the 
genius  with  which  Vercingetorix  organised  it,  from 
this  moment  his  position  began  slowly  to  mend. 
Labienus,  by  some  clever  manoeuvring  and  one  hard- 
fought  battle,  had  disentangled  himself  from  the 
network  of  insurrection  that  surrounded  him  on  the 
Seine,  and  the  junction  of  the  armies  was  effected. 
Caesar  had  now  at  the  lowest  computation  50,000 
men  under  him  ;  to  these  he  added  a  contingent  of 
German  cavalry  which  he  had  sent  for — a  somewhat 
humiliating  confession  of  weakness — from  beyond 
the  Rhine.  And  now  rightly  judging  it  his  best 
course  to  keep  up  his  communication  with  Italy,  to 
secure  a  base  of  operations  in  Roman  territory,  and 
so  doubtless  (as  the  summer  was  not  far  advanced) 
to  begin  the  task  of  conquest  afresh,  he  turned  in  a 
south-easterly  direction  towards  the  country  of  the 
Sequani,  intending  to  put  himself  in  touch  with  the 
Roman  province,  on  the  northern  frontier  of  which 
that  people  dwelt.  He  was  just  upon  their  borders, 
when  he  was  caught  in  his  march  by  Vercingetorix, 
who,  after  a  general  Gallic  council  at  Bibracte,  had 
again  been  appointed  general-in-chief,  and  had  organ- 
ised a  powerful  cavalry  to  pursue  his  policy  of  cutting 
off  his  enemy's  supplies.  The  legions  had  to  fight  in 
marching  order,  but  Caesar  was  equal  to  the  emer- 
gency, suited  his  tactics  to  the  novel  situation, 
shook  off  the  enemy  with  the  help  of  his  German 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  229 

horsemen,  and  turned  their  retreat  into  a  rout.  Then 
Vercingetorix,  despairing  once  more  of  success  in 
the  open  field,  threw  himself  with  all  his  forces  Into 
the  neighbouring  fortress  of  Alesia  ;  a  name  for  ever 
famous  in  the  annals  of  warfare. 

The  traveller  who  takes  the  railway  from  Paris  to 
Dijon,  on  his  way  to  Switzerland  or  the  Riviera, 
passes  near  this  ancient  stronghold  as  he  enters  the 
Burgundian  Cote  d'Or,  between  Tonnerre  and  Dijon. 
It  is  an  isolated  hill,  shaped  not  unlike  that  of  Ger- 
govia,  and  nearly  a  mile  in  length  ;  as  you  ascend  it, 
you  find  the  slope  moderate  until  you  near  the  sum- 
mit, where  you  are  confronted  by  a  steep  wall  of 
broken  rock.  This  extends  round  a  great  part  of  the 
hill,  and  makes  it  almost  impregnable  to  assault. 
And  this  rocky  summit  is  not  connected,  like  that  of 
Gergovia,  with  the  neighbouring  hills,  by  anything 
that  can  be  called  a  ridge  ;  but  stands  almost  as  much 
alone  as  does  the  Acropolis  of  Athens.  To  the  west- 
ward, it  overlooks  a  considerable  plain  ;  but  to  north, 
south,  and  east,  as  may  be  seen  in  the  annexed  plan, 
other  hills  are  grouped  around  it  at  no  great  dis- 
tance. On  the  north  and  south  they  are  separated 
from  it  by  two  valleys  about  half  a  mile  in  breadth, 
down  which  run  two  streams  to  join  the  river  Brenne 
in  the  plain  to  the  westward  ;  but  on  the  eastern  side 
the  ground  is  higher,  and  forms  in  fact  a  low  water- 
shed between  these  valleys.  Though  modern  artil- 
lery could  command  it  from  any  of  these  heights,  it 
was  undoubtedly  a  place  of  immense  strength  in 
Caesar's  time ;  when  he  reached  it,  it  was  occupied 
by  a  force  more  than  sufficient  to  defend  it  at  all 


230  Julius   CcBsar.  [54  B.c- 


points,  provisioned  for  thirty  days,  and  supplied  with 
abundant  water  by  natural  springs  on  the  hillside. 
He  saw  at  once  that  it  could  not  be  taken  by 
storm,  and  that  to  blockade  it  would  be  a  work 
of  stupendous  labour.  Nevertheless  he  resolved 
to  try  this  last  method.  Could  he  but  succeed,  the 
war  would  be  practically  ended  ;  and  as  he  was  mas- 
ter of  the  largest  and  most  experienced  army  he  had 
ever  yet  worked  with,  failure,  in  any  serious  sense, 
was  not  to  be  thought  of. 

In  order  to  gain  an  adequate  idea  of  the  vast  ex- 
tent of  the  work  now  undertaken  by  Caesar,  the  reader 
must  not  fail  to  examine  the  plan  carefully,  with  the 
following  explanations  in  his  mind  as  he  studies  it. 
The  length  of  the  summit  of  the  hill  is  about  one 
mile,  its  breadth  at  the  widest  half  that  distance  ;  but 
the  circumference  of  its  base  is  fully  six  miles.  To 
draw  a  line  of  works  around  this  base  would  alone 
have  been  a  heavy  task  for  an  army  of  50,000  or 
60,000  men  ;  but  it  was  necessary  also  to  occupy  the 
adjoining  heights  where  they  approached  nearest  to 
Alesia,  in  order  not  only  to  command  a  view  of  the 
city  and  the  proceedings  of  its  defenders,  but  to 
guard  against  an  enemy  advancing  from  without. 

What  Caesar  actually  did,  he  has  recorded  with 
great  exactness  in  three  chapters  of  his  seventh  book  ; 
and  these  have  been  completely  verified  and  ex- 
plained by  the  excavations  made  by  order  of 
Napoleon  III.  in  1862.  First  of  all,  four  camps 
were  formed,  two  on  the  hill  to  the  south  (Mont  de 
Flavigny),  and  one  on  that  to  the  north-east ;  these 
were  occupied  by  the  greater  part  of  the  infantry. 


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52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  231 

In  another  camp,  at  the  foot  of  a  hill  to  the  north- 
west (Mont  R^a),  two  whole  legions  were  stationed ; 
this  was  the  weakest  point  in  the  whole  line,  for  the 
crest  of  this  hill  was  too  far  from  Alesia  to  be 
brought  within  the  lines  of  blockade.  In  the  plain 
near  the  river  Brenne,  the  cavalry  was  quartered  in 
three  camps,  and  a  fourth  was  placed  at  the  extreme 
north,  where  now  stands  the  village  of  Gresigny. 
All  these  camps  were  strongly  fortified  ;  and  in  front 
of  them,  i.  e.,  between  them  and  the  base  of  the  hill, 
was  carried  a  double  ditch  with  a  rampart  and  pali- 
sade behind  it,  11,000  paces,  or  some  eight  miles  in 
length.  This  was  strengthened  by  twenty-three 
forts  icastelld)  at  intervals  of  about  a  third  of  a  mile  ; 
and  further  by  an  elaborate  series  of  devices  to  em- 
barrass an  attacking  force,  consisting  chiefly  of 
branches  and  trunks  of  trees  fixed  in  the  ground, 
and  of  holes  or  traps  dug  and  then  covered  over  at 
the  top  to  deceive  the  eye.  Lastly,  on  the  western 
side,  in  the  plain,  a  ditch  twenty  feet  deep  was  dug 
at  the  very  base  of  the  hill,  with  almost  perpendicular 
sides ;  this  was  some  distance  within  the  line  of 
investment,  and  was  meant  to  embarrass  the  enemy 
during  an  attack,  and  to  give  the  Romans  time  to 
concentrate  at  any  threatened  point. 

The  works  had  hardly  been  begun,  when  Ver- 
cingetorix  made  a  vigorous  attack  on  them  with  his 
cavalry.  These  were  beaten,  and  pursued  right  up 
to  the  city  gate  by  Caesar's  German  horse  ;  and  Ver- 
cingetorix,  wisely  judging  that  cavalry  would  be  of 
no  further  use  to  him,  and  would  only  consume  his 
provision,    sent    them    off,    before   he   was    entirely 


232  yulius  CcEsar.  [54  B.C.- 

hemmed  in,  to  summon  the  tribes  in  every  direction 
to  the  rescue.  They  did  their  work  well ;  and  be- 
fore the  garrison  was  actually  starved  out,  an  enor- 
mous host,  computed  at  240,000,  made  up  of  contin- 
gents from  almost  every  Gallic  people,  had  arrived 
on  the  scene  and  turned  the  tables  upon  Caesar,  who 
was  now  invested  in  his  turn.  But  from  prisoners 
and  deserters  he  had  heard  what  was  going  on  in 
time  to  construct  an  outer  line  of  defence,  on  the 
same  elaborate  plan  as  the  inner  line  of  investment ; 
and  thus  he  now  occupied  a  position,  unique  in  mili- 
tary history,  consisting  of  a  narrow  fortified  ring, 
with  a  numerous  and  furious  enemy  both  within  it 
and  without.  Surely  never  was  the  strength,  good- 
will, and  obedience  of  any  army  so  severely  taxed, 
as  in  the  construction  and  defence  of  these  extra- 
ordinary lines,  which  Caesar  describes  with  his  own 
peculiar  sangfroid^  as  though  they  were  all  in  the 
day's  work. 

Great  indeed  was  the  joy  of  the  besieged  when 
they  saw  this  great  host  approaching.  They  were 
already  almost  worn  out  by  famine.  Voices  had 
even  been  heard  proposing  surrender  ;  others  wished 
for  a  last  sortie,  while  they  yet  had  strength  to  fight. 
One  Arvernian  chieftain  urged  them  to  hold  on  to 
the  last,  and  to  resort  even  to  cannibalism  rather 
than  submit.  Into  the  mouth  of  this  man,  Caesar, 
contrary  to  his  custom,  has  put  a  speech  of  some 
length,  to  rouse  the  feelings  c^  his  reader  to  the  in- 
tense horror  of  the  situation  ;*and  from  this  point  to 
the  end  of  the  siege  he  has  abandoned  his  usual  cool 
and  quiet  style,  and  told  the  story  in  vigorous  and 


Rotrancheraent   de  la  (onlrcvallalion 


Hail  ranveM  df  jtrotto 


^j^^^^^-^^ — 1  r>4/^ 


1^Dtlrles  t^x^  L2,3 


Pourlrs  Rgurn  ^.3,0.8,9 


ROMAN    WORKS    AT   ALESIA. 
{From  Napoleon's  "  C^sarJ*^) 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  233 

graphic  sentences,  rising  in  intensity  till  the  last  ter- 
rible crisis  is  reached,  and  showing  how  keenly  he 
recognised  that  this  struggle  must  decide  his  own 
fate,  as  well  as  that  of  Gaul.  I 

Two  terrible  combats  followed  the  arrival  of  the 
new  Gallic  army :  the  first  by  day,  which  lasted 
from  noon  till  nightfall ;  the  second  by  night,  after 
a  day  spent  by  the  enemy  in  collecting  material  to 
fill  up  the  ditches  of  Csesar's  outer  line.  Both  at- 
tacks were  repulsed,  though  the  second  one  was 
assisted  by  a  furious  sortie  from  the  town.  Then  all 
three  armies  gathered  themselves  together  for  one 
last  mighty  struggle  :  every  Gaul  knew,  says  Csesar, 
that  defeat  meant  destruction  ;  every  Roman,  that 
victory  would  put  an  end  to  all  his  toil. 

There  was,  as  we  saw,  a  weak  point  in  Caesar's 
lines,  where,  at  the  foot  of  Mont  Rea  on  the  north, 
two  legions  had  been  established.  Here  the  line  of 
circumvallation  could  not  be  carried  over  the  sum- 
mit of  the  hill  without  a  detour  too  long  to  be 
thought  of ;  and  it  ran  along  the  slope  above  the 
camp  of  the  two  legions.  The  Gauls  of  the  relieving 
army  saw  that  here,  if  anywhere,  the  lines  could  be 
broken  through  ;  and  a  force  was  sent  by  night 
round  in  the  rear  of  this  hill,  which,  after  resting  till 
mid-day,  crossed  the  summit,  and  descended  upon 
the  fortifications  and  camp  below  them.  At  the 
same  time  the  besieged  made  a  last  furious  sally, 
and  the  rest  of  the  relieving  force  attacked  the  lines 
at  every  point.  The  Romans  had  to  fight  in  front 
and  rear  at  once,  and  it  was  with  the  utmost  difH- 
culty  that  they  held  their  own  on  a  line  of  such  un- 


234  yulius  CcBsar,  [54B.C.- 

paralleled  length.  Caesar,  like  a  modern  general, 
took  up  a  position  whence  he  could  see  the  whole 
ajtion,  and,  keeping  a  reserve  in  hand,  sent  aid 
repeatedly  to  every  point  which  seemed  specially 
hard  pressed. 

It  soon  became  evident  that  the  lines  would  be 
forced  at  the  weak  point  under  Mont  R^a ;  and 
Caesar  sent  Labienus  thither  with  3,000  men,  with 
orders  to  withdraw  the  whole  force  at  that  point,  if 
he  could  not  hold  it,  and  then  as  a  last  resort  to 
dash  out  of  the  lines  and  take  the  enemy  in  flank 
and  rear.  Leaving  his  own  watch-station,  he  hurried 
round  the  works  to  cheer  the  men  and  urge  them  to 
end  their  labours  by  this  supreme  effort  ;  a  step 
which  shows  that  the  crisis  had  indeed  come.  In 
the  plain  the  lines  were  strong,  and  the  Gauls  from 
Alesia,  despairing  of  victory  there,  rushed  up  the 
slopes  of  Mont  Flavigny  which  Caesar  had  just  left, 
and  attacked  the  slighter  defences  on  that  side. 
Caesar  despatched  first  Brutus  with  succour,  then 
Fabius  ;  but  still  the  attack  was  unwearied.  At  last 
he  called  up  his  reserve,  which  had  not  yet  been 
engaged,  and  after  beating  the  enemy  off  at  that 
point,  rode  away  once  more  to  the  scene  of  the 
struggle  at  Mont  Rea.  Labienus,  hopeless  of  hold- 
ing his  ground  there,  had  collected  every  man  he 
could  lay  hands  on,  and  was  preparing  to  take  that 
step  which  Caesar  had  ordered  as  a  last  resource. 
An  aide-de-camp  flew  with  the  news  to  Caesar,  who 
swiftly  gathered  a  few  cohorts  from  the  forts  in  the 
plain,  and  ordered  some  squadrons  of  cavalry  to  ride 
round  outside  the  lines  and  take  the  enemy  in  the  rear. 


fi^'-  %, 


MAP  OF  OPERATIONS  AT  ALESIA. 

AFTER   NAPOLEON   III.    (jULES  CESAR). 

A-  Aksia.     B.  Mont  R6a.     C.  Gallic  Army  of  Relief.     *..♦    V  Caisar's  Castella  Connecting  his  Lines. 


52  B.C.]  The  Gallic  Rebellions.  235 

When  the  Gauls  on  Mont  R^a  recognised  him  by  the 
purple  mantle  of  the  proconsul  which  he  wore  in  ac- 
tion, and  saw  him  bringing  up  his  last  available  troops, 
they  knew  that  the  supreme  moment  had  arrived. 
For  a  few  minutes  they  renewed  the  fight  with  fury  ; 
then,  before  Labienus  had  carried  out  his  desperate 
task,  the  cavalry  sent  by  Caesar  appeared  in  their 
rear,  and  they  began  to  fall  back.  They  were  met 
by  the  horsemen  and  cut  to  pieces.  This  decided 
the  battle  ;  all. the  rest  was  capture  and  slaughter. 
Seventy-four  standards  were  taken  ;  hardly  a  man 
would  have  escaped,  if  the  Romans  had  not  been 
utterly  worn  out.  As  it  was,  the  cavalry  sent  in  pur- 
suit broke  up  the  whole  army,  and  after  a  terrible 
slaughter,  returned  with  multitudes  of  prisoners. 

Next  day  Vercingetorix  called  a  council  of  chief- 
tains, and  proposed  submission  as  a  sheer  necessity. 
''I  myself,"  he  added,  "have  not  been  fighting  for 
my  own  ends,  but  for  my  country.  My  work  is  now 
over,  and  I  offer  myself  as  a  victim  to  appease 
Caesar's  wrath.  Kill  me,  or  surrender  me, — which- 
ever you  will."  They  decided  that  he  should  sur- 
render himself,  and  appeal  for  them  to  Caesar's  well- 
known  clemency.  But  to  Roman  eyes  things  had 
gone  too  far  for  mercy.  The  scene  which  followed 
is  only  just  alluded  to  by  Caesar  himself,  but  the 
account  of  it  in  later  writers  bears  the  stamp  of 
truth.  ''  Vercingetorix  went  out  of  the  gates  ex- 
cellently well  armed,  and  his  horse  furnished  Avith 
rich  caparison  accordingly,  and  rode  round  about 
Caesar,  who  sat  in  his  chair  of  state.  Then  alighting 
from  his  horse,  he  took  off  his  caparison  and  furni- 


236  yulius    Ccesar.  [54  B.C. 

ture,  and  unarmed  himself,  and  laid  all  on  the 
ground,  and  went  and  sat  down  at  Caesar's  feet,  and 
said  never  a  word.  So  Caesar  at  length  committed 
him  as  a  prisoner  taken  in  the  wars,  to  lead  him 
afterwards  in  the  triumph  at  Rome,"  *  He  is  said 
to  have  been  led  along  the  Sacred  Way  in  Caesar's 
great  triumph  six  years  later,  and  to  have  been  put 
to  death  in  the  ancient  dungeon  at  the  foot  of  the 
Capitol,  while  his  conqueror  offered  his  thanks  and 
prayers  in  the  great  temple  above. 

So  died  the  hero  of  the  most  heroic  struggle  ever 
fought  out  by  the  noble  Celtic  race.  Nineteen  cen- 
turies later,  a  monument  was  erected  to  his  memory 
on  the  hill  which  will  ever  be  associated  with  his 
name.  But  no  colossal  mound  or  breezy  barrow 
among  his  native  hills  was  to  mark  his  last  resting- 
place  ;  his  body  must  have  been  cast  out  into  some 
vile  refuse-heap  in  the  great  imperial  city,  and  only 
the  memory  of  his  deeds  survives.  But  they  survive 
in  the  words  of  his  conqueror  ;  so  much  at  least  has 
Caesar  done  for  the  most  formidable  of  all  his  foes. 
He  has  told  us  enough  of  Vercingetorix  to  show  us 
that  he  was  one  who  embodied  all  the  finest  qualities 
of  his  race,  and  added  to  them  a  steadiness  of  pur- 
pose and  a  power  of  organisation  rare  among  the 
Gallic  peoples.  In  Caesar's  pages  he  stands  out  as 
the  only  man  who  could  overcome  all  the  petty  dis- 
sensions, the  suicidal  jealousies,  which  had  made  his 
countrymen  so  long  a  prey  to  every  invader ;  who 
not  only  fired  his  people  with  the  love  of  liberty, 
but  taught  them  how  to  fight  for  it  with  sanity, 
discipline,  and  perseverance. 

*  North's  Plutarch,  "  Life  of  Caesar,"  ch.  26. 


52  B.C.] 


The  Gallic  Rebellions. 


237 


/  And  on  the  conqueror  who  showed  no  mercy,  what 
fudgment  are  we  to  pass  ?     Like  his  victim,  he  was 
a  man  in  whom  all  the  best  instincts  of  his  race  were 
united  ;  like  him,  too,  he  joined  with  these  others 
which    his     countrymen     rarely    possessed.         The 
Romans  never  forgave  their  most   deadly  enemies ; 
yet  Caesar,  as  he  showed  again  and  again  in  the  last 
years  of  his  life,  could  both  forgive  and  put  unshaken 
trust  in  the  forgiven.     Still  he  was  a  Roman,  and  to 
a  Roman  the  heroic  never  did  or  could  appeal,  but 
when   the  hero   was   himself  a   Roman.     He  might 
admire,  but  his  admiration  would  never  be  stirred 
into  the  warm  glow   of  generous  impulse.     And  so 
much  is  indeed  wanting  in  the  character  of  Caesar, 
which  some  have  wished  to  paint  as  perfect  beyond 
the   poor   measure    of   perfection   to   which   human 
nature  can   attain — that   he  was  a   true   Roman  at 
heart,  and  as  a  Roman  could  not  always  reach  that 
highest  level  of  perfect  justice  where  cool  head  and 
warm  heart  work  together  in  blameless  harmony,     i 


A  ROMAN   HEAD 


CHAPTER.  XIV. 

PACIFICATION   OF   GAUL  AND   OUTBREAK  OF 
CIVIL  WAR. 

52-49  B.C. 


H  E  fall  of  Alesia  decided  the  fate 
'  of  Gaul.  Henceforward  that 
splendid  country  with  its  gifted 
population  was  to  exercise  an 
ever-increasing  influence  on 
European  history ;  an  influ- 
ence on  the  whole  for  good, 
and  one  which,  in  some  ways 
at  least,  has  surpassed  that 
of  every  other  European  race. 
Great  indeed  were  the  sufferings  the  Gallic  people 
underwent,  before  by  becoming  embodied  in  the 
Roman  Empire  they  could  attain  the  position  for 
which  their  genius  fitted  them.  We  may,  if  we 
choose,  call  up  before  our  minds  a  dismal  picture  of 
ruined  homesteads  and  wasted  crops,  of  population 
thinned  by  war  and  famine,  of  domestic  and  civic 
morality    disintegrated  by   war   and    passion.     Un- 

238 


52  B.C.]  Pacificatioji  of  Gaul.  239 

doubtedly  Caesar's  name  was  terrible  in  the  land,  and 
some  stubborn  tribes  had  seen  him  in  no  other  guise 
than  that  of  a  ruthless  conqueror  and  stern  master. 
Even  the  year  that  followed  the  siege  of  Alesia  (51 
B.C.),  the  events  of  which  must  be  here  omitted, 
saw  the  lands  of  rebellious  Belgic  peoples  ravaged 
again,  and  the  whole  heroic  garrison  of  Uxellodu- 
num  sent  to  their  homes  with  their  right  hands  cut 
off.  The  fact  was  that  the  conqueror's  anger  was 
thoroughly  roused  ;  his  prize  had  all  but  slipped  from 
his  grasp,  his  term  of  command  was  rapidly  drawing 
to  an  end — a  fact  his  enemies  knew  only  too  well,"^ — 
and  he  put  forth  without  scruple  all  the  force  of  his 
will.  The  result  at  least  answered  his  expectations. 
The  last  year  of  his  government  was  a  comparatively 
peaceful  one,  which  he  could  devote  to  a  general 
pacification.  The  Romanising  tribes,  the  ^dui  and 
others,  who  had  been  seduced  from  their  allegiance 
only  by  the  genius  of  Vercingetorix,  remained  hence- 
forward loyal  subjects  ;  the  rest  submitted  to  the  will 
of  fate  and  Caesar.  No  attempt  was  made,  even 
after  he  had  finally  quitted  Gaul,  to  rise  against  the 
governors  whom  he  appointed  ;  and  the  land  had 
rest,  so  far  as  we  know,  for  nearly  seventy  years. 

When  the  last  struggles  for  liberty  were  over, 
Caesar  had  still  a  year  to  devote  to  those  victories  of 
peace,  without  which,  as  he  very  well  knew,  all  his 
work  would  be  thrown  away.  JUnluckily  his  officer 
Hirtius,  who  wrote  the  eighth  and  last  book  of  the 
Gallic  War,  has  devoted  only  a  few  lines  to  this  most 
important  part  of  his  master's  work,  and  we  can  add 

*  Hirtius,  B.  G.,  viii.,  39, 


240  yulius  Ccesar.  [52  B.C. 

to  them  but  a  few  stray  hints  drawn  from  later  writers. 
Hirtius  says  that  Caesar  spent  the  winter  of  51  B.C. 
in  the  country  of  the  Belgse,  bent  upon  the  task  of 
conciHation,  so  as  to  leave  no  further  room  for  fresh 
appeal  to  arms.  (  He  laid  no  heavy  burdens  on  the 
tribes,  made  handsome  presents  to  their  chiefs,  and 
now  at  last  found  his  opportunity  for  using  his  rare 
gifts  of  courtesy  and  gentleness.  ''  Gaul,  worn  out 
with  a  long  series  of  disasters,  was  thus  easily  kept  in 
peace,  by  providing  it  with  happier  opportunities  of 
obedience  than  it  had  enjoyed  in  the  previous  years." 
Henceforward,  so  far  as  he  had  time  to  attend  to 
Gallic  affairs,  this  policy  was  steadily  acted  on.  He 
had  enrolled  one  whole  legion,  besides  cavalry  and 
auxiliaries,  from  among  the  conquered  peoples  ;  and 
this  legion,  which  was  to  do  him  much  good  service, 
and  was  known  by  the  name  of  the  ''  Lark  "  from 
the  crest  on  their  helmets,  eventually  hv  his  good- 
will received  the  full  Roman  citizenship.!  It  is  even 
said  that  he  later  introduced  a  few  Gauls  into  the 
Roman  Senate  ;  and  whether  this  be  true  or  not,  the 
fact  that  it  is  told  of  him  serves  to  show  the  direc- 
tion which  the  world  believed  his  thoughts  to  be 
taking./ 

Of  Caesars  organisation  of  his  conquests  we  know 
hardly  anything.  They  were  no  doubt  at  first  simply 
added  to  the  existing  Transalpine  province,  and  were 
for  some  years  ruled,  as  he  had  ruled  them,  by  a  sin- 
gle provincial  governor.  But  before  his  death  in  44 
B.C.,  he  had  divided  them  between  two  governors, 
the  one  taking  the  whole  of  the  south,  excluding  the 
older  Narbonese  province,  and  the  other  the  whole 


49  B.C.]  Pacification  of  Gaul,  241 

of  the  north,  henceforward  to  be  called  Belgica. 
This  in  itself  shows  a  certain  progress  towards  civili- 
sation, for  it  implies  an  increase  of  civil  business 
beyond  the  powers  of  a  single  ruler.  Augustus, 
following  on  the  same  lines,  divided  southern  Gaul 
into  three  provinces ;  and  from  his  time  the  whole 
territory  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  ocean  and 
from  the  ocean  to  the  Rhine,  was  administered  by 
four  provincial  governors.!  No  attempt  was  made  by 
Caesar  to  drain  the  resources  of  the  country  into  the 
Roman  treasury  ;  he  knew  that  the  people  had  suf- 
fered terribly,  that  they  had  been  in  debt  before  he 
conquered  them,  and  that  he  and  his  staff  had  already 
sufficiently  enriched  themselves  at  their  expense. 
Tribute  had  of  course  to  be  paid  ;  but  it  was  to  be 
paid  in  one  lump  sum,  was  to  be  levied  by  the  Gauls 
themselves,  and  does  not  seem  to  have  been  excessive 
in  amount.  1 

One  word  more  before  we  ^ter  on  the  next  act 
in  the  drama  of  this  great  life,  i  What  was  the  effect 
of  these  long  campaigns,  this  absence  of  nine  years 
from  the  capital,  on  the  character  and  capacities  of 
Csesar  himself  ?  I 

Enough  has  been  said  in  former  chapters  to  show 
the  deteriorating  influence  of  life  at  Rome  on  the 
character  and  conduct  of  men  naturally  well-mean- 
ing. Enough  has  also  been  said  to  point  out  the 
narrow  view  of  politics — of  the  duties  of  Rome  to 
her  vast  empire,  of  the  rights  of  humanity  against 
her — which  a  continued  life  in  the  forum,  like  that 
of  Cicero,  seemed  necessarily  to  bring  with  it.  Caesar 
had  indeed  always,  so  far  as  we  can  discern,  held 
16 


242  yulius  Ccesar.  [52  B.C.- 

wider  views  on  these  subjects,  derived  from  his 
democratic  predecessors  ;  but  he,  too,  might  have 
been  swept  away  in  the  whirlpool  of  party  fury  and 
selfishness,  but  for  his  long  sojourn  in  a  foreign  land, 
relieved  by  visits  to  Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  home  then 
of  all  that  was  best  in  Italy.  We  know  too  well 
even  in  these  days  how  hard  it  is  to  keep  steadily 
and  honourably  to  great  principles  in  the  heat  of 
party  strife.  It  was  far  harder  to  do  so  then,  in  an 
age  when  self-restraint  was  the  rarest  of  virtues,  and 
political  quarrels  knew  no  such  thing  as  compromise. 
But  Csesar  in  Gaul  must  have  learnt  to  keep  his 
mind  steadily  fixed  on  one  great  end,  the  re-con- 
stitution of  the  Empire  on  a  rational  and  humani- 
tarian basis.  We  have  no  direct  evidence  of  this, 
but  we  can  be  certain  of  it.  In  Gaul  he  had  leisure 
to  watch  the  phantasmagoria  of  politics  at  home, 
and  to  see  through  the  blind  folly  of  it ;  while  at 
the  same  time  he  mixed  daily  with  men  who  were 
young  in  civilisation,  and  whose  moral  and  political 
vitality  was  not  yet  spent.  And  everywhere  he  saw 
the  value  of  absolute  command  in  ordering  a  dis- 
united state,  and  the  value  of  implicit  obedience  as  a 
discipline  ;  at  every  turn  he  learnt  that  he  had  the 
requisite  force  within  him  to  make  men  obey  him 
willingly,  and  by  degrees  he  learnt  also  how  much 
patience,  gentleness,  and  persevering  hard  work  are 
necessary  to  the  successful  and  permanent  use  of 
that  force.  And  so  it  was  that  when  the  last  year 
of  his  government  arrived,  his  political  insight  was 
clearer  than  ever,  and  his  capacity  for  enforcing  his 
will  was  ten  times  greater  than  it  had  been.     As  his 


49  B.C.]  Pacification  of  Gaul.  243 

conduct  afterwards  fully  showed,  he  had  learnt  not 
only  the  duties  of  government  and  the  art  of  war, 
but  the  great  secrets  of  humanity — good  faith  and 
justice.  He  had  once  or  twice  strayed  from  the 
right  path,  and  had  probably  repented  it.  He  never 
again  left  it ;  [and  if  in  the  last  six  years  of  his  life  we 
find  in  him  an  unparalleled  combination  of  hard 
work  and  strong  will  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  high 
aims  and  true  humanity  on  the  other,  we  may  ac- 
count for  it  by  supposing  that  a  nature,  in  itself 
noble  and  humane,  had  gained  yet  more  of  strength 
and  self-restraint  from  a  long  period  of  labour  in  a 
bracing  political  air,  and  chiefly  from  the  last  few 
years  of  constant  toil,  anxiety,  and  disappointment. 
We  must  now  return  for  a  brief  space  to  the  course 
of  events  at  Rome  since  the  re-construction  of  the 
triumvirate  at  Lucca  in  May,  56  B.C.  By  that 
arrangement,  as  we  saw,  Caesar  gained  a  five  years' 
prolongation  of  his  command,  and  a  law  was  passed 
the  following  year  which  probably  made  March  i,  49 
B.C.,  the  limit  of  his  tenure.  ^  Pompeius  and  Crassus 
were  to  be  consuls  for  55.  I  Pompeius,  on  his  part, 
obtained  the  governorship  01  both  Spanish  provinces 
for  five  years  from  the  close  of  his  consulship,  and 
Crassus  in  the  same  way  the  governorship  of  Syria. 
Crassus  left  Rpme  for  his  province  at  the  end  of  55  ; 
but  *Pompeiusiwas  to  remain,  contrary  to  all  prece- 
dent, in  spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  commanding  an 
army  and  was  actually  a  provincial  governor.  To 
him,  therefore,  once  more  fell  the  task  of  keeping  the 
city  in  good  order,  and  of  defeating  the  inevitable 
struggles  of  anarchical  tribunes  and  electioneering 
clubs.     I 


244  Julius  Ccesar.  [52  B.C.- 

During  the  year  of  their  consulship  no  special 
opposition  was  offered  to  Pompeius  and  Crassus, 
who  contrived  to  get  the  laws  passed  which  concerned 
their  interests  and  that  of  Caesar,  and  added  one  or 
two  others  of  a  generally  useful  character.  But  no 
sooner  was  Pompeius  left  alone  than  the  enemies  of 
this  self-constituted  and  irresponsible  government 
began  to  take  advantage  of  his  isolation  and  weak- 
ness. Bribery  was  of  course  rampant  on  both  sides, 
both  in  elections  and  in  the  law-courts,  and  letters  of 
Cicero's  dated  July,  54  B.C.,  show  the  utter  political 
profligacy  of  the  time  in  the  most  glowing  colours."^ 
The  existing  consuls  made  a  private  contract  with 
two  of  the  candidates  to  obtain  their  election,  while 
the  juries  convicted  the  innocent  and  acquitted  the 
guilty.  /The  elections  were  postponed  again  and 
again,  so  great  was  the  excitement,  and  so  incompe- 
tent was  all  authority  to  control  the  mobs.  Almost 
absolute  anarchy  prevailed  for  twelve  months,  and 
the  consuls  for  53  B.C.  were  only  elected  in  July  of  that 
year.  A  dictatorship  was  freely  talked  of,  and  men 
naturally  looked  to  Pompeius.  /Crassus  was  defeated 
and  killed  in  Parthia  this  year;  Caesar  was  engaged 
in  his  deadly  struggle  with  the  revolted  Belgae,  and 
had  no  choice  but  to  carry  out  the  work  to  which  he 
had  put  his  hand.  /  Pompeius  stood  quite  alone ; 
for  the  third  time  he  had  the  fate  of  the  Empire  and 
his  own  in  his  hands,  should  he  but  choose  to  seize  the 
opportunity.  He  had  his  two  Spanish  provinces,  and 
an  army  in  Italy,  with  which  he  might  master  the 
capital  if  he  pleased.     Nothing  more  was  necessary 

*  "  Ad  Att.,"  iv.,  15  and  i8. 


I 


49  B.C.]  Pacification  of  GauL  245 

to  make  him  absolute,  except  the  consent  of  Caesar — 
and  this  consent,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  he  actually 
obtained.   1 

The  situation  at  the  beginning  of  52  B.C.  was  a  very 
critical  one.  The  three  rulers  were  reduced  to  two, 
and  of  those  one  only  was  in  a  position  to  govern. 
/The  two  survivors  were  on  good  terms,  each  content 
that  the  other  should  be  where  he  was  ;  but  the  one 
bond  that  had  promised  permanently  to  unite  them 
had  been  rudely  snapped.  Caesar's  daughter  Julia, 
the  dearly  loved  w^ife  of  Pompeius,  had  ^ied  the 
year  before  ;  and  her  loss  was  irreparable.  For  five 
years  there  had  been  no  difference  between  the  two 
men,  and  this  was  universally  ascribed  to  her  influ- 
ence. In  vain  Caesar  tried  to  fill  up  the  gap  she  left  by 
proposing  to  marry  Pompeius'  daughter,  and  offering 
him  the  hand  of  his  own  grand-niece.  These  offers  were 
declined  ;  and  from  this  time  we  may  probably  date 
a  certain  want  of  confidence  between  the  two,  which 
ripened,  as  Caesar's  prolonged  absence  drew  to  an  end, 
into  alarm  and  suspicion,  and  even  into  underhand 
deahng,  on  the  part  of  the  weaker  of  the  two.  We 
must  briefly  trace  the  growth  of  this  new  phase  in 
their  relations  to  each  other. 

At  the  beginning  of  52  B.C.  there  were  no  consuls; 
as  we  saw,  the  elections  for  53  had  been  postponed  so 
long  that  they  only  took  place  at  the  time  when  the 
consuls  for  52  should  have  been  elected.  Everything 
was  at  a  standstill ;  the  notion  of  a  dictatorship  took 
a  stronger  hold  than  ever  on  men's  minds.  Caesar 
was  far  away  and  could  exercise  no  direct  personal 
influence  on  Roman  politics.     For  a  short  time  this 


246  Julius  Ccssar.  [52  B.c- 

miserable  state  of  affairs  dragged  on,  till  an  accident 
brought  on  a  crisis  suddenly.  On  January  13th  Clo- 
dius  and  Milo,  the  two  freelances  of  the  streets,  met 
on  the  Appian  Way,  and  in  a  sudden  brawl  Clodius 
was  killed.  The  history  of  these  men  for  the  last 
few  years  does  not  concern  us  here ;  it  was  not  the 
murder  of  an  unprincipled  demagogue  that  was  in 
itself  important,  but  the  events  which  followed  from 
it.  The  body  was  brought  to  Rome,  and  the  excita- 
ble mob  broke  out  into  open  riot  at  the  loss  of  their 
old  favourite.  Inflamed  by  the  funeral  speeches, 
and  by  the  sight  of  the  corpse,  they  burnt  down  the 
senate-house  and  used  it  as  a  funeral-pyre.  Milo, 
the  senatorial  candidate  for  the  consulship,  and  Lepi- 
dus  the  interrex  who  should  have  conducted  the 
elections,  were  besieged  in  their  houses  ;  it  was  much 
as  if  the  Houses  of  Parliament  were  to  be  burnt 
down,  and  all  government  ofifices  closed  by  a  London 
mob. 

iTo  re-establish  order  was  now  absolutely  neces- 
sary. The  task  fell,  as  it  had  always  hitherto  fallen, 
to  the  Senate;  and  the  Senate  appointed  as  their 
executive  officer  the  only  man  who  had  the  means  of 
compelling  obedience.  They  proclaimed  martial  law, 
and  directed  Pompeius  to  raise  a  new  army  in  Italy  ; 
they  declared  the  rioters  guilty  of  high  treason  ;  and, 
finally,  after  a  lapse  of  some  weeks,  they  nominated 
him  sole  consul,  without  the  form  of  popular  elec- 
tion. This  last  step  was  proposed  by  Caesar's  old 
colleague  and  enemy  Bibulus,  the  most  obstinate  of 
the  senatorial  party ;  it  was  practically  the  same 
thing  as  giving  Pompeius  the  dictatorship,  and  it  was 


49  B.C.]  Pacification  of  Gaul.  247 

accomplished    by    the    same    senatorial    procedure. 
Thus   the   bewildered   triumvir  found  his  only  help 
and  counsel  in  the  Senate  he  had  so  long  despised. 
He  became  its  nominee  and  its  sole  executive  officer 
on  the  motion  of  its  most  pronounced  aristocrat.      In 
reality,  however,  he  became  its  master,  and  the  Sen- 
ate, by  appealing  through  him  to  the  miHtary  arm, 
practically  acknowledged  that  the  days  of  a  constitu- 
tional  republic  were   over.      He  brought   troops  to 
Rome,  saw  the  trial  of  Milo  carried  through  under  an 
armed  guard,  and  fairly  mastered  the  unruly  element 
in  the  city  populace.     In  the  summer  he  nominated 
his  father-in-law  Metellus  Scipio,  to  be  his  colleague, 
but  remained  master  of  the  situation  for  the  rest  of 
the  year. 

\  How  did  Caesar  regard  these  startling  proceedings 
and  this  new  alliance  between  his  colleague  and  the 
Senate?   JHc  had  returned  to  Cisalpine  Gaul  after 
punishing  the  Belgic  tribes  (p.  217)  and   had   there 
heard  of  the  murder  of  Clodius,  and  of  the  decrees 
of  the  Senate.     He  took  advantage  of  that  one  which 
ordered  an   Italian  levy,  to  raise  new  troops  in  the 
Cisalpine  province.     He  must  have  had  communica- 
tions with  Pompeius,  but  we  know  nothing  of  them 
save  that  he  made  no  opposition  to  his  colleague's 
elevation  to  supreme  power,  or  to  the  use  he  made 
of  it.     The  fact  was  that  his  hands  were  tied.     Ver- 
cingetorix  was  beginning  his  great  rebellion,  and  he 
must  leave  Pompeius  and  the  Senate  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  or  be  content  to   see  the  whole  of  his 
work  in  Gaul  utterly  destroyed.     All  that  he  tells  us 
is  that,  when  he  left  north  Italy  to  begin  that  last 


248  Julius  CcBsar,  [52  B.c- 

terrible  campaign,  he  had  learnt  of  the  restoration  of 
order  in  Rome,  and  considered  it  to  be  due  to  the 
''  virtus,''  i.  e.,  the  firmness  and  courage  of  Pompeius.* 
The  struggle  with  Vercingetorix  detained  him  till 
the  autumn,  and  the  following  winter  he  passed  in 
Transalpine  Gaul ;  nor  did  he  once  return  even  to 
his  Cisalpine  province  until  the  spring  of  50  B.C. 
He  was  intent  on  finishing  his  own  work,  and  knew 
that  it  was  on  this  that  his  own  future  and  that  of 
the  Empire  depended,  far  more  than  on  the  caprice 
or  blunders  of  Pompeius  and  the  Senate. 
I  When  at  last  he  did  return,  he  found  serious  diffi- 
culties in  front  of  him.  Pompeius  had  drifted  into  a 
position  in  regard  to  him  which  can  at  the  best  be 
described  as  an  armed  and  suspicious  neutrality, 
while  the  senatorial  party,  now  trusting  to  the  aid 
of  Pompeius,  even  if  it  had  to  be  won  at  the  cost  of 
their  own  liberties,  was  openly  determined  to  achieve 
his  ruin.  Caesar,  ennobled  and  strengthened  in  char- 
acter by  adversity,  and  trusting  in  himself  and  his 
resources,  in  his  agents  at  Rome,  and  perhaps  in  his 
star,  made  no  threats,  anxi  left  almost  his  whole  army 
in  the  distant  province. |  But  plain  as  it  is  that  he 
sought  no  open  rupture,  and  that  the  last  thing  he 
wished  for  was  civil  war,  he  could  not  sit  still  and  see 
ruin  staring  him  in  the. face,  the  moment  he  should 
have  resigned  his  provinces  and  his  army  ;  and 
thus  arose  that  famous  quarrel,  which  shook  the 
world  to  its  foundations,  and  went  far  in  its  re- 
sults to  solve  the  problems  of  the  Roman  revolu- 
tion.     It    is    called,    in    the    language    of    scientific 

*  B.  G.,  vii.,  6,    I.      This  was  probably  written  in  51  B.C. 


49  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  Civil  War.  249 

history,  the  question  between  Caesar  and  the  Sen- 
ate ;  it  was  really  a  question  between  old  ideas  and 
new  ones,  between  forms  and  realities,  between  the 
ancient  and  worn-out  government  of  the  city-state, 
and  the  one  man  whose  genius  and  destiny  were 
driving  him  towards  the  creation  of  an  entirely  new 
system.  L^ 

To  put  the  case  for  either  party  in  this  quarrel  in  a 
few  words  is  by  no  means  an  easy  task,  much  less  to 
sum  it  up  impartially.  All  that  can  be  done  here  is  to 
state  the  facts  as  far  as  we  can  know  them,  and  to 
draw  the  inferences  which  seem  legitimate. 

(•The  plot  laid  for  Caesar's  destruction  was  a  per- 
fectly fair  one  from  the  point  of  view  of  an  honest 
enemy.  In  order  to  remain  a  power  in  the  Empire 
it  was  indispensable  for  him  to  be  either  proconsul 
or  consul — to  govern  a  province  or  to  govern  in 
Italy.  There  must  be  no  interval  in  which  he  should 
hold  neither  ofifice.  In  such  an  interval  he  would  be 
merely  a  private  man,  unprotected  by  ofifice  from 
the  assaults  of  his  enemies  ;  he  could  be  tried  for 
extortion  or  high  treason,  his  conviction  might  be 
secured  by  the  help  of  bribery  and  political  clubs, 
and  he  would  have  to  go  into  exile  and  die  a  politi- 
cal death.  To  this  politicaL  extinction  the  only 
alternative  would  be  civil  war.s  And  even  if  he  were 
not  likely  to  be  convicted,  the  time  of  his  trial  might 
so  be  arranged  that  he  would  be  disqualified,  as  an 
accused  person,  for  candidature  for  the  consulship. 
Now  Caesar's  proconsulship  of  Gaul  was  to  terminate 
on  March  i,  49  B.C.,  and  the  consular  elections  would 
take  place  at  the  earliest  in  the  following  summer. 


250  yulius  CcBsar.  [52  B.C.- 

There  would  therefore  be  an  interval  between  the 
two  offices,  and  he  would  be  exposed  to  the  utmost 
peril  if  he  gave  up  province  and  army  on  March  ist. 

But  he  had  of  course  long  ago  foreseen  this.  His 
agents  in  Rome  kept  him  fully  informed  of  the  out- 
spoken hatred  of  his  foes,^  and  he  had  taken  steps 
to  secure  himself  against  it.  When  the  law  was 
passed  in  55  B.C.,  which  added  a  fresh  term  of  five 
years  to  his  government,  Pompeius  seems  to  have 
inserted  in  it  (doubtless  in  accordance  with  a  previ- 
ous promise  to  Caesar)  a  clause  prohibiting  the  dis- 
cussion of  a  successor  before  March  i,  50.t  At  that 
time  it  was  the  rule,  as  it  had  been  since  Sulla  had 
regulated  the  succession  to  proconsular  governments, 
that  the  Senate  should  select  the  provinces  to  be 
governed  in  any  year  by  proconsuls,  before  the  elec- 
tion of  the  consuls  who  after  their  year  of  office 
would  succeed  to  proconsulships ;  thus  the  consuls 
elected  in  50,  who  would  serve  their  consulship  in 
49,  would  only  succeed  in  48  to  those  provinces 
which  the  Senate  had  chosen  before  their  election  as 
consuls.  If  Caesar's  provinces  were  not  to  be  open 
to  discussion  in  the  Senate  till  March  i,  50,  he  could 
not  be  superseded  except  by  the  consuls  of  49,  and 
these  would  not  be  able  to  succeed  him  till  January 
I,  48.  He  would  thus  be  able  to  retain  his  army 
and  his  government  throughout  the  year  49. 

But  there  was  another  difficulty  to  be  foreseen 


*  Suetonius,  Caesar,  30. 

f  This  important  point  is  made  almost  certain  by  comparing 
Caelius'  words,  (Fam.,  viii.,  8,  4,  and  9)  with  Hirtius,  B.  G., 
viii.,  53- 


49  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  Civil  War,  251 

and  overcomeJ  As  the  law  stood,  he  would  have  to 
come  in  person  to  Rome  to  profess  himself  a  candi- 
date and  to  canvass  for  the  consulship.  He  had  had 
to  do  this  in  60  B.C.,  as  we  saw,  and  had  given  up  his 
triumph  in  order  to  comply  with  the  regulation. 
But  the  imperious  necessity  of  self-preservation  for- 
bade him  to  yield  a  second  time  ;  and  he  took  a  step 
which  will  perhaps  be  only  thought  justifiable  by 
those  who  understand  the  deadly  nature  of  the  con- 
flict he  wished  to  avoid.  Through  the  agency  of  a 
united  body  of  friendly  and  probably  well-paid 
tribunes,  he  had  a  law  promulgated  early  in  52  B.C., 
which  relieved  him  from  the  necessity  of  canvass- 
ing in  person.  Pompeius  supported  this  law ;  to 
oppose  it  would  have  been  an  open  breach  with 
Caesar,  for  which  he  was  neither  willing  nor  ready. 
Even  Cicero  seems  to  have  used  his  influence  in  its 
favour,  and  to  have  induced  his  friend  Caelius  not  to 
oppose  it  ;  he  had  met  Caesar  lately  at  Ravenna,  and 
was  for  the  time  under  the  spell  of  the  magician.* 
The  law  of  course  was  passed,  and  Caesar  might  feel 
himself  secure.  He  would  retain  both  army  and 
provinces  throughout  49,  and  would  not  be  forced 
to  return  to  Rome  until  he  was  safe  from  prosecu- 
tion as  consul.  During  his  consulship,  he  might,  as 
in  59,  obtain  by  a  special  law  another  provincial 
command.    J 

But  on  his  return  to  north  Italy  in  the  spring  of  50 
B.C.,  he  found  all  the  defences  broken  down  which  he 
had  been  at  such  pains  to  construct.  Pompeius  and 
the  Senate  had   combined  to  alter  the  whole  legal 

*  Cic,  Fam.,  vi.,  6,  5  ;  cp.  Phil.,  ii.,  10-24. 


252  Julius  CcBsar.  [52  B.C.- 

machinery  for  appointing  provincial  governors,  by  a 
law,  bearing  the  name  of  the  sole  consul,  and  passed 
not  long  after  that  one  which  dispensed  with  Caesar's 
personal  canvass.  ^There  was  now  to  be  an  interval  of 
five  years  between  a  consulship  and  a  proconsulship. 
The  first  obvious  result  of  this  would  be  to  prevent 
Caesar,  even  if  he  were  duly  elected  consul  in  49, 
from  obtaining  a  fresh  provincial  governorship  until 
five  years  from  the  end  of  48.  iBut  it  struck  a  much 
more  direct  blow  at  his  interests  than  this.  When 
the  bill  became  law,  there  would  be  an  interval  of 
some  years  before  any  consuls  would  be  qualified 
under  it  for  provinces ;  and  to  fill  up  the  governor- 
ships during  the  interval,  the  Senate  was  authorised 
to  appoint  any  persons  of  consular  rank  who  had 
not  as  yet  succeeded  to  proconsulships.  This  they 
might  do  at  any  time,  without  regard  to  any  pre- 
viously existing  regulations ;  and  thus  they  now  had 
it  in  their  power  to  supersede  Cssar  on  March  i,  49, 
i.  e.,  to  demand  his  resignation  both  of  his  army  and 
his  provinces.  To  complete  the  work,  by  this  bill 
(or  another  one)  it  was  expressly  re-enacted  that  a 
personal  candidature  for  the  consulship  should  hence- 
forth be  indispensable.  This  was  almost  an  open 
declaration  of  war ;  and  Caesar's  friends  pointed  out 
to  Pompeius  that  he  was  contravening  the  vested 
interests  which  Caesar  possessed  through  the  tri- 
bunes' law  passed  earlier  in  the  year.l  Pompeius  then 
appended  a  clause  to  the  bill,  on  his  own  authority, 
as  it  seems,  and  after  it  had  been  formally  passed  by 
the  people,  saving  the  interests  of  anyone  who  had 
previously  been  excepted  by  law  from  its  provisions. 


49  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  Civil  War.  253 

Such  a  clause,  it  need  hardly  be  said,  was  legally 
mere  waste  paper. 

This  bill  came  into  force  in  51  B.C.,  and  already  in 
that  year  the  Senate  became  eager  to  act  upon  it  for 
Caesar's  destruction.  In  September  the  question  of 
superseding  him  was  first  formally  discussed  *  ;  but 
Pompeius  himself  interfered,  with  the  objection  that 
by  the  law  under  which  Caesar  held,  the  matter  could 
not  be  dealt  with  till  after  March  i,  50  B.C.,  and  the 
obedient  Senate  contented  itself  with  resolving  to 
take  it  as  the  first  business  after  that  date.  But 
when  the  day  arrived,  nothing  was  done  ;  so  well 
did  Caesar's  agents  do  their  work,  and  so  half-hearted 
was  Pompeius  in  his  opposition  to  them,  that  after 
two  or  three  adjournments  the  question  was  again 
allowed  to  drop.  And  even  up  to  the  last  day  of 
that  year  no  definite  resolution  had  been  taken. 

But  if  the  Senate  had  taken  no  decisive  step,  the 
political  current  was  none  the  less  setting  strongly 
towards  civil  war.  |  It  was  becoming  every  day 
plainer  that  the  question  was  one,  not  so  much  be- 
tween Caesar  and  the  Senate,  as  between  Caesar  and 
Pompeius.  /The  mist  was  lifting,  and  the  real  com- 
batants were  becoming  visible  to  all  men.  ^They 
could  see  Caesar,  now  politically  almost  defenceless, 
but  with  an  apparently  irresistible  army,  and  fast 
being  driven  to  desperate  action  by  the  absolute 
refusal  of  his  enemies  to  admit  what  must  in  all  fair- 
ness be  considered  his  legal  rights.}  They  could  see 
Pompeius,  on  the  other  hand,  master  of  Italy  by 

*  The  matter  had  been  touched  on  in  July,  but  adjourned  till  the 
indispensable  Pompeius,  who  was  at  Ariminum,  should  return. 


2  54  yulius  CcEsar,  [52  B.C.- 

means  of  the  army  which  the  Senate  had  allowed 
him  to  raise,  and  governor  at  the  same  time,  con- 
trary to  all  precedent,  of  the  Spanish  provinces  ; 
and  they  knew  that  this  military  power  of  his  was 
guaranteed  him  by  a  law  for  no  less  than  five  more 
years.  Between  this  Scylla  and  this  Charybdis — 
between  Caesar's  desperation  and  Pompeius'  military 
absolutism — it  was  all  but  impossible  that  the  old 
and  shattered  Republic  could  be  safely  steered. 
And  the  hopelessness  of  the  situation  is  only  made 
the  clearer  if  we  can  believe,  as  we  have  every  reason 
to  do,  that  neither  Caesar  nor  Pompeius  had  any  real 
desire  to  resort  to  civil  war. 

In  the  summer  of  50  B.C.  Caesar  let  it  be  known  in 
the  Senate,  through  a  fickle  but  able  young  tribune 
who  had  lately  come  into  his  pay,  that  he  was  willing 
to  resign  his  army  and  provinces  if  Pompeius  would 
simultaneously  do  the  same  ;  and  the  Senate  voted 
a  resolution  in  this  sense  by  a  majority  of  370  to  22. 
The  consul  Marcellus  broke  up  the  meeting  in  anger, 
crying  out  that  they  were  voting  for  Caesar  to  be 
their  master.  About  the  same  time,  or  earlier,  a 
scheme  was  suggested  for  sending  Pompeius  to  the 
East,  and  so  ridding  themselves  of  King  Log  ;  and 
in  view  of  this  Caesar  was  required  to  send  home  a 
legion  which  he  had  some  time  previously  borrowed 
from  Pompeius  to  help  in  the  Gallic  rebellion,  and 
to  contribute  another  himself.  He  at  once  obeyed 
the  order  ;  but  the  legions  were  detained  by  Pom- 
peius in  Italy,  and  the  Parthian  War  was  quietly 
dropped.  These  two  facts — the  vote  in  the  Senate, 
and  the  retention  of  the  legion — show  plainly  enough 


49  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  Civil  War.  255 

that  the  Senate  was  afraid  of  both  the  rivals,  and 
that  it  was  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  one  whom  it 
least  dreaded. 

So  the  year  wore  on,  and  the  actual  crisis  was  still 
delayed.  The  consular  elections  were  hostile  to 
Caesar,  though,  on  the  other  hand,  two  of  his  officers, 
M.  Antonius  and  Q.  Cassius,  were  elected  tribunes 
of  the  people.  On  Lentulus  Crus  and  Claudius 
Marcellus,  the  new  consuls,  must  rest  the  immediate 
blame  of  the  Civil  War.  No  sooner  had  they  entered 
on  office  on  January  i,  49  B.C.,  than  it  became  obvious 
that  the  difficulty  would  shortly  come  to  a  head. 
On  that  day  Curio  once  more  presented  proposals 
from  Caesar,  in  the  form  of  a  letter  to  be  read  before 
the  Senate  by  the  new  consuls.  What  these  pro- 
posals were  cannot  be  determined  with  certainty, 
owing  to  the  loss  of  the  last  few  lines  of  the  eighth 
book  of  the  Gallic  War ;  but  it  is  highly  probable 
that  they  were  those  extreme  concessions  which 
Suetonius  mentions  as  having  been  already  sub- 
mitted at  an  earlier  date,  before  Caesar  finally  left 
his  Transalpine  province  in  the  autumn."^  They 
startle  us  by  their  marvellous  moderation,  and  hardly 
an  historian  has  been  found  to  give  Caesar  the  credit 
of  honesty  in  venturing  on  them.  He  declared  him- 
self willing  to  give  up  the  Transalpine  province  and 
eight  of  his  legions,  if  the  Senate  would  allow  him  to 
retain  Cisalpine  Gaul  with  two  legions,  or  that  prov- 
ince and  Illyria  with  one  only.  And  he  only  asked 
that  this  arrangement  should  continue  until  after  he 
had  been  elected  consul ;  after  his  election  he  would 

*  Suet..  Caesar,  29  and  30. 


2^6  yulius  Ccesar.  [52  B.C.- 

resign  everything,  and  thus  place  himself  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  his  enemies  during  the  last  months  of  the 
year. 

Caesar's  letter  was  read,  after  some  opposition. 
What  followed,  he  has  himself  described,  no  doubt 
from  accounts  given  him  by  Curio  and  Antonius,  in 
the  first  chapters  of  his  work  on  the  Civil  War.  In 
the  main  they  must  represent  the  truth,  though  ob- 
viously written  in  indignation  and  anger.  The  con- 
suls would  not  allow  the  proposals  to  be  considered. 
Lentulus  even  hinted  that  he  would  go  over  to 
Caesar  unless  decisive  action  were  taken.  Pompeius, 
roused  at  last,  let  it  be  known  through  his  father-in- 
law,  Scipio,  that  if  the  Senate  wished  for  help  from 
him.  they  must  act  now  or  never.  All  attempts  at 
delay  were  roughly  put  aside  ;  the  majority  that  had 
voted  some  months  before  for  a  general  disarma- 
ment, frightened  by  these  threats  and  by  the  presence 
of  Pompeius'  soldiery  in  the  city,  now  passed  a 
decree  ordering  Caesar  to  give  up  his  provinces  and 
army  by  a  fixed  date  (possibly  by  July  ist,  the  last 
day  on  which  he  could  become  a  candidate  for  the 
consulship),  on  pain  of  being  proclaimed  a  public 
enemy.  Antonius  and  Curio  put  their  tribunician 
veto  on  this  decree.  Several  days  were  spent  in  dis- 
cussing the  legality  of  this  veto,  during  which  every 
attempt  to  communicate  with  Caesar  was  frustrated. 
At  length,  on  January  7th,  the  decisive  step  was 
taken.  The  consuls  were  authorised,  by  that  once 
terrible  decree  under  which  Cicero  had  put  to  death 
the  conspirators  fourteen  years  before,  to  see  that 
the  Republic  took  no  hurt.    A  state  of  war  was  then 


MARCUS    ANTONIUS. 

FROM  THE  BUST  IN  THE  UFFIZI  GALLERY  IN  FLORENCE   {VtSContt). 

(  Ba  71  fttetster. ) 


49  B.C.]  Outbreak  of  Civil  War, 


257 


declared,  and  Caesar's  tribunes  were  no  longer  secure 
of  their  lives.  They  fled  to  their  master  at  Ravenna, 
and  the  Senate  immediately  proceeded  to  appoint 
successors  to  the  Gallic  provinces,  to  order  fresh 
levies  and  supplies,  to  place  the  whole  resources  of 
the  state  in  the  hands  of  Pompeius.  On  that  day 
the  Senate  sealed  its  own  fate  ;  and  though  the  great 
Council  had  yet  in  the  future  much  valuable  work 
to  do,  it  never  met  again,  save  for  a  few  short  weeks 
in  the  winter  that  followed  C^Esar's  death,  as  the 
independent  ruler  of  the  civilised  world 
17 


ROMAN  LICTOR. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

CIVIL  WAR    IN   ITALY   AND    SPAIN. 
49   B.C. 

^SAR  had  made  no  prepara^ 
tions  for  such  a  contingency 
as  a  declaration  of  war.  Hir^ 
tius,  who  knew  him  well  and 
was  an  honest  soldier  whose 
word  can  be  relied  on,  says 
that  Caesar  fully  believed  that 
as  soon  as  the  Senate  could 
regain  its  freedom  of  action, 
it  would  approve  his  cause."^ 
He  refused  to  listen  to  unpleasant  reports  about 
Labienus,  whom  he  had  set  over  the  Cisalpine 
province  during  his  last  visit  to  Further  Gaul ;  and 
for  some  time  this  strategical  key  to  Italy  was 
actually  in  the  hands  of  a  man  who  was  secretly 
plotting  against  his  chief,  and  was  soon  to  be  his 
bitterest  enemy.     And  when  at  last  Caesar  arrived 


*  Hirtius,  B.  G.,  viii.,  52. 


258 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  iit  Italy  and  Spain.  259 

and  superseded  him,  he  brought  only  a  single  legion 
with  him,  though  the  year  was  drawing  to  a  close, 
the  consuls  elect  were  hostile  to  him,  and  Pompeius 
had  actually  been  entrusted  with  the  task  of  raising 
levies  throughout  Italy.  Those  who  think  that  every- 
thing Caesar  did  was  the  result  of  deep  calculation 
must  find  it  hard  to  explain  these  facts. 

But  anyone  who  can  fairly  divest  his  mind  of  the 
notion  of  Caesar's  craft,  and  can  read  without  preju- 
dice the  books  on  the  Civil  War,  will  not  be  likely 
to  find  himself  forced  to   retreat  on  his  old  belief. 
Those  books,  with  the  whole  story  of  the  rest  of 
Caesar's  life,  seem  to  tell  another  tale.     An  extra- 
ordinary confidence  in  his  own  good  fortune,  leading 
to  serious  rashness  and  risk,  an  almost  blind  belief 
in  the  faithfulness  of  all  his  friends  and  helpers,  and 
a  persistent  desire  to  avoid  shedding  the  blood  of 
Roman  citizens,— these  are  the  characteristics  which 
astonish   us  again   and   again    in    the   last  years  of 
Caesar's  Hfe.     He  was  no  deep  calculator;  his  habit 
was  to  act  for  the  immediate  exigency.     He  was  no 
suspicious  enemy,  but  a  perfectly  frank  and  honest 
friend    whom    simple    men    loved.*  \  He   not    only 
shunned   civil   war  till  the   very  last   moment,   but 
then  only  entered  on  it  because  to   submit  would 
have  ruined  not  only  himself  but  all  his  hopes  for 
the  Empire,  and  would  have  undone  all  the  work  of 
his  party  since  the  Gracchi,  j   He  stood   firm  as  a 
rock  when  it  became  clear  that  he  must  fight  or  be 
destroyed  ;  but  never  in  any  civil  war  has  victory 

*  Such  men  were  Matius,   Decimus  Brutus,   Hirtius,  Oppius,  and 
other  intimate  friends. 


26o  Julitis  Ccesar,  [49  B.C. 

been  used  with  such  clemency,  or  enormous  strength 
wielded  so  gently. 

When  Antonius  and  Cassius,  or  couriers  despatched 
by  them,  reached  Ravenna  with  the  decisive  news, 
Caesar  addressed  the  thirteenth  legion,  the  only  one  he 
had  with  him.  He  explained  the  determination  of 
his  enemies  to  ruin  him,  and  asked  the  soldiers  to 
defend  him.  Their  loyalty  ascertained,  he  sent 
orders  for  the  rest  of  his  army  to  march  at  once  from 
Further  Gaul,*  and  set  forward  himself  for  Ariminum, 
the  frontier  town  of  Italy,  as  it  was  then  politically 
defined.  For  a  proconsul  to  pass  beyond  the  boun- 
dary of  his  province  was  high  treason  to  the  state, 
and  the  boundary  here  was  the  little  river  Rubicon, 
flowing  from  the  Apennines  into  the  Adriatic.  The 
moment  of  crossing  the  Rubicon  was  therefore  the 
turning-point  of  his  life.  Asinius  Pollio,  who  after- 
wards wrote  memoirs  of  him,  was  with  him  at  the 
time,  and  it  is  perhaps  to  his  book  that  Plutarch 
owed  a  story  of  Caesar's  doubt  and  hesitation  when 
he  reached  the  banks  of  the  stream  by  night. f  He 
may  well  have  stayed  for  a  moment  to  brace  himself 
for  the  task  before  him  ;  but  the  die  once  cast,  he 
went  straight  on  to  Ariminum,  and  never  hesitated 
again  for  the  rest  of  his  life. 

At  Ariminum,  which  he  occupied  without  opposi- 
tion, he  found  Roscius,  a  praetor,  and  a  young  con- 

*  This  is  his  own  statement.  Colonel  Stoffel  has  made  it  seem 
probable  that  an  order  of  this  kind  must  have  been  sent  three  or 
four  weeks  earlier.     (Histoire  de  Jules  Cesar,  i.,  205  foil.) 

f  Plut.,  Cses. ,  29.  Cp.  Suet.,  Jul.,  31.  If  we  could  be  sure  that  this 
and  the  other  tales  of  this  night  are  not  really  legends  which  gathered 
round  a  famous  event,  they  might  be  worth  inserting. 


49  B.C.]    Civil  War  in  Italy  and  Spain.  261 

nexion  of  his  own,  with  a  friendly  message  from 
Pompeius,  excusing  himself  and  urging  Caesar  to 
abate  his  anger.  He  sent  them  back  with  a  last  pro- 
posal for  peace,  which  is  quite  as  astonishing  as  his 
former  one,  and  would  hardly  be  credited  from 
Caesar,  if  it  were  not  amply  confirmed  in  a  letter  of 
Cicero's."^  "  Let  Pompeius  retire  to  Spain  ;  let  both 
parties  simultaneously  disarm,  and  allow  the  consti- 
tution to  work  once  more  without  terrorism  ;  and  I 
will  then  give  up  every  point  in  dispute."  To  this 
he  added  an  earnest  request  for  a  personal  interview. 
Meanwhile  Pompeius  and  the  consuls  had  aban- 
doned Rome  in  haste,  making  for  Capua,  where 
were  the  only  two  legions  which  were  complete  and 
ready  for  action  ;  no  vigorous  preparation  for  war 
had  been  made,  and  they  despaired  of  staying  the 
enemy's  advance  at  any  point  north  of  Rome.  Be- 
fore they  reached  Capua  Caesar's  messengers  over- 
took them,  and  two  days  later  (January  27th)  an 
answer  was  despatched  after  serious  deliberation. 
Caesar  must  return  to  his  province,  and  there  dis- 
band his  army ;  when  that  was  done,  Pompeius 
would  join  his  own  legions  in  Spain, f  and  the  Senate 
might  meet  in  Rome  for  a  general  settlement.  To 
such  a  demand  no  reply  was  possible  but  instant 
action.  Antonius  was  despatched  to  occupy  Ar- 
retium,  and  hold  the  main  road  from  Rome  to  the 
Cisalpine  province,   so  as   to   protect   Caesar's    flank 

*  Cses.,  B.  C,  i.,  10.     Cic,  Ad  Fam.,  xvi.,  12,  3. 

f  Cicero  (/.  r.)  omits  the  point  of  which  Csesar  naturally  complained, 
/.  c,  the  dismissal  of  his  army.  Cicero's  letters  of  this  time  are  often 
hasty  and  reckless  of  the  truth  ;  and  as  he  here  puts  the  conditions, 
it  would  have  been  difficult  for  Caesar  to  refuse  them. 


262  Julius   CcBsar.  [4-9  B.C. 

and  rear  ;  the  rest  of  the  troops  were  launched  upon 
the  road  that  follows  the  Adriatic  coast  southwards, 
and  three  coast  towns  were  successively  taken.  Aux- 
imum,  Cingulum,  and  Asculum  opened  their  gates, 
and  some  Pompeian  officers  fell  into  Caesar's  hands. 
They  were  courteously  dismissed  ;  and  Cingulum, 
though  it  was  a  foundation  of  Labienus,  who  had 
now  deserted  Caesar,  met  with  no  ill-treatment. 

Pompeius  had  fixed  his  head-quarters  at  Luceria, 
a  town  in  Apulia  near  the  high  road  which  his  enemy 
was  pursuing  ;  it  was  his  object  to  concentrate  his 
troops  here,  and  then  to  retreat  along  the  same 
road  to  Brundisium,  in  order  to  evacuate  Italy  and 
cross  to  Epirus.  We  need  not  stop  to  criticise  his 
strategy  ;  we  have  his  own  word  for  it  that  he  could 
not  trust  his  soldiers,  and  that  the  work  of  concen- 
tration in  midwinter  was  slow.*  That  he  was  right, 
is  shown  by  the  fate  of  Domitius,  who  had  been 
collecting  troops  for  him  at  Corfinium,  some  eighty 
miles  north-west  of  Luceria.  Though  urged  by  re- 
peated orders  and  entreaties  from  his  chief,  he 
delayed  too  long.  On  February  14th  Caesar  was  upon 
him.  He  had  left  the  coast-road  with  this  object, 
knowing  that  with  his  small  force  he  could  not 
afford  to  leave  Domitius  in  his  rear.  Italy,  if  we  are 
to  believe  Cicero,  was  against  Caesar  ;  and  if  Domi- 
tius were  left  in  a  strong  position  in  central  Italy, 
he  might  gradually  raise  a  powerful  force,  cut  off 
Caesar's  legions  which  were  following  at  intervals, 
and  even  occupy  Cisalpine  Gaul.    Caesar's  resolution 

*  Four  of  Pompeius'  despatches  are  preserved  in   Cic,  Ad  Att., 
viii.,  12,  A,  B,  C,  D. 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  i7i  Italy  and  Spain.  263 

was  justified,  though  it  cost  him  a  delay  of  seven 
days,  which  had  other  serious  consequences.  Cor- 
finium  was  invested,  and  the  conduct  of  Domitius* 
troops  showed  that  Pompeius  had  rightly  judged 
the  situation.  Believing  that  their  commander  was 
about  to  make  his  escape  alone,  on  February  20th 
they  opened  the  gates  ;  the  next  day  the  senators 
and  equites  who  had  gathered  there  surrendered  to 
Caesar,  who  after  a  short  speech  released  them  all 
unconditionally.  He  protected  them  from  all  insult, 
and  returned  to  Domitius  a  large  sum  of  money 
which  had  been  entrusted  him  for  military  purposes. 
The  captured  troops  enlisted  in  his  ranks,  and  took 
the  oath  of  obedience  to  him.  The  same  day  he  set 
off  with  all  speed  towards  Luceria  ;  but  Pompeius 
had  already  evacuated  that  place  and  was  on  his 
way  to  Brundisium. 

If  we  may  judge  from  Cicero's  letters,  which 
abound  in  these  weeks,  Caesar's  clemency  and  cour- 
tesy at  Corfinium  had  an  extraordinary  effect  on  all 
waverers  in  Italy.  Up  to  this  time  Cicero  had  writ- 
ten of  him  in  terms  of  intense  hatred  and  fear  ;  now 
his  whole  tone  changes.  Caesar  found  time  as  he 
hurried  southward  from  Corfinium,  to  send  him  a 
hasty  note,  which  is  still  preserved  ;  and  about  this 
time  he  also  wrote  a  letter  to  his  private  friends  and 
agents,  Balbus  and  Oppius,  which  was  probably 
meant  to  be  copied  and  sent  to  various  acquaint- 
ances as  a  declaration  of  policy.^  In  this  remarkable 
document,  which  is  also  preserved,  he  states  in 
explicit  terms  his  determination  not  to  imitate  the 

*  Cic,  Ad  Att.,  ix.,  7  C.  and  6  A. 


264  yulius   Ccesar,  [49  B.C. 

cruelty  of  Sulla  and  other  conquerors  in  previous 
civil  wars.  "  My  method  of  conquest  shall  be  a  new 
one ;  I  will  fortify  myself  with  compassion  and 
generosity."  He  lays  the  blame  of  the  war,  not  on 
Pompeius,  but  on  the  Senate,  and  expresses  his 
ardent  desire  for  a  reconciliation  with  his  great  rival. 
From  this  time  forward  Italy  was  on  the  whole  on 
his  side  ;  and  there  was  need  of  it,  for  all  the  prov- 
inces but  Gaul  were  as  yet  occupied  by  the  troops 
of  the  Senate  or  of  its  supposed  champion. 

On  March  9th  he  reached  Brundisium  with  six 
legions,  three  of  his  old  ones,  and  three  newly 
formed.  Pompeius  was  still  in  the  town,  but  a  part 
of  his  force,  under  the  two  consuls,  had  already 
sailed  for  Epirus.  Caesar  instantly  set  to  work  with 
two  objects :  first,  to  blockade  the  port ;  secondly, 
to  bring  Pompeius  to  a  personal  interview.  Moles 
were  constructed  at  the  entrance  of  the  harbour,  and 
negotiations  were  attempted  through  common  friends, 
as  well  as  through  a  certain  IMagius  whom  Caesar  had 
captured.  But  Pompeius  successfully  counteracted 
the  moles,  and  steadily  refused  the  interview,  main- 
taining, according  to  Caesar,  that  in  the  absence  of 
the  consuls  he  had  no  authority  to  treat.'*  Such  an 
answer  was  under  the  circumstances  absurd,  and  it 
is  not  hard  to  guess  its  real  motive.  I  He  dreaded 
Caesar's  personal  address  and  persuasiveness  as  much 
as  Caesar  himself  trusted  in  it ;  he  had  perhaps  begun 
to  realise  his  opponent's  greatness  as  he  had  never 
realised  it  before,  and  felt  that  he  must  now  fight  or 
lose  his   old   position  as  "  the  first   citizen    of   the 

*B.  C.,1.,26.     Lettersof  CsesarinCic,  Ad  Att.,ix.,  13  A  and  14. 


MA  ^m{ 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  in  Italy  and  Spain.  265 

state."  I  He  exerted  himself  with  unwonted  alacrity, 
and  by  ^skilful  dispositions  he  contrived  to  escape  on 
March  17th,  with  the  loss  of  only  two  ships,  which  ran 
against  one  of  Caesar's  moles  and  were  captured  with 
all  on  board.  Had  his  enemy  not  been  delayed  at 
Corfinium,  it  is  quite  possible  that  he  might  either 
have  been  forced  to  surrender  with  all  his  troops,  or 
at  least  have  voluntarily  come  to  terms  and  aban- 
doned the  Senate. 

Pompeius  had  escaped  ;  and  to  follow  him  at  once 
was  impossible,  for  there  were  no  transports  at  hand. 
Caesar  determined  on  a  plan  which,  on  a  much  smaller 
scale,  Napoleon  so  often  adopted  with  brilliant  sue 
cess.  He  stood  in  Italy  between  two  hostile  penin^ 
sulas ;  between  Pompeius  in  Epirus  with  one  army, 
and  the  Icgati  of  Pompeius  in  Spain  with  another. 
If  allowed  to  concentrate  strength,  these  two  armies 
would  combine  to  crush  him,  and  as  commanding 
the  seas,  they  would  be  able  to  blockade  Italy ;  but 
if  the  one  were  with  all  speed  destroyed,  he  could 
take  the  offensive  against  the  other  with  his  rear 
clear  of  enemies,  and  with  his  whole  available  force. 
The  Spanish  army  was  largely  composed  of  veterans, 
and  was  far  more  formidable  than  that  of  Pompeius 
was  likely  for  some  time  to  be  ;  this  accordingly  was 
to  be  the  first  object  of  his  attack.  To  prevent  a 
blockade  of  Italy,  he  sent  one  of  his  legati  to  Sar- 
dinia with  one  legion,  and  Curio  to  Sicily  with 
another ;  and  they  had  no  difficulty  in  occupying 
those  islands,  and  so  securing  a  corn-supply  for 
Rome.  Cato,  who  was  in  command  in  Sicily,  fled 
to  Epirus  in  despair,  after  uttering  bitter  reproaches 


266  Julius  Ccesar,  [49  B.C. 

against  Pompeius  for  plunging  into  war  without  any 
adequate  preparation  ;  and  it  is  characteristic  of  the 
total  want  both  of  union  and  discretion  among 
Caesar's  enemies,  that  Cicero  is  equally  bitter  in  his 
complaints  against  Cato  for  so  hastily  evacuating  a 
most  valuable  province.* 

Caesar  set  out  towards  Rome,  on  his  way  to  Spain, 
immediately  after  Pompeius  had  escaped.  The 
Senate  and  consuls  had  been  swept  out  of  Italy, 
and  some  provision  must  be  made  for  the  govern- 
ment ;  there  would  be  no  time  to  organise  a  consti- 
tution, but  some  first  steps  might  be  taken,  and 
negotiation  might  be  renewed.  His  first  object  was 
to  bring  together  all  the  members  of  the  Senate  who 
were  still  in  Italy ;  among  these  was  Cicero,  and  if 
Cicero  could  be  induced  to  be  present,  his  example 
would  have  a  good  effect.  At  Formiae,  on  his  way 
to  Rome,  he  had  a  friendly  but  unsatisfactory  meet- 
ing Avith  the  friend  of  his  early  days,  which  Cicero 
duly  reported  to  Atticus.  f  Cicero  decHned  to  ap- 
pear in  the  Senate,  unless  he  could  speak  his  mind 
freely,  and  his  views,  uncertain  as  they  were  at  this 
time,  could  not  be  made  to  suit  Caesar's.  They 
parted  with  a  promise  from  Cicero  that  he  would 
take  time  to  consider  the  matter,  and  did^not  meet 
aeain  until  Caesar  was  master  of  the  world.J  The  two 
noblest  characters  of  the  age  were  destined  to  be 
continually  in  conflict  ;  the  one  looking  ever  back- 
wards, the  other  ever  at  the  facts  before  him ;  the  man 
of  letters  clinging  fondly  to  a  broken  constitution, 

*  Cic,  Ad  Att.,  X.,  i6,  3.     Cses.,  B.  C,  i.,  30. 
t  Ad  Att.,  ix.,  18. 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  in  Italy  and  Spain,  267 

the  man  of  action  forced  henceforward  in  spite  of 
himself  to  treat  it  as  no  longer  capable  of  repair./ 

On  the  last  day  of  March  Caesar  arrived  in  Rame. 
The  Senate  was  legally  summoned  by  the  tribunes 
Antonius  and  Cassius,  and  Caesar  addressed  it  in  a 
speech  of  which  he  has  given  us  the  heads.  iHe  be- 
gan by  stating  his  own  case  in  the  present  quarrel, 
pointing  out  how  Pompeius  and  the  Senate  had  com- 
bined to  deprive  him  of  advantages,  especially  the 
right  to  stand  for  the  consulship  in  his  absence, 
which  had  been  bestowed  on  him  by  the  people  ; 
and  he  went  on  to  contrast  the  many  attempts  he 
had  made  to  obtain  peace,  with  the  reception  those 
attempts  had  encountered.  fThen  he  came  to  the 
point.  Would  they  unite  with  him  to  carry  on  the 
government  ?  If  they  feared  to  do  so,  he  would  be 
no  burden  to  them,  but  would  carry  it  on  by  himself. 
Lastly,  he  invited  them  to  select  envoys  to  send  to 
Pompeius ;  not  as  a  confession  of  weakness,  but  as  a 
matter  alike  of  justice  and  equity. 

The  last  proposal  was  agreed  to,  but  no  one  would 
go,  as  Caesar  tells  us,  from  fear  of  Pompeius,  or,  as 
Dio  Cassius  has  it,  because  they  doubted  whether  he 
was  in  earnest.  Seeing  them  to  be  hopeless  he  began 
to  act  for  himself.  They  met  him  with  the  tribuni- 
cian  veto  "^  ;  he  brushed  it  aside,  and,  as  the  story 
runs,  even  removed  a  tribune,  Metellus,  from  the 
door  of  the  inner  treasury,  when  he  interposed  his 
person  to  prevent  its  violation.  He  took  all  the 
money  contained  in  it,  and,  making  up  his  mind  to 
waste  no  more  time,  left  the  city,  after  a  stay  of  a 

*  Caelius  to  Cicero.     Ad.  Fam.,  viii.,  i6,  i. 


268  JulitLS  CcBsar,  [4  9  B . C. 

very  few  days,  on  his  way  to  Spain.  But  before 
leaving  he  appointed  a  praetor  to  govern  Rome  as 
prefect  of  the  city,  and  a  tribune,  with  the  title  of 
pro-prsetor,  to  command  the  troops  in  Italy.  These 
were  M.  ^milius  Lepidus  and  M.  Antonius,  after- 
wards two  members  of  the  second  triumvirate.  The 
third  member,  Caesar's  grandnephew,  C.  Octavius, 
afterwards  called  Augustus  Caesar,  was  this  year  a 
boy  of  fourteen. 

These  appointments,  and  in  fact  all  Caesar's  acts 
since  the  crossing  of  the  Rubicon,  were  of  course 
entirely  unconstitutional.  When  he  left  his  province 
he  became  guilty  of  high  treason,  and  unless  that  act 
can  be  justified,  all  that  he  did  afterwards  must  be 
reckoned  as  a  wanton  violation  of  those  sacred  prin- 
ciples of  constitutional  order  under  which  all  free 
political  societies  agree  to  live.  Such  a  principle  at 
Rome  was  that  of  senatorial  government ;  it  was 
almost  a  necessary  law  of  the  Roman  mind.  To 
attempt  to  make  conditions  with  the  Senate,  as  Caesar 
had  done,  and  then  to  disobey  it,  to  make  war  on  it, 
and  to  drive  it  and  the  magistrates  out  of  Italy,  was 
to  break  utterly  with  one  of  the  most  deeply  rooted 
traditions  of  government  in  the  mind  of  the  ordinary 
Roman.!  But  we  have  tried  to  make  it  plain  in  this 
volume  that  there  was  another  principle,  of  later 
growth,  and  rooted  in  the  great  changes  of  recent 
times,  which  was  of  far  graver  importance  to  the 
human  race  than  the  idea  of  government  by  an  assem- 
bly of  Roman  notables.  This  was  the  principle  of 
the  development  of  Italy  and  the  provinces  by  means 
of  Roman  institutions ;  and  of  this  Caesar  was  the  rep- 


THE  YOUNG  AUGUSTUS. 

FROM  THE  BUST  IN  THE  VATICAN. 
{Baumeister.) 


49  B.C.J     Civil  ]]\x7'  in  Italy  and  Spaiii.  269 

resentative.  Were  the  two  principles  incompatible  ? 
Was  it  really  necessary  to  overthrow  the|Senate  in 
order  to  govern  and  develop  the  Empire  ?^The  only 
way  to  answer  these  questions  is  to  study  impartially 
the  whole  history  of  the  relations  between  Rome  and 
her  dependencies,  first  under  the  Republic  and  then 
under  the  Empire ;  and  such  a  study  must  almost 
always  lead  to  an  affirmative  answer.  The  Senate 
had  failed  to  do  the  work  that  had  to  be  done ;  it 
had  resisted  every  project  of  reform ;  it  was  tied 
down  by  the  selfish  interests  of  a  permanent  ma- 
jority ;  it  was  unable  to  control  its  own  provincial 
governors,  and  the  strongest  of  them  for  the  time 
being  must  always  be  its  master.  Thus,  when  Caesar 
crossed  the  Rubicon  in  January,  and  when  in  April 
he  told  the  senators  that  he  was  prepared  to  take  the 
government  on  himself,  he  was  justified  to  himself  by 
the  past,  and  he  is  justified  to  us  also  by  the  result. 
Caesar  left  Rome  on  or  about  April  5th  on  his  way 
to  Spain.  His  wrath  cooled  down  on  the  journey, 
and  on  the  i6th  he  wrote  a  kind  and  friendly  note 
to  Cicero,  urging  him  for  their  old  friendship's  sake 
to  remain  in  Italy  and  abstain  from  all  partisanship.* 
On  arriving  at  Massilia,  he  made  precisely  the  same 
appeal  to  fifteen  of  the  leading  citizens,  whom  he 
summoned  to  meet  him  ;  and  with  a  temporary  suc- 
cess, as  in  Cicero's  case.  But  the  arrival  of  a  fleet 
under  that  unworthy  Domitius,  who  had  been  taken 

*  Ad  Att.,  X.,  8  B.  This  is  a  very  interesting  letter.  It  seems  to 
have  been  written  by  Caesar  in  his  carriage,  and  shows  obvious  signs 
of  haste.  He  appeals,  it  is  noteworthy,  first  to  his  good  fortune,  and 
then  to  his  past  life,  to  induce  Cicero  not  to  side  against  him. 


270  ytdiiis   CcBsar,  [49  B.C. 

and  released  at  Corfinium,  caused  the  Massiliots  to 
change  their  mind  ;  while  Cicero,  on  the  first  news 
of  a  disaster  to  Caesar's  arms,  turned  against  him  and 
joined  the  real  enemies  of  the  state. 

There  was  no  time,  however,  to  dally  before  Mas- 
silia.  Caesar  built  a  fleet  with  wonderful  rapidity, 
put  it  in  command  of  D.  Brutus,  his  admiral  of 
former  days,  and  hastened  over  the  Pyrenees  to  deal 
with  the  Pompeian  armies  in  Spain,  which  were  now 
concentrated  north  of  the  Ebro  under  Afranius  and 
Petrelus.  He  had  already  sent  on  six  legions  under 
Fabius,  and  now  joined  them  with  nine  hundred 
cavalry  at  Ilerda  on  the  Segres.  The  basin  of  this 
river,  which  descends  from  the  Pyrenees  to  join  the 
Ebro  some  sixty  miles  from  its  mouth,  was  now  to  be 
the  field  of  the  most  brilliant  campaign  in  all  Caesar's 
military  life.  It  is  a  short  and  exciting  drama  in  three 
acts  or  phases,  lasting  in  all  only  forty  days.  The 
story,  which  must  be  here  told  as  summarily  as  possi- 
ble, occupies  the  last  half  of  the  first  book  of  the  Civil 
Wars,  and  is  written  with  every  appearance  of  truth. 

The  first  phase  of  the  campaign  opens  with  Cae- 
sar's arrival  before  Ilerda  on  June  23d.*  The  town, 
now  called  Lerida,  stood  on  the  right  or  western 
bank  of  the  Segres  on  a  hill  close  to  the  river,  com- 
manding the  main  road  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the 
Ebro.  Afranius  and  Petreius  were  encamped  on 
another  hill  somewhat  to  the  south-westward,  and 
between  them  and  the  town  was  another  lower 
eminence.     At   Ilerda  there  was   a  bridge,  so  that 

*  These  dates  are  those  of  the  unreformed  calendar.  They  are  given 
here  with  the  view  of  showing  the  rapidity  of  Ctesar's  movements. 


49  B.C.]    Civil  War  in  Italy  and  Spain.  271 

by  holding  the  town  they  could  command  both 
banks  of  the  river,  and  gather  supplies  in  every 
direction  except  to  the  north.  Caesar  also  had 
two  bridges  four  miles  apart,  made  by  his  officer 
Fabius  before  his  arrival ;  one  of  these  had  been 
broken  by  a  storm.  As  soon  as  it  was  repaired 
Caesar  offered  battle,  but  it  was  declined,  and  he  set 
to  work  to  fortify  a  camp  in  the  plain  near  to  that 
of  the  enemy,  in  order  to  watch  his  opportunity. 

On  the  27th,  seeing  the  importance  of  the  little 
hill  which  lay  between  Ilerda  and  the  enemy's  camp, 
he  determined  to  seize  it,  and  so  to  cut  him  off  from 
the  town  and  its  bridge,  and  from  communication 
with  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  But  the  attempt 
was  a  signal  failure,  though  made  with  picked  men  ; 
the  enemy's  troops  reached  the  hill  first,  and  fight- 
ing in  loose  skirmishing  order,  drove  the  Caesarians 
before  them,  and  compelled  the  whole  legion  to 
which  the  attacking  party  belonged  to  retreat  to  the 
nearest  high  ground.  This  surprising  result  dis- 
heartened the  whole  army.  The  ninth  legion  was  sent 
to  the  rescue,  but  only  succeeded  in  making  matters 
worse.  They  at  first  repulsed  the  enemy,  but  in 
pursuing  them  up  to  the  city  wall,  were  stopped  by 
a  sudden  steep  rise  in  the  slope  they  were  following, 
from  the  top  of  which  rise  the  enemy  could  dis- 
charge missiles  on  them  at  his  leisure.  This  slope 
and  the  sharp  rise  at  the  upper  part  of  it  were 
enclosed  between  two  rocky  spurs  or  ridges,  which 
projected  from  this  southern  side  of  the  hill  at  a  con- 
siderable angle.  The  farther  Caesar's  men  pressed 
up  the  ascent  the  more  closely  they  were  hemmed  in 


272  Julius   Ccesar.  [49  B.C. 

between  the  steep  walls  of  these  spurs ;  and  when  they 
were  stopped  by  the  sudden  rise  they  found  them- 
selves crowded  in  a  narrow  space  where  they  could 
no  longer  advance  or  manoeuvre,  or  retreat  without 
bringing  the  enemy  down  on  them  with  headlong  force. 
The  attacking  column  was  now  worse  than  useless,  for 
it  blocked  up  the  way  for  supports,  which  could  not 
reach  it  on  the  flanks  owing  to  the  steep  sides  of  the 
ridges  between  which  it  was  wedged.  The  column, 
however,  stood  its  ground  bravely,  though  severely 
handled  by  the  enemy  above ;  and  Caesar  contrived 
to  keep  it  there  during  five  hours  by  sending  fresh 
troops  to  take  the  place  of  the  wounded  and  fatigued. 
At  last  when  all  missiles  were  spent,  the  men  drew 
their  swords  and  rushed  up  the  steep  rise  above 
them,  driving  the  enemy  under  the  city  wall  and 
thus  making  a  free  space  for  their  own  retreat.  This 
was  further  secured  by  the  valour  of  the  cavalry 
which  pushed  up  under  the  steep  sides  of  the  ridge, 
and  interposed  themselves  between  the  retreating 
column  and  the  enemy.  fThis  day's  work  cost  Caesar 
heavy  loss ;  and  though  he  says  that  both  sides 
claimed  the  victory,  it  is  plain  that  it  was  a  defeat  for 
him  at  every  point,  and  that  the  ninth  legion  must 
have  been  utterly  routed,  and  perhaps  destroyed, 
had  they  once  given  way  on  the  ridge  and  begun 
to  retreat  with  the  enemy  close  upon  them."^ 

In  this  first  act  of  the  campaign  the  famous  Gallic 
troops  had  been  fairly  beaten,  but  even  worse  was 

*  The  real  nature  of  this  fight  has  been  for  the  first  time  fully  de- 
termined by  Colonel  Stoffel's  personal  examination  of  the  ground. 
See  his  work,  vol,  i.,  52  ;  Cses.  B.  C,  i.,  45,  46. 


49  B.C.]     Civil  JVa7^  in  Italy  a7id  Spai7t.  273 

in  store  for  them.  During  the  fighting  the  river 
Segres  had  risen  and  overflowed  its  banks,  owing  to 
heavy  rain  and  the  melting  of  snow  on  the  Pyrenees. 
Fabius'  two  bridges  were  carried  away,  while  the 
high  stone  bridge  at  Ilerda  stood  firm  ;  Caesar  was 
cut  off  from  the  left  bank,  while  Afranius  could  still 
operate  there  and  prevent  any  new  bridge  being 
built.  Worse  still,  another  river,  the  Cinga,  thirty 
miles  to  the  west,  was  also  flooded  and  impassable, 
so  that  Caesar  was  confined  in  a  narrow  space  where 
all  supplies  were  already  exhausted,  and  the  growing 
corn  was  very  far  from  ripe.  The  Pompeians  had 
ample  supplies  in  Ilerda,  and  were  free  to  forage  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Segres,  and  with  their  abundant 
light  troops,  accustomed  to  swim  rivers,  they  could 
cut  off  all  Caesar's  foragers  and  intercept  all  convoys. 
Corn  in  the  camp  rose  to  the  extraordinary  price  of 
fifty  denarii  the  modius  ;  a  disastrous  retreat  into 
Gaul  was  inevitable  if  this  went  on,  and  the  news  of 
it  would  utterly  destroy  Caesar's  prestige  in  the 
Empire.  Rumours  had  already  been  flying  about  of 
Pompeius'  approach  from  the  east  to  end  the  war, 
which  showed  how  the  wind  was  blowing,  though 
they  were  utterly  unfounded.  In  this  crisis  news 
reached  Afranius  of  a  large  convoy  of  supplies  which 
was  on  its  way  to  Caesar  from,  Gaul  and  was  unable 
to  cross  the  river  so  as  to  reach  him  ;  it  was  pro- 
tected by  Gallic  archers  and  cavalry,  but  was  heavily 
encumbered  and  without  discipline.  He  made  a 
vigorous  effort  to  capture  it  and  end  the  war,  and 
Caesar  saw  clearly  that  he  must  save  it  or  succumb. 

The    expedient    by   which   he   extricated    himself 
18 


2  74  y2tluts  Ccssar,  [49  B.C. 

from  such  peril  shows  the  immense  advantage  pos- 
sessed by  a  general  whose  troops  are  trained  to  turn 
their  hands  to  all  kinds  of  work.  He  set  his  men  to 
build  boats  of  timber,  wattles,  and  skins,  such  as 
they  had  seen  in  Britain.  These  were  conveyed  by 
night,  each  on  two  carts,  twenty  miles  up  the  river, 
so  as  to  be  as  far  as  possible  out  of  the  enemy's 
reach  ;  a  few  soldiers  crossed  in  them  and  fortified 
a  position  on  the  other  bank.  Then  a  bridge  was 
begun,  and  finished  in  two  days ;  the  convoy  was 
brought  across  to  the  right  bank,  Caesar's  cavalry 
began  to  scour  the  left  bank  and  to  cut  off  Afranius' 
foraging  parties,  and  the  tables  were  completely 
turned  on  the  enemy,  who  was  doubtless  as  much 
taken  by  surprise  as  was  Soult  when  Wellington 
crossed  the  Douro  almost  under  his  very  eyes.  So 
ended,  about  July  13th,  the  second  phase  of  this 
remarkable  campaign. 

The  Pompeian  generals  now  began  to  contemplate 
a  retreat  on  the  Ebro,  and  sent  orders  for  a  bridge 
to  be  built  over  that  river  to  secure  their  passage 
into  central  Spain.  They  were  confirmed  in  this 
plan  by  another  device  of  Caesar's.  He  had  ditches 
dug,  thirty  feet  wide,  from  one  channel  of  the  river 
to  another,  about  a  mile  above  Ilerda,  and  so  reduced 
the  volume  of  water  in  the  main  stream  as  to  render 
it  fordable  at  least  for  his  cavalry,  which  had  been 
compelled  each  day  to  go  round  by  his  recently 
constructed  distant  bridge. "^     The  enemy  crossed  at 

*  The  Segres  here  flows  in  three  channels  ;  if  Stoffel  is  right  in  his 
conjecture,  the  ditches  led  from  the  main  stream  in  the  middle  to  the 
westernmost  one.     (Stoffel,  i.,  58.) 


49  B.C.]     Civil  Will'  in  Italy  and  Spain.  275 

Ilerda  and  began  his  retreat  before  daybreak  on 
July  25th.  The  left  bank  was  of  course  chosen, 
because  Caesar  could  only  operate  on  it  in  force  with 
cavalry,  and  because  supplies  were  still  to  be  had 
there.  His  cavalry  at  once  began  to  hang  upon  the 
retreating  foe,  but  the  infantry  were  detained  by  the 
depth  of  the  ford.  The  men. could  not  endure  this, 
and  clamoured  to  be  allowed  to  risk  the  passage. 
Caesar  could  not  resist  their  ardour.  He  left  all  the 
weaker  men  behind,  and  the  rest  got  over  with 
trifling  loss  and  overtook  the  enemy  by  a  forced 
march.  The  armies  encamped  face  to  face  that  night. 
At  earliest  dawn  both  generals  reconnoitred  and 
found  themselves  but  a  few  miles  from  the  rocky  hills 
which  here  close  in  from  the  north  upon  the  valley  of 
the  Ebro  ;  it  was  obvious  that  whichever  army  could 
reach  the  defiles  first  would  be  able  to  stop  the 
progress  of  the  other. 

The  Pompeians,  after  deliberation,  determined  to 
push  for  the  hills  next  morning.  Caesar  did  not 
wait,  but  leaving  his  cavalry  in  the  plain,  turned 
aside,  and  climbing  the  steep  hills  which  bounded 
the  valley  to  the  west,  disappeared  from  his  enemy's 
view.  They  fancied  he  was  giving  up  the  pursuit, 
and  jeered  at  his  army  as  it  retreated  ;  but  presently 
they  saw  it  turn  southward  along  the  hills,  and  knew 
that  his  object  was  to  cut  off  their  retreat.  A  race 
began  for  the  possession  of  the  distant  defiles ; 
Caesar's  men  scrambling  over  rocky  heights,  the 
Pompeians  hurrying  along  the  plain.  But  the  latter 
had  started  too  late  ;  before  they  could  attain  their 
goal,  Caesar  had  dropped  from  the  hills  into  the  val- 


276  Juluis   CcBsar.  [49  B.C. 

ley  in  front  of  them.  His  cavalry  was  hanging  on 
their  rear,  and  their  situation  was  a  desperate  one. 
An  attempt  to  force  a  way  over  the  mountains  to  the 
Segres  only  ended  in  the  destruction  of  four  Pom- 
peian  cohorts. 

Caesar's  men  wished  to  fall  on  the  enemy,  thus 
caught  in  a  trap,  but  he  would  not  hear  of  it.  He 
wished  for  a  bloodless  victory,  and  has  given  such 
reasons  for  his  decision  as  even  his  worst  enemies 
must  respect.'^  A  surrender  would  have  taken  place 
then  and  there,  but  for  the  folly  of  Petreius,  who, 
when  the  soldiers  of  the  two  armies  were  freely  mix- 
ing together  in  expectation  of  it,  called  his  men  to 
arms,  administered  the  military  oath  afresh,  and 
slew  all  the  Caesarians  who  were  in  his  reach.  Not 
even  then  would  Csesar  attack ;  he  stood  firm  as  a 
rock  against  the  passion  of  a  whole  army.  But  the 
catastrophe  was  not  long  delayed.  In  attempting  as 
a  last  resource  a  retreat  to  Ilerda,  the  Pompeians 
were  once  more  caught  and  surrounded ;  cut  off 
from  all  supplies,  and  from  water,  which  in  this  dis- 
trict is  extremely  difficult  to  obtain,  Afranius  and 
Petreius  at  last  craved  humbly  for  quarter,  and 
accepted  the  generous  conditions  offered  them  of 
simply  disbanding  their  troops  and  leaving  Spain. 
These  terms  were  offered  in  a  speech  in  which  Caesar 
has  summarised  for  his  readers  his  political  position 
as  well  as  his  military  policy  ;  a  speech  which  should 
be  studied  by  everyone  who  would  pronounce  judg- 
ment on  his  character  and  conduct.  The  surrender 
took  place   on  August  2d,  and  in  a  few  days  the 

*B.  C,  i.,  72. 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  in  Italy  and  Spain.  277 

lately  victorious  army  was  disbanded,  after  being 
supplied  with  corn  by  Caesar,  and  also  with  such  pay 
as  was  due  to  them  from  their  own  generals.  Not  a 
man  was  robbed  or  harmed,  or  even  compelled  to 
enter  Caesar's  service.* 

The  province  of  Hither  or  eastern  Spain  was  now 
in  Caesar's  hands ;  Further  Spain  was  still  held  for 
Pompeius  by  M.  Terentius  Varro,  the  famous  scholar 
and  antiquarian,  who  had  been  busy  all  the  summer 
in  preparing  for  its  defence.  But  the  news  of  Caesar's 
victory,  and  the  moderate  use  he  made  of  it,  upset 
all  Varro's  calculations,  and  rendered  all  his  labour 
useless.  The  province  declared  unmistakably  for 
Cssar,  though  the  influence  of  Pompeius  there  was 
supposed  to  be  overwhelming.  The  chief  towns 
closed  their  gates  against  Varro.  Gades  expelled  its 
Pompeian  garrison.  In  obedience  to  an  edict  sent 
beforehand  by  Caesar,  the  chief  men  of  every  com- 
munity came  to  Cordova  to  meet  him  ;  and  when  he 
reached  the  town  himself,  he  had  already  had  the 
satisfaction  of  receiving  the  news  of  the  submission 
of  Varro,  who  now  handed  over  the  one  legion  that 
had  remained  faithful  to  him,  and  came  to  Cordova 
to  surrender  his  military  chest  and  the  public  ac- 
counts of  the  province.  At  Cordova  Caesar  held  a 
general  assembly,  and  in  a  set  speech  expressed  his 
good-will  and  gratitude  ;  remitted  all  burdens  and 
political  penalties  imposed  by  Varro,  and  after  dis- 
tributing rewards  to  various  individuals  and  com- 
munities, went  on  to  Gades,  where  he  took  ship  for 
Tarragona,  and  proceeded  thence  by  land  to  Mas- 

*  B.  C.  i.,  85. 


278  Juliiis   CcEsar.  [49  B.C. 

silia.  He  arrived  there  about  the  end  of  September, 
having  in  three  months  secured  the  allegiance  of  the 
whole  peninsula  in  an  almost  bloodless  campaign. 

The  whole  of  the  western  half  of  the  Empire  was 
now  in  his  power,  with  the  single  exception  of  Mas- 
silia.  -While  Csesar  was  in  Spain  the  siege  of  the 
ancient  Greek  city  had  been  carried  on  by  the  faith- 
ful Brutus  with  the  fleet,  and  by  Trebonius  on  land, 
and  with  such  skill  and  energy  that  Csesar  has  left 
as  careful  accounts  of  their  methods  and  engineering 
as  if  he  had  himself  been  present.  His  record  must 
be  passed  over  here,  for  its  interest  is  purely  a  mili- 
tary one;  the  only  part  which  he  took  in  the  siege 
was  to  receive  the  final  submission  of  the  town,  and 
to  leave  it  unharmed,  as  a  tribute  ''  rather  to  its  an- 
•  cient  renown  than  to  any  claim  it  had  on  himself."  "^ 
»  But  the  reader  of  these  two  chapters  can  hardly  fail 
to  be  struck  by  two  traits  in  Caesar's  character  which 
have  already  been  pointed  out  in  the  story  of  the 
Gallic  War  :  the  scientific  interest  which  he  shows  in 
all  military  operations,  and  the  generous  care  with 
which  he  watched  and  recorded  the  independent 
efforts  of  his  lieutenants,  j  Both  these  traits  are  also 
excellently  illustrated  in  the  last  twenty-two  chapters 
of  this  same  second  book  of  the  Civil  Wars,  in  which 
he  has  told  how  the  province  of  Africa  was  lost  to 
him  this  same  summer  by  the  rashness  and  inexperi- 
ence of  Curio. f    Not  a  word  of  contempt  or  reproach 


*B.  C,  ii.,  22. 

f  Mommsen,  R.  H.,  iv.,  393,  takes  a  different  and  singular  view 
both  of  Curio  himself  and  his  military  ability.  This  view  is  not 
shared  by  Colonel  Stoffel  (vol.  i.,  312). 


49  B.C.]     Civil  War  ifi  Italy  and  Spain.  279 

escapes  him  ;  Curio  was  his  own  choice  as  a  general, 
and  he  doubtless  felt  the  responsibility.  But  in  the 
story  he  brings  out  clearly  the  faults,  both  of  charac- 
ter and  conduct,  which  brought  about  the  disaster, 
as  a  lesson  to  all  students  of  the  military  art.  The 
Commentaries,  let  it  be  said  once  more,  are  not 
merely  political  pamphlets,  as  some  critics  have  per- 
suaded themselves  ;  they  are  the  records  of  the  work 
of  a  great  soldier  and  his  subordinates,  prompted,  in- 
deed, by  a  desire  to  have  that  work  regarded  by  pos- 
terity as  Caesar  himself  regarded  it,  but  chiefly  by  a 
half  unconscious  recognition  of  the  space  it  would 
be  entitled  one  day  to  occupy  in  the  history  of  the 
world. 

At  Massilia  he  heard  that  he  had  been  appointed 
dictator,  with  the  immediate  object  of  holding  the 
consular  elections  for  the  next  year.  Lepidus,  who 
had  been  left  in  command  at  Rome,  could  not  legally 
preside  at  this  election,  being  only  a  praetor.  Both 
consuls  were  in  Epirus,  and  the  simplest  method  was 
to  appoint  a  dictator,  whose  authority  would  over- 
ride that  of  all  existing  magistrates.  Under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  was  not  possible  to  get  this  done  in 
the  way  which  was  constitutionally  proper,  the  Senate 
selecting  the  dictator  and  the  acting  consul  declaring 
him  duly  appointed  ;  but  facts  are  stronger  than 
forms,  and  since  Tiberius  Gracchus  the  voice  of  the 
people  in  their  assembly  had  been  held  by  the  demo- 
cratic party  to  be  valid  without  senatorial  sanction. 
Even  Sulla  had  acted  on  this  principle,  when  taking 
absolute  power  into  his  hands ;  jand  Lepidus  was 
only  following  this  aristocratic   precedent  when  he 


28o  yulius   CcEsar.  [49  B.C. 

proposed  by  a  law  to  make  Caesar  dictator.  The 
law  was  of  course  passed  ;  but  it  was  not  yet  time 
for  Caesar  to  assume  such  an  absolutism  as  that  of 
Sulla,  even  if  he  desired  it.  /  Only  the  western  half 
of  the  Empire  as  yet  owned  nis  supremacy ;  the  great 
struggle  had  still  to  be  fought,  and  Csesar  was  not 
the  man  to  waste  time  in  building  up  a  new  system 
of  government  before  that  issue  was  decided. 

We  have  his  own  brief  account  of  the  use  he  made 
of  this  dictatorship.*  He  presided  at  the  consular 
elections,  and  was  elected  himself  with  Servilius 
Isauricus.  To  restore  credit  in  Italy,  which  had 
been  terribly  shaken  by  the  Civil  War,  and  to  make 
it  plain  to  all  that  he  was  no  wild  revolutionist,  he 
passed  a  law  of  debtor  and  creditor,  as  a  temporary 
remedy  for  social  disquietude.  He  recalled,  by  a 
series  of  legislative  enactments,  a  number  of  persons 
who  had  been  exiled  under  the  rule  of  Pompeius  and 
the  Senate,  and  might  now  be  useful  to  himself.  And 
though  he  does  not  mention  it,  we  know  from  other 
sources  that  he  now  fulfilled  an  old  promise,  and 
gave  by  law  the  full  citizenship  to  all  free  inhabitants 
of  Transpadane  Gaul.  These,  and  other  enactments 
which  probably  belong  to  the  end  of  this  year  49 
B.C.,  will  be  considered  in  a  subsequent  chapter. 
/  He  held  his  office  only  eleven  days.l  When  all 
fhe  necessary  business  had  been  got  throt^h,  he  left, 
apparently  unwearied  by  a  whole  year  of  incessant 
toil,  for  Brundisium,  whither  the  army  had  been  sent 
on,  and  reached  it  before  the  last  day  of  December. 

*  B.  C,  iii.,  I. 


CHAPTER    XVI. 


DYRRHACHIUM   AND   PHARSALUS. 
48   B.C. 

HOEVER  would  understand 
the  decisive  campaign  which 
has  made  the  year  48  B.C. 
a  landmark  in  the  world's 
history,  must  first  grasp  the 
situation  at  its  outset  geo- 
graphically and  strategically. 
That  done,  he  will  be  able 
to  pursue  the  story  suffi- 
ciently in  outline,  without 
reference  to  many  details  which  must  be  omitted  in 
this  chapter.'  The  third  book  of  Caesar's  Civil  Wars, 
if  he  is  able  to  read  it,  will  supply  these  omissions ; 
and  he  will  find  no  better  reading  in  any  military 
history,  ancient  or  modern. 

Pompeius  was  in  unrestricted  command  of  the 
whole  eastern  half  of  the  Empire,  with  its  military 
and  naval  resources.     His  fleets,  drawn  from  Egypt 

281 


282  yulius  CcEsar.  t48B.C. 

and  the  Greek  ports  of  the  Levant,  were  cruising 
unopposed  along  the  coast  of  western  Greece  and 
Epirus  ;  his  army,  reinforced  by  large  and  useful 
contingents  of  archers  and  light-armed  troops  from 
the  East,  was  being  collected  towards  the  end  of  49 
B.C.  in  Macedonia,  with  a  view  to  concentration  on 
the  coast  of  Epirus  opposite  to  Italy.  Here  the  chief 
port  was  Dyrrhachium,  now  Durazzo  ;  and  from  this 
point  ran  a  great  Roman  road,  the  Via  Egnatia, 
across  the  mountains  of  Macedonia,  and  along  the 
coast  of  Thrace,  to  the  Hellespont.  This  road  was 
the  only  land-route  from  the  Adriatic  to  Asia  Minor 
and  the  East  ;  and  so  long  as  Pompeius  held  it  in  its 
whole  length,  and  was  master  of  Dyrrhachium  and 
of  the  seas,  it  was  practically  impossible  for  Caesar  to 
attack  him.  He  on  the  other  hand  might  easily 
attack  or  at  least  blockade  Italy,  and  then  proceed 
to  use  it  as  a  base  of  operations  for  the  reduction  of 
Gaul  and  Spain. 

/  Three  facts  will  here  strike  the  reader :  first,  that 
the  strategical  advantages  were  all  on  the  side  of 
Pompeius,  who  could  strike  without  serious  risk  from 
an  almost  impregnable  position ;  secondly,  that  the 
key  of  the  whole  military  situation  is  the  port  of 
Dyrrhachium ;  thirdly,  that  now  for  the  first  time 
the  eastern  and  western  portions  of  the  Roman  Em- 
pire are  seen  politically  separated,  owning  different 
masters,  and  about  to  engage  in  a  deadly  struggle 
for  supremacy.! 

Caesar's  first  object  was  at  all  risks  to  get  posses- 
sion of  Dyrrhachium  ;  but  to  do  this,  or  even  to 
hold  it  when  seized,  without  command  of  the  sea, 


MAP  OF  OPERATIONS  NEAR   DYRRACHIUM,  48  B.C. 

(after  stoffel). 

a.  c/esar's  principal  camp.      b.  pompeius'  principal  camp.      c.  camp  occupied  by  pompeius, 

the  scene  of  his  victory  after  breaking  the  unfinished  lines. 


48  B.C.I     Dyrrhachium  and  Pharsalus.  283 

would  be  a  more  dangerous  task  than  any  he  had 
ever  undertaken.  He  might  well  have  chosen  to 
stay  and  rule  in  Italy  and  the  West,  and  to  leave 
Pompeius  to  his  own  devices.  But  there  is  no  more 
signal  proof  of  the  great  instincts  which  governed 
him,  than  the  fact  that  he  resolved  to  attack  at  all 
hazards.  I  What  use  would  there  be  in  legislating  and 
organising,  so  long  as  there  was  a  power  left  to  grow 
in  the  East,  which  might  return  at  his  death  to 
destroy  all  his  work  ?  j  He  never  seems  to  have  hesi- 
tated, either  as  to  the  necessity  of  attacking,  or  the 
way  in  which  it  should  be  done.  The  regular  route 
from  Rome  to  Dyrrhachium  and  the  East  was  by  the 
great  road  to  Brundisium,  whence  the  sea  passage  is 
less  than  a  hundred  miles  ;  at  Brundisium  accord- 
ingly he  had  concentrated  his  army,  with  a  view  to  a 
sudden  descent  upon  the  opposite  coast. 

His  rapidity  seems  to  have  taken  even  his  own  of- 
ficers by  surprise  ;  for  when  he  arrived  at  Brundisium, 
no  sufficient  fleet  was  ready.  With  his  usual  reserve, 
he  does  not  say  who  was  to  blame,  but  in  a  single 
sentence  of  eight  words  shows  plainly  his  disappoint- 
ment. He  would  not  wait,  but  embarked  with  a 
force  of  not  more  than  twenty  thousand  infantry 
and  six  hundred  cavalry,  leaving  Antonius  with 
orders  to  bring  over  the  rest  when  the  transports 
should  return  for  that  purpose.  He  set  sail  on  Jan- 
uary 4,  48  B.C.,  and  landed  safely  next  day  at  a  little 
inlet  in  the  rocky  coast  of  Acroceraunia,  some  hun- 
dred miles  south  of  Dyrrhachium,  fearing  to  steer 
for  any  of  the  well-known  ports  on  the  coast,  owing 
to  the  presence  of  the  hostile  fleets.     The  same  day 


284  yulius    CcESai\  [48  B.C. 

he  started  on  his  march  towards  Dyrrhachium,  and 
the  same  night  the  fleet  set  sail  to  return  to  Brun- 
disium.  Caesar  himself  was  as  usual  rewarded  for  his 
swiftness,  and  established  himself  in  the  port  of 
Oricum,  where  the  Greek  soldiers  of  Pompeius 
forced  their  commander  to  open  the  gates  to  him  ; 
but  the  fleet  was  too  late  to  catch  the  evening 
breeze  from  the  land,  and  thirty  ships  were  caught 
by  the  enemy,  and  burnt  with  every  soul  on  board. 
The  Pompeian  admiral  who  committed  this  atrocity 
was  M.  Bibulus,  Caesar's  old  colleague  and  enemy  in 
his  praetorship  and  consulship  ;  he  did  it  in  a  fit  of 
rage,  Caesar  says,  at  finding  that  his  own  negligence 
had  allowed  his  foe  to  slip  through  his  hands  and  to 
land  unopposed. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  pushed  on  to  Apollonia,  an 
important  town  not  more  than  fifty  miles  from 
Dyrrhachium.  The  gates  were  opened,  as  at  Oricum, 
by  the  Pompeian  soldiery,  and  the  acquisition  was  a 
valuable  one,  because  a  branch  road  from  the  Via 
Egnatia  ran  down  at  this  point  to  the  coast.  But 
Pompeius  had  before  this  heard  of  Caesar's  landing; 
he  was  returning  from  Macedonia  along  the  great 
road  to  winter  at  Dyrrhachium,  where  he  had  col- 
lected great  stores,  and  he  now  woke  up  to  the 
absolute  necessity  of  reaching  that  town  before 
Caesar.  But  so  great  was  the  consternation  in  his 
army  on  learning  that  Caesar  himself  was  at  hand, 
that  a  panic  and  mutiny  were  only  quelled  by  the 
vigour  of  Labienus,  now  Caesar's  deadliest  enemy. 
He  was  able,  however,  in  the  nick  of  time  to  place 
himself  between  Caesar  and  Dyrrhachium  ;  as  he  had 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhackium  a?id  Phar Stilus.  285 

a  greatly  superior  force,  this  was  enough  to  keep  his 
antagonist  entirely  on  the  defensive  until  the  rest  of 
his  army  should  arrive.  Caesar  fortified  a  camp  on 
the  southern  side  of  the  river  Apsus,  which  flows  into 
the  sea  between  Dyrrhachium  and  Apollonia ;  Pom- 
peius  encamped  on  the  opposite  bank,  and  there  the 
two  armies  remained  inactive  from  January  to  May. 

Inaction  was  to  Caesar  of  all  things  the  most 
unbearable,  but  he  had  now  to  pay  the  penalty  for 
his  own  magnificent  audacity.  With  only  half  his 
army  he  had  flung  himself  into  the  centre  of  the 
enemy's  position,  whence  it  was  equally  impossible 
either  to  retreat  or  to  advance.  Supplies  were  dif- 
ficult to  obtain  ;  the  coast  was  efficiently  blockaded  ; 
Pompeius  was  only  waiting  for  reinforcements  to 
overwhelm  him.  Once  his  fleet-set  sail  from  Brun- 
disium,  and  was  only  saved  by  the  arrival  of  a  letter 
which  he  had  sent  to  warn  the  commander  that  he 
would  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy  if  he  attempted 
to  cross.  In  these  straits  he  tried  to  renew  negotia- 
tion with  Pompeius,  but  here  again  Labienus  stood 
in  the  way,  and,  if  we  can  accept  Caesar's  word,  by 
a  treacherous  discharge  of  weapons  broke  up  an 
interview  which  had  been  arranged  between  officers 
on  either  side.  It  was  some  consolation  to  him  that 
the  blockading  ships,  being  unable  to  land  anywhere 
on  the  coast  south  of  the  Apsus,  were  in  such  dis- 
tress for  water  and  provisions  that  their  officers  also 
tried  to  negotiate,  and  Bibulus,  their  admiral,  died  of 
the  privations  he  endured. 

So  the  time  went  on,  and  Caesar  became  more  and 
more   impatient.     He  sent    orders  to  Antonius  at 


286  yulius  Ccesar.  r48  B.C. 

Brundisium  that  he  must  come  at  all  risks,  named 
places  on  the  coast  where  he  could  land  without 
great  danger,  and  expressed  himself  with  unusual 
sternness.  He  did  not  then  know  that  Antonius 
had  himself  been  attacked  at  Brundisium  by  a 
Pompeian  fleet,  and  had  shown  great  skill  in  baffling 
it  and  forcing  it  to  put  to  sea  again.  A  story  was 
current  in  later  times,  which  may  have  had  some 
foundation  in  fact,  that  Caesar  determined  at  this 
time  to  cross  in  person  to  Brundisium  and  see  for 
himself  what  caused  the  delay ;  that  he  hired  a 
twelve-oared  boat,  rowed  down  the  Apsus  to  the 
bar,  and  was  only  forced  to  relinquish  his  purpose 
by  the  refusal  of  the  seamen  to  proceed  against  a 
strong  westerly  wind.  So  much  in  the  story  may 
be  true,  and  Caesar's  habitual  reserve  about  himself 
is  sufficient  to  account  for  its  non-appearance  in  his 
own  narrative. 

At  last,  however,  the  long-expected  fleet  was  seen 
passing  Apollonia  with  a  strong  south  wind  astern. 
From  Dyrrhachium  a  squadron  of  Rhodian  war- 
galleys  at  once  put  out  to  intercept  it ;  just  then  the 
wind  dropped  and  gave  the  Rhodian  rowers  the 
advantage  they  needed  over  the  sailing-vessels  of 
Antonius.  Great  must  have  been  the  excitement 
of  the  watchers  on  the  shore,  as  the  rowers  gained 
on  their  prey.  But  once  more  the  southern  breeze 
began  to  blow,  and  rose  till  it  became  a  gale ;  the 
Caesarian  ships  flew  northwards  before  it  to  the 
little  port  of  Nymphaeum  near  Lissus,  while  of  the 
Rhodian  force  every  ship  was  caught  and  destroyed 
by   the   tempest.     Some   few   of    the    shipwrecked 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachium  and  Pharsalus.  287 

crews   fell   into  Caesar's   hands,   who   sent  them  all 
back  unhurt  to  Dyrrhachium. 

Both  armies,  from  their  camps  on  the  Apsus,  had 
seen  the  fleet  sail  by ;  but  for  a  day  or  two  they 
remained  in  ignorance  of  what  had  become  of  it. 
When  the  news  arrived  that  Antonius  had  landed 
safely  near  Lissus,  the  camps  were  at  last  broken  up  ; 
Pompeius  hastened  northwards  to  intercept  him, 
while  Caesar  sought  for  a  ford  higher  up  the  river, 
and  tried  to  effect  a  junction  with  his  lieutenant  by 
taking  a  circuitous  route  inland.  The  junction  was 
safely  effected,  while  Pompeius  was  lying  inactive  in 
an  ambuscade,  and  expecting  Antonius  to  fall  into 
the  trap  ;  a  fact  which  shows  how  greatly  he  was 
wanting  in  the  quickness  and  intelligence  which  were 
so  characteristic  of  his  adversary.  He  brought,  it 
seems,  no  power  of  imagination  to  the  conduct  of  a 
campaign  ;  that  faculty  which  so  often  enabled 
Wellington  in  Spain  to  divine  what  was  going  on 
behind  distant  mountain  ridges.  He  was  an  excel- 
lent organiser,  if  he  had  ample  time  and  means,  but 
his  mind  worked  so  slowly,  that  when  in  this  war  he 
was  at  last  opposed  to  a  man  of  genius,  he  proved 
utterly  incompetent  to  turn  his  great  advantages  to 
account.  No  quick-witted  general,  even  of  the 
second  order,  would  have  allowed  Caesar  and  An- 
tonius to  join  forces  without  a  severe  struggle.  The 
result  was  that  he  was  forced  to  fall  back  on  Dyr 
rhachium,  and  encamped  at  Asparagium,  a  few  miles 
south  of  the  city.  Caesar  followed,  and  offered 
battle.  This  was  refused  ;  and  Pompeius  could  not 
of  course  be  attacked  in  his  fortified  camp.     Again 


288  yulius  CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 

the  man  of  genius  deluded  his  sleepy  adversary  ;  he 
retreated  into  the  hills  eastwards,  as  if  bent  on 
exploring  the  country  for  supplies,  and  then  turning 
suddenly  to  the  north,  and  marching  day  and  night, 
he  swooped  down  on  Dyrrhachium.  It  was  a  bril- 
liant manoeuvre  ;  the  city  indeed  could  not  be  taken, 
for  it  lay  on  a  rocky  peninsula,  and  was  accessible 
only  by  a  narrow  neck  of  land  between  sea  and 
marshes  ;  but  this  neck  was  now  in  Caesar's  power, 
the  great  road  was  at  this  point  in  his  hands,  and 
Pompeius  was  cut  off  from  his  most  valuable  stores. 

Surely  Pompeius  could  be  induced  to  fight  now. 
''  Let  us  have  it  out,"  Caesar  always  seems  to  be  say- 
ing in  this  campaign,  *'  or  make  up  the  quarrel 
amicably  ;  if  we  fight  and  you  win,  there  will  at  least 
be  a  settlement,  and  that  is  what  the  world  wants." 
But  Pompeius  would  neither  negotiate  nor  risk  a 
battle.  All  along  he  seems  to  have  felt  some  want 
of  confidence  in  his  own  soldiers,  and  to  have  had 
some  reason  for  it ;  Labienus,  too,  who  knew  the 
qualities  of  Caesar's  men,  and  their  leader's  tactical 
skill,  may  have  advised  him  not  to  precipitate  mat- 
ters while  his  fleets  were  in  command  of  the  sea  and 
could  provision  him  without  difficulty.  He  estab- 
lished himself  at  Petra,  a  conspicuous  hill  on  the 
coast  a  short  distance  south  of  Dyrrhachium,  sent 
orders  to  his  fleets  to  collect  supplies  from  every 
quarter,  and  sat  down  complacently  to  watch  events, 
and,  if  possible,  to  starve  out  his  enemy. 

This  led  Caesar  to  adopt  a  novel  plan,  for  which 
he  has  been  generally  blamed  by  military  critics ; 
and    until   Colonel   Stoffel   published   (in    1887)  the 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachium  and  Pharsalus.  289 

results  of  his  personal  examination  of  the  ground, 
there  was  apparently  much  to  justify  such  censure. 
It  was  formerly  believed  that  Caesar  attempted  to 
perform  a  feat  for  which  his  forces  were  quite  inad- 
equate. But  it  appears  now  that  the  design,  when 
first  entered  on,  was  bold  but  by  no  means  hopeless, 
and  that  it  was  only  as  its  execution  proceeded  that 
it  became  more  and  more  exacting  and  dangerous 
for  an  arm^y  of  hardly  more  than  22,000  men,^  coping 
with  an  enemy  of  not  less  than  double  that  number. 
As  his  adversary  would  not  fight  a  battle  (which 
in  ancient  warfare  was  easily  avoided  by  the  occupa- 
tion of  an  entrenched  camp),  Caesar  determined  to 
hem  him  in  by  a  line  of  circumvallation.  The  ac- 
companying map  will  show  that  the  country  round 
Petra,  where  Pompeius  was  encamped,  is  hilly ;  it  is, 
in  fact,  a  tract  of  steep  clayey  hills,  intersected  by 
numerous  ravines  and  gorges,  in  which  ordinary 
military  operations  would  be  almost  impracticable. 
But  such  ground  might  be  utilised  to  prevent  an 
enemy  escaping  through  it.;  and  this  was  what 
Caesar  now  set  about  doing.  I  His  object,  he  tells  us, 
was  threefold  :  first,  to  secure  his  own  supplies  from 
the  inroads  of  the  strong  Pompeian  cavalry ; 
secondly,  to  render  that  cavalry  useless  in  its 
attempts  to  harass  his  own  force ;  thirdly,  to 
impress  the  world  with  the  news  that  the  great 
Pompeius  was  hemmed  in,  and  dared  not  risk  a 
battle.  It  is  clear  that  he  had  given  up  all  hope  of 
a  speedy  issue  to  the  campaign.  | 

*  Two  of  his  legions  had  been  detached,  as  will  be  seen  later  on, 

to  prevent  reinforcements  reaching  Pompeius. 
19 


290  yuliics   Ccesar.  [48  B.C. 

The  idea  was  quite  worthy  of  Caesar's  genius,  but 
was  not  destined  to  be  successfully  carried  out.  He 
had  clearly  intended  that  his  line  of  forts  should  not 
extend  over  a  circuit  of  more  than  eight  or  ten  miles 
at  the  most ;  and  in  that  case  they  would  have  de- 
scended to  the  sea  at  a  point  only  two  or  three  miles 
below  Petra.  But  Pompeius  saw  at  once  that  his 
cue  was  to  compel  Caesar  to  extend  his  lines,  and  so 
to  weaken  his  force  at  every  point.*  He  himself 
had  the  advantage  of  a  concentrated  position,  and 
could  strike  rapidly  and  in  force  at  any  point  in 
Caesar's  lines ;  and  thus,  by  at  least  one  vigorous 
attack  on  his  enemy's  extreme  left,  while  the  work 
was  still  going  on,  he  contrived  to  push  back  that 
wing  and  thereby  to  extend,  by  some  two  or  three 
miles,  the  whole  circuit  of  circumvallation,  and 
seriously  to  delay  its  completion  on  this  side.  He 
also  succeeded  in  constructing  a  series  of  defences, 
within  Caesar's  lines,  with  the  object  of  keeping  his 
enemy  at  a  distance,  and  of  securing  the  ground  he 
had  gained  on  his  right. 

It  would  be  tedious  here  to  detail  the  operations 
of  this  blockade.  It  answered  its  purpose  for  some 
time ;  a  vigorous  attempt  to  break  out  at  Dyrrha- 
chium,  backed  by  simultaneous  attacks  on  other 
parts  of  the  lines,  was  foiled  with  heavy  loss.  At 
last  Pompeius  began  to  feel  severely  the  want  of 
fodder  and  water  for  his  numerous  cavalry.  The 
horses  were  dying  in  numbers,  though  ships  were 
continually  arriving  with  supplies  for  the  men. 
Caesar's  army  on  the  other  hand  was  in   excellent 

*See  B.  C,  iii.,  44,  2;   45,  i. 


JO      to     s 


MACEDONIA   AND    GREECE. 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachium  and  Pharsalus,  291 

health,  and  well  supplied  with  water ;  their  corn  sup- 
ply had  been  exhausted,  but  they  had  discovered  a 
root  growing  on  the  hills,  which  when  pounded  with 
milk  made  a  very  palatable  bread.  They  even  de- 
clared that  they  would  sooner  eat  the  bark  of  trees 
than  let  Pompeius  slip  out  of  their  grasp. 

It  was  probably  the  mortality  among  his  horses 
which  caused  Pompeius  to  make  a  last  desperate 
attempt  to  break  out  of  the  net  which  enclosed  him. 
His  cavalry  was  his  most  useful  arm,  and  that  which, 
as  we  saw  just  now,  Caesar  feared  most.  An  unex- 
pected opportunity  soon  occurred.  Two  Gauls  in 
Caesar's  army,  who  had  served  him  well  and  had  been 
amply  rewarded,  were  detected  in  malpractices ;  and 
though  not  punished  by  him,  they  thought  their 
credit  was  gone,  went  over  to  Pompeius,  and  gave 
him  complete  information  about  the  disposition  of 
Caesar's  army,  and  the  weak  points  in  his  lines.  The 
result  of  this  was  that  Pompeius  determined  to 
attack  these  at  their  southernmost  point,  where  they 
came  down  to  the  sea  on  Caesar's  extreme  left. 
This  point  was  the  farthest  from  Pompeius'  camp, 
and  he  seems  to  have  neglected  it  so  far  ;  Caesar's 
attention,  too,  had  been  engaged  elsewhere,  and  the 
works  here  were  not  as  yet  completed.  The  ditch 
and  rampart  had  indeed  been  finished,  and  carried 
down  to  the  shore ;  and  another  line  of  the  same 
kind,  facing  southwards,  and  intended  by  Caesar,  as 
at  Alesia,  to  check  a  possible  attack  on  his  rear,  had 
also  been   constructed    at    this   point.*     These  two 

*  This  was  part  of  a  projected  outer  line  of  circumvallation,  to  be 
carried  round  the  whole  of  the  position. 


292  jfulius   CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 

lines  were  two  hundred  yards  apart  ;  and  as  it  was 
possible  that  the  enemy  might  throw  troops  from 
the  sea  into  the  space  between  them,  and  so  double 
up  Caesar's  left  wing,  another  cross  line  had  been 
projected,  to  connect  the  two  parallel  ones,  and  so 
check  any  such  attack.  But  this  short  transverse 
line  had  not  been  constructed  ;  and  this  was  the 
most  valuable  piece  of  information  which  the  two 
Gallic  deserters  brought  to  Pompeius. 

He  took  advantage  of  it  with  skill.  A  large  force 
of  light-armed  was  conveyed  by  night  in  boats  to 
the  rear  of  Caesar's  lines,  while  the  main  body  of 
legionaries  was  concentrated  in  front  of  them.  All 
were  provided  with  material  for  filling  up  the 
ditches,  and  also  with  a  new  form  of  protection  for 
the  head,  consisting  of  osier  screens  fixed  on  the 
helmets.  At  daybreak  they  surprised  the  weak 
outpost  of  the  ninth  legion  on  duty  in  the  lines 
near  the  sea ;  this  was  attacked  first  in  front  and 
rear,  and  then  assailed  in  flank  also  by  a  force  which 
landed  between  the  two  ramparts.  The  commander 
of  the  legion,  which  was  in  its  camp  not  far  off, 
came  quickly  to  the  rescue,  but  his  troops  were  car- 
ried away  in  confusion  by  the  flight  of  the  outposts ; 
and  it  was  not  till  Antonius  was  seen  descending 
with  some  thousands  of  men  from  the  heights  above, 
that  the  flight  and  pursuit  were  checked.  When 
Caesar  himself  arrived,  summoned  by  the  smoke  of 
signal  fires,  he  saw  at  once  that  the  disaster  to  his 
lines  was  irreparable.  His  enemy  had  forced  him 
to  extend  his  lines,  and  the  ground  he  had  attempted 
to   cover  was  too  great  for  the  working  strength  of 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachiuin  and  Pkarsalus.  293 

his  army.  His  intense  dislike  of  renouncing  any 
project  to  which  he  had  set  his  hand,  had  led  him 
for  once  into  serious  error.  All  his  work  was  thrown 
away  ;  the  lines  were  abandoned  ;  and  a  camp  was 
constructed  that  same  morning  for  the  whole  army 
near  the  new  position  of  Pompeius. 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  eventful  ddif,  Caesar 
made  an  attempt  to  revive  the  spirits  of  his  men, 
and  to  inflict  loss  on  the  enemy,  by  attacking  a 
Pompeian  legion  which  had  been  seen  marching  to 
occupy  a  deserted  camp  some  little  distance  to  the 
north  of  both  armies.  This  camp  had  been  made 
by  Caesar's  ninth  legion^  and  then  abandoned  ;  it  was 
next  occupied  by  Pompeius,  who  had  connected  it 
by  a  ditch  and  rampart  with  a  stream  still  farther  to 
the  north,  in  order  to  secure  a  water-supply  for  its 
garrison.  He,  however,  in  his  turn,  had  for  some 
reason  abandoned  it ;  but  now,  as  it  seems  to  have 
been  situated  on  Caesar's  right  flank,  he  probably 
thought  it  worth  re-occupying.  His  legion  took 
possession  of  it ;  but  Caesar  now  attacked  in  full 
force,  and  with  his  left  wing,  which  he  led  in  person, 
broke  down  the  gate  and  drove  the  defenders  to  the 
rear  of  the  camp,  where  they  endeavoured  to  rally. 
Meanwhile  the  right  wing,  misled  by  the  entrench- 
ment leading  to  the  stream,  which  they  strangely 
took  for  part  of  the  camp,  had  followed  this  in 
search  of  a  gate,  and  became  separated  from  their 
comrades  on  the  left.  Finding  their  mistake,  they 
made  a  breach  in  the  entrenchment,  and  poured 
through,  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  only  to  find 
a  powerful  body  of  the  enemy  pressing  upon  them, 


294  yulius   CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 

which  Pompeius  had  sent  to  the  rescue.  A  panic 
seized  them,  for  the  rampart  and  ditch  in  their  rear 
now  cut  off  their  retreat ;  and  the  whole  wing  was 
put  to  rout  as  they  tried  to  scale  this  obstacle, 
losing  more  men  by  the  fall  into  the  ditch  than  by 
the  sword  of  the  enemy.  Panic  too  now  seized  the 
victorious  left  wing,  who  seeing  from  the  camp  the 
disaster  on  the  right,  thought  they  would  be  taken 
in  the  rear  and  cut  ofT ;  and  in  a  moment,  by  one  of 
those  strange  turns  of  fortune  which,  as  Caesar  here 
observes,  decide  great  events,  the  whole  army  was  in 
confusion  and  flight.  As  in  the  battle  with  the 
Nervii,  he  himself  essayed  to  arrest  the  panic- 
stricken  crowd.  He  seized  a  standard,  and  laid 
hands  on  its  bearer,  who  in  his  wild  terror  (so  Plu- 
tarch tells  the  story),  actually  raised  his  sword  to 
strike  his  general,  and  would  have  killed  him,  had 
not  Caesar's  shield-bearer  cut  off  the  man's  arm  at  the 
shoulder.* 

■^  Caesar  does  not  in  the  least  disguise  the  gravity  of 
this  defeat.  He  tells  us  that  the  whole  army  would 
have  been  destroyed,  if  the  same  wall  which  proved 
so  fatal  to  his  right  wing,  had  not  also  served  to 
check  the  enemy's  pursuit.  In  any  case,  Pompeius 
should  have  followed  up  his  victory  at  once ;  Caesar 
could  only  account  for  his  sluggishness  by  supposing 
that  he  feared  an  ambuscade.  It  was  on  this  occa- 
sion that  Caesar  is  reported  to  have  said  that  the 
enemy  would  have  finished  the  campaign  then  and 
there,  if  they  had  only  had  a  general  who  knew  how 


*  Csesar  himself  says  that  he  laid  hands  on  the  standard-bearer, 
but  omits  the  rest  of  the  story.     B.  C,  iii.,  69. 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachium  and  Pkarsalus.  295 

to  conquer."^  1  He  lost  this  day,  by  his  own  confession, 
960  rank  and  file,  5  military  tribunes,  32  centurions, 
and  32  standards.  Pompeius  was  saluted  as  Impera- 
tor  by  his  army,  according  to  the  old  custom  after  a 
victory ;  but  sullied  his  fame,  if  we  may  accept 
Caesar's  account,  by  allowing  the  renegade  Labienus 
to  butcher  all  the  prisoners  in  cold  blood,  after 
taunting  them  with  cowardice  unworthy  of  Gallic 
veterans. 

1  Like  Wellington  at  Burgos  in  1812,  Caesar  had 
failed  in  his  designs  from  want  of  a  sufficient  force ; 
like  Wellington,  too,  he  could  no  longer  venture  on 
a  battle,  even  if  the  chance  were  offered  him.'  In 
each  case  the  only  safe  course  was  to  retreat,  and  in 
each  case  the  retreat  was  conducted  with  admirable 
skill.  Wellington  muffled  the  wheels  of  his  gun- 
carriages,  and  so  escaping  notice  for  a  while,  got  the 
start  of  his  foes:  Caesar,  after  a  short  address  of 
encouragement,  sent  on  his  wounded  and  baggage 
at  night-fall  under  an  escort,  then  despatched  his 
main  body,  and  started  himself  at  dawn  with  a  rear- 
guard of  two  legions.  Before  noon  he  had  reached 
his  old  camp  from  which  some  weeks  before  he  had 
slipped  away  so  adroitly  to  swoop  upon  Dyrrhachium; 
and  here,  on  the  bank  of  a  river,  he  was  overtaken 
by  the  Pompeian  cavalry.  It  was  beaten  off,  but  it 
was  necessary  for  Caesar  to  hasten  onwards ;  and 
seeing  the  enemy  were  straggling  after  fodder,  or 
taking  their  ease  in  their  own  old  camp,  he  started 
once  more  that  afternoon,  and  was  never  again 
caught  up.     On  the  fourth  day  Pompeius  gave  up 

*  Appian,  B.  C,  ii.,  62. 


296  yulitis  Ccssar,  [48  B.C. 

the  pursuit,  and  had  to  turn  his  attention  to  devis- 
ing a  fresh  plan  of  campaign. 

Caesar's  base  of  operations,  so  far  as  he  had  any  at 
all,  was  ApoUonia ;  and  making  for  that  town,  he 
paid  his  men,  deposited  his  wounded,  and  made  his 
plans  for  continuing  the  struggle.  When  Antonius 
had  joined  him  some  weeks  before,  he  had  taken 
advantage  of  his  increased  numbers  to  despatch  two 
legions  under  Domitius  Calvinus  along  the  great 
road  ^  into  Macedonia  to  check  the  advance  of  the 
re-inforcements  which  Pompeius  was  expecting  in 
that  direction.  Domitius  performed  his  duty  well, 
and  Scipio,  Pompeius'  father-in-law,  had  failed  to  get 
past  him  with  the  troops  he  was  bringing.  It  was 
now  Caesar's  object  to  re-unite  with  Domitius,  and, 
by  threatening  to  crush  Scipio,  to  draw  Pompeius 
away  from  the  sea,  and  so  to  deprive  him  of  the 
advantages  he  had  so  far  enjoyed  from  the  mastery 
of  it.  And  if  Pompeius  should  venture  on  an  invasion 
of  Italy — a  course  strongly  urged  on  him  by  some  of 
his  many  advisers, — he  would  have  to  sacrifice  Scipio, 
and  leave  his  enemy  in  entire  possession  of  Greece  and 
Macedonia.  The  lucidity  of  Caesar's  mind  is  no- 
where better  seen  than  in  the  short  chapter  in  which 
he  has  explained  the  situation  as  he  understood  it ; 
and  probably  no  general  ever  put  so  much  sound 
reasoning  into  words  so  few  and  so  clear.f 

He  had  hardly  sent  word  to  Domitius  to  join  him 
when  he   found  that  Pompeius  had  himself  turned 

*  This  was  open  to  him,  as  we  saw,  after  his  descent  on  Dyrrha- 
chium,  as  was  also  the  branch  of  it  which  led  to  ApoUonia. 
f  B.  C,  iii.,  78. 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhackium  and  Pkarsalus.  297 

eastwards  along  the  great  road  with  a  view  to  a 
junction  with  Scipio.  Domitius  was,  therefore, 
Hkely  to  be  caught  between  two  armies ;  and  in 
fact  he  had  a  very  narrow  escape.  Some  talkative 
Gauls  in  Pompeius'  army,  friends  of  the  two  who 
had  betrayed  Caesar  before  Dyrrhachium,  now  did 
Caesar  a  good  turn,  and  in  chatting  with  some  of 
Domitius'  foragers  let  them  know  of  the  danger. 
He  escaped  just  in  time,  crossed  the  mountains 
which  separate  Macedonia  from  Thessaly,  and  joined 
Caesar,  who  had  meanwhile  marched  from  Apollo- 
nia  in  a  south-easterly  direction,  at  ^ginium  in  the 
north-western  corner  of  the  great  Thessalian  plain. 
The  united  armies  passed  southwards  to  Gomphi,  a 
town  of  some  size,  and  stormed  it  on  the  afternoon 
of  their  arrival.  Caesar  let  his  soldiers  plunder  it  as 
they  pleased  and  enjoy  at  last  abundant  wine  and 
food.  Like  Wellington's  men  in  the  retreat  from 
Burgos,  they  are  said  to  have  here  got  drunk  and 
behaved  ill,  as  might  be  expected  after  long  priva- 
tion and  hard  work.  Another  town  wisely  opened 
its  gates  in  time,  and  was  spared  the  same  fate  ;  and 
then  the  army  marched  at  leisure  across  the  great 
plain,  enjoying  comparative  plenty,  and  so  recover- 
ing the  tone  and  spirit  which  famished  soldiers 
inevitably  lose,  to  the  neighbourhood  of  the  city  of 
Pharsalus,  where  several  great  roads  converged. 

Pompeius,  too,  having  effected  his  junction  with 
Scipio,  gave  up  all  other  plans,  and  descended  into 
the  Thessalian  plain  as  far  as  Larissa  in  its  centre. 
Even  now,  it  is  said,  he  was  still  unwilling  to  fight  a 
battle.     He  wished  to  wear  out  his  subtle  enemy  by 


298  Julius  CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 

constant  manoeuvring,  and  to  use  his  strong  cavalry 
to  cut  off  Caesar's  supplies.  And  there  is  little  doubt 
that  this  was  the  judgment  of  a  wise  and  cautious 
general  who  knew  the  weak  points  of  his  army. 
But  Pompeius  was  no  more  his  own  master  now 
than  in  the  days  when  he  had  tried  to  govern  at 
Rome.  The  same  foolish  clamours,  the  same  petty 
competition  and  quarrelling,  which  his  rival  had 
escaped  for  ten  years  in  Gaul,  distracted  him  now, 
and  at  last  induced  him  to  fight,  against  his  own 
better  judgment.  He  marched  from  Larissa,  and 
encamped  on  the  slope  of  a  hill  facing  Caesar's  posi- 
tion near  Pharsalus.  For  this  last  of  the  long 
succession  of  follies,  which  sealed  the  fate  of  the 
Republic,  the  senators  who  were  in  his  camp  at  the 
time  must  be  held  chiefly  responsible. 

One  may  well  pause  to  take  breath,  like  Caesar's 
soldiers  in  the  action,  before  entering  on  the  de- 
scription of  a  battle  fraught  with  such  issues  as  that 
of  Pharsalus.  It  is  not  indeed  so  much  in  the  num- 
bers of  the  combatants,  or  in  the  intensity  of  the 
struggle,  that  its  gravity  is  felt  ;  the  armed  men 
present  on  the  field  did  not  much  exceed  half  the 
number  that  fought  at  Waterloo,  and  the  decisive 
fighting  could  not  have  lasted  much  more  than  an 
hour.  Here,  too,  is  lacking  the  interest  which  at- 
taches to  a  battle  of  which  the  scene  is  known  and 
can  be  visited  ;  for  the  exact  position  of  the  battle- 
field has  never  as  yet  been  placed  beyond  all  doubt.* 
The   interest  lies  rather  in  this,  that  the  condition 

*  Colonel  Stoffel  believed  he  had  discovered  it ;  but  in  this  instance 
he  failed  (as  I  think)  to  reconcile  his  view  with  Caesar's  own  language. 


48  B.C.]     Dyrrhachiuni  and  Pharsalus.  299 

of  the  Roman  world  and  the  struggle  going  on  in 
it,  are  mirrored  on  this  field  with  such  astonishing 
fidelity.  All  the  world's  decisive  battles  have  this 
interest  in  some  degree,  and  the  historian  who 
neglects  them  loses  some  of  his  best  opportunities; 
but  in  none,  perhaps,  have  the  contending  forces 
in  a  world-wide  revolution  been  so  exactly  focussed 
in  two  armies  on  a  single  battle-field.  On  one  side 
the  disunion,  selfishness,  and  pride  of  the  last  sur- 
vivors of  an  ancient  oligarchy,  speculating  before 
the  event  on  the  wealth  or  office  that  victory  was 
to  bring  them  ;  on  the  other  the  absolute  command 
of  a  single  man,  whose  clear  mental  vision  was  en- 
tirely occupied  with  the  facts  and  issues  that  lay 
before  him  that  day.  The  one  host  was  composed 
in  great  part  of  a  motley  crowd  from  Greece  and 
the  East,  representing  that  spurious  Hellenic  civil- 
isation that  for  a  century  had  sapped  the  vigour  of 
Roman  life  ;  the  other  was  chiefly  drawn  from  the 
Gallic  populations  of  Italy  and  the  West,  fresh,  vig- 
orous, intelligent,  and  united  in  devotion  and  loyalty 
to  a  leader  whom  not  even  defeat  could  dishearten. 
With  Pompeius  was  the  spirit  of  the  past,  and  his 
failure  did  but  answer  to  the  failure  of  a  decaying 
world  ;  with  Caesar  was  the  spirit  of  the  future,  and 
his  victory  marks  the  moment  when  humanity  could 
once  more  start  hopefully  upon  a  new  line  of 
progress.   ■*  ■■ 

For  some  days  the  armies  remained  in  position  ; 
Pompeius  would  not  advance  into  the  plain,  but 
drew  up  his  army  each  day  at  the  foot  of  the  hill 
on  which  his  camp  was  placed.     Here  he  could  not 


300  yulius  CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 


be  safely  attacked  ;  and  Caesar  determined  to  try  the 
plan  of  drawing  him  away  from  his  hill  by  a  series 
of  rapid  marches.  On  the  morning  of  the  9th  of 
August  the  signal  for  marching  had  been  given, 
and  the  camp  struck,  when  Caesar  saw  that  the 
enemy's  line  of  battle  had  been  drawn  out  a  little 
farther  from  the  hill  than  usual ;  just  enough  to 
deprive  Pompeius  of  the  natural  advantage  of  the 
ground.  But  his  position  was  still  a  formidable 
one.  His  right  rested  securely  on  a  stream  with 
precipitous  banks  ;  his  left  extended  far  into  the 
plain,  and  was  flanked  by  his  cavalry,  7,000  in 
number,  and  by  a  host  of  light-armed  men  and 
archers.  With  this  left  wing  he  meant  to  outflank 
Caesar's  right,  and  then  to  attack  him  in  the  rear  ; 
and  as  it  appeared  afterwards,  he  had  expressed 
himself  as  absolutely  confident  of  the  result.*  He 
had  about  50,000  men  on  the  field,  exclusive  of 
light  troops. 

At  sight  of  this  magnificent  army  Caesar  spoke  to 
his  staff,  just  as  his  own  men  were  issuing  from 
their  camp  in  marching  order.  *'  We  must  stop  the 
march  and  attack.  This  is  what  we  have  been  look- 
ing for  so  long ;  we  shall  not  easily  find  a  better 
opportunity."  He  reconnoitred  the  enemy's  forma- 
tion more  closely,  and  arranged  his  own  to  counter- 
act it.  He  saw  at  once  that  his  right  wing  was  to 
be  turned,  and  there  of  course  he  placed  his  small 
force  of  1,000  cavalry,  and  the  famous  tenth  legion, 
which  had  served  him  so  long  and  so  well.  The 
rest  of  the  army  he  placed  in  three  lines,  and  these 

♦Caes.,  B.  C,  iii.,  86. 


48  B.C.]     DyrrhacJiium  and  Pharsalus.  301 

were  divided  into  a  left  wing,  a  centre,  and  a  right 
wing,  commanded  respectively  by  Antonius,  Domi- 
tius,  and  P.  Sulla,  a  nephew  of  Sulla  the  Dictator, 
who  had  distinguished  himself  at  Dyrrhachium  by 
his  self-restraint,  as  well  as  his  skill.*  At  the  last 
moment,  as  it  seems,  he  made  another  disposition  to 
strengthen  the  threatened  right  wing,  which,  as  he 
himself  states  with  unusual  emphasis,  decided  the 
fortune  of  the  day.  From  his  third  line,  or  reserve, 
he  drew  a  detachment  of  several  cohorts,  or,  as  we 
may  call  them,  battalions,  and  placed  them  in  the 
right  rear  with  special  orders,  and  a  warning  that 
victory  would  depend  on  their  valour.  His  whole 
force  cannot  be  computed  at  more  than  30,000 
strong,  including  light-armed  troops. 

When  all  was  ready,  he  made  the  usual  address, 
reminding  the  troops,  as  he  tells  us,  of  all  his  hope- 
less efforts  to  procure  peace,  and  calling  them  to 
witness  that  he  was  forced  to  fight.  Then  he  took 
station  on  the  right  wing  and  ordered  the  trumpet 
to  sound  for  the  attack.  The  first  two  lines  levelled 
their  javelins  and  advanced  at  a  run  ;  the  Pompeians, 
in  obedience  to  their  general's  order,  awaited  them 
motionless.  In  giving  this  order,  says  Caesar  in  a 
couple  of  striking  sentences,  Pompeius  judged 
wrongly  ;  he  thought  the  attacking  line  would  get 
into  disorder,  but  he  forgot  that  human  nature 
is  excitable,  and  that  in  a  battle  such  excitement 
must  be  rather  encouraged  than  repressed.  Cassar's 
men,  finding  that  the  enemy  did  not  stir,  halted 
of  their  own  accord  at  a  short  distance  from  them 

*B.  C.,iii.,  51. 


302  Julius  CcEsar.  [48  B.C. 

to  take  breath,  then  moved  forward  again,  dis- 
charged their  javelins,  drew  swords,  and  charged 
home.  The  charge  was  bravely  met,  and  a  hard 
struggle  ensued. 

Meanwhile  the  whole  Pompeian  cavalry,  covered 
by  clouds  of  archers,  had  attacked  Caesar's  right 
wing.  His  own  horsemen  could  not  resist  such  a 
force,  and  gradually  fell  back.  But  Caesar  was  on 
the  watch  for  this ;  he  did  not  here  commit  the 
blunder  of  which  he  seems  to  have  been  guilty  in 
his  late  defeat,  of  leading  the  attack  in  person  and 
so  losing  touch  with  one  half  of  his  army.  He  gave 
the  signal  to  the  battalions  he  had  placed  in  reserve. 
Wheeling  to  the  right,  so  as  to  face  the  horsemen 
now  descending  on  the  right  flank  and  rear,  they 
ran  forward  at  the  charge,  not  discharging  their 
javelins  but  using  them  as  spears,  and  driving  them 
against  man  and  horse.  Such  tactics  might  seem 
desperate,  but  they  answered  Caesar's  expectations. 
The  cavalry  was  taken  aback  by  a  method  of  fight- 
ing so  novel ;  they  were  checked,  gave  way,  and 
fled  at  full  speed  to  the  hills. 

All  this  time  the  struggle  in  the  front  had  gone 
on  without  result,  but  now  that  the  enemy's  cavalry 
was  beaten  Caesar  could  use  his  third  line,  which 
had  remained  in  position  to  protect  the  rear.  It 
was  now  sent  forward  to  support  the  two  front 
lines,  and  this  decided  the  battle.  The  whole 
Pompeian  army  fled  to  their  camp  ;  Pompeius  gave 
orders  to  secure  the  gates  and  man  the  ramparts, 
and  then  retired  to  his  tent.  Caesar,  thinking  that 
a  broken  army  might  be  dislodged  even  from  a  for- 


48  B.C.]      Dyrrhachium  and  Pharsalus.  303 

tified  camp,  appealed  to  his  men  to  finish  their  work, 
though  it  was  now  mid-day  and  the  heat  was  intense. 
The  camp  was  stormed.  Pompeius  galloped  out  by 
the  gate  at  the  rear  and  fled  towards  Larissa ;  the 
troops  escaped  as  best  they  could  and,  following  the 
example  of  the  cavalry,  made  for  the  summits  of 
the  neighbouring  hills.  They  were  followed  the 
same  afternoon  by  Caesar,  whose  power  of  discipline 
could  draw  his  men  away  from  plundering  the  lux- 
urious tents  of  the  Pompeian  officers,  even  after  so 
many  months  of  privation  and  discomfort.  At 
night-fall  he  caught  them  in  a  position  from  which 
their  water-supply  could  be  cut  off,  and  at  the  sight 
of  his  unwearied  soldiers  bracing  themselves  to  this 
last  effort  with  the  spade,  they  sent  to  capitulate. 
Next  morning  at  daybreak  they  descended  at  his 
orders  to  the  plain  and  laid  down  their  arms. 
According  to  his  own  account,  he  had  mercy  upon 
all,  spoke  a  few  reassuring  words,  and  commended 
them  to  the  care  of  his  soldiers.  The  same  day  he 
started  in  pursuit  of  Pompeius,  who  had  gone  to 
Larissa  with  a  few  horsemen. 

In  this  battle  Pompeius  lost  some  15,000  men 
killed  or  wounded  and  24,000  prisoners  ;  a  hundred 
and  eighty  standards  were  taken  and  the  eagles 
of  eight  legions,  besides  a  quantity  of  plate  found 
in  the  camp,  and  much  other  spoil. "^     Caesar,  who  is 


*  Including  the  papers  of  Pompeius,  which  Caesar  is  said  to  have 
burnt  without  reading  them.  (Dio  Cass.,  41,  62,  63  ;  who,  however, 
says,  on  what  authority  we  know  not,  that  Cnssar  put  to  death  those 
of  the  senators  and  equiles  among  his  prisoners  whom  he  had  once 
before  taken  and  released,  as  at  Corfinium.) 


304  y ulitis  Qcsar.  [43  B.C. 

usually  truthful  in  such  matters,  even  when  they 
reflect  no  credit  on  him,  puts  his  own  loss  at  only 
two  hundred,  including,  however,  thirty  centurions. 
Among  these  was  one  Crastinus,  an  old  soldier  of 
the  tenth  legion,  who,  when  the  trumpet  sounded 
on  the  eve  of  the  battle,  had  called  out  to  his  general 
that,  whether  alive  or  dead,  he  would  that  day 
deserve  his  thanks.  He  made  good  his  word,  and, 
if  Appian's  tale  is  true,  his  grateful  commander  had 
his  body  searched  for,  decorated  with  military 
honours,  and  buried  apart  from  the  rest. 

Pompeius  did  not  wait  at  Larissa.  He  hurried 
through  the  vale  of  Tempe  to  the  coast,  found  a 
ship,  and  crossed  the  ^gean  to  Mytilene,  where  his 
wife  Cornelia  heard  from  his  own  lips  the  first  tidings 
of  the  battle.  He  did  not  land,  but  took  her  and 
his  younger  son  on  board  and  sailed  along  the 
coast  to  Cilicia  and  then  to  Cyprus,  in  great  doubt 
as  to  where  to  turn  for  help.  If  he  had  still  had 
any  vigour  or  decision  he  would  have  gone  west- 
wards to  join  the  fleet  from  which  he  had  so  unwisely 
allowed  himself  to  be  dissociated  ;  he  might  have 
carried  on  the  struggle  for  years  at  sea,  with  the 
rich  province  of  Africa,  which  was  still  his,  as  a  base 
of  operations.  But  of  Africa  he  knew  little  or 
nothing,  while  in  Syria  and  the  East  his  name  was 
known  to  everyone.  He  fell  back  on  the  scenes  of 
his  old  triumphs,  but  found'  that  the  Oriental  never 
worships  the  setting  sun.  At  Cyprus  they  would 
not  admit  him,  and  he  was  told  that  it  would  be  the 
same  in  Syria.  There  was  still  Egypt,  which  was 
not  indeed  a  Roman  province,  but  was  under  Roman 


48  B.C.]      Dyrrhachiurn  and  Pharsalus.  305 

influence,"^  and  had  in  Alexandria  the  best  and  richest 
port  in  the  Mediterranean.  It  was  at  this  time  torn 
by  a  civil  war,  and  a  boy-king,  Ptolemy,  had  lately 
succeeded  in  expelling  his  sister  Cleopatra,  who, 
under  their  father's  will,  was  to  share  the  throne 
with  himself.  The  boy  and  girl  were  now  each 
with  an  army  near  the  Pelusiac  mouth  of  the  Nile. 

To  Pelusium  Pompeius  sailed,  and  sent  to  the 
young  king  to  ask  for  protection  on  the  ground  of 
friendship  with  his  late  father.  He  was  invited  to 
come  ashore,  embraced  his  wife,  and  embarked  in  a 
small  boat  which  had  been  sent  for  him.  As  he 
reached  the  shore  he  was  brutally  murdered,  un- 
resisting, by  Achillas,  an  officer  of  the  King,  and 
Septimius,  an  old  officer  of  his  own,  now  on  service 
in  Egypt.  No  one  knew  what  prompted  this  villain^ 
ous  act  of  treachery  ;  whether  it  was  a  desire  to 
propitiate  Caesar,  or  a  national  feeling  that  Pompeius 
would  be  a  dangerous  guest,  and  might  make  him- 
self master  of  the  country. 

The  pathos  of  the  story  of  his  last  days  is  height- 
ened by  many  details  in  the  narratives  of  Plutarch 
and  others,  which  must  be  omitted  here.  The 
reader  will  rather  wish  to  know  what  manner  of  man 
this  was,  who  was  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  the 
greatest  figure  in  the  Roman  world,  and  who  has 
come  before  us  so  constantly  in  our  narrative,  first  as 
Caesar's  friend  and  son-in-law,  then  as  his  rival  and 
enemy.     But    the    fact    is    that    of    Pompeius'    real 

*  There  was  a  considerable  Roman  force  now  in  Egypt,  left  by 
Gabinius  after  his  invasion  in  56  B.C.,  and  Gabinius  was  an  old 
adherent  of  Pompeius. 


3o6  Julius  CcBsar.  [48  B.C. 

character  as  a  man  we  know  hardly  anything.  Cicero, 
whose  letters  at  least  might  have  revealed  him  to  us, 
seems  never  to  have  known  the  man  intimately,  as 
he  knew  Caesar,  and  the  result  we  get  from  him 
is  an  uncertain  and  negative  one.  Probably  Pom- 
peius  was  cold  and  reserved,  except  with  a  very  few 
intimates,  and  disliked  the  impulsive,  pushing  clever- 
ness of  his  would-be  friend.  But  if  we  may  accept 
the  general  tradition  of  antiquity,  he  was  a  just  and 
honourable  man  in  private  life,  clean-handed  in  a 
corrupt  age,  and  unwilling  by  nature  to  be  cruel  or 
treacherous.  He  did  not  shine  in  the  fashionable  or 
literary  society  of  Rome,  for  he  had  no  special  gift 
of  speaking  or  writing ;  he  had  been  educated  as  a 
soldier  only,  and  it  was  perhaps  a  consciousness  of 
his  own  defects  and  ignorance  that  made  him  so  in- 
accessible and  reserved. 

We  can  measure  his  stature  better  as  a  soldier  and 
statesman.  In  the  conduct  of  war  he  was  prudent 
by  nature,  and  experience  had  made  him  almost 
over-cautious.  As  has  been  already  said,  if  he  had 
ample  time  and  means  at  his  disposal,  he  could  work 
out  a  great  result  ;  and  in  this  way  he  made  his 
three  great  contributions  to  the  welfare  of  the  Em- 
pire— the  destruction  of  the  pirates,  the  final  over- 
throw of  Mithridates,  and  the  settlement  of  the 
eastern  frontier  on  what  was  practically  the  line  of 
the  Euphrates.  But  the  great  work  he  did  does  not 
prove  him  a  great  man.  He  was  wanting,  so  far  as 
we  can  tell,  not  only  in  rapidity  and  resource  in  the 
field,  but  in  that  power  of  inspiring  men  with  con- 
fidence in  his  own  genius  and  destiny  which  carried 


48  B.C.]      Dyrrhacktum  and  Pharsalus.  307 

Caesar  safely  through  so  many  perils.  Loyalty  to 
the  person  of  a  great  leader  has  a  magical  power  in 
times  of  tumult  and  revolution  ;  and  loyalty  could 
never  be  paid  to  Pompeius  as  it  was  to  Caesar.  The 
adherents  of  the  one  were  always  trying  to  get  the 
better  of  him  ;  the  friends  of  the  other  obeyed  him 
with  enthusiasm.  And  this  was  so  in  politics  as  well 
as  in  war.  Men  looked  for  leadership  to  Pompeius, 
and  found  him  uncertain  whither  to  lead  ;  they 
looked  to  Caesar,  and  found  themselves  at  once  in 
the  grip  of  a  mighty  will.  A  man  without  knowl- 
edge of  men,  and  without  understanding  in  politics, 
cannot  govern  events  when  great  questions  have 
to  be  decided  ;  and  though  we  may  feel  tenderly 
towards  one  whose  downfall  was  so  sudden  and  so 
sad,  we  must  allow  that  all  his  history  shows  him 
incapable  of  doing  the  work  that  the  world  was  then 
ever  more  and  more  earnestly  demanding.  He 
came  indeed  within  a  touch  of  being  the  founder  of 
a  new  monarchy,  and  for  the  three  years  preceding 
the  outbreak  of  civil  war  he  held  a  position  in  many 
points  closely  resembling  that  of  the  early  emperors. 
He  played  a  great  part,  and  his  successful  rival  duly 
honoured  his  memory.  Yet  in  Pompeius  there  was 
not  the  material  out  of  which  great  rulers  are  made. 
The  recognition  of  the  real  nature  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  and  the  invention  of  a  method  of  govern- 
ment which  might  solve  its  many  problems,  were  not 
within  the  scope  of  a  mind  that  moved  with  an 
impetus  so  feeble. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 

CiESAR'S     LAST     WARS. 
48-45    B.C. 


^|HE  task  to  which  Pompeius  was 
unequal  was,  we  said  in  the 
last  words  of  the  last  chapter, 
the    recognition    of    the   true 


nature  of  the  Roman  Empire, 
and  the  invention  of  a  method 
of  government  which  might 
solve  its  many  problems. 
I  Caesar,  as  we  have  seen  all 
along,  understood  better  than 
any  living  man  what  this  Empire  was,  and  in  what 
direction  it  was  to  be  developed  ;  but  had  he  also 
any  clear  idea  of  a  system  of  government  which 
might  be  suited  to  its  needs,  seeing  that  the  sena-^ 
torial  method  was  utterly  worn  out  and  discredited  ?^ 

The  answer  to  this  question  must  be  postponed  to 
the  next  chapter.  In  the  present  one  we  must  give 
a  very  brief  sketch  of  the  work  that  had  to  be  done 
before  questions  of  method  could  be  grappled  with. 

308 


48  B.C.]  CcBsars  Last  Wars, 


309 


I  Only  let  it  be  said  at  once  that  the  work  of  Caesar's 
life  was  not  organisation,  but  the  necessary  prep- 
aration for  it.  I  He  prepared  the  field,  and  he  indi- 
cated in  some  degree  how  it  should  be  planted,  but 
it  was  left  for  a  very  different  and  a  subtler  character 
both  to  plant  it  and  to  see  the  crop  grow.  What 
then  was  this  task  of  preparation,  which  was  the  real 
work  of  his  indefatigable  energy  ?  It  had  been  going 
on  ever  since  he  was  consul,  and  appeared  as  the 
really  active  partner  in  the  triumvirate ;  a  slow  but 
sure  process,  lasting  through  the  Gallic  War,  through 
the  conquest  of  Italy  and  Spain,  through  the  cam- 
paign that  ended  at  Pharsalus,  and  finding  its  com- 
pletion in  the  wars  now  about  to  be  summarised. 
It  was  simply  the  enforcement  of  the  lesson,  which 
the  Roman  world  refused  to  learn  except  under 
compulsion  of  arms,  that  a  man  has  arisen  more 
deserving  of  loyalty  than  all  the  gathered  wisdom  of 
an  old  city  aristocracy.  Trust,  loyalty,  obedience, 
qualities  which  had  long  vanished  from  the  Roman 
mind,  must  be  created  anew,  even  if  it  had  to  be 
done  by  the  stern  lessons  of  war,  as  well  as  by  the 
gentler  teaching  of  humanity  and  mercy.  Towards 
this  end  Caesar  untiringly  worked  in  province  after 
province,  until  the  whole  world  recognised  that  he 
was  as  irresistible  as  he  was  gracious,  and  believed 
in  him  because  they  could  not  crush  him,  and 
because  they  had  no  just  cause  to  hate  him. 
Though,  like  David,  he  himself  for  good  reason 
could  not  carry  out  the  great  building  that  was 
called  for,  he  laid  great  store  of  material  for  it,  in 
teaching  the  world  this  lesson,  without  which  all  the 


3IO  Julius  CcBsar.  [48  B.C.- 

subtle  skill  of  his  successor  would  assuredly  have 
gone  for  nothing. 

We  are  justified  in  limiting  our  account  of  Caesar's 
last  wars  to  a  mere  outline,  not  only  by  the  compass 
of  this  volume,  but  because  we  here  finally  part 
company  with  Caesar  himself  as  an  author.  The 
three  memoirs  which  tell  of  his  work  in  Egypt, 
Africa,  and  Spain,*  were  written  probably  by  eye- 
witnesses and  ofificers  of  his  army,  and  are  no  doubt 
fairly  accurate  in  matters  of  military  detail.  But 
of  military  detail  the  reader  will  already  have  had 
enough,  and  will  prefer  that  it  should  be  omitted, 
where  Caesar  is  no  longer  telling  the  story  himself. 

The  victor  followed  the  vanquished  with  all  speed 
to  Egypt,  only  to  be  apprised  of  Pompeius'  death 
by  the  ghastly  spectacle  of  his  head,  brought  to  him 
by  a  Greek  rhetorician  on  behalf  of  the  assassins. 
He  had  with  him  a  very  small  force,  little  more  than 
three  thousand  legionaries  ;  with  these  he  landed  at 
Alexandria,  sent  orders  for  other  forces  to  come 
with  speed,  and  began  to  busy  himself  in  Egyptian 
affairs.  It  was  clearly  not  his  original  intention  to 
stay  long,  but  northerly  winds  detained  him  until  he 
got  entangled  in  the  meshes  of  Alexandrian  intrigue  ; 
in  other  meshes  too,  if  the  stories  about  Cleopatra 
are  true.     He  landed  early  in  October,  48  B.C.,  and 


*The  "  De  Bello  Alexandrino,"  is  now  believed  by  some  critics  to 
be  the  work  of  the  accomplished  Asinius  Pollio,  The  authorship  of 
the  other  two  works  is  quite  uncertain  ;  that  on  the  last  Spanish  war  is 
by  a  very  rude  hand.  None  of  the  three,  though  modelled  on  Caesar's 
method,  can  compare  with  his  own  "Commentaries"  in  respect  of 
style  and  workmanship. 


45  B.C.]  CcBsars  Last  Wars,  311 

did  not  get  out  of  the  toils  until  the  June  following. 
The  delay  was  a  calamity  for  himself  and  the  Em- 
pire. The  secret  history  of  these  months  can  never 
be  written  ;  Asinius  Pollio,  or  whoever  wrote  the 
book  about  this  war,  has  told  us  nothing  of  it. 
Some  writers,  like  Mr.  Froude,  have  denied  that 
there  was  a  secret  history  at  all,  and  believe  that  the 
relations  of  Caesar  and  the  bewitching  Egyptian 
princess  were  merely  the  inventions  of  a  later  age, 
like  so  many  foolish  tales  which  we  justly  reject. 
But  the  delay  after  his  arrival,  and  the  later  delay  of 
three  months  after  the  final  settlement  of  Egypt, 
taken  together  with  the  known  beauty  and  ability  of 
Cleopatra  and  the  birth  of  a  son  named  Caesarion, 
make  the  inference  almost  irresistible.  The  air,  the 
antiquity,  the  river  of  Egypt  have  some  strange 
power  of  fascinating  strangers,  and  when  to  these 
are  added  the  charms  of  such  a  woman  as  Caesar 
had  not  met  for  more  than  ten  years,  if  ever  in  his 
life,  we  can  understand  the  temptation  and  believe 
in  the  lost  romance.  Stories  were  afloat  in  later 
times  that  the  pair  projected  or  even  carried  out  an 
expedition  far  up  the  Nile  ;  and  the  myth  that 
the  conqueror  of  Pharsalus  thought  of  renouncing 
his  life's  work  to  discover  the  sources  of  the  river, 
may  perhaps  contain,  like  most  myths,  a  certain 
grain  of  truth.  Caesar  could  not  be  in  Egypt  with- 
out discussing  that  ancient  problem ;  and  he  could 
not  speculate  on  such  a  matter  without  wishing  to  act. 
The  external  history  of  this  long  sojourn  we  do 
know ;  it  must  be  condensed  here  into  a  few  sen- 
tences.   No  sooner  was  Caesar  in  Alexandria,  than  he 


312  yulius  CcBsar.  [48  B.C. - 

began,  as  Roman  consul  in  a  semi-dependent  state, 
to  regulate  the  succession  to  the  throne  on  the 
basis  of  the  last  king's  will.  But  he  did  not  know 
the  Alexandrians,  that  motley  congeries  of  all  the 
clever  waifs  and  strays  of  the  Mediterranean.  Their 
pride  was  hurt  ;  which  perhaps  would  not  have  been 
the  case  had  not  Caesar's  small  force  been  so  tempt- 
ing an  object  to  molest.  The  young  Ptolemy's  army 
and  fleet  might  between  them  destroy  this  man  as 
well  as  Pompeius ;  they  were  under  the  command  of 
a  certain  Achillas,  the  Arabi  of  that  day,  who  by 
playing  upon  such  national  feeling  as  existed,  roused 
the  populace  as  well,  and  besieged  Caesar  in  the 
eastern  quarter  of  the  town,  where  was  the  palace  of 
the  Ptolemies.  He  had  to  struggle  hard  for  very 
existence,  for  reinforcements  did  not  arrive,  water 
was  scarce,  and  the  enemy  gradually  closed  him  in. 

So  the  winter  passed,  while  Caesar  was  once  more 
clinging  desperately  to  a  hostile  coast,  and  struggling 
with  an  enemy's  fleet.  The  situation  was  not  unlike 
that  of  1882  after  the  bombardment  and  occupation 
of  Alexandria  by  the  English.  The  presence  of  a 
handful  of  foreign  troops  amid  a  sullen  and  angry 
population,  the  helplessness  of  the  ruler  of  the 
country  in  their  hands,  the  impossibility  of  forcing 
an  exit  out  of  the  city,  the  determined  character  of 
the  Egyptian  military  chief,  and  even  the  great 
conflagration,  which  in  this  case  did  the  world 
irreparable  damage  by  destroying  the  great  library 
of  the  Ptolemies,  or  at  least  a  large  portion  of  it,  all 
remind  us  of  the  most  recent  invasion  of  the  land 
which  has  so  often  proved  a  snare  to  the  invader. 


45  B.C.]  Ccesar  s  Last  Wars,  313 

And  when  at  last  the  longed-for  diversion  came,  it 
came  in  the  same  direction  as  in  1882,  by  way  of  the 
eastern  Delta  and  Cairo. 

Mithridates  of  Pergamum,  a  reputed  son  of  the 
great  Mithridates,  had  been  entrusted  by  Caesar  with 
the  task  of  bringing  reinforcements  by  land ;  for 
access  by  sea  was  hazardous,  and  one  legion  only 
had  been  able  to  get  into  Alexandria  during  the 
winter.  Why  this  man  was  chosen  does  not  appear, 
but  he  did  his  work  so  well  as  fully  to  justify  Caesar's 
choice.  He  marched  through  Cilicia  and  Syria, 
collecting  troops,  among  whom  were  said  to  be  3,000 
Jews,  on  his  way,  and  breaking  into  Egypt  near 
what  is  now  Port  Said,  stormed  the  town  of  Pelu- 
sium.  Then,  marching  up  the  eastern  branch  of  the 
Nile  to  avoid  the  entanglements  of  the  Delta,  he 
crossed  the  river  at  Memphis  (Cairo).  The  young 
King,  who  had  been  released  by  Caesar,  and  was  now  at 
the  head  of  his  own  troops,  tried  in  vain  to  stop  him  ; 
while  Caesar,  who  had  been  apprised  of  his  approach, 
joined  him  by  shipping  his  force  to  a  point  west  of 
the  Delta  and  marching  up  the  right  bank  of  the 
western  branch.  The  united  armies  entirely  defeated 
the  King,  who  was  drowned  in  the  Nile  after  the 
battle.  No  further  resistance  was  offered,  and  Cae- 
sar became  master  of  Egypt  at  the  end  of  March, 
47  B.C. 

Cleopatra  and  a  younger  brother  were  set  together 
on  the  throne,  and  Caesar  left  all  his  army  but  one 
legion  in  Egypt  to  secure  this  arrangement ;  for,  as 
his  historian  puts  it,  in  language  singularly  like  that 
of  an  English  cabinet  minister,  "he  thought  that  the 


314  Julius  Ccesar,  [48  B.c- 

interests  of  the  Empire  demanded  that  if  kings  were 
set  up  they  should  be  supported,  and  that  if  they 
rebelled,  the  means  of  coercion  should  be  at  hand." 
The  policy  is  truly  Roman,  yet  not  unknown  even 
in  modern  times ;  and,  indeed,  Egypt  was  and  is 
quite  the  most  dangerous  corner  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean. Whoever  was  master  of  Egypt  could  prevent 
anyone  else  from  being  master  of  the  world.  This  is 
curiously  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  Caesar  left  a  man 
of  no  birth  or  prominence  in  command  of  his  force 
there  ;  an  ambitious  man  might  have  caused  him 
serious  difficulty  as  well  as  anxiety.  Caesar's  wisdom 
here  was  closely  followed  afterwards  by  Augustus. 

He  left  Egypt  in  June,  after  the  three  month's 
delay  already  alluded  to.  /There  was  urgent  occa- 
sion for  him  to  go  at  once  to  Italy,  where  Antonius, 
who  had  been  left  in  charge,  had  become  justly  un- 
popular.\  In  Spain,  too,  his  representative  Q.  Cassius, 
had  spoilt  all  his  work  by  harshness  and  oppression, 
and  in  Africa  his  enemies  were  collecting  large  forces. 
But  Caesar's  work  in  the  East  was  as  yet  only  half 
done,  and  he  set  about  completing  it  with  all  his  old 
rapidity.  He  passed  through  Syria,  settling  disputes, 
making  friends  with  border  kinglets  and  princes, 
visiting  all  the  great  towns,  and  stimulating  every- 
one by  his  presence  and  his  promises.  Then,  leaving 
a  kinsman,  Sextus  Caesar,  as  governor,  he  sailed  to 
Tarsus,  the  capital  of  Cilicia,  despatched  all  the  busi- 
ness of  that  province  and  the  neighbouring  dependent 
states,  and  hurried  over  Mount  Taurus  into  Cappa- 
docia.  There  he  received  and  pardoned  Deiotarus, 
tetrarch  of  Galatia,  who  had  fought  against  him  at 


45  B.C.]  CcBsars  Last  Wars.  315 

Pharsalus,  took  with  him  a  legion  which  this  prince 
had  trained  in  Roman  fashion,  and  passed  quickly 
into  the  province  of  Pontus,  now  in  the  hands  of  an 
enemy  to  everything  Roman. 

While  Caesar  was  in  Egypt,  Pharnaces,  son  of  the 
great  Mithridates,  had  taken  advantage  of  the  gen- 
eral confusion  in  the  Empire  to  recover  his  father's 
kingdom  of  Pontus,  which  Pompeius  had  annexed 
to  the  Roman  Empire.  He  had  beaten  Caesar's 
ofificer,  L.  Domitius,  in  fair  fight,  and  had  become 
a  standing  danger  to  Roman  influence  in  Asia 
Minor.  He  tried  now  to  negotiate,  and  pretended 
to  promise  obedience,  in  the  belief  that  Caesar  would 
have  to  hurry  to  Italy  and  leave  him  to  his  own  de- 
vices. But  Caesar  had  learnt  in  Egypt  the  ways  of 
eastern  potentates,  and  was  not  to  be  taken  in.  He 
promptly  ordered  the  King  to  evacuate  Roman  ter- 
ritory, and  when  he  tried  to  play  a  diplomatic  game, 
showed  him  at  once  with  whom  he  had  to  deal.  At 
Zela  a  battle  was  fought,  in  which  Caesar  ran  some 
risk,  for  he  had  hardly  any  of  his  veterans  with  him  ; 
but  the  result  was  only  doubtful  for  a  few  minutes. 
Pharnaces  fled  from  Pontus,  and  his  army  was 
entirely  destroyed. "^  Caesar  passed  on  through 
Galatia  and  Bithynia  to  the  province  of  Asia  proper, 
settling  affairs  in  every  centre  ;  and  leaving  the  faith- 
ful Mithridates  with  the  title  of  King  of  the  Bos- 
phorus,    as   a   guarantee    for   the  security   of  these 


*  This  was  the  battle  after  which  Caesar  is  said  to  have  written  to 
a  friend  the  three  famous  words  "  Veni,  vidi,  vici."  The  author  of 
the  "  Bell.  Alex."  (77)  says  that  he  was  extraordinarily  delighted  with 
the  speedy  issue  of  the  campaign. 


3i6  Julius   CcBsar.  [48  B.C. - 

provinces,  he  sailed  for  Italy,  and  arrived  at  Taren- 
tum  before  anyone  was  aware  of  his  approach.  If 
he  had  really  wasted  time  or  lost  energy  in  Egypt, 
he  was  making  up  for  it  now. 

On  the  way  from  Tarentum  to  Brundisium  he  met 
Cicero,  who  had  been  waiting  for  him  here  for  nearly 
a  year.  He  alighted,  embraced  his  old  friend,  and 
walked  with  him  some  distance.  The  result  of  their 
talk  was  shown  by  Cicero's  conduct  for  the  rest  of 
Caesar's  lifetime  ;  he  retired  to  his  villas,  and  sought 
relief  in  literary  work,  encouraged  doubtless  by 
Caesar's  ardent  praise.  The  magical  effect  of  Caesar's 
presence  was  felt  throughout  Italy ;  all  sedition 
ceased,  and  Rome,  which  had  been  the  scene  of  riot 
and  bloodshed  under  the  uncertain  rule  of  Antonius, 
was  quiet  in  an  instant.  The  master  spent  three 
months  in  the  city,  working  hard.  He  had  been  a 
second  time  appointed  dictator  while  he  was  in 
Egypt,  and  probably  without  any  limit  of  time, 
space,  or  power  ;l  and  he  acted  now  without  scruple 
as  an  absolute  monarch.  Everything  that  had  to  be 
done  he  saw  to  himself.  Money  was  raised,  bills 
were  passed,  the  Senate  recruited,  magistrates  and 
provincial  governors  appointed.  But  there  was  no 
time  for  any  attempt  at  permanent  organisation  ;  he 
must  wrest  Africa  from  his  enemies  before  there 
could  be  any  hope  of  a  peaceful  and  enduring  set- 
tlement, r  He  quelled  a  most  serious  mutiny,  in  which 
even  his  faithful  tenth  legion  was  concerned,  with  all 
his  wonderful  skill  and  knowledge  of  human  nature ; 
sent  on  all  available  forces  to  Sicily,  and  arrived 
himself  at  Lilybaeum  in  the  middle  of  December. 


4-5  B.C.]  CcBsar  s  Last  Wars.  3 1  7 

He  pitched  his  tent  almost  within  reach  of  the 
waves,  says  the  historian,  to  show  the  troops  that  he 
meant  instant  embarkation.  On  December  27th  all 
was  ready,  and  the  fleet  set  sail  with  six  legions  and 
2,000  cavalry.  On  the  fourth  day  he  sighted  the 
coast  of  Africa,  about  the  middle  of  that  long  stretch 
of  coast  that  runs  north  and  south  from  Carthage  to 
the  lesser  Syrtis.  But  only  a  few  ships  were  still 
with  him  ;  the  others  had  been  scattered  in  the 
transit,  and  when  he  landed  at  Hadrumetum  he  had 
only  3,000  infantry  and  150  horsemen.  For  the 
third  time  since  the  war  broke  out  he  found  himself 
clinging  to  a  line  of  coast  in  the  face  of  greatly 
superior  forces  ;  and  these  were  now  commanded, 
nominally  indeed  by  Scipio,  whose  ability  was  small, 
but  in  reality  by  Labienus,  the  most  dangerous  of 
all  his  enemies. I  These  men  were  desperate,  for  they 
were  fighting  not  so  much  for  the  Republic  as  against 
Caesar  ;  compromise  for  the  common  good  was  all 
along  abominable,  and  cruelty  was  justifiable,  in  their 
eyes.*  Cato,  who  was  at  Utica  in  the  north,  was 
too  honourable  for  cruel  or  unjust  dealing  ;  but  even 
he  was  now  enlisting  the  Mauritanian  King,  Juba,  a 
fierce  untrustworthy  character,  in  the  cause  of  what 
he  believed  to  be  liberty. | 

The  first  few  days  in  this  situation  must  have  been 
most  trying  both  to  Caesar  and  his  soldiers.  The 
author  of  the  book  on  this  war  has  given  us  a  life- 
like picture  of  the  way  in  which  he  could  overcome 
the  anxiety  of  his  men.  One  day  he  garrisoned  the 
town  of  Ruspina  with  part  of  his  little  force,  marched 

*  De  Bell.  Afr,,  4,  28,  46,  etc.  ;  confirmed  by  Cicero. 


3i8  Julius  Ccssar.  [48B.C.- 

the  rest  at  night-fall  to  the  port,  two  miles  away,  and 
there  put  them  on  board  his  ships,  leaving  the  gar- 
rison in  ignorance  of  what  he  was  doing.  The  men 
with  him  were  equally  in  the  dark  as  to  where  they 
were  going,  and  showed  their  depression  too  plainly  ; 
but  the  wonderful  spirits  of  their  general,  his  alacrity, 
his  erect  mien,  his  very  look,  revived  them.  "  They 
settled  down  in  peace,  and  trusted  that  by  his  great 
knowledge  and  judgment  all  things  might  be  made 
easy  for  them."  They  were  not  deceived  ;  next 
morning  at  dawn  when  he  was  about  to  weigh 
anchor,  some  vessels  hove  in  sight  with  part  of  his 
missing  force  on  board,  and  they  found  that  it  was 
to  go  in  search  of  these  that  he  had  embarked.  He 
feared  that  they  might  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands, 
and  had  taken  troops  with  him  ;  secrecy  had  been 
used,  that  the  garrison  in  Ruspina  might  not  know 
that  it  had  been  left  to  itself.  Caesar's  character  as 
a  master  of  men  nowhere  stands  out  clearer  than  in 
this  incident,  told  with  enthusiasm  by  one  who  had 
experienced  his  extraordinary  charm.  The  pity  was, 
that  there  was  no  one  living  like  him,  and  that  such 
vast  issues  should  hang  upon  a  single  life. 

With  increased  forces  he  was  able  to  take  the 
field  and  to  fight  a  battle  near  Ruspina  with  the 
enemy's  innumerable  cavalry  and  archers  under 
Labienus.  He  was  entirely  surrounded,  but  by  an 
adroit  movement  the  exact  nature  of  which  is  not 
clear,  he  quickly  lengthened  his  line,  cut  the  enemy's 
closely  pressing  squadrons  in  two,  and  sent  them 
flying.  But  it  was  useless  to  go  on  with  such  war- 
fare,  which   would    soon    have    worn    out    his   little 


4^5  B.C.]  Ccesars  Last  Wars.  319 

force  ;  he  therefore  fortified  a  position  at  Ruspina, 
and  waited  till  the  rest  of  his  wandering  vessels  at 
last  arrived.  This  was  his  fifth  descent  on  a  shore 
occupied  by  an  enemy  "^  ;  in  each  case  his  conduct 
was  bold  almost  to  rashness,  and  the  peril  was  over- 
come only  by  his  own  unfailing  spirits  and  resource. 
When  at  length  the  greater  part  of  his  army  was 
collected,  he  took  the  field  and  sought,  as  usual,  for 
an  opportunity  of  fighting  a  battle.  Scipio  was  now 
in  command  of  the  enemy,  and  his  force,  together 
with  that  of  the  King,  Juba,  who  had  also  arrived, 
was  too  formidable  to  be  attacked  except  on  a  fair 
field.  For  more  than  two  months  Caesar  looked  in 
vain  for  a  favourable  chance,  and  meanwhile  he  was 
constantly  in  difficulty  for  supplies ;  at  one  time  the 
cavalry  had  even  to  feed  their  horses  on  seaweed. 
At  last,  in  the  first  days  of  April,  he  determined  to 
march  southwards  along  the  coast  and  invest  the 
town  of  Thapsus  ;  if  he  took  it  he  would  gain  a  good 
port  and  supplies,  and  might  perhaps  tempt  Scipio 
to  save  it  by  a  battle.  The  move  succeeded  ;  Scipio 
raced  with  him  to  Thapsus,  but  came  too  late,  and 
Caesar  drew  his  lines  round  the  town.  Scipio  at 
last,  finding  his  enemy  encamped  between  him  and 
the  town,  determined  to  fight,  and  drew  out  his 
army  for  battle  while  his  camp  was  being  fortified 
in  his  rear.  Caesar  instantly  accepted  the  challenge. 
His  troops  were  quickly  arranged,  as  at  Pharsalus, 
both  for  attack  and  defence.  Suddenly  it  was  seen 
that  there  was  a  panic  or  commotion  of  some  kind 
among  the  workers  at  the  enemy's  camp.     The  staff 

*  Including  the  two  invasions  of  Britain. 


320  yiilius   CcBsar.  [48  B.C.- 

ofificers  and  some  old  soldiers  implored  Caesar  to 
attack  at  once,  but  he  refused.  On  this  day  he 
hesitated,  and  as  Plutarch  tells  a  story  that  he  was 
seized  with  illness  and  was  not  present  himself  in  the 
fight,  it  is  just  possible  that,  like  Napoleon  at  Boro- 
dino, he  may  have  been  robbed  of  his  usual  vigour 
at  a  critical  moment. "^  But  the  soldiers  could  not 
and  would  not  be  held  in  ;  a  trumpeter  sounded  the 
advance,  the  whole  army  rushed  on  the  enemy,  and 
the  battle  was  soon  over.  The  elephants  gave  some 
little  trouble,  but  as  usual  when  once  put  to  flight, 
only  added  to  the  confusion.  The  butchery  was 
terrible,  for  the  soldiers  had  the  bit  between  their 
teeth,  and  slaughtered  even  those  who  surrendered, 
under  Caesar's  very  eyes.  They  were  taking  their 
revenge  for  the  restraint  that  had  been  so  long 
placed  on  them,  a  restraint  which  had  probably  been 
one  cause  of  their  recent  mutiny.  |  Caesar's  humanity 
had  tried  their  patience  too  hard,  and  he  now  had 
to  learn  that  there  was  a  limit  to  his  power  over 
them.  From  this  time  to  the  end  of  his  life  there 
must  have  been  vexation  in  his  heart ;  disappoint- 
ment, like  that  of  Cromwell,  because  he  could  not 
inspire  others  with  his  own  ideal  of  just  conduct; 
misgiving,  perhaps,  as  well,  because  the  greater  his 
triumphs  the  more  isolated  he  became.  / 

Still  more  painful  was  the  last  and  best  remembered 
event  of  this  grievous  war.  Cato  had  been  for  years 
the  most  determined  enemy   of  Caesar  and  all  his 


*  The  author  of  the  "  De  Bello  Afr.,"  (ch.  83)  on  the  other  hand, 
describes  Caesar  as  yielding  to  the  men,  giving  the  signal  *'  Goodluck," 
and  galloping  to  the  front. 


DEFENCES  OF  A  CAMP. 

a.  VALLUM    PED   XIL        b,    LORICULA.       C.    FOSSA    DUPLEX.       d.    TURRES.       e.    PONTES.        f.    PORTA. 


45  B.C.]  Ccesar  s  Last  Wars.  321 

works,  perhaps  from  personal  reasons  as  well  as 
political ;  yet  in  that  age  he  was  like  Caesar  alone  in 
this,  that  he  had  clear  political  convictions,  and  acted 
on  them  not  only  with  consistency,  but  with  justice 
and  humanity.  He  was  the  only  republican  leader, 
we  are  told,  who  did  not  disgrace  the  cause  in  Africa 
by  wanton  cruelty.  When  the  fugitives  arrived  at 
Utica  from  Thapsus  in  wild  panic,  he  tried  to  stay 
their  cruelty  to  the  citizens,  but  in  vain ;  and  then, 
seeing  that  no  resistance  could  be  organized,  he 
made  arrangements  for  the  embarkation  of  all  who 
were  ready  to  go,  and,  disdaining  to,  fly  himself, 
committed  suicide.  The  story  is  familiar  from  Plu- 
tarch's narrative,  and  need  not  be  told  here,  nor  need 
we  comment  on  the  character  of  a  man  who  had 
little  real  influence  on  affairs,  no  gifts  as  a  leader  of 
men,  no  power  of  seeing  how  good  may  be  extracted 
even  from  apparent  evil.  All  his  fine  qualities, 
which  might  have  been  invaluable  in  that  age  of 
universal  corruption,  were  simply  thrown  away  for 
want  of  a  grain  of  vulgar  common  sense,  and  his 
death  only  serves  to  illustrate  that  utter  want  of 
any  idea  of  compromise  which  marks  the  Roman 
revolution  throughout  its  course.  Cato  had  made  up 
his  mind  that  Caesar  was  the  deadly  enemy  of  the 
state;  but  he  confused  the  state  with  the  constitu- 
tion, and  died  rather  than  put  his  conviction  to  the 
test.  The  whole  action  of  the  Pompeian  party  from 
the  outbreak  of  civil  war  is  as  wrong-headed,  even 
from  their  own  point  of  view,  as  that  of  the  ultra- 
republican  fanatics  under  Cromwell.  They  forced  on 
a  military  despotism,  which  was  probably  as  distaste- 


32  2  yulius  CcBsar,  [48B.C.- 

ful  to  the  despot  as  to  themselves  ;  they  diminished  by 
one  half  the  available  intellect  of  the  state,  because 
they  could  not  endure  that  it  should  be  at  the  ser- 
vice of  the  one  man  who  was  capable  of  directing  it. 
Caesar  left  Africa  in  June,  46  B.C.,  after  settling  the 
affairs  of  that  province,  and  organising  a  new  one  to 
the  west  of  it,  to  be  called  New  Africa,  of  which  Sallust 
the  historian  was  the  first  governor.  He  took  large 
sums  of  money  with  him,  gained  by  the  sale  of  the 
property  of  King  Juba  and  others,  and  by  confisca- 
tions and  requisitions  in  towns  which  had  obsti- 
nately held  out  against  him.  He  was  already 
beginning  to  feel  the  heavy  trammels  of  power  and 
victory.  The  legions  which  had  won  the  world  for 
him  must  be  paid  all  they  had  been  promised,  and 
the  citizens  of  Rome,  after  their  kind,  must  be  made 
to  feel  his  greatness.  The  gorgeous  triumphal  pro- 
cession with  which  he  entered  the  city,  passing  along 
that  Sacred  Way  of  which  the  pavement  has  but 
recently  been  unearthed,  was  long  remembered,  and 
many  stories  were  told  of  it,  some  true,  perhaps, 
some  undoubtedly  false.  One  fact  is  certain,  that  it 
was  celebrated  not  over  Roman  citizens,  but  over 
Gauls  and  Egyptians,  over  Pharnaces  and  Juba.  No 
captive  Roman  attended  the  car  of  the  conqueror; 
but  the  magnificence,  the  lavish  expenditure,  the 
adulation,  which  now  began  to  make  a  king  and  even 
a  demi-god  of  Caesar,  all  showed  that  the  Romans  of 
the  city  were  only  fit  to  be  captives,  and  that  their 
master  knew  how  to  treat  them. 

I    After  the  triumph,  with  his  power  confirmed  by  a 
new  dictatorship  and  the  title  of  Praefectus  Morum, 


45  B.C.]  Ccesars  Last  Wars.  323 

or  ''  superintendent  of  manners,"  and  with  other 
honours,  which  will  be  mentioned  in  their  proper 
place,  he  remained  in  Rome  for  several  months,  in 
which  more  permanently  valuable  work  was  done 
than  was  ever  achieved  in  the  same  space  of  time, 
unless  it  were  by  Cromwell  in  1653-4.  Had  not 
the  headstrong  pertinacity  of  those  deadly  foes  alike 
to  Csesar  and  to  reason,  who  had  fled  from  Africa 
after  their  crushing  defeat,  refused  to  abide  by  the 
decrees  of  fate,  and  to  allow  a  great  conqueror  the 
chance  of  being  also  a  great  healer,  how  much  more 
might  not  have  been  done  ?  The  imperious  legions, 
getting  now  ever  more  reckless  and  dangerous, 
might  have  been  entirely  disbanded  ;  a  Senate,  no 
longer  ruled  by  a  narrow  oligarchy,  might  have  been 
gradually  set  to  work ;  all  that  huge  task  of  re- 
organisation, which  had  eventually  to  be  postponed 
for  twenty  years,  might  at  least  have  been  got 
beyond  a  beginning.l  But  while  Csesar  was  hard  at 
work  at  Rome,  Labienus  and  others  were  raising 
Spain  against  him.  Again  they  made  it  impossible 
for  him  to  use  his  great  talents  in  the  best  way.  He 
had  no  one  else  to  whom  he  could  entrust  a  fresh 
war,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year  he  was  forced  to  take 
up  arms  himself  once  more.l 

No  war  was  ever  more  unreasonable,  or  more 
cruelly  waged,  than  this  fresh  outbreak  by  the  Pom- 
peian  party ;  it  was  a  war  of  darkness  against  light. 
But  unfortunately  there  was  inflammable  matter  in 
Spain  for  which  Caesar  was  himself  chiefly  respon- 
sible. When  he  quitted  Spain  in  49  B.C.  he  left  as 
governor  of  the  further  province  a  certain  Cassius 


324  Julius   Ccesa r.  [4 8  B . C .- 

Longinus,  who  was  apparently  the  worst  man  he 
could  have  chosen.  Cassius  soon  entirely  ruined  all 
Caesar's  work  by  misgovernment  and  extortion.  An 
attempt  was  made  to  assassinate  him ;  Corduba 
revolted,  under  one  of  Cassius'  own  quaestors,  and  it 
was  only  by  the  help  of  Lepidus,  who  was  in  com- 
mand in  Hither  Spain,  that  quiet  was  restored  and 
Cassius  expelled.  Caesar  appointed  Trebonius,  one 
of  his  tried  officers,  to  succeed  him  ;  but  this  was 
not  till  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Alexandrian  war, 
and  it  was  then  too  late.  The  mischief  was  done, 
and  was  irreparable.  The  Pompeian  party  had 
always  been  strong  in  Spain,  though  good  govern- 
ment might  have  kept  them  quiet ;  and  when  the 
eldest  son  of  Pompeius  appeared  on  the  scene,  the 
fuel  instantly  caught  fire.  They  could  not  have 
had  a  worse  leader  ;  we  know  from  so  good  a  witness 
as  Cicero  that  he  was  wanting  both  in  sense  and 
humanity.* 

This  last  of  Caesar's  wars  may  be  dismissed  in  a 
very  few  words.  The  events  of  it  are  both  obscure 
and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  uninteresting ;  the  temper 
shown  on  both  sides  was  angry  and  cruel.  The  scene 
was  the  valley  of  the  Guadalquiver  about  Cordova  ; 
and  it  seems  to  have  consisted,  like  the  latter  part  of 
the  African  war,  in  a  long  series  of  endeavours  on 
Caesar's  part  to  get  his  enemy  to  fight  a  pitched 
battle.  At  last  the  chance  came,  on  the  17th  of 
March,  45  B.C.f     The  battle,  which  bears  the  name 

*  For  his  character,  see  Cic,  Ad  Fam.,  xv.,  19. 
f  The  calendar  had  by  this  time  been  reformed  ;  this  is,  therefore, 
the  true  date. 


45  B.C.]  CcBsars  Last  Wars.  325 

of  the  town  of  Munda,  was  desperately  contested. 
The  Pompeians  had  the  advantage  of  numbers  as 
well  as  position  ;  it  is  said  that  Caesar  himself  had 
to  lead  his  wavering  legions  a  second  time  to  the 
attack,  and  the  words  were  put  into  his  mouth  by 
the  story-mongers,  that  he  had  often  before  fought 
for  victory,  but  never  until  now  for  life.  The 
slaughter  was  frightful ;  Labienus  was  among  the 
killed,  and  young  Pompeius  fled  wounded  only  to 
be  hunted  down  and  murdered.  »  With  such  terrible 
scenes  Caesar's  military  life  came  to  an  end.  Each 
of  these  struggles,  while  increasing  his  absolutism, 
made  it  more  and  more  impossible  for  him  to  do  the 
work  of  peace.     | 

*'  For  what  can  war  but  endless  war  still  breed  ?  " 

The  nobler  task  that  was  awaiting  his  hand,  still 
little  more  than  begun,  was  not  by  him  to  be  com- 
pleted. He  arrived  at  Rome  early  in  September, 
after  settling  the  affairs  of  Spain  ;  and  six  months 
more  of  life  was  all  that  was  left  him.  His  enemies 
had  after  all  done  their  work  ;  in  crushing  them  he 
had  risen  to  such  a  height  of  power  as  the  jealous 
Roman  mind  could  no  longer  endure. 


^-1  ■-■  \  '^  ^ 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

Caesar's  use  of  absolute  power. 
49-44  B.C. 

H  E  reader  has  by  this  time  made 
a  close  acquaintance  with  the 
personality  of  the  man  to 
whom  the  destinies  of  the 
world  were  for  a  short  space 
committed.  In  following  his 
own  account  of  the  Gallic 
and  Civil  wars,  this  personal- 
ity has  been  continually  before 
us.  Its  leading  features  can 
hardly  be  misinterpreted  by  anyone  who  is  willing 
to  abide  by  what  is  believed  to  be  historic  truth, 
and  to  set  aside  the  doubtful  accumulations  of  gos- 
sip and  scandal.  And  now  that  we  have  reached 
the  point  where  Caesar  found  himself  at  last  un- 
disputed master  of  the  Empire,  we  may  safely 
leave  the  man  and  turn  to  his  work — or  rather  to 
that  nobler  part  of  his  work  which  was  no  longer 
the  direct  result  of  personal  struggle,  self-regarding 

326 


49  B.C.]      CcBsar  s  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        327 

aims,  or  even  of  an  unrivalled  talent  for  the  conduct 
of  war. 

Caesar's  work  marks  the  consummation  of  a  series 
of  revolutionary  tendencies  which  had  been  gaining 
strength  for  generations,  and  even  for  centuries. 
Such  tendencies  are  from  time  to  time  perceived  and 
interpreted  by  statesmen  like  Gains  Gracchus,  whose 
reason  and  sympathy  combine  to  qualify  them  as 
revolutionary  leaders  and  spokesmen  ;  but  human 
nature  is  in  spite  of  itself  so  intensely  conservative, 
that  it  would  seem  to  need  every  favourable  circum- 
stance,— the  right  man  to  lead,  an  overwhelming 
material  force,  a  universal  cry  of  discontent, — nay, 
even  an  almost  universal  lowering  of  the  moral  stand- 
ard, before  the  world  can  shake  itself  free  of  old 
trammels,  and  begin  again  in  freedom  and  hope./  It 
has  been  one  object  of  this  book  so  far  to  show  that 
in  the  world  of  Caesar's  time  almost  every  ingredient 
was  present  that  could  lead  to  a  revolutionary  explo- 
sion :  a  low  moral  standard  ;  a  prevailing  discontent 
which  was  often  the  result  of  real  hopeless  misery  ; 
an  overwhelming  material  force  in  the  shape  of  a 
well-trained  professional  army  ;  and  lastly,  the  right 
man  both  to  perceive  and  interpret  the  evil,  to  con- 
trol the  forces,  and  to  provide  for  the  future  by 
reconstruction. 

But,  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  this  difficult 
subject,  what  were  in  reality  these  revolutionary 
tendencies  to  which  Caesar  first  gave  clear  articulate 
expression  ?  We  may  trace  three,  all  closely  con- 
nected with  each  other,  and  forming  in  fact  one 
powerful   current,   the  direction  of  which  had  been 


328  Julius   CcEsar,  [49  B.C.- 

at  least  discovered,  if  not  guided,  by  the  Roman 
democratic  leaders  from  the  Gracchi  onwards. 
'  First,  and  most  obvious  of  the  three,  there  was 
the  demand  for  some  permanent  change  in  the  char- 
acter of  the  central  government  at  Rome,  which 
should  take  the  control  of  affairs  out  of  the  hands 
of  incompetent  and  sordid  men,  and  deposit  it  with 
those  who  could  be  trusted  to  act  with  reason,  and 
with  goodwill  towards  mankind.  / 

/Secondly,  and  following  directly  on  the  first,  there 
was  the  demand  for  a  social  change  which  should 
neutralise  the  enormous  influence  of  the  small  body 
of  Italian  capitalists,  whether  used  to  prop  up  a 
rotten  system  of  government  at  home,  or  to  oppress 
the  masses  of  population  in  the  provinces. 

Thirdly,  there  was  the  inarticulate  demand,  audi- 
ble only  to  the  real  statesman,  and  arising  out  of 
complicated  causes  which  had  been  at  work  for  cen- 
turies, for  a  new  system  of  political  organisation, 
which  might  give  new  life  to  the  numberless  little 
communities  of  which  the  Empire  was  made  up, 
and  might  weld  them  all  into  a  compact  whole,  of 
which  each  might  be  well  content  to  form  a  partJ 

It  is  easy  to  see  at  a  glance  that  the  solution  of 
such  problems  as  these,  the  task  of  directing  such 
revolutionary  forces  to  their  full  realisation,  was 
utterly  beyond  the  power  of  a  single  man  or  a  single 
age.  Caesar  himself  could  only  make  a  beginning, 
and  of  that  beginning  part  at  least  did  not  survive 
the  chaos  that  followed  his  death,  j  But  in  another 
sense  he  stands  not  as  a  beginner  but  as  the  finisher 
of  a  great  work.     In  him  all  these  forces  came  to  a 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolut e  Power.         329 

head  and  found  expression.  It  was  he  who  coerced 
the  whole  Roman  world  into  attention,  and  made  it 
hearken  to  the  voice  of  reason.  True,  the  very  fact 
that  he  had  to  use  force  deprived  him  of  the  power 
to  be  a  great  constructor,  for  he  spent  himself  in  the 
effort,  and  force  was  rewarded  by  assassinatTo^\  But 
more  perhaps  than  any  statesman  in  history,  he  was, 
as  his  very  features  seem  to  attest,  a  great  school- 
master of  mankind.  He  finished  the  education 
which  the  Gracchi  had  begun  ;  but  of  the  use  to 
which  the  new  knowledge  was  to  be  applied  he  could 
make  only  a  bare  beginning. 

Let  us,  however,  try  and  see  how,  in  such  work  of 
Caesar's  as  we  can  be  certain  was  really  his,  there  is 
indicated  a  sense  of  the  three  great  claims  which  the 
world  seemed  to  be  making  on  the  legislator ;  we 
shall  at  the  same  time  learn  at  least  something  of  the 
way  in  which  he  purposed  to  deal  with  those  claims. 
"*^I. — Reconstruction  of  the  machinery  of  govern- 
ment. 

When  a  constitution  has  been  destroyed,  two  tasks 
devolve  upon  the  destroying  agent.  He  has,  first, 
to  carry  on  the  work  of  administration  for  the  time, 
so  as  to  preclude  anarchy ;  and,  secondly,  he  has  to 
build  up  a  new  and  stable  system  of  government, 
whose  stability  will  depend  on  its  conformity  with 
the  needs,  habits,  and  feelings  of  the  people  to  be 
governed.  The  first  of  these  is  of  course  far  the 
easier  of  the  two,  and  by  Caesar  it  was  successfully 
carried  out.  The  second  is  always  difficult,  as  the 
English  and  French  revolutions  have  alike  taught 
us;  in  the  case  of  the  Roman  Empire  the  difficulties 


330  Juluis  CcBsar.  [49  B.C. 

were  almost  superhuman.  Caesar  had  only  really 
begun  to  lay  his  hand  to  this  second  part  of  his  task 
when  it  was  cut  short  by  his  assassination. 

We  saw  that  in  April,  49  B.C.,  when  he  entered 
Rome  for  the  first  time  as  its  master,  he  tried  to  bring 
together  a  senate.  This  was  the  natural  course  for 
a  man  to  take  who  had  lived  all  his  life  under  a 
constitution  in  which  the  senate  controlled  almost 
all  administrative  departments,  and  was  the  only 
permanent  deliberative  body.  But  his  attempt  was 
a  failure ;  such  senators  as  assembled  would  not  do 
what  he  wished.  He  therefore  placed  Lepidus  as 
prcBtor  ^irbamis  in  charge  of  Rome,  Antonius  (in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  he  was  tribune)  in  military 
command  of  Italy  as  his  legatus,  and  appointed 
governors  for  certain  provinces,  also  as  his  own  legati. 
In  other  words,  he  assumed  the  supreme  administra- 
tive power  which  had  so  far  belonged  to  the  Senate 
alone.  But  it  is  clear  that  he  assumed  it  only  provi- 
sionally, and  still  perhaps  expected  to  be  able  to 
rebuild  in  some  sense  the  old  constitution.  He 
looked  forward  to  being  consul  in  a  regular  way  the 
next  year  ;  and  his  chief  object  in  being  made  dicta- 
tor later  in  the  year  (see  p.  279)  was  to  hold  the 
consular  elections.  He  was  dictator  for  only  eleven 
days,  during  which  he  was  elected  consul  (himself 
presiding  at  the  election)  with  Servilius  Isauricus  as 
colleague.  During  his  absence,  until  the  battle  of 
Pharsalus,  Servilius  carried  on  the  government  at 
Rome,  in  conjunction  apparently  with  a  senate.^"*\^ 

But  after  that  battle,  and  the  death  of  Pompeius, 
the  position  of  affairs  was  changed  again.  All  union^ 


44  B.C.]      CcEsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power,        331 

all  compromise  had  been  proved  impossible.  There 
had  been  serious  disturbances  in  Italy ;  war  was 
brewing  in  Africa  and  Spain.  No  permanent  consti- 
tution could  yet  be  devised.  The  old  one  could  in 
no  sense  be  reconstructed,  while  Caesar  was  himself 
in  Egypt  and  had  before  him  a  prospect  of  long  and 
perilous  warfare.  Another  provisional  government 
was  established  as  the  only  possible  expedient./  In 
October,  48  B.C.,  he  again  accepted  the  dictatorship, 
and  as  it  was  probably  given  him  without  definite 
limit  of  time,  and  was  backed  up  by  a  series  of 
prerogatives  which  made  his  personal  power  almost 
unassailable,  we  must  consider  this  new  provisional 
government  as  simply  absolutism.  Under  it  he  could 
decide  alone  on  questions  of  war  and  peace ;  he  could 
appoint  praetors  to  govern  provinces ;  he  could  deal 
judicially  with  his  enemies ;  he  could  control  the 
most  important  elections  ;  lastly,  he  could  exercise 
the  powers  of  the  tribunate  of  the  people,  and  was 
thus  freed  from  the  necessity  of  using  tribunes  either 
to  initiate  or  to  control  legislation.  All  these  pre- 
rogatives were  probably  based  on  formally  regular 
legislative  enactments  ;  and  the  bestowal  of  them 
was  in  a  sense  an  indemnification  for  his  previous 
exercise  of  abnormal  power.  But  there  is  nothing 
to  show  that  they  were  meant  to  be  permanent ; 
even  the  unlimited  dictatorship  was  probably  under- 
stood as  provisional  only,  being,  like  that  of  Sulla,  a 
bestowal  of  power  to  build  up  a  constitution,  and  In 
no  sense  part  of  a  new  constitution  itself.  |  That 
ancient  ofifice  had  always  been  a  temporary  expe- 
dient— a  brief  reversion  to  kingship, — in  order  to  tide 


332  yulius  CcEsar.  [49  B.C. 

over  a  pressing  difficulty.  As  such  it  was  used  now; 
for  a  permanent  dictatorship  was  to  a  Roman  a 
contradiction  in  terms. 

These  powers  did  not  come  into  active  operation 
until  Caesar  was  again  in  Rome  in  the  autumn  of  47 
B.C.  He  could  then  only  stay  some  two  months,  as  the 
African  War  was  pressing  on  him  ;  and  he  used  them 
only  to  restore  order,  to  pass  some  necessary  laws 
which  will  be  mentioned  presently,  to  hold  the  elec- 
tions, and  to  appoint  provincial  governors.  A  com- 
plete reconstruction  must  again  be  postponed.  And 
as  was  shown  in  the  last  chapter,  the  implacable 
wrath  of  his  enemies  made  it  ever  more  impossible 
for  him  to  harmonise  conflicting  interests  and  feel- 
ings on  anything  like  the  old  constitutional  lines. 

It  was  only  when  he  returned  victorious  from  Africa 
in  the  summer  of  46  B.C.  (see  p.  322),  that  the  field 
seemed  at  last  clear  for  the  formidable  task.  |  Mean- 
while fresh  powers  had  been  given  him,  of  which  we 
have  a  very  imperfect  knowledge.  The  chief  was  a 
new  dictatorship  for  ten  years,  and  a  censorial  power, 
which  gave  him  complete  control  over  the  Senate  as 
well  as  over  the  conduct  of  the  whole  citizen  body. 
With  an  absolutism  thus  raised  to  the  highest  possi- 
ble pitch,  he  remained  in  Rome  for  several  months, 
working  incessantly  at  the  necessary  legislation.  \ 
Yet  among  all  the  laws,  some  of  them  of  the  greatest 
importance,  which  we  know  to  have  been  passed  at 
this  time,  we  hear  of  none  that  went  directly  towards 
the  building  up  of  a  constitution.  It  is  true  indeed 
that  if  we  possessed  the  original  texts  of  his  laws  of 
public   violence  and   high  treason,   we    might   form 


44  B.C.]     CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        333 

some  negative  idea  of  what  his  intentions  were.  But 
all  that  we  can  with  any  safety  guess  from  the  work 
of  these  months,  is  the  following.  1  First,  Caesar  did 
not  propose  to  establish  a  military  monarchy ;  he 
began  to  disband  his  famous  legions,  which  of  late 
had  become  fretful  and  headstrong,  and  to  settle  them 
on  the  soil  of  Italy  ;  and  before  the  end  of  his  life 
he  had  even  dismissed  his  body-guard.  Secondly,  he 
did  not  wish  to  revive  the  old  Senate,  either  in  respect 
of  its  composition  or  its  prerogative.  He  raised  its 
numbers  to  nine  hundred,  appointing  persons  who 
under  the  old  regime  could  never  have  aspired  to 
a  seat ;  it  is  said  that  among  these  were  even  a 
few  provincials,  as  well  as  men  of  comparatively  low 
rank  in  life.  He  wished  therefore  to  deprive  it  of 
its  old  oligarchic  tone,  but  to  retain  it  as  a  Great 
Council,  destined  perhaps  in  due  time  to  represent 
in  some  degree  the  interests  of  the  whole  Empire. 
Thirdly,  he  thought  it  best  that,  during  his  life  at 
least,  one  man,  and  one  only,  should  guide  the 
destinies  of  that  Empire.  He  now  accepted  for  life 
the  title  of  Imperator,  thus  showing  that  he  was  the 
holder,  wherever  in  the  Empire  he  might  be,  of  that 
united  civil  and  military  command  which  the  Romans 
had  always  understood  by  the  word  imperium  ;  the 
only  word  which  could  suggest  in  a  single  conception  . 
the  government  of  Rome,  Italy,  and  the  provinces.    | 

There  is  no  indication  as  to  what  he  wished  or 
expected  to  happen  after  his  death.  He  was  now  in 
his  fifty-sixth  year,  and  his  health  was  somewhat 
shaken  by  incessant  toil.  He  might  reasonably  sup- 
pose that  his  life  would  not  be  a  long  one ;  and  in 


334  yulius  CcBsar,  [49  B.c- 

fact  we  know  that  at  this  very  time  he  was  several 
times  heard  to  say  that  he  had  Hved  long  enough. 
There  was  no  one  among  his  adherents  who  had  any 
good  chance  of  succeeding  to  his  own  unexampled 
power.  Antonius,  the  ablest,  was  unprincipled  and 
unpopular ;  all  the  rest  were  quiet  and  hard-working 
men  of  only  moderate  ability.  To  a  man  in  Caesar's 
position  the  outlook  must  have  seemed  almost  hope- 
less ;  for  a  return  to  republican  institutions  was 
hardly  to  be  thought  of  if  his  work  was  to  endure. 
He  may  well  have  trusted  to  his  faithful  goddess 
Fortuna  to  shield  his  life  yet  awhile,  until  he  could 
see  some  light.  But  it  is  possible  that  at  this  very 
time,  in  December,  46  B.C.,  when  he  was  leaving  Rome 
for  the  last  time  to  crush  the  Pompeians  in  Spain,  a 
solution  presented  itself  to  him. 

»*^""Gaius  Octavius,  the  son  of  his  niece  Atia,  was  in 
this  year,  45  B.C.,  seventeen  years  old ;  old  enough, 
that  is,  to  see  his  first  military  service.  Accordingly 
he  now  followed  his  great-uncle  to  Spain,  on  the 
old  Roman  footing  of  contubemalis  or  pupil  to  a 
general  in  the  art  of  war.  Of  their  intercourse  we 
know  nothing  whatever ;  ^  but  on  his  return  Caesar 
sent  the  lad  to  Apollonia  to  study  with  Greek  mas- 
ters, and  in  the  will  which  was  too  soon  to  come  into 
operation,  he  made  him  his  principal  heir  and 
adopted  him  as  his  son.  ^  It  is  said  also  that  he 
meant  to  take  him  with   him  on  his  projected  Par- 

*  It  is  doubtful  whether  they  met  at  all  in  Spain.  Octavius  fell  ill, 
and  according  to  one  account  was  shipwrecked  ;  he  could  not  well 
have  arrived  till  the  campaign  was  over.  See  Druraann,  Rom.  Gesch., 
iv.,  252. 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  AbsohUe  Power,        335 

thian  expedition,  and  that  the  reason  why  he  sent 
him  to  Apollonia,  was  that  he  might  witness  the 
assembhng  and  drilhng  of  the  legions  that  were 
already  being  concentrated  there.  If  a  successor 
could  be  found,  who  would  inherit  the  name,  the 
blood,  and  the  wealth  of  Caesar,  and  whose  ability 
to  govern  like  Caesar  were  acknowledged  in  the  Em- 
pire, the  uncertain  and  threatening  prospect  might 
brighten  up.  And  there  was  indeed  great  promise 
in  this  boy ;  he  not  only  was  fair  to  look  on,  but 
able,  quiet,  and  genial.  A  close  observer  might  have 
seen  that  his  temperament  was  very  different  from 
Caesar's  ;  but  it  turned  out  that  he  possessed  exactly 
the  qualities  needed  for  the  judicious  development 
of  the  main  results  of  Caesar's  outspoken  autocracy. 
That  autocracy  must  always  be  regarded  as  extra- 
ordinary and  provisional  ;  but  it  struck  the  keynote 
by  which  a  clever  successor  might  tune  the  system 
to  the  sensitive  ear  of  the  Roman  world. 
\  We  are  not  then  surprised  to  find  that  during  the 
last  months  of  his  life,  after  his  return  from  Spain, 
among  the  innumerable  honours  lavished  on  him  in 
flattery  by  an  obsequious  Senate  and  people,  Caesar 
accepted  some  which  seem  to  mark  his  willingness  to 
make  his  absolutism  more  definite,  and  such  as  might 
be  transmitted  to  an  heir,  j  JHe  entered,  early  in  Feb- 
ruary, 44  B.C.,*  on  a  final  dictatorship  for  his  life-time  ; 
a  serious  step,  because  it  put  an  entirely  new  mean- 
ing on  an  old  republican  institution.  He  now  began 
to  allow  the  image  of  his  head  to  be  placed  on  the 

*  At  some  date  between  Jan.   25th  and  Feb.   15th.      (Henzen  in 
Ephemeris  Epigraphica,  ii.,  285.) 


336  Julius  Ccesar.  [49  B.C. 

coinage.  This  had  no  precedent  in  Roman  history, 
but  it  had  always  been,  in  the  empires  of  the  East, 
the  special  prerogative  of  the  monarch.  He  allowed 
his  statue  to  be  added  to  those  of  the  seven  kings  of 
Rome  on  the  Capitol.  He  appeared  on  public  occa- 
sions in  the  purple  triumphal  dress ;  and  in  many 
other  little  ways,  which  it  would  be  wearisome  to 
catalogue  here,  allowed  his  person  to  become  the 
centre  of  the  pomp  and  ceremonial  of  a  court. 
Whether  in  so  doing  he  was  showing  signs  of  grow- 
ing weakness, — of  surrender  at  last  to  that  demon  of 
unreason  which  he  had  spent  his  life  in  conquering, 
is  a  question  that  can  never  be  decided.  \  It  will  be 
referred  to  again  in  the  next  chapter ;  all  that  we  are 
concerned  with  now  is  the  high  probability,  as  re- 
sulting from  these  facts,  that  he  meant  the  permanent 
constitution  of  the  Empire  to  be  monarchy,  and  that 
monarchy,  if  possible,  an  hereditary  one.  And  he 
went  far  enough,  in  this  first  and  purely  constitu- 
tional aspect  of  the  revolution,  to  leave  the  impress 
of  his  mind  on  the  Roman  world  for  the  whole 
remainder  of  its  history  ;  a  result  which  would  have 
been  impossible,  if  he  had  not  divined  rightly  the  one 
method  by  which  that  world  could  by  any  possibility 
be  held  together. 

n.|  The  social  change  which  Csesar  sought  to  bring 
about  is  much  harder  to  explain.  To  do  so  effectually 
would  entail  an  inquiry  into  the  social  and  economic 
condition,  not  only  of  Rome  and  Italy,  but  of  the 
whole  Empire.  We  must  be  content  with  a  very 
brief  survey,  and  then  ask  in  what  direction  Caesar 
seems  to  have  been  looking  for  improvement.  \ 


44  B.C.]      Ccesars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.         'i^^'j 

Let  us  look  first  at  the  great  city  itself,  with  its 
vast  and  various  population.  That  vivid  contrast 
between  rich  and  poor,  which  had  always  been  the 
curse  of  the  old  city-state  of  the  ancient  world,  had 
long  been  fatally  exaggerated  at  Rome.  The  con- 
querors of  the  world  had  grown  rich  in  the  process  of 
conquest,  but  their  wealth  was  in  the  hands  of  a  few. 
All  Italy  bore  witness  to  this ;  the  greater  part  of  it 
was  in  the  possession  of  large  land-owners,  whose 
vast  estates  were  cultivated  by  slaves.  The  old  free 
population  had  drifted  to  Rome,  as  the  only  place  to 
which  they  could  possibly  migrate,  and  mingled  there 
with  a  motley  collection  of  waifs  and  strays  from  all 
parts  of  the  world,  and  with  a  crowd  of  liberated 
slaves,  all  more  or  less  idle,  and  destitute  of  any 
regular  means  of  subsistence.  Like  the  *'  mean 
whites  "  of  the  Southern  States  before  the  American 
Civil  War,  they  were  the  dangerous  product  of  an 
inhuman  and  exaggerated  slave-system. 

Efforts  had  been  made  to  remedy  these  terrible 
evils ;  but  the  wealthy  class  was  also  the  class  that 
held  the  reins  of  government,  the  social  question 
became  a  political  one,  and  the  cause  of  the  Senate 
became  the  cause  of  unrighteous  wealth.  The  two 
Gracchi  were  slain  as  enemies  of  the  state  they 
wished  to  save.  Of  all  the  remedies  they  proposed, 
only  one  was  still  in  operation  in  Caesar's  day,  and 
that  was  the  worst — a  measure  in  fact  of  relief,  and 
not  a  remedy.  Gains  Gracchus  had  begun  the  prac- 
tice of  feeding  the  Roman  unemployed  by  the  dis- 
tribution of  cheap  corn  ;  Sulla  had  wisely  abolished 
it.     But  the  senatorial  party  had  revived  it  for  their 


338  Julius  CcBsar,  [49  B,C.- 

own  purposes  in  73  B.C.  ;  and  Clodius  in  58  had 
taken  advantage  of  this  to  do  away  even  with  the 
small  sum  that  the  recipients  of  the  dole  were 
expected  to  pay.  All  the  rest  of  the  Gracchan 
projects — land  distribution  in  Italy,  colonisation,  and 
custom  duties,  had  practically  come  to  nothing. 
Italy  was  more  than  ever  depopulated,  Rome  was 
poorer  and  more  congested  than  ever ;  rich  men  had 
amassed  wealth  amounting  even  to  millions  of 
pounds,  and  they  were  for  the  most  part  wrapped  in 
the  slumber  of  an  utterly  selfish  indifference,  or  at 
least  content  to  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  a  literary 
luxury  without  casting  even  a  glance  at  the  awful 
abyss  on  the  brink  of  which  they  stood.  Among 
them  were  some  honourable  and  right-minded  men ; 
but  history  must  judge  of  them  as  a  whole,  and  can 
pronounce  but  one  verdict  on  a  class  which  only 
woke  up  to  activity  when  its  own  private  interests 
were  threatened.  t 

And  this  is  not  the  whole  of  the  indictment.  1  If  we 
ask  whence  the  wealth  of  these  great  capitalisls  was 
derived,  the  answer  is  that  it  came  in  great  measure 
from  the  provinces  which  they  were  called  on  to 
govern,  or  to  help  in  governing,  j  That  is,  the  gov- 
ernor and  his  retinue,  and  the  wnole  posse  of  tax- 
gatherers  and  money-lenders  who  flourished  under 
his  protection,  carried  back  to  Rome  enormous 
profits,  as  legitimate  spoil ;  and  this  was  drawn 
ultimately  from  the  labouring  classes  in  the  provinces, 
who  thus  spent  their  strength  for  the  benefit  of  a 
small  and  idle  section  of  their  masters.  If  we  could 
imagine  the  England  of  to-day  governed  by  Indian 


44  B.C.]      CcEsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        339 

nabobs,  and  the  India  of  to-day  regarded  only  as  a 
fair  field  for  the  enrichment  of  that  governing  class ; 
and  if  by  a  further  effort  we  could  substitute  for  the 
English  working  classes  a  population  composed 
chiefly  of  slaves ;  we  should  then  have  some  idea  of 
the  picture  presented  by  the  Roman  world  during 
the  greater  part  of  the  last  century  of  the  republican 
government.  On  the  one  hand  a  compact  oligarchy, 
without  any  sense  of  duty  or  trusteeship,  maintain- 
ing its  hold  on  the  government  by  wealth  wrung 
from  its  best  subjects  ;  on  the  other,  a  proletariate, 
idle  at  Rome,  dying  out  in  Italy,  and  impoverished 
in  the  provinces.  And  below  all,  a  vast  slave-popu- 
lation, which  had  already  been  proved  to  be  in  itself 
a  serious  danger  to  the  state,  as  well  as  indirectly  a 
chief  cause  of  other  perils.  As  Mommsen  has  most 
truly  said,  none  of  the  evils  for  which  the  capitalists 
of  our  day  can  be  called  to  account,  are  to  be  com- 
pared for  a  moment  to  the  hideous  ruin  which  the 
Roman  oligarch  had  wrought  in  a  couple  of  centuries 
on  the  fair  shores  of  the  Mediterranean. 

It  will  be  obvious  at  once  that  there  could  be  no 
panacea  for  such  a  social  and  economical  condition, 
reacting  with  such  deadly  force  upon  the  body  poli- 
tic. The  best  that  could  be  done  was,  while  apply- 
ing some  temporary  remedies,  to  induce  a  healthier 
tone  in  the  patient,  and  so  to  make  it  possible  for 
nature  eventually  to  work  an  improvement.  And 
no  statesman  had  any  chance  of  effecting  even  this, 
without  qualifications  which  have  rarely  if  ever  been 
united  in  a  single  man.  He  must  understand  the 
nature  of  the  disease  in  its  entirety,  and  not  only  in 


340  yulius  CcBsar.  [49  B.C.- 

part ;  he  must  be  acquainted  with  the  condition  of 
the  Empire,  not  of  Rome  or  Italy  only.  He  must 
have  a  nature  to  claim,  and  a  power  to  exact,  that 
feeling  of  loyalty  and  trust,  without  which  no  physi- 
cian can  work  to  any  good  purpose.  And  he  must 
be  patient  enough  to  put  aside  all  quack  remedies, 
and  to  expect  no  more  than  a  gradual  amelioration, 
of  which  he  might  not  himself  live  to  see  more  than 
the  beginning. 

All  these  conditions  were  realised  in  Caesar,  and 
this  fact,  far  more  than  his  military  exploits,  forms 
his  chief  claim  to  be  considered  one  of  the  world's 
greatest  men.  It  is  true  that  his  own  hands  were 
not  altogether  clean  ;  he  was  reckoned  among  the 
capitalists  ;  he  had  drawn  great  sums  from  his  prov- 
inces, and  had  spent  them  in  securing  his  political 
position.  He  had  lived  in  fact  like  his  fellows,  and 
had  been  carried  down  the  polluted  stream.  But 
his  wealth,  his  knowledge,  his  power,  and  his 
patience,  were  not  used  in  these  last  years  of  his 
life  only  to  serve  his  own  purposes,  but  for  the  good 
of  the  state  in  its  whole  length  and  breadth.  Let 
us  try  to  show  that  this  was  so,  even  from  our  im- 
perfect knowledge  of  his  own  necessarily  imperfect 
work. 

/  Of  temporary  remedies,  the  first  to  notice  is  a  law 
issued  during  the  few  days  which  Caesar  spent  in 
Rome  in  November,  49  B.C.,  before  leaving  Italy  for 
Epirus  (see  p.  280).  Its  object  was  to  restore  credit 
in  Italy,  and  to  neutralise  the  natural  effect  of  civil 
war  in  producing  unmerited  bankruptcy  on  the  one 
hand,  and  exaggerated  capitalist  tyranny  on  the  other. 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  yib solute  Paiver.         341 

The  revolutionists  of  the  day  would  no  doubt  have 
gladly  seen  him  wiping  out  all  debts  at  one  stroke,  and 
abolishing  house-rent  and  interest  ;  such  proposals 
had  always  been  in  the  programme  of  the  ''  extreme 
left  "  since  Catiline's  conspiracy,  and  were  the  natu- 
ral result  of  an  utterly  unhealthy  economic  condition. 
Cicero,  writing  wildly  to  Atticus  at  this  critical  time 
(49  B.C.),  expresses  his  conviction  that  Caesar  will  ac- 
tually go  these  lengths,  forgetting,  curiously  enough, 
that  Caesar  was  a  creditor  on  a  vast  scale,  and  that 
he  himself  was  among  his  debtors.  Only  a  year  later 
Cicero  had  to  learn  that  violent  attacks  on  property 
were  more  likely  to  come  from  his  own  foolish 
friends  than  from  statesmen  like  Caesar  ;  for  it  was 
his  old  pupil  Caelius,  a  clever  butterfly  of  the  day, 
and  later  his  son-in-law,  Dolabella,  and  his  old  friend 
Milo,  who  actually  tried  the  tempting  game  of  ap- 
pealing to  popular  greed,  and  so  outbidding  the 
master.  Caesar,  on  the  other  hand,  looked  as  usual 
to  the  interest  of  all  classes,  not  of  one  only,  know- 
ing well  that  Nemesis  awaits  the  man  who  deals  un- 
justly even  with  unjust  doers. 

What  he  did  was  this,  as  he  tells  it  himself."^  He 
enacted,  first,  that  debtors  should  be  allowed  to 
make  over  their  property  to  their  creditors  in  pay- 
ment of  debt,  and  secondly,  that  such  property 
should  be  estimated  by  arbitrators  at  the  value  it 
would  have  borne,  had  no  civil  war  broken  out.  The 
first  of  these  regulations  practically  constituted  a 
new  law  of  bankruptcy,  and  was  followed  in  due 
time,  probably  under  Augustus,  by  a  more  complete 

*  Bell.  Civ.,  iii.,  i. 


342  yulius   CcBsar.  [49  B.c- 

and  permanent  enactment  on  the  same  lines.  It  re- 
lieved the  borrower  from  the  liability  to  personal 
bondage,  which  had  been  hitherto  always  recognised 
by  statute,  and  we  may  see  in  it  the  germ  of  our 
modern  laws  of  bankruptcy.^  The  second  regulation 
was  a  temporary  expedient  in  the  interest  of  the 
debtor,  wild  enough  according  to  our  ideas  of  eco- 
nomic science,  but  characteristic  of  antiquity ;  a 
strong  remedy  applied  to  a  serious  disease.  If  cred- 
itors everywhere  called  in  their  debts,  while  all  values 
were  lowered  by  the  Civil  War,  innumerable  debtors 
would  be  utterly  ruined,  and  capitalism  would  gain 
instead  of  losing  by  a  war  of  which  it  was  itself  one 
main  causej  Caesar  is  also  said  to  have  ordered,  like 
Solon,  that  all  interest  already  paid  should  be  de- 
ducted from  the  capital  sum  ;  and  Suetonius  reckons 
the  loss  to  the  .capitalist  on  this  score  as  on  an  ave- 
rage one  fourth  of  the  sum  lent.  We  hear  also  of  a 
law  directed  against  hoarding,  and  of  another  which 
compelled  the  capitalist  to  invest  part  of  his  capital 
in  land,  for  the  benefit  of  Italian  agriculture,  and  to 
discourage  the  usurer's  business ;  these  were  proba- 
bly passed  two  years  later,  and  meant  as  permanent 
enactments. 

All  this  had  been  skilfully  framed  in  the  interest 
of  the  poor  debtor,  without  doing  more  injury  to 
the  rich  than  was  necessary  and  deserved.  But  the 
idle  poor  of  the  great  city,  the  curse  of  the  last  few 
generations,  were  not  encouraged  to  look  for  special 
indulgence.  We  may  even  now  read  some  of  the 
rules  laid  down  by  Caesar  for  the  proper  management 
of   those    doles    of   corn    which    had  so   long    been 


44  B.C.]      CcEsar  s  Use  of  Absohite  Paivei'.         343 

making  Rome  a  refuge  for  all  the  lazy  paupers  of 
Italy.*  The  effect  of  them  was  simply  to  change  a 
flagrant  abuse  into  a  well  regulated  system  of  relief. 
The  number  of  recipients  was  reduced  from  320,000 
to  150,000,  and  that  this  latter  number  was  to  be 
rigidly  adhered  to  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  the 
magistrate  who  should  give  a  dole  to  anyone  whose 
claim  had  not  been  publicly  sanctioned,  was  liable  to 
a  fine  of  not  less  than  ^400.  And  Caesar  was  not 
content  with  putting  this  unlucky  institution  of 
Gaius  Gracchus  on  a  rational  basis  ;  he  also  set  to 
work  at  the  great  design  which  Gracchus  had  pro- 
jected, to  act  as  a  remedy  destined  eventually  to 
supersede  all  necessity  of  relief.  Rome  and  Italy 
were  now  to  pour  their  unemployed  into  the  various 
provinces,  where  they  were  to  be  settled  in  colonies 
after  the  old  Roman  fashion,  with  allotments  of  land 
and  the  prospect  of  gaining  a  healthy  livelihood. 
But  it  was  with  Caesar  as  with  Gracchus  ;  the  great 
design  had  but  just  begun  to  take  effect  when  its 
author  fell  a  victim  to  the  blindness  of  republican 
''  patriots."  We  only  know  for  certain  of  a  few 
colonies  which  were  actually  founded,  chiefly  in 
southern  Gaul  and  in  Spain. f 

The  veteran  soldiers  of  the  famous  legions  which 
had  borne  Caesar  to  power  were  not  allowed,  when 
their  service  was  over,  to  recruit  the  pauperism  of 

*  Lex  Julia  Municipalis,  first  six  sections. 

\  lie  did  not  live  to  see  Corinth  and  Carthage  colonised,  but  it  is 
certain  that  these  foundations  date  from  the  year  of  his  death.  1  he 
two  great  commercial  cities  of  former  times  were  to  rise  from  the 
ruins  in  which  the  Republic  had  laid  them  and  to  flourish  afresh  under 
the  Empire. 


344  yulius  CcBsar.  [49  B.C.- 

the  capital,  like  those  of  Marius,  nor  to  become  a 
standing  menace  to  the  peace  of  Italy,  as  had  long 
been  the  case  with  Sulla's  old  warriors.  They  were 
either  settled  in  the  above-mentioned  colonies,  or 
were  distributed  over  Italy,  after  the  African  cam- 
paign, in  such  a  way  as  to  prevent  them  from  con- 
centrating their  strength  again.  The  difficult  task 
of  providing  them  with  land  was  carried  out  without 
injustice  or  violence,  for  it  was  the  master's  object 
and  interest  to  leave  no  cause  for  irritation  in  any 
class  of  the  population.  These  veterans  were  splen- 
did men,  used  to  labour  of  all  kinds,  and  if  they 
could  be  localised  apart  and  take  root  in  their  new 
homes,  might  be  a  help  rather  than  a  hindrance  to 
the  regeneration  of  Italy.  They  were  not  entirely 
without  the  means  of  starting  a  small  farm  ;  each 
legionary  had  received  from  Caesar  after  his  triumph 
a  sum  equal  to  more  than  ;^I50  of  our  money,  and 
the  centurions  much  more.  1  And  here  it  is  worth 
noting  that  the  vast  sums  which  passed  into  Caesar's 
hands,  from  confiscation  of  the  property  of  van- 
quished enemies  or  in  other  ways,  were  not  used  by 
him  as  personal  property,  but  as  held  in  trust  for 
the  whole  state,  and  were  allowed  to  filter  thus 
through  his  hands  as  it  were  into  the  soil  of  Italy, 
or  were  converted  into  state  treasure,  or  destined  in 
his  will  to  be  distributed  in  very  small  sums  over  the 
whole  body  of  Roman  citizens.  I 

That  Caesar  was  not  working  merely  by  instinct 
in  all  this,  but  consciously  endeavouring  to  reduce 
the  evil  effects  of  ill-used  capital,  is  shown  by  one  or 
two  other  measures  which  we  can  do  no  more  than 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        345 

mention.  How  far  they  were  or  could  be  carried 
out  is  indeed  doubtful,  but  their  meaning  is  plain. 
Every  great  holder  of  a  cattle-run  in  Italy  was  to 
have  not  less  than  a  third  of  his  labourers  free  men 
and  not  slaves,  a  rule  which  would  compel  payment 
of  wages  and  decrease  the  opportunities  of  enormous 
profits.  Idle  luxury  he  sought  to  check  by  direct 
sumptuary  laws,  no  doubt  in  vain  ;  more  effectively, 
perhaps,  by  the  re-imposition  of  customs-duties  on 
foreign  goods  landed  at  Italian  ports.  By  this  last 
measure,  in  which  he  once  again  followed  the  steps 
of  G.  Gracchus,  he  at  once -encouraged  Italian  pro- 
duction and  made  the  rich  pay  something  to  the 
state  for  the  luxurious  privileges  of  wealth.  Lastly, 
to  stimulate  a  healthier  tone  of  mind  in  this  same 
effeminate  class,  he  forbade  any  son  of  a  senator  to 
leave  Italy  save  in  the  course  of  a  military  education, 
or  in  the  retinue  of  a  provincial  governor.  And  no 
citizen  of  any  rank  was  to  be  more  than  three  years 
continuously  abroad  between  the  age  of  twenty  and 
forty — that  is,  they  were  not  to  settle  in  the  provinces 
except  as  permanent  colonists,  or  to  range  over  the 
Empire,  as  the  equestrian  class  had  so  long  been 
doing,  in  order  to  glut  themselves  on  the  weakness 
of  pauperised  provincials. 

"  Quid  leges  sine  moribus  vance  proficiunt  f  "  So 
wrote  Horace,  under  Caesar's  successor,  seeing  as  yet 
no  moral  regeneration  at  work  in  the  Roman  mind. 
And  there  is  indeed  no  greater  mistake  than  to  con- 
ceive of  Caesar  as  a  teacher  of  morality.  The  idea 
of  a  new  righteousness  to  leaven  the  world  was  not 
to  come,  and  could  not  come,  from   Italy  ;  not  from 


34^  yulius  CcBsar,  [49  b.c.~ 

the  humane  instincts  of  the  man  of  action,  nor  yet 
from  the  second-hand  philosophy  so  exquisitely 
Latinised  by  Cicero.  But  in  public  life  at  least, 
Caesar  showed  a  recognition  of  the  law  that  justice 
must  form  the  basis  of  all  social  well-being  ;  and  if 
we  turn  for  a  moment  from  Italy  to  the  provinces, 
we  shall  see  that  he  included  in  that  idea  of  justice 
all  the  inhabitants  of  the  Empire. 
I  Two  leading  motives  seem  to  have  governed  his 
dealings  with  the  provinces.  First,  there  was  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation,  which  led  him  to  ap- 
point the  governors  directly  himself,  or  to  leave  but 
a  nominal  power  of  selection  to  his  Senate.  If  the 
Empire  were  to  hold  together  any  longer,  it  was 
essential  that  these  satraps  should  be  really  dependent 
on,  and  responsible  to,  a  master  who  was  strong 
enough  to  punish  disloyalty  or  injustice.  His  own 
rise  to  power  was  now  a  warning  to  him.  It 
was  he  who  introduced  as  a  definite  system  the 
practice  of  nominating  his  own  legati  to  governor- 
ships ;  men,  that  is,  who  were  in  the  position  of 
subordinates  to  his  own  imperium,  delegates  bound 
to  obey  his  orders,  and  punishable  by  himself  alone. 
This  was  one  example  of  that  "  tyranny,"  which  so 
astonished  and  horrified  the  official  mind  at  Rome  ; 
in  reality  it  was  only  the  substitution  of  a  real  for 
a  sham  system  of  responsibility.  It  was  continued 
by  Augustus,  and  though  it  was  applied  by  him  and 
his  successors  only  to  a  certain  number  of  the  gov- 
ernorships, the  existence  of  an  autocratic  centre  of 
power  rapidly  affected  the  whole  system,  and  secured 
for  the  provinces  on  the  whole  a  far  better  chance 


44  B.C.I      CcEsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power,        347 


of  development  than  they  had  enjoyed  under  the 
real  tyranny  of  irresponsible  republican  rulers,  i 
Though  not  theoretically  perfect,  and  depending 
for  its  efficacy  on  the  industry  and  vigilance  of  a 
single  man,  it  was  the  only  possible  alternative  to 
disruption  and  misgovernment  in  that  age.  We  still 
note  with  admiration,  in  the  correspondence  between 
Pliny  and  Trajan  a  century  and  a  half  later,  the 
paternal  care  with  which  a  hard-working  autocrat 
could  interest  himself  in  the  administrative  details 
of  a  distant  province,  and  the  affectionate  loyalty 
of  a  trusted  representative  of  his  power. 

By  such  methods  it  became  possible  to  do  at 
least  something  towards  staying  that  continual  drain 
of  provincial  wealth  to  Rome  and  Italy,  which,  as 
we  saw,  was  at  the  bottom  of  the  whole  social  cor- 
ruption of  the  time  ;  and  this,  if  we  interpret  Caesar 
rightly,  was  the  second  great  motive  in  his  mind  in 
dealing  with  the  provinces.  He  wished,  in  fact,  to 
correlate  his  reforms  at  home  with  the  necessary 
reform  in  provincial  government.*  He  had  in  his 
first  consulship  thoroughly  revised  the  law  against 
extortion  in  the  provinces,  and  he  now  put  it  in 
force  with  vigour,  ejecting  (says  Suetonius)  from  the 
Senate  all  who  were  con  /  cted  under  it.  (  The  proper 
administration  of  this  law,  of  the  law  of  high  trea- 
son,"^  and  of  that  against  bribery  at  elections,  would 
go  far  towards  stopping  the  accumulation,  as  well  as 
the  misuse  of  ill-gotten  wealth.     And  if  the  govern- 

*  This  was  also  fully  revised  by  Caesar,  and  the  result  was  approved 
even  by  Cicero  (Phil.,  i.,9).  We  unfortunately  are  in  the  dark  as 
to  the  additions  or  improvements  which  he  made  in  it. 


348  Julius   CcBsar.  t49  B.C.- 

ors  themselves  ceased  to  be  sharks,  it  would  natu- 
rally follow  that  a  healthier  tone  might  be  anticipated 
among  the  members  of  their  retinue  and  the  Roman 
men  of  business  in  each  province.  {  Lastly,  the 
state  itself  was  no  longer  to  be  the  grcat  destroyer 
of  provincial  wellbeing ;  for  little  as  we  know  of 
Caesar's  financial  intentions,  we  can  at  least  be  sure 
that  what  he  did  was  in  the  right  direction.  The 
tithe-system  of  direct  taxation,  which  had  ruined 
the  rich  province  of  Asia  since  G.  Gracchus,  was 
either  abolished  entirely,  or  at  least  the  collection  of 
the  tithes  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  provincials 
themselves.  The  new  province  of  Gaul  was  taxed 
in  a  lump  sum,  and  not  a  heavy  one.  The  project 
of  a  general  census^_though  Cs£aaii_did^ot_live  to 
carry  it  out,  made  it  plain  that  he  wished  to  lay  the 
foundation  of  all_rigliteous  financial  _djealing^/by 
ascertaining  and  registering  the  tax-paying_capacitx^ 
of^alTp fop ef f yTnTth e^  E mpire^  | 
I  Thus,  wherever  we  turn,  we  see  indications  of 
an  attempt  to  remedy  the  most  crying  social  and 
economical  evils  of  the  day.  ^The  power  of  vast 
capital  to  do  infinite  material  and  moral  harm,  was 
checked  both  by  measures  of  immediate  application, 
and  by  the  more  far-sighted  method  of  shutting  up 
the  sources  of  illegitimate  accumulation.  And  it 
must  be  allowed,  that  in  spite  of  all  the  evils  inci- 
dental to  a  system  of  absolutism,  we  can  trace  in  the 
era  of  the  early  Empire  a  steady  progress  in  the  ma- 
terial well-being  of  the  masses,  and  some  tendency 
towards  a  better  public  morality  in  the  region  of 
government ;  and  we  must  refer  the  origin  of  this 


44  B.C.I      CcBsar  s  Use  of  Absohite  Paiver.        349 

to  the  width  of  view  and  the  right  instincts,  not  only 
of  Augustus,  but  of  the  man  who  was  his  master 
and,  in  some  respects  at  least,  his  model. 

III.  We  have  now  seen  something  of  the  new 
form  of  central  government  which  Caesar  initiated, 
and  also  something  of  the  attempts  he  made  to 
remedy  the  social  demoralisation  of  the  age.  There 
remains  the  question  whether  he  conceived,  or  tried 
to  put  into  effect,/  any  scheme  for  the  political  re- 
organisation of  the  Empirei  The  reader  who  is  not 
conversant  with  the  histories  of  Greece  and  Rome, 
may  be  at  a  loss  to  understand  what  is  here  meant ; 
yet  it  must  be  understood,  if  Caesar's  position  in  the 
world's  history  is  to  be  adequately  recognised.  Let 
us  begin  by  explaining  very  briefly  what  need  of 
re-organisation  there  was. 

If  a  traveller  had  passed  through  the  Empire  at 
this  time,  inquiring  how  the  business  of  government 
was  carried  on  in  the  different  parts  of  it,  he  must 
have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was  no 
unity  of  system,  either  in  matters  of  law,  finance,  or 
general  administration.  In  Italy  he  would  find  the 
Roman  law  everywhere  applied,  because  all  the  in- 
habitants were  now  citizens  of  Rome  ;  but  in  any 
town  he  visited  he  would  probably  be  told  that  its 
local  authorities  were  in  a  very  uncertain  position, 
that  their  relations  to  the  Roman  magistrates  were 
ill-defined  or  not  defined  at  all,  and  that  in  many 
cases  the  local  magistracies  and  councils  were  filled 
by  persons  quite  unfitted  to  serve,  whether  from 
inexperience,  low  birth,  or  bad  character.  In  Cis- 
alpine Gaul  he  would  probably  find  a  better  moral 


350  Julius  CcBsar,  [49  b.c- 

tone,  but  a  far  more  anomalous  legal  position.  This 
rich  district  was  2, province ,  and  governed  like  other 
provinces  by  a  proconsul  or  propraetor  ;  yet  all  the 
inhabitants  south  of  the  Po  had  long  been  Roman 
citizens,  and  in  49  B.C.,  as  we  saw,  Caesar  gave  the  full 
citizenship  also  to  the  district  between  the  Po  and 
the  Alps.  After  that  date,  all  the  free  inhabitants 
of  the  peninsula  were  qualified  to  vote  in  the  elec- 
tive and  legislative  assemblies  at  Rome — that  is,  to 
elect  the  magistrates  who  were  to  govern  them,  and 
to  vote  on  the  laws  they  were  to  obey ;  yet  they 
could  seldom  or  never  be  present  on  such  occasions, 
the  laws  were  passed  and  the  magistrates  elected  by 
the  people  of  the  great  city  only,  and  the  rest  were 
left  to  manage  their  own  affairs  as  best  they  could, 
with  little  sense  of  the  privileges  they  nominally 
possessed.  An  intelligent  Italian  might  well  have 
told  our  traveller  that  he  was  living  in  a  state  of 
political  chaos.  "  Long  ago,"  he  might  have  said, 
"■  most  of  us  belonged  to  free  communities,  and 
after  we  fell  under  the  Roman  power,  we  were  at 
least  nominally  independent,  though  bound  to  serve 
in  Roman  armies.  Now  that  we  have  become 
Roman  citizens,  we  seem  to  be  neither  governors 
nor  governed  ;  our  local  affairs  are  going  to  pieces, 
and  we  cannot  influence  the  affairs  of  the  Empire." 
Let  us  now  imagine  that  our  traveller  has  crossed 
from  Brundisium  to  Epirus,  and  is  making  a  tour 
through  the  cities  of  Greece,  Macedonia,  and  Asia 
Minor.  Here  he  would  find  a  state  of  things  doubt- 
less more  intelligible,  but  far  less  promising.  Most 
of  these  cities  had  had  a  history,  and  in  many  cases 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        351 

an  inspiring  one.  The  old  Greek  idea  of  the  free 
and  self-sufficient  city-state  still  lingered  on  among 
them,  and  some  few  were  even  now  called  free 
cities,  or  boasted  an  ''  alliance  "  with  Rome.  But 
even  these  last  were  really  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Roman  provincial  governor ;  and  all  the  less 
privileged  cities  only  retained  their  local  institu- 
tions at  his  will  and  pleasure.  Everywhere  the 
traveller  would  find  that  the  law  itself  and  its  ad- 
ministration, the  security  of  person  and  property, 
the  operation  of  wills  and  covenants,  even  the  rate 
of  interest,  depended  on  the  temper  and  industry 
of  the  provincial  governor  and  his  suite,  and  might 
be  at  any  time  altered  on  the  arrival  of  a  new  one. 
Under  a  good  governor,  and  in  time  of  peace,  these 
cities  might  enjoy  the  phantom  of  a  local  autonomy, 
and  elect  their  own  magistrates  and  council,  as  of 
old  ;  but  the  Roman  imperium  cast  its  grim  shadow 
everywhere,  chilling  men  and  disheartening  them, 
like  a  London  fog  of  to-day.  The  Greeks,  not  only 
in  the  East,  but  wherever  they  had  settled,  must 
have  felt  that  at  best  they  were  only  allowed  to 
play  at  governing  themselves,  and  that  such  amuse- 
ment was  hardly  better  than  the  most  abject  state 
of  servitude. 

In  the  far  West,  in  Spain  as  well  as  in  Africa,  and 
in  the  vast  newly  acquired  territory  of  Gaul,  there 
had  been  no  memory  of  a  time  when  every  city  was 
free  and  self-governing,  as  in  Greece.  In  Spain 
there  were  not  as  yet  many  towns,  though  the 
Romans  had  everywhere  recognised  the  value  of 
them  ;  in  Gaul  there  were  hardly  any.     The  inhabi- 


352  yiilius   Qrsar,  t49  B.C.- 

tants  lived  in  villages,  and  were  gathered  into  tribal 
groups,  such  as  the  ^dui  or  the  Carnutes.  There 
was  here,  then,  no  question  of  even  a  nominal  in- 
dependence, except  where  the  Romans  had  bestowed 
it  on  some  ancient  Greek  colony  like  Massilia,  or 
allowed  a  Gallic  tribe  to  call  themselves  the  friends 
of  the  Roman  people.  Here  the  provincial  governor 
was  checked  by  fewer  ancient  traditions  or  usages, 
and  the  Romanisation  of  the  people  was  an  easier 
task.  No  real  civilisation  had  preceded  the  Roman 
in  the  West. 

Supposing  our  traveller  to  have  made  his  tour  of 
inquiry  in  the  year  50  B.C.,  just  before  the  Civil  War 
broke  out,  he  might  well  have  asked  what  possible 
bond  of  union  could  be  discovered,  capable  of  hold- 
ing together  such  a  chaos  of  races,  languages, 
religions,  traditions,  interests,  and  forms  of  local  gov- 
ernment, as  the  so-called  Roman  Empire  then  con- 
tained. At  one  time  the  great  council  of  the  city  of 
Rome  had  really  held  this  empire  together  by  virtue 
of  the  immense  prestige  won  for  it  by  its  indomitable 
firmness  alike  in  victory  and  defeat.  But  now  the 
task  itself  was  a  far  larger  and  more  complicated  one, 
and  the  Senate  had  utterly  discredited  itself.  \The 
two  great  sources  of  decay  which  had  everywtiere 
disintegrated  the  ancient  form  of  city-state,  had  done 
their  work  effectually  at  Rome  ;  conquest  had  cor- 
rupted both  the  conquered  and  the  conqueror,  and 
the  quarrels  of  rich  and  poor  had  demoralised  both 
parties  within  the  state  itself.  ]  There  was  in  fact  no 
single  city-state  of  the  true  old  type,  free  and  self- 
sufficing,    now    left    in    the    whole    civilised    world. 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.         353 

Rome  herself  had  grown  out  of  all  limits,  and  all 
the  other  cities  had  lost  their  freedom,  and  depended 
for  their  very  existence  on  the  will  of  Rome  and  her 
magistrates.  If  the  Greek  political  philosophers  had 
re-entered  the  world  in  this  year,  they  would  have 
found  their  analysis  of  political  life  and  duty  no 
longer  applicable  ;  the  old  idea  of  the  state  was 
gone,  and  what  was  there  to  take  its  place  ?  A  year 
or  two  later,  even  the  existing  semblance  of  union 
threatened  to  disappear ;  the  East  was  arrayed 
against  the  West  in  the  plains  of  Thessaly,  and  Italy, 
helpless  and  impoverished,  seemed  likely  to  be 
crushed  between  them. 

Yet  we  have  but  to  look  forward  half  a  century,  to 
find  the  whole  Roman  dominion  once  more  firmly 
knit  together  and  at  peace  ;  content  and  prosperity 
beginning  to  reign  both  in  East  and  West,  Italy  well- 
governed,  and  the  great  cosmopolitan  city  quiet  and 
enjoying  its  life.  And  still  more  astonishing  is  it  to 
find  that  this  unity,  in  spite  of  severe  shocks,  survives 
for  several  centuries  ;  that  an  entirely  new  era  of 
political  life  has  begun,  and  impressed  itself  so  in- 
delibly on  men's  minds,  that  when  it  finally  passes 
away  in  the  hurricanes  of  barbarian  invasion,  the 
memory  and  the  worship  of  it  remain,  and  become  a 
solid  basis  on  which  new  structures  can  be  raised. 
/  It  is  true  enough  that  this  unity  was  never  real  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  France  of  to-day  is  united  ;  the 
East  and  West  always  differed,  and  were  eventually 
separated.  But  in  the  sense  of  belonging  to  a  great 
whole  ;  in  the  reaHsation  of  a  unity  of  power,  com- 
petent to  protect  ;  in  the  possession  of  something  to 
23 


354  JmIuis   Cc€sar.  [49  B.c- 

which  to  be  loyal — a  clear,  visible  impersonation  of 
the  majesty  of  the  Roman  government, — in  all  these 
ways  there  came  to  be  a  unity  of  the  Empire,  which 
bridges  over  the  gulf  between  the  ancient  and  the 
modern  state.  {  And  this  was  the  result  in  the  main 
of  two  great  political  conceptions  :  i.  The  idea  of  a 
central  unit,  not  now  a  city,  but  a  person,  to  whom 
all  other  units  in  the  system  should  look  up  as  the 
ultimate  and  universal  referee  ;  2.  The  idea  of  a  form 
of  local  government,  applicable  throughout  the  whole 
system,  with  modifications  suited  to  pre-existing  insti- 
tutions and  the  character  of  the  various  populations,  j 

Both  these  conceptions,  afterwards  so  inseparable 
from  one  another  and  so  closely  interwoven,  had 
been  in  men's  minds  before  Caesar  fought  his  way  to 
absolutism  ;  but  the  notion  of  creating  a  new  politi- 
cal entity  out  of  them  had  probably  been  fully  real- 
ised by  no  one.  In  any  practical  problem,  it  is  less 
hard  to  discover  what  conditions  are  present,  than  to 
see  how  to  utilise  them  to  advantage.  |  We  are  jus- 
tified in  believing  that  it  was  Caesar  who  first  fully 
grasped  the  conditions  of  the  problem  before  the 
Roman  statesman,  and  at  the  same  time  discovered 
the  right  solution.  If  this  be  so,  he  may  indeed  be 
called  the  founder  of  the  Roman  Empire  ;  for  though 
the  outward  form  and  show  of  government  which 
Augustus  devised  was  not  that  which  Julius  had 
adopted,  yet  if  we  look  a  little  closer,  we  shall  find 
that  the  two  chief  factors  in  the  imperial  system 
were  henceforward  those  to  which  the  first  Caesar 
had  pointed,  as  the  only  possible  life-giving  principles  , 
in  a  huge  collection  of  decaying  matter.      | 


44  B.C.]      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.         355 

Let  us  try  to  show  that  these  two  principles  were 
really  in  Caesar's  mind,  i  That  he  conceived  of  per- 
sonal government  as  a  permanency,  we  have  already 
seen.  He  became  legally  absolute  himself,  he  pre- 
pared the  way  for  a  successor,  he  depressed  the  cap- 
italist class  which  supplied  the  material  for  the 
dispossessed  oligarchy.  But  he  did  more  than  this. 
He  left  no  rival  in  the  Empire,  as  Sulla  had  done  ; 
and  there  was  no  part  of  the  Empire  that  had  not 
felt  his  presence.  He  was  not  a  name  only  in  distant 
provinces.  His  person  was  familiar  to  the  leading 
men  of  Gaul,  Spain,  and  Africa  ;  he  had  settled  the 
affairs  of  Syria  and  Egypt,  and  of  the  three  provin- 
ces of  Asia  Minor.  It  was  known  everywhere  that 
"the  governors  of  all  the  provinces  were  now  his  men. 
He  knit  together  the  Roman  world  with  a  strength 
it  had  never  known  before,  and  the  centre  of  the 
system  was  beginning  to  be  felt  to  be  his  mind,  and 
not  the  city  of  Rome. 

The  second  idea,  that  of  a  limited  local  self-gov- 
ernment, so  far  as  it  was  Caesar's,  is  in  part  plainly 
visible  to  us,  in  part  beyond  our  reach.  So  far  as  the 
communities  of  Roman  citizens  were  concerned, 
whether  in  Italy  or  beyond  it,  we  know  that  he 
organised  theiu  civic  life,  and  endeavoured  to  purify 
and  elevate  it.l  The  Museum  at  Naples  even  now 
contains  a  great  part  of  the  famous  municipal  law  by 
which  this  object  was  to  be  achieved.  And  as  this 
same  law  contains  ordinances  for  the  good  gov- 
ernment of  the  city  of  Rome,  and  even  for  the  regu- 
lation of  traffic  in  her  streets  and  of  the  corn-dole 
for  her  poor  inhabitants,  we  may  fairly  guess  with 


35^  yulins   CcEsar.  [49  B.c- 

Mommsen  that  Rome  herself  was  to  be  henceforward 
in  the  eye  of  the  law  only  a  municipal  town,  the 
first  of  all  in  dignity,  but  not  in  power.  She  was  to 
resign  her  place  as  mistress,  and  to  be  no  more  than 
a  convenient  centre  for  the  conduct  of  the  business 
of  the  Empire.  She  was  to  be  the  type,  and  like  her, 
all  other  cities  which  possessed  Roman  rights  were  to 
have  their  council  and  their  magistrates  on  the  model 
of  her  own,  and  to  manage  their  own  affairs  within 
certain  limits  * ;  but  no  one  city  was  henceforth  to 
dominate  the  rest,  i  The  task  of  supervising  the 
whole  was  to  be  the  duty  of  jone  irian  ;  but  he  wa-s  to 
be  helped  in  each  individual  community  by  the  free 
action^of  the^ communal  authorities.  This,  as  briefly 
stated  as  is  possible,  was  the  idea  we  believe  to  have 
been  in^^aesar's  mind,  and  it  foreshadows  the  actual 
future  of  th£  Empire,  and  ushers  in  a  new  era  of 
political  life.|  It  would  be  too  much  to  assert  that 
he  contemplated  the  application  of  it  to  the  provinces 
also,  i.e.,  to  all  the  innumicrable  cities  and  cantons  which 
had  no  share  in  the  Roman  citizenship.  But  there 
is  something  to  be  said  in  favour  even  of  such  an 
hypothesis  as  this.  For  in  two  ways,  henceforward, 
the  course  of  local  governmefTt  in  the  provinces  was 
left  free  and  unimpeded  as  compared  with  what  it 
l.iad  _beenj  Tirst,  the  governor  was  kept  more  closely 
in  check,  and  could  no  longer  safely  trample  on 
such_  liberties  as  were  possessed  by  the  cities  which 
he  governed  ;  secondly,  the  Roman  citizenship 
alr^dy  spread    over   Italy,   was   now   beginning  to 

*  We  still  possess  a  fragment  of   a  law  (Lex  Rubria),  passed  at 
Caesar's  instigation,  which   regulated  these  limits  for  Cisalpine  Gaul. 


44  B.C.]      CcBsar  s  Use  of  Absolute  Power,         357 

creep  into  the  provinces.  Csesar  was  the  first  to 
feestow  it  entire  upon  a  foreign  community,  when  he 
enfranchised  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  free  city  of 
Gades,  the  native  place  of  the  faithful  Balbus.  Col- 
onies of  Roman  citizens,  as  we  have  seen,  according 
to  the  plan  of  G.  Gracchus,  were  now  beginning  to  be 
freely  planted  in  the  provinces.  The  Latin  ''  right,"  a 
diminished  form  of  the  full  citizenship,  was  conceded 
to  all  Sicily  and  perhaps  to  a  considerable  part  of  the 
old  Transalpine  province  of  Gaul.^  And  wherever 
such  rights  were  bestowed,  the  municipal  organisa- 
tion came  into  force,  and  the  provincial  governor  was 
no  longer  able  to  exercise  his  caprice.  From  such 
facts  we  may  quite  reasonably  infer  that  Caesar  fore- 
saw with  approval  the  gradual  extension  of  Roman 
citizenship  over  the  whole  Empire,  and  the  consequent 
security  and  uniformity  of  municipal  life.  And  with 
this  too  would  go  the  gradually  increasing  sphere  of 
Roman  law,  that  wonderful  systematisation  of  the 
rights  and  duties  of  civilised  men,  under  the  influence 
of  which  the  legal  ideas  of  modern  Europe  are  to  a 
great  extent  still  unconsciously  moulded. 

This  most  imperfect  account  of  Caesar's  work  and 
projects,  long  as  it  has  been,  cannot  be  closed  without 
an  allusion  to  one  other  point  in  which  his  deeds 
reflected  the  light  of  a  mind  more  luminous  than  that 
of  any  great  ruler  since  Pericles.  We  have  seen  how 
he  tempered  strong  government  with  justice  and 
humanity ;  but  these  virtues  were  not  unknown  to 

*Cic.,  Ad  Att.,   14,    12,   I,  does  not  make   the    point   certain  as 
regards  all  Sicily  ;  but  at  least  there  was  an  intention  of  the  kind. 


358  yulius   CcEsar,  [49  B.C.- 

Roman civilisation,  though  for  nearly  a  century  they 
had  been  crushed  out  by  party  hatred.  What  is 
really  new  in  Caesar  is  this  :-|-that  now  for  the  first 
time  in  Roman  history,  what  we  should  call  scientific 
intelligence  was  brought  to  bear  on  the  problems  of 
government."  His  turn  of  mind,  as  has  been  already 
pointed  out,  was  not  rhetorical  but  scientific ;  it  was 
not  words  or  ideals  that  attracted  him,  but  facts 
and  knowledge.  In  other  words,  he  did  not  follow 
the  pseudo-Hellenic  culture  of  the  day,  but  asserted 
the  truly  Roman  character  of  his  understanding 
without  reverting  to  the  older  Roman  model  of 
stubborn  ignorance./  This  is  visible  in  all  his  writings 
that  have  come  down  to  us,  which  are  the  expression 
in  the  fewest  possible  words  of  an  invaluable  series 
of  military,  geographical,  and  ethnical  observations. 
It  was  doubtless  also  to  be  found  in  his  other  writings, 
such  as  those  two  books  on  grammar  which  were 
composed,  as  it  is  said,  in  one  of  his  long  journeys 
from  north  Italy  to  join  his  army  in  Gaul.  And 
lastly  it  may  be  traced  in  the  whole  of  his  political 
work  ;  not  only  in  his  steady  refusal  to  deal  with 
ideals  and  fancies  such  as  delighted  and  misled  Cicero, 
but  in  the  actual  application  of  scientific  knowledge 
and  order  to  matters  of  public  concern.  To  him-  we 
are  still  under  obligation  for  the  boon  of  a  scientifi- 
cally ordered  calendar.  It  was  he  who  first  projected 
the  codification  of  the  several  elements  of  Roman 
law, — a  plan  inlikfmony  with  that  more  comprehen- 
sive  one  for  the  unification  of  the  whole  Empire.  He 
Joo  first  proposed  a  general  census  on  scientific  prin- 

*  This  is  indeed  to  some  extent  true  also  of  G.  Gracchus  and  Sulla, 
but  in  a  far  less  degree. 


44  B.C.I      CcBsars  Use  of  Absolute  Power.        359 

ciples,  with  a  practical  and  humane  object.  JThfi. 
collection  of  a  vast  library  of  Greek  and  Latin  works 
was__aaotJ[ie£lor3Kis"aims  ;  aiid' as 'Suetohius  "fells  us, 
his  former  enemy,  the  learned  Varro,  was  commis- 
sioned to  set  about  the  "wbrkr^  very  where  he  sought 
out  men  of  knowledge  and  men  of  letters,  pressed 
them  into  his  service,  and  if  they  were  without  it, 
gave  them  the  Roman  citizenship.  \ 

When  we  add  this  last  consideration  to  all  we 
have  learnt  of  his  military  genius,  his  acquisition  and 
use  of  power,  his  social  legislation,  and  his  plans  for 
the  creation  of  a  new  type  of  political  organism,  we 
must  allow  that  we  have  here  a  man  whose  equal  as 
a  ruler  of  men  has  probably  never  been  seen  since. 
Never,  we  may  at  least  conclude  with  confidence, 
have  problems  on  such  a  vast  scale  been  met  by 
genius  of  such  a  kind.  As  a  human  being  he  was 
doubtless  far  from  perfect,  though  capable  of  loving 
and  being  loved  like  humbler  men  ;  but  if  we  think 
of  his  work  only,  we  can  allow  to  no  other  statesman 
an  equal  meed  for  the  lasting  value  of  his  labour. 
We  feel  the  truth  of  that  presentation  of  him  by 
our  own  greatest  genius,  where  it  is  not  the  bodily 
presence  of  the  hero  that  is  the  protagonist  of  the 
play,  but  the  spirit  of  Csesar  that  lives  after  him. 
Brutus  and  Cassius  and  Antony  are  the  human 
characters  in  the  drama,  each  with  their  strong  and 
weak  points,  but  over  them  all  towers  the  spirit  of 
the  slain  Caesar,  destined  for  centuries  to  claim  im- 
mortality and  worship,  while  their  weak  and  disunited 
efforts  to  control  the  destinies  of  the  world  became 
no  more  than  material  for  the  biographer  and  the 
poet. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

THE  END. 
44.  B.C. 


E  left  Caesar  returning  to  Rome 
after  the  bloody  struggle  in 
Spain  in  the  spring  of  45  B.C. 
There  are  some  facts  which 
seem  to  suggest  that  the  sav- 
age nature  of  the  resistance 
offered  him,  and  the  growing 
brutality  of  his  own  men,  had 
worked  their  natural  effect 
even  on  his  mild  temper.  It 
is  said  too  that  he  suffered  severely  in  Spain  from 
the  seizures  to  which  he  was  constitutionally  liable, 
and  to  this  we  must  add  the  vexation  which  every 
man  of  high  aims  must  feel  when  he  is  continually 
thwarted  by  irreconcilable  enemies  and  forced 
again  and  again  to  postpone  the  work  of  peace. 
The  rude  historian  of  the  Spanish  war  has  preserved 
for  us  a  broken  outline  of  the  speech  he  delivered 
at     Hispalis    before    leaving    the    province,    which 

360 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  361 

clearly  shows  the  indignation  he  felt  towards  the 
people  of  Further  Spain  for  taking  sides  with  his 
enemies.  They  had  always  been  his  peculiar  care 
ever  since  he  served  his  quaestorship  among  them, 
and  they  had  requited  him  with  rebellion  at  a  time 
when  it  was  to  him  most  vexatious  and  damaging. 

His  return  had  been  most  anxiously  awaited  at 
Rome.  Cicero,  deep  in  literary  work,  was  eagerly 
inquiring  of  Balbus  when  he  might  be  expected. 
Antonius  and  Trebonius  set  off  to  meet  him  at 
Massilia,  perhaps  in  some  doubt  as  to  their  recep- 
tion, or  with  an  evil  design  in  their  hearts ;  Marcus 
Brutus,  whom  Caesar  loved  as  his  own  son,  is  also 
said  to  have  gone  there  in  some  expectation  of  a 
new  turn  of  mind  in  the  conqueror.^  It  seems  in- 
deed possible  that  the  more  sanguine  republicans 
half  believed  that  the  master  would  now  lay  down 
his  abnormal  power  and  allow  the  old  constitution 
to  get  into  its  familiar  lumbering  motion  once  more. 
Cicero,  writing  to  an  exiled  friend  at  this  time,  tells 
him  that  when  the  wars  are  at  last  over,  the  moment 
must  come  which  will  decide  whether  the  Republic  is 
to  perish  utterly  or  gain  a  new  lease  of  life.f  And 
Cicero  too  had  been  meditating,  and  had  partly 
written,  an  address  to  Caesar  on  the  condition  of  the 
state,  which,  in  spite  of  the  flattery  with  which  he 
deemed  it  necessary  to  spice  it,  must  have  contained 
suggestions  of  this  kind.  But  he  was  sick  at  heart, 
and  could  not  finish  it. 


*Cic.,  Ad  Att.,  13,  40.  Brutus  sent  word  home  that  Caesar  was 
coming  round  to  the  views  of  the  "honest  men."  "Where  are 
they  ?  "  says  Cicero, 

fFam.,  vi.,  2. 


362  yulius   Ccssar.  [44  B.C. 

There  was  indeed  much  to  make  honest  "men,  of 
the  older  and  narrower  poHtical  faith,  as  restless 
and  hopeless  as  Cicero.  Their  feelings  can  only  be 
realised  by  those  who  can  peruse  the  mass  of  corre- 
spondence between  Cicero  and  his  friends  during  the 
last  fifteen  months  of  Caesar's  life.  The  reader  of 
these  will  mark  three  alternating  characteristics 
which  tell  a  true  story  of  the  painful  situation  of 
these  men.  j  Submission  to  the  new  master,  with  a 
tendency  to  flatter  him,  yet  occasionally  to  think  of 
him  even  now  as  a  man  and  a  friend  ;  intense  repug- 
nance to  the  dulness,  or  more  truly  the  non-existence, 
of  political  life  in  the  capital — the  appalling  con- 
trast to  that  life  of  excitement  and  agitation  on 
which  Cicero's  sensitive  soul  had  fed,  even  while  it 
pained  him ;  and  lastly,  an  utter  absence  of  any 
interest  in  Caesar's  great  projects  for  the  good  of  the 
whole  Empire,  showing,  better  than  anything  else 
can  show  us,  how  great  was  the  gulf  which  separated 
the  man  whose  eyes  were  ever  on  the  past  from  the 
man  who  stood  at  the  helm  and  looked  far  into 
unknown  seas.    I 

When  Caesar  at  last  arrived  in  September,  all  such 
fanciful  hopes  were  rudely  dispelled.  He  made  no 
sign  of  restoring  the  Republic.  On  the  contrary,  he 
seems  from  this  time  to  have  exercised  his  power 
with  greater  confidence,  greater  audacity,  and  with 
less  consideration  either  for  the  feelings  of  others 
or  for  the  safety  of  his  own  life.  He  made  his  will 
on  September  13th,  at  his  estate  of  Lavicum,  before 
reaching  Rome  ;  a  step  which  turned  out  to  be  of 
the  utmost  importance  for  the  future  of  his  great 


MARCUS   BRUTUS. 

FROM  THE  BUST  IN  THE  MUSEUM  OF  THE  CAPITOL  IN   ROME    \l  ' isconti). 

{Ba  u  rf leister.') 


44  B.C.]  The  End,  363 

projects.  He  then  entered  the  city,  possibly  for 
the  "  Roman  games  "  on  September  15th,  and  soon 
afterwards  celebrated  a  fresh  triumph  with  great 
pomp.  It  would  have  been  better  to  have  dispensed 
with  this,  for  the  victory  was  over  Roman  citizens  ; 
yet  not  only  did  Caesar  triumph  himself,  but  he 
allowed  two  of  his  legati  the  same  honour  on  separate 
occasions,  though  they  had  shown,  as  it  was  said,  no 
special  merit.  At  the  games  which  followed  this 
triumph,  there  was  a  singular  illustration  of  the  com- 
pleteness of  the  new  despotism.  A  famous  play- 
wright, sixty  years  of  age,  named  Laberius,  was 
invited  by  Caesar  to  take  part  in  the  performance 
of  one  of  his  own  plays.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that 
Caesar  meant  this  as  a  deliberate  insult  to  a  man  of 
talent  who  was  a  Roman  knight  ;  but  it  is  certain 
that  the  poet  took  the  invitation  as  a  command,  for 
we  still  have  the  verses  in  which  he  deplored  his  own 
obedience."^  We  cannot  explain  the  story,  or  ex- 
tenuate the  injury,  except  by  reference  to  Laberius' 
well-known  bitterness  of  speech  ;  we  can  only  be 
sure  that  it  was  unlike  anything  we  have  yet  learnt 
of  Caesar's  courteous  and  considerate  nature.f 

Another  act  of  absolutism,  which  hurt  tender 
consciences,  was  the  sudden  election  of  consuls  and 
praetors  for  the  rest  of  the  year.  Caesar  had  himself 
been  sole  consul  this  year  ;  the  city  had  been  gov- 
erned by  Lepidus  his  ''  master  of  the  horse,"  and  by 
''  prefects  "   nominated  by  him,   instead   of  by  the 

*  Macrob.,  Sat.,  ii,,  7. 

f  On  this  very  occasion  the  poet  made  a  bitter  jest  to  Cicero, 
whick  will  be  found  in  Macrob.,  Sat.,  ii.,  3,  10. 


364  Julius  CcEsar,  [44  B.C. 

usual  magistrates.  He  now  laid  down  the  consul- 
ship, and  relieved  the  prefects  of  their  office.  But 
in  the  eyes  of  Cicero  and  his  friends,  downright 
despotism  was  better  than  a  sham  republic.  These 
new  consuls  and  praetors  were  really  nominees  of 
the  master"^  ;  they  were  not  independent  magistrates, 
each  going  his  own  way  in  that  delightful  confusion 
dear  to  lovers  of  the  old  regime  ;  they  were  ''  func- 
tionaries," as  M.  Boissier  happily  calls  them, — i.  e., 
they  had  business  to  perform,  and  performed  it 
under  the  supervision  of  a  higher  authority.  That 
such  authorities  should  be  controlled,  and  feel  them- 
selves only  as  wheels  in  a  machine,  was  intolerable 
to  Roman  feeling  ;  yet  Caesar  did  not  seem  to  care 
to  disguise  the  truth.  His  nature  was  to  face  facts, 
not  to  conceal  them,  and  he  hazarded  his  life  by  his 
frankness.  For  Augustus  the  task  was  easier,  and 
the  man's  nature  was  better  suited  to  reconcile  the 
sensitiveness  of  the  city  with  the  needs  of  the  Em- 
pire, j  For  Caesar  there  was  now  no  compromise 
possible  between  republic  and  monarchy.  For  him 
monarchy  meajit^jt^he  libexation  of  the  Empire  ;  for 
the  republicans  it  meant  the  oppression  of  the  city. 
For  him  the  republic  meant  confusion  and  scandal  ; 
for  tli£iii__it_meant  freedom  and  lawful  gain.  His 
idea  of  government  was  that  every  authority  should 
work  in  due  subordination  to  the  rest  and  to  the 
centre  ;  to  them  it  appeared  as  the  free  irrespon- 
sible action  of  every  magistrate  during  his  term  of 

*  On  the  last  day  of  this  year  Caesar  showed  his  contempt  for  the 
consulship  by  having  a  man  elected  to  fill  for  a  few  hours  the  place 
of  one  of  the  consuls  who  died  that  day. 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  365 

office. te  How  could  such  a  constitution  perform  the 
task  of  government  which  the  world  required  of 
Rome  ?  To  restore  the  republican  constitution  would 
have  been  to  destroy  all  his  work,  to  be  false  to  all 
his  aims ;  and  he  seems  to  have  now  resolved  to 
make  the  monarchy  a  more  living  and  obvious  reality. 

There  was  no  lack  of  opportunity.  Personal 
privileges  and  distinctions  were  heaped  upon  him  in 
a  continuous  stream  during  these  last  months  of  his 
life  ;  the  reader  of  Dio  Cassius  and  Appian  wearies 
of  them,  and  is  not  surprised  to  find  him  only  too 
ready  to  escape  from  this  weary  round  of  adulation, 
in  another  frontier  war.  Some  he  accepted,  others 
rejected  ;  but  the  golden  chair  in  the  Senate,  the 
triumphal  robe  on  all  state  occasions,  the  head 
stamped  on  the  new  coinage,  the  statue  added  to 
those  of  the  seven  kings,  were  quite  enough  to  pro- 
claim the  new  monarchy,  even  before  the  question 
of  the  title  of  Rex  had  been  raised.  If  ever  there 
was  a  king,  Caesar  was  one,  though,  like  the  greatest 
of  our  English  kings,  he  never  bore  the  title. 

But  up  to  the  end  of  this  year,  45  B.C.,  it  does  not 
seem  that  the  adulation  reached  its  highest  point. 
Caesar  had  his  hands  full ;  he  was  busy,  so  far  as  we 
can  discern,  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  Senate, 
which  must  have  taken  much  time  and  thought ; 
with  the  settling  of  his  veterans  on  their  newly 
acquired  land  ;  with  the  completion  of  his  vast 
buildings  in  the  cityTwTiTch^Tiaxf lately  given  employ- 
ment_tg.jLhe  poor,  and  were  making  old  Rome  into 
a  new  and  splend[d_city  ;  with  his  new  gold  coinage  ; 
with  the-xreation_  of  new  patrician  houses,  a  plan, 


366  yulius   Ccesar.  f44  B.C. 

as  it  would  seem,  for  reviving  the  old  nobility  of 
birth,  in  place  of  that  worn-out  nobility  of  state 
service,  which  had  come  to  an  end  with  the  extinc- 
of  its  functions  under  his  own  sway.  Other 
far-reaching  projects  belong  perhaps  to  these  months, 
such  as  the  draining  of  the  malarious  Pomptine 
marshes,  and  the  construction  of  a  new  harbour  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Tiber ;  works  which  would  have  given 
useful  employment  to  the  idle  proletariate  of  the 
great  city.  It  is  said  also  that  he  wished  to  cut 
through  the  Isthmus  of  Corinth,  and  thus  secure  a 
direct  route  by  sea,  connecting  Italy  with  the  East. 
These  plans  mean  nothing  more  than  that  one  who 
had  never  yet  found  difificulties  insurmountable  in 
war,  was  now  employing  his  engineers  in  devising 
such  works  of  peace  as  might  serve  to  knit  the  Em- 
pire more  strongly  together,  and  make  trade  and 
travel  quicker  and  more  easy.  I  They  surely  do  not 
mark  the  overweening  ambition  of  a  tyrant,  as  some 
thought  then  and  afterwards  ;  what  they  show  us  is 
indeed  an  extraordinary  and  restless  activity,  which 
the  slow-going  conservative  Roman  could  neither 
appreciate  nor  forgive.  Here  was  indeed  a  kingly 
mind,  though  one  perhaps  now  beginning  to  show 
some  faint  signs  of  feverishness.    I 

In  December,  however,  he  tooK  what  had  long 
been  for  him  an  impossibility  and  a  dream — a  brief 
holiday  in  the  country.  It  was  really  December, 
for  the  new  calendar  had  come  into  force  at  the 
beginning  of  this  year  ;  and  Caesar  moved  south- 
wards in  state,  with  the  military  guard  he  had  not 
yet  abandoned,  to  that  mild  and  beautiful  sea-coast 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  367 

of  Campania  which  the  Romans  loved  so  dearly. 
For  a  moment  the  mist  is  lifted  that  enshrouds 
the  persons  of  the  great  men  of  antiquity,  and 
on  the  19th  of  December  we  catch  a  glimpse 
of  Caesar  as  he  really  was.  He  had  spent  a 
night  near  Puteoli,  at  the  villa  of  a  connexion  of 
his  own,  Q.  Marcius  Philippus,  who  had  been 
consul  in  the  critical  year  56  B.C.  Cicero,  too, 
had  a  villa  in  the  neighbourhood,  and  happened  to 
be  staying  there.  The  Dictator  proposed  a  visit, 
and  Cicero,  in  an  ever  memorable  letter,  describes 
to  Atticus  what  happened.  Caesar  remained  at 
Philippus'  house  till  twelve  or  one  o'clock,  and 
admitted  no  one  but  Balbus,  with  whom  (as  Cicero 
guesses)  he  was  going  over  accounts.  Then  he 
took  a  walk  on  the  shore,  and  in  the  afternoon 
came  to  Cicero's  villa.  There  he  bathed,  and  was 
anointed,  and  after  taking  some  kind  of  stomachic 
medicine,  as  was  apparently  his  habit,  sat  down  to 
dinner.  The  suite  was  accommodated  also,  though 
Cicero  had  been  much  put  about  for  ways  and 
means  ;  the  escort  of  soldiers  was  encamped  in  the 
park.  Caesar  ate  and  drank  and  talked  with  much 
freedom  and  enjoyment,  but  the  conversation  was 
entirely  literary.  Cicero,  too,  evidently  enjoyed 
the  visit,  though  he  tells  Atticus  that  his  guest 
was  not  one  to  whom  you  would  readily  say, 
"Come  again,  my  dear  friend,  on  the  first  oppor- 
tunity." It  is  sad  to  think  that  a  few  weeks  later 
Cicero  was  exulting  over  the  cruel  death  of  the 
man  on  whom  he  had  lavished  his  hospitality.  At 
the  end  of  his  letter  Cicero  adds  that  as  the  Die- 


368  Julius   Ca;sar.  [44  B.C. 

tator  passed  the  villa  of  Dolabella,  whom  he  had 
reason  to  distrust,  his  guards,  who  always  rode  at 
a  little  distance,  for  once  closed  round  his  horse ; 
and  so  he  disappears  from  our  view."^ 
/  Dolabella  had  been  promised  the  consulship  for 
44  B.C. ;  but  Csesar  now  assumed  it  himself  with  An- 
tonius,  promising  it  to  DoUbella  when  he  should 
have  started  for  the  East,  /he  was  now  beginning 
to  be  fully  occupied  with  the  preparations  for  his 
expedition  against  the  Parthians,  on  which  he  was 
to  set  out  in  March.  This  was  a  project  of  long 
standing;  it  was  the  inevitable  result  of  the  actions 
of  his  former  confederates.  Pompeius  had  made 
Syria  into  a  province,  and  brought  the  Roman  Em- 
pire into  touch  with  the  Parthian,  which  extended 
from  central  Asia  to  the  Euphrates.  Crassus  had 
been  utterly  defeated  in  invading  Parthia,  and  ever 
since  his  disaster,  the  Parthians  had  been  menacing 
the  frontier,  and  had  frequently  broken  through  it. 
At  this  very  time  they  were  in  Syria,  and  in  active 
support  of  the  last  of  the  Pompeian  commanders, 
Caecilius  Bassus,  who  had  worsted  the  Caesarian 
generals,  and  was  practically  in  possession  of  part  of 
the  province.  There  was  no  time  to  be  lost ;  this 
cloud  might  grow  into  a  serious  storm  in  the  East, 
and  the  lately  won  unity  of  the  Empire  might  once 
more  be  threatened. 

Expecting  to  be  away  for  some  time,  he  made  all 
necessary  arrangements  for  at  least  two  years  to 
come.  Two  steady  and  trusty  friends,  Hirtius  and 
Pansa,  were  to  be  consuls  in  43  B.C.,  and  were  actually 

♦  Cic,  Ad.  Att.,  xiii.,  52. 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  369 

elected  ;  two  others,  D.  Brutus  and  Munatius  Plancus, 
were  selected  for  42  B.C.  The  well-beloved  Marcus 
Brutus  was  to  be  prcetor  urbanus  for  this  year,  and 
then  to  govern  Macedonia ;  C.  Cassius,  a  much 
older  man,  and  a  skilful  soldier,  this  year  prcEtor 
peregrinus^  was  after  his  ofifice  to  proceed  to  Syria, 
where  he  had  already  served  with  distinction,  and 
would  be  useful  to  Caesar.  These  two,  among 
others,  had  fought  against  Caesar  till  the  battle  of 
Pharsalus,  but  now  seemed  to  be  readily  responding 
to  the  claim  of  his  generous  policy  of  trust  and 
reconciliation.  But  Decimus  Brutus  was  to  govern 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  the  strategical  key  to  Italy  ;  it  was 
thus  in  the  safe-keeping  of  one  of  Caesar's  oldest 
and  most  trusted  soldiers,  whom  we  have  seen  long 
ago  beating  the  maritime  tribes  of  western  Gaul  on 
their  own  element.  All  the  provinces  were  provided 
with  governors,  and  many  other  arrangements  were 
completed,  for  which  no  place  can  be  found  here; 
but  the  very  fact  that  all  these  appointments  could 
be  made,  that  they  were  accepted,  and  that  Caesar 
could  venture  to  absent  himself  again  for  a  long 
period  from  the  capital,  shows  that  he  felt  himself 
now  entirely  secure,  and  justified  both  in  displaying 
his  confidence,  and  in  assuming,  more  distinctly 
than  ever,  the  outward  semblance  of  a  monarch. 

For  he  now  dismissed  all  his  guards,  and  was 
often  seen  in  the  city  quite  unprotected.^  At  the 
same  time  he   restored  the  statues  of  Sulla  and  of 


*  Hirtius  and  Pansa  are  said  to  have  remonstrated  with  him  on 
this  point  ;  he  answered  that  it  was  better  to  die  once  than  to  be 
always  in  fear  of  death.     Velleius,  ii.,  57 


24 


2,yo  yulius  Ccesar.  [44  B.C. 

Pompeius,  which  had  been  thrown  down  by  the 
mob  after  the  battle  of  Pharsalus.  i  Now  burst  out 
afresh  the  flood  of  adulation  ;  Caesar  was  to  be  a 
god  as  well  as  a  king.  A  new  collegium  of  Luperci, 
the  priests  of  an  ancient  and  unknown  deity,  was 
instituted  and  called  by  his  name.  I  A  temple  was 
to  be  erected  to  Jupiter  Julius  and  Clementia ;  the 
month  Quinctilis  was  to  be  called  after  his  gentile 
name,  which  it  still  bears  ;  a  score  at  least  of  other 
such  offerings  were  made  at  the  shrine  of  his  great- 
ness, in  that  strange  oriental  spirit  of  mingled 
cringing  and  irony  which  seized  on  a  weak  genera- 
tion and  was  handed  down  to  its  successors.  For 
some  at  least  of  these  Antonius  the  consul  was 
responsible,  for  he  now  became  the  head  of  the 
Julian  Luperci,  and  priest  of  Jupiter  Julius  "^  ;  the 
man  who  had  long  been  Caesar's  evil  genius,  and 
was  even  now  luring  him  to  his  destruction. 

Repeated  attempts  were  also  made  to  get  him  to 
assume  the  title,  as  well  as  the  reality,  of  monarchy. 
But  the  word  rex  was  ever  hated  at  Rome,  and  this 
was  but  too  plainly  a  stratagem  to  bring  him  into 
general  odium.  He  seems  steadily  to  have  refused  all 
such  appeals,  whether  suggested  in  private,  or  on  such 
public  occasions  as  the  Lupercalia  (February  15th), 
when  the  famous  scene  seems  really  to  have  occurred 
which  Shakespeare  has  embodied  from  Plutarch  in 
his  play.  "  I  am  no  king,  but  Caesar,"  he  said  on 
another  occasion.  Again,  a  story  is  told,  which 
wears  the  appearance  of  truth,f  that  one  day,  when 

*  Cic,  Phil.,  ii.,  sec.  no. 

f  It  is  told  in  various  forms,  of  which  I  adopt  that  given  by  Nico- 
laus  Damascenus  (Vita  C?es.  Oct.,  ch.  22). 


44B.C.1  The  End.  37 1 

he  was  busied  with  the  building  of  his  new  forum, 
talking  to  his  architects,  and  apportioning  the  work, 
the  Senate  came  to  him  in  procession,  with  the  con- 
suls and  all  the  other  magistrates  at  their  head,  to 
offer  him  a  new  Hst  of  these  regal  and  divine  hon- 
ours. Caesar  remained  sitting,  talking  and  consulting 
his  papers,  and  with  difficulty  could  be  persuaded  to 
relinquish  useful  work,  and  to  turn  and  face  folly. 
Much  more  to  his  purpose  than  all  these  vanities, 
was  the  fact,  which  we  now  know,  that  before  Feb- 
ruary 15th  he  had  accepted  the  dictatorship  for  his 
life.     (See  p.  335.) 

Butyie  was  now  on  a  far  higher  pinnacle  of  per- 
sonal power  than  any  one  man  can  safely  bold,  who  | 
has  won  it  by  force  of  arms  and  in  a  state  corrupt  \ 
and  diseased-!  It  was  not  his  work  that  was  recog- 
nised and  lauded,  but  his  powerj  For  his  absolutism 
men  like  Cicero  could  dread  and  hate  him,  while 
they  laughed  at  his  reform  of  the  calendar,  or  wept 
over  his  neglect  of  some  ancient  maxim  of  city-law. 
Whatever  he  did  was  sure  to  hurt  the  feelings  of 
someone.  Placards  were  put  up,  urging  men  to  ab- 
stain from  showing  his  new  senators  the  way  to  the 
Senate-house.  The  distribution  of  offices  brought 
him  many  enemies,  just  as  it  brings  enemies  to  every 
new  President  of  the  United  States.  The  men  who 
flattered  him  hated  him  because  he  was  above  flat- 
tery, and  doubtless  those  who  abstained  from  flattery 
hated  him  because  he  was  its  object.  At  the  very 
time  when  all  seemed  most  ready  to  do  his  will,  and 
better  satisfied  (as  Cassius  had  expressed  it  some 
months  before  ^)  to  have  a  wise  and  gentle  absolutism 

*  Cic.  Fam.,  xv.,  19. 


372  JmUus  Ccesar.  [44  B.C. 

than  such  an  one  as  Caesar's  enemies  would  have  ex- 
ercised if  victorious,  the  clouds  of  ill-will  were  gath- 
ering and  threatening  him  on  every  side.  Only  a 
few  trusted  personal  friends  were  really  left  him, 
such  as  the  acute  and  ready  Balbus,  the  gentle 
Oppius,  who  had  for  years  acted  with  Balbus  as  his 
confidential  secretary  and  agent,  and  whose  pen  was 
afterwards  used  in  his  master's  honour ;  and  the 
quiet  and  retiring  Matius,  a  true  friend,  whose  touch- 
ing letter  to  Cicero,  after  the  Dictator's  death,  is 
most  fortunately  preserved  for  us  in  Cicero's  corre- 
spondence. To  these  we  may  add  Hirtius,  and 
Pansa,  and  Lepidus,  among  his  old  divisional 
generals,  with  Asinius  PoUio,  afterwards  the  historian 
of  his  deeds,  and  a  few  others,  who,  like  Pollio,  were 
now  absent  from  Rome  ;  but  the  ablest  living 
Roman  apart  from  Caesar  himself,  Antonius,  the 
unprincipled  and  self-seeking,  had  been  too  often  a 
trouble  to  his  master  to  be  reckoned  among  the 
really  intimate  and  faithful. 

When  all  this  discontent  drew  to  a  head,  and  who 
it  was  who  first  kindled  the  inflammable  material, 
we  can  never  know.  The  idea  of  assassination  was 
familiar  to  the  old-fashioned  republicans,  who  be- 
lieved, for  example,  that  the  murder  of  the  two 
Gracchi  was  justifiable  and  necessary  ;  and  beyond 
doubt  Caesar's  life  had  long  been  a  perilous  one. 
Cicero  afterwards  accused  C.  Cassius,  Trebonius,  and 
Antonius,  of  having  on  two  occasions  planned  the 
murder  of  the  Dictator ;  "^  and  the  accusation  may 
have  been  true  in  regard  to  Cassius  if  not  the  others. 


*  Phil.,  ii.,  sec.  26  and  34. 


44  B.C.]  The  End. 


^n 


But  Cicero  himself,  though  assuredly  not  the  prime 
mover  in  the  actual  conspiracy,  is  not  free  from  sus- 
picion ;  a  letter  he  wrote  to  Atticus  some  months 
before,  shows  plainly  that  he  contemplated  the  pos- 
sibiHty  of  such  a  deed.*  A  consistent  tradition 
represented  Marcus  Brutus  as  only  drawn  into  the 
plot  with  difficulty,  and  Decimus  Brutus,  as  one  of 
Caesar's  oldest  and  most  trusted  friends,  can  hardly 
have  been  the  real  instigator.  I  The  evidence  points 
on  the  whole  to  Cassius,  a  ''  lean  and  hungry  "  man, 
of  a  bitter  and  jealous  spirit.  He  had  sufficient 
cause  to  hate  Caesar  personally ;  he  had  served 
under  Crassus  and  Pompeius,  and  had  surrendered  a 
superior  fleet  to  him  after  Pharsalus,  when  as  it  is 
said,  he  might  easily  have  destroyed  him.  |He  had 
suffered  the  ignominy  of  being  liberated  knd  par- 
doned. He  had  tried  to  kill  Caesar  in  Asia  Minor, 
if  what  Cicero  wrote  is  true  ;  and  recently  he  had 
been  placed  below  Brutus,  though  he  was  much  his 
senior,  in  the  list  of  praetors  for  the  year  just  begin- 
ning. The  truth  may  be,  that  Cassius,  or  some  lesser 
man  of  the  same  type,  such  as  Casca  or  Ligarius, 
was  the  first  to  suggest  the  idea  of  murder,  when 
Caesar  gave  up  his  guard,  and  became  at  once  more 
kingly  and  more  confident  ;  and  that  the  cause  was 
not  so  much  republican  enthusiasm  as  personal 
malice  and  vindictiveness.f 

Whoever  may  have  been  the  original  leader,  and 

*  Cp.  Ad  Att.  xiii.,  40,  with  Phil,,  ii.,  sec.  26.  The  coincidence 
of  the  language  in  the  two  passages  is  striking. 

f  Plutarch,  Brutus,  ch.  9,  who  however  here  follows  an  authority 
evidently  prejudiced  against  Cassius. 


374  yulius   CcBsar.  [44  B.C. 

whatever  his  motive,  there  were  plenty  ready  to  fol- 
low him  for  political  reasons,  whether  among  former 
friends  of  Caesar  or  among  outwardly  reconciled 
enemies.  Sixty  are  said  to  have  joined  in  the  plot, 
and  with  such  numbers  it  would  certainly  have  been 
discovered,  but  for  Caesar's  own  pre-occupation  and 
confidence,  and  his  comparative  inexperience  of  the 
intrigues  and  meannesses  of  life  in  the  capital.*  jjt 
is  this  frank  carelessness  of  his  that  gives  such  pathos 
and  irony  to  the  tragedy  which  follows-5-a  pathos 
which  is  deepened  by  the  fact  that  j the  victim's 
worst  foes  were  his  chosen  and  trusted  friends.  I  Of 
the  most  famous  of  these,  the  Marcus  Brutus  on 
whom  his  own  folly  and  Shakespeare's  genius  have 
bestowed  an  unmerited  immortality,  only  a  word  can 
be  said  here.  He  was  perhaps  one  of  those  weak 
men,  students  of  life  chiefly  in  books,  who  are  apt 
to  attach  themselves  to  stronger  characters,  but  can- 
not guard  themselves  alone  against  outbreaks  of 
folly  or  even  of  cruelty.  Brutus  had  long  ago  been 
associated  with  Cato,  whose  daughter  he  had  lately 
married  ;  after  Pharsalus,  where  he  fought  against 
Caesar,  and  was  joyfully  received  by  him  imme- 
diately after  the  battle,  he  devoted  himself  to  the 
new  master,  whose  affection  for  him  led  some  to 
fancy  that  he  was  the  great  man's  illegitimate  son. 
Since  Caesar's  return  from  Spain,  his  devotion  seems 
again  to  have  cooled,  perhaps  under  the  influence  of 
his  wife  and  of  Cicero.  Such  men  are  apt  to  love, 
to  speak,  and  sometimes  to  act,  with  a  force  that 
astonishes  ;  it  was  of  Brutus  that  Caesar  said,  "  What- 

*  Nic.  Dam.,  20. 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  375 

ever  he  desires,  he  desires  with  all  his  might." 
These  qualities  make  a  man  the  object  of  a  certain 
tenderness  in  his  friends  ;  they  feel  that  he  has  in- 
stincts for  righteousness,  they  pardon  his  vehemence, 
and  respect  his  enthusiasm.  But  the  type  of  mind  is 
a  narrow  and  feeble  one,  and  in  times  of  hot  politi- 
cal feeling,  where  a  cool  judgment  is  necessary,  and 
the  power  to  recognise  facts  as  they  are,  it  is  as 
likely  to  go  wrong  as  to  go  right.  Brutus  was  not 
born  to  be  an  independent  man  of  action. 

Every  effort  was  now  made  to  fan  the  lukewarm 
feelings  of  this  student  into  a  glow  of  hatred  against 
the  monarchy.  He  was  reminded,  by  papers  left  in  his 
praetor's  seat,  of  his  alleged  descent  from  Brutus  the 
tyrannicide.  Stories  were  told  that  his  wife  urged 
him  to  action  by  showing  that  she  could  wound  her- 
self with  a  dagger  unmoved,  and  that  Cassius  by 
subtle  speech  persuaded  him  that  liberty  could  only 
be  gained  by  murder.  We  cannot  test  the  truth  of 
such  tales  ;  all  we  can  be  sure  of  is  that  Brutus  was 
hard  to  gain,  but  that  once  persuaded,  he  went  into 
the  plot  with  all  the  enthusiasm  of  weakness.  But 
he  insisted  that  Caesar  should  be  the  only  victim  ; 
he  struck,  he  said,  not  at  the  monarch,  but  at  the 
monarchy,  and  would  have  no  unnecessary  blood, 
shed.  Thus  Antonius  and  Lepidus  owed  their  lives 
to  him ;  and  events  showed  with  a  sad  irony  that 
in  his  wrong-headedness  he  had  done  exactly  the 
opposite  of  what  he  intended.  The  monarch  was 
murdered,  and  the  monarchy  left  untouched. 

There  was  no  time  to  lose.  Caesar  was  to  leave 
Rome  on  March  i8th,  and  after  that  date  his  person 


3/6  yiiliiis  CcBsar.  [44  B.C. 

would  be  secure  from  attack.  At  any  time  the  plot 
might  be  betrayed,  or  at  least  his  suspicions  might 
be  roused.  More  than  one  scheme  for  the  murder 
was  proposed  and  given  up  ;  at  last  it  was  resolved 
that  the  deed  should  be  done  on  the  Ides  (15th)  of 
March,  for  which  day  a  meeting  of  the  Senate  had 
been  summoned,  when  Cssar  was  to  resign  the  con- 
sulship, and  announce  Dolabella  as  his  successor. 
Caesar  remained  heedless  of  all  rumours,  and  true 
to  his  maxim  that  "it  is  better  to  die  once  than 
to  be  always  in  fear  of  death."  On  the  evening 
of  the  14th  he  dined  with  Lepidus,  and  brought 
Decimus  Brutus  with  him.  Busy  as  ever,  he  was 
despatching  letters  while  conversation  went  on.  He 
was  listening,  however ;  his  power  of  attending  to 
many  things  at  once  was  not  the  least  of  his  many 
wonderful  gifts.  The  guests  began  to  talk  of  death, 
and  the  question  was  raised,  what  kind  of  death  is 
the  best  ?  Caesar  looked  up  from  his  papers,  and 
said,  ''  That  which  is  least  expected." 

This  story  has  some  claim  to  acceptance ;  but  the 
myths  that  gathered  round  the  events  of  that  night 
and  the  next  day  must  be  passed  over  in  silence.  In 
the  morning  Caesar  was  late  in  coming  to  the  Sen- 
ate, and  Decimus  Brutus  went  to  fetch  him.  When 
conspiracy  is  in  the  air,  some  dim  consciousness  of 
what  is  impending  may  invade  solicitous  minds  ;  and 
Caesar's  wife  Calpurnia  is  said  to  have  been  unwil- 
ling to  let  him  leave  her.  It  is  strange  that  the 
Roman  writers  who  believed  Caesar  to  be  the  enemy 
of  other  men's  wives,  should  have  so  eagerly  com- 
memorated the  tradition  of  this  tenderness  in  his  own. 


44  B.C.]  The  End.  377 

The  traitor  succeeded  in  his  mission,  and  Caesar 
came  in  a  litter  from  his  house  under  the  Palatine, 
across  the  forum,  beneath  the  northern  end  of  the 
Capitol,  to  the  theatre  of  Pompeius.  Attempts 
were  even  now  made,  it  was  afterwards  said,  to  warn 
him  in  time,  but  in  vain.  He  entered  the  building, 
the  Senate  rising  to  receive  him,  and  took  his  seat 
on  his  golden  chair  of  state.  Tillius  Cimber,  one  of 
the  conspirators,  urged  on  him  a  memorial  praying 
for  his  brother's  restoration  from  exile ;  the  rest 
crowded  round  him  ;  Trebonius  held  the  dangerous 
Antonius  in  conversation  at  the  door.  Caesar  re- 
fused the  petition.  Cimber  took  him  entreatingly 
by  the  hands  while  Casca  crept  behind  him.  Then 
Cimber  seized  his  toga  and  tried  to  render  his  hands 
useless.  Caesar  rose  and  called  aloud,  and  then 
Casca  struck  him  with  an  ill-aimed  dagger.  It  was 
the  signal  for  a  shower  of  blows,  against  which  the 
victim  struggled  for  a  few  moments,  wounding  one 
man  with  the  metal  stihis  he  carried ;  then  he  cov- 
ered his  head  with  his  toga,  and  reeling  a  few  steps, 
propped  up  only  by  the  multitude  of  his  butchers, 
he  fell  dead  at  the  feet  of  Pompeius*  statue. 
\Vi  is  the  most  brutal  and  the  most  pathetic  scene  f  x. 
that  profane  history  has  to  record  t  it  was,  as  Goethe,  ^ 
has  said,  the  most  senseless  deed  that  ever  was 
done.^It  was  wholly  useless,  for^it  did  not  and  could 
not  save  Rome  from  monarchyj./  It  was  cowardly 
and  treacherous  in  all  its  details  ^^  and  it  was  utterly 
wrong-headed,  for  it  showed  that  the  men  who  were 
guilty  of  it  knew  neither  what  liberty  nor  govern- 
ment meant.     It  plunged  the  Empire  into  another 


-> 


378  yulius   CcBsar. 

long  period  of  civil  war,  in  which  whole  provinces 
were  devastated,  the  East  divided  against  the  West, 
and  all  fair  hopes  shattered  of  unity  and  honest  gov- 
ernment. All  this  ruin  could  be  caused  by  a  handful 
of  men,  who,  pursuing  a  phantom  liberty  and  follow- 
ing the  lead  of  a  personal  hatred,  slew  the  one  man 
who  saw  the  truth  of  things. 

Three  slaves  carried  the  body  home,  bleeding  from 
twenty-three  wounds,  while  the  people  looked  on 
aghast.  Two  or  three  days  later  it  was  burnt  in  the 
forum  by  the  mob  and  the  soldiers,  in  a  scene  of  the 
wildest  excitement,  while  the  ''  liberators  of  their 
country  "  were  hidden  away  in  terror.  Caesar's  will 
was  read  beforehand,  and  it  was  found  that  his 
principal  heir  was  the  young  Octavius,  who  was 
also  adopted  as  his  son.  He  had  left  his  gardens 
beyond  the  Tiber  to  the  use  of  the  city,  and  a  sum 
of  money  to  every  resident  citizen  of  Rome.  But 
what  most  moves  us,  as  it  moved  those  who  listened 
in  the  forum  that  day,  is  that  Decimus  Brutus,  the 
man  who  led  him  into  the  fatal  snare,  occupied  the 
second  place  in  the  destined  succession  to  his  prop- 
erty. 


ROMAN  SWORDS. 


EPILOGUE. 


E  who  pursues  his  reading  from 
Caesar's  death  into  the  period 
of  the  Empire,  cannot  fail  to 
be  struck  by  a  change  which 
becomes  more  and  more  de- 
cided as  he  goes  onwards.  It 
is  not  so  much  the  history  of 
Rome  that  he  is  studying,  as 
the  history  of  the  civilised 
world  ;  the  history,  that  is, 
of  the  various  dependencies  of  Rome,  and  of  their 
relations  to  the  central  authority.  Even  when  fol- 
lowing the  lead  of  a  conservative  historian  like 
Tacitus,  whose  political  horizon  was  not  much 
wider  than  that  of  Cicero,  we  feel  this  change  in 
some  degree.  But  it  is  only  fully  realised  when  we 
pass  beyond  Tacitus  to  the  reigns  of  Hadrian  and 
the  Antonines,  and  when  we  have  learned  to  appre- 
ciate the  immense  value  of  the  fresh  material  that 
the  collection  of  inscriptions  has  of  recent  years 
placed  within  our  reach,  enabling  us  to  recognise  in 

379 


380  yidius  CcEsar, 

the  life  and  institutions  of  the  provinces  the  really 
essential  facts  in  the  history  of  the  Empire. 

It  is  when  we  have  learnt  this  lesson  that  we  be- 
gin to  understand  the  full  force  of  Caesar's  work,  and 
his  place  in  the  history  of  the  world.  We  seem  to 
have  passed  out  of  the  close  atmosphere  of  a  great 
town,  where  our  view  was  on  every  side  shut  in, 
and  where  the  chatter  of  cliques  and  pedants  was 
continually  misleading  us,  into  a  wide  and  open 
country,  and  a  freer  and  fresher  air.  We  feel  the 
bracing  effect,  just  as  we  believe  Csesar  to  have  felt 
it  during  those  nine  years  of  strengthening  discipline 
in  Gaul.  Whether  we  study  the  government  of  the 
Empire,  or  its  law,  its  religion,  its  society,  its  army, 
we  feel  that  a  great  change  has  taken  place,  and 
that  even  if  it  be  a  change  which  in  some  ways,  as 
for  example  in  art  and  literature,  has  lowered  the 
level  of  human  effort,  it  is  yet  one  which  has  raised 
the  mass  of  mankind  in  material  well-being,  and  has 
made  them  the  constituent  body  of  a  great  protec- 
tive political  union.  And  more  than  this,  it  has 
even  brought  within  their  reach  a  simple  and  uni- 
versal doctrine  of  right  and  wrong;  a  rule  of  con- 
duct based  on  beliefs  and  hopes,  for  which  the  older 
world,  which  knew  no  such  union,  could  not,  so  far 
as  we  can  guess,  have  ever  found  a  place.  Under 
the  Empire  art  and  literature  slowly  decay,  with  the 
decay  of  that  civic  or  national  life  in  which  they 
seem  best  to  flourish ;  but  in  the  imperial  unity 
room  is  found  for  other  influences  more  suited  to 
the  needs  of  the  age  and  of  more  universal  effi- 
cacy. 


Epilogue.  381 

Let  us  take  an  illustration  of  this  change  from  the 
history  of  religion,  which  has  not  as  yet  been  touched 
on  in  these  pages.  The  religious  ideas  of  the  old 
Greeks  and  Italians  had  been,  like  their  politics, 
strictly  local  in  character.  Just  as  every  little  com- 
munity was  ideally  independent  of  every  other,  so 
also  each  had  its  own  peculiar  worships,  in  which 
god  and  priest,  temple  and  ritual,  were  conceived 
as  belonging  to  that  locality  only.  To  transfer  a 
worship  from  one  city  to  another  was  a  matter  of 
extreme  difficulty — nay,  it  was  even  impossible, 
unless  the  god  himself  signified  in  some  way  his 
readiness  to  move.  No  doubt  certain  worships,  like 
certain  states,  gained  a  wider  renown  and  a  more 
universal  influence  ;  but  the  great  mass  of  Greeks 
and  Italians  were  wholly  without  any  idea  of  a 
religion  binding  upon  all  men,  just  as  they  could  at 
most  but  dimly  perceive  that  man  has  any  duties 
outside  his  own  political  community. 

The  conquest  of  the  world  by  Rome  took  off  the 
keen  edge  of  all  these  narrow  ideas  and  prejudices. 
Local  politics  lost  their  interest,  and  local  religions 
their  prestige.  Rome  may  be  said  to  have  cast  a 
great  shadow  over  the  peoples  of  the  Mediterranean, 
and  the  details  and  the  brightness  of  all  their  civic 
life  and  religion  were  obscured  as  the  light  lessened. 
By  Caesar's  time  the  obscurity  was  great,  and  was 
probably  telling  on  the  public  and  private  morality 
of  the  world.  What  power  for  good  there  had  been 
in  the  old  worships  had  been  irretrievably  weakened, 
and  there  was  no  sign  of  anything  to  take  its  place. 
The  age  of  local  religions  was  past,  and  no  universal 


382  Julius  CcBsar, 

belief  or  practice  seemed  likely  to  knit  the  peoples 
together.  As  in  politics,  so  in  religion,  the  Graeco- 
Roman  world  was,  in  the  last  century  B.C.,  in  a  state 
of  chaos. 

■^But  after  Caesar's  death  we  at  once  begin  to  find 
that  the  world  is  open  to  a  universal  cult.  The 
form  which  it  took  is  to  us  strange  enough,  and  at 
first  sight  inexplicable.  But  we  do  not  need  here 
even  to  touch  on  the  questions  which  lie  around  the 
curious  phenomenon  of  the  worship  of  the  Caesars  ; 
what  we  have  to  notice  is  simply  the  fact  that  it 
rapidly  spread  over  the  whole  Empire,  mingling 
with,  or  superseding,  the  older  religious  forms,  and 
that  it  became  a  most  powerful  instrument  in  hold- 
ing together  the  whole  political  system.  Caesar  was 
not  indeed  himself  the  man  intentionally  to  start  on 
its  course  an  idea  so  hollow  ;  but  it  was  he  who,  by 
turning  the  eyes  of  all  men  on  his  own  unique  per- 
sonality, made  it  possible  for  something  like  a  uni- 
versal worship  to  take  the  place  of  the  dying  local 
religions.  This  worship  lasted  for  a  while  as  a 
reality,  and  lingered  some  time  longer  as  a  survival; 
but  it  could  not  long  satisfy  the  wants  of  mankind, 
for  it  laid  down  no  rule  of  conduct,  and  raised 
neither  hope  nor  fear  for  the  future.  But  it  showed 
that  the  world  was  open  to  a  new  and  real  religion ; 
it  put  the  finishing  touch  to  the  destruction  of  the 
old  local  worships ;  It  established  a  connection  be- 
tween the  government  of  the  world  and  its  religion  ; 
it  was  in  a  certain  sense  the  foreshadowing  of  the 
acknowledgment  of  Christianity  as  the  religion  of 
the  Roman  Empire.;.  And  it  is  but  a  single  illustra- 


Epilogue.  383 

tion  of  the  difference  between  the  world  before 
Caesar  and  after  him,  and  of  the  extraordinary  force 
which  his  work  and  his  personality  exercised  on  the 
minds  of  men.  He  stood,  as  we  said  at  the  outset, 
at  the  end  of  a  long  series  of  revolutionary  tenden- 
cies, and  sums  them  up ;  he  also  laid  the  foundation- 
stone  of  a  new  era  of  the  world's  life. 

It  cannot  then  be  said  of  Caesar,  as  it  has  been 
said  of  Pericles,*  that  in  destroying  an  ancient  con- 
stitution which  had  in  its  time  done  good  work,  he 
did  but  initiate  a  period  of  degeneracy.  Among  the 
Romans  themselves  the  seeds  of  degeneracy  had 
long  been  sown  ;  they  had  passed  through  their 
period  of  freedom  and  glory,  and  what  they  were 
still  to  contribute  to  the  world  was  not  to  be  the 
fruit  of  their  own.  peculiar  genius.  For  the  world 
which  Rome  had  conquered,  it  was  not  a  period  of 
degeneracy  which  Caesar  initiated,  but  one  of  hope 
and  development ;  the  interests  of  the  rulers  were 
now  no  longer  in  antagonism  with  those  of  the 
ruled.  For  the  selfish  rule  of  a  city-aristocracy  had 
been  substituted  the  autocracy  of  a  single  hard- 
working man  ;  and  henceforward  the  governed  knew 
that  they  might  expect  to  be  protected  from  enemies 
within  and  without  the  limits  of  the  Empire,  and 
that  they  might  hope  to  rise  eventually  to  the 
political  status  of  their  rulers. 

At  first,  indeed,  when  Caesar's  murder  had  left  the 
world  again  without  a  master,  all  was  once  more 
chaos.  It  was  only  after  thirteen  years  of  division 
and  discord  that  the  man  whom  Caesar  had  probably 

*See  the  preface  to  Mr.  Abbott's  "  Pericles,"  in  this  series. 


384  Julius  Ccesar. 

destined  to  be  his  successor,  found  himself  at  last  in 
the  position  which  his  uncle  had  occupied.  Then 
came  the  period  of  organisation — an  organisation 
based  in  the  main  on  Caesar's  foundation,  leaving  it 
only  where  for  the  time  there  was  need  of  a  more 
skilful  adaptation  to  the  wants  and  feelings  of  weary 
humanity.  A  long  life,  an  incomparable  tact,  and  a 
deep  dislike  of  war,  enabled  Augustus  to  complete 
this  organisation,  and  to  hand  it  over  to  a  succes- 
sor of  no  mean  ability.  But  of  necessity  there  were 
weak  points  in  it,  and  in  the  reigns  of  Tiberius 
and  his  successors  these  came  to  light,  and  all  but 
wrecked  it.  A  better  season  set  in,  when  in  69  A.D. 
Vespasian  took  the  helm  into  strong  hands,  and  from 
that  time  to  the  death  of  the  last  of  the  Antonines, 
the  whole  vast  region  which  had  known  Caesar's 
footsteps,  from  Britain  to  the  Euphrates,  and  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  African  deserts,  enjoyed,  on  the 
whole,  peace,  plenty,  and  prosperity,  j  And  for 
many  centuries  afterwards,  when  the  world  was 
once  more  torn  asunder  by  internal  division  and 
barbarian  invasion,  men  still  found  a  hope  of  salva- 
tion in  the  two  inseparable  ideas  of  the  great  Empire 
and  its  monarch,  each  of  them  now  illuminated  by 
the  Christianity  for  which  Caesar's  work  had  made 
space  in  the  world.       | 


AUGUSTUS  AND  IMPERIAL  ROME. 

FROM  A  REPRODUCTION  IN  WIESELER'S    "  DENKMALER  DER  ALTEN  KUNST  "    OF  THE  CAMEO  IN  VIENNA. 


INDEX. 


Achillas,     Egyptian    leader,    48 
B.C.,  305,  312 
^^^cta    Senatus,    publication    of, 
105,  106 

Aduatuca,  209^.,  215 

iEdileship,  69 

^dui,  137/".,  141,  147,  148/:, 
163,  214,  219,  224 

Afranius,  270^. 
-t2*C|ranan  bill,  72 

Alauda  (the  legion),  240 

Alesia,  siege  and  battle  of,  229^. 

Alexandria,  305,  312  jf. 

Allobroges,  81,  136,  140,  147 

Ambiani,  167 

Ambiorix,  20C)  ff. 

Amiens,  167,  169,  209,  212 

Antonius,  Marcus,  acts  for 
Caesar  as  tribune,  Jan.,  49 
B.C.,  255,  267  ;  joins  Caesar 
at  Dyrrhachium,  286  ff.  ;  at 
Pharsalus,  301  ;  commands  in 
Ita:ly,  314^.,  330  ;  meets  Cae- 
sar at  Massilia,  45  B.C.,  361  ; 
consul  44  B.C.,  368  ;  char- 
acter, 372  ;  present  at 
Caesar's  murder,  377 

Apollonia,  284,  286,  296 

Appian,  history  of,  105 

Apsus,  river,  285^. 

Aquileia,  144 

Ariminum,  260 


Ariovistus,  King  of  Suebi,  137, 
142,  149/: 

Arverni,  136,  148  ff.,  163, 
220,  223 

Asinius  Pollio,  historian,  etc., 
260,  310,  311,  372 

Augustus,  10,  97,  205,  268  ;  in 
Spain  with  Caesar,  334 ;  his 
system  of  government,  354, 
364  ;  Caesar's  heir,  388 

Aurelia,  11  ff.,  92 

Avaricum  (Bourges),  221 


B 


Balbus    (L.    Cornelius),   Caesar's 
secretary,    etc.,    96,    97,    loi, 

263,  367,  372 
Bankruptcy,  Caesar's  law  of,   341 

Belfort,  154 

Belgae,  id^ff.,  205,  240 

Besan9on,  152,  160,  164 

Bibracte,  146,  228 

Bibrax,  166 

Bibulus  (M.  Calpurnius,    consul 

59   B.C.),    98,    105,   III,    246, 

284  ;  death  of,  285 
Boii,  147 

Boissier,  Gustave,  364 
Bona  Dea  (rites  of),  92 
Britain,     invasion     of,     194  ff.; 

place  of  landing  in,  196 


as 


385 


386 


Index, 


Brundisium,  89,  264,  280 
Brutus  (Decimus),  184,  220,  270, 

369  ;       betrays    Csesar,    376  ; 

mentioned     in    Caesar's     will, 

378 
Brutus    (M.    Junius),    361    and 

note  ;  conspires  against  Caesar, 

373/. 


C3elius(M.  Rufus),  251,  341 
Caesar,  personal  appearance  and 
'  physical  powers^i^;  boyhood, 
earliest    politicalexperiences, 
20  ff.;    quaestor,    57 ;    aedile, 
68  ;  praetor,  91  ;  consul,   104  ; 
in  Gaul,   126  ;    commentaries, 
ff.;  campaign  in  Gaul,  129, 
^ff.j  "campaign  in  Germany,  148 
ff.;  in   Brittany,    176  ff.;  in- 
vades  Germany    and    Britain, 
187  ff.;  returns  from  Britain, 
207  ;  represses  Gallic  rebellion, 
■     209  ff.;  campaign    in    Spain, 
ibhff.;  final  campaign  against 
I     Pompey,     281    ff.;     his     last 
I     wars,  3o8_^.y  his  use  of  power, 
\    326  ff. ;    his   death,    360  ff.; 
vhis  life's  work,  380  _^.  ^ 

Calendar,  reform~of7^^,  371 
Cantii,  the,  205 
Capitalism,  evils  of,  337^. 
Capua,  113,  261 
Carthage,  4  ;  colonised  by  Caesar, 

343 
Cassius,   C.    Longinus,  conspires 

against  Caesar,  2)1^  ff 
Cassius,    Q.    Longinus,    governs 

Spain  for  Caesar,  324 
Cassivellaunus,  203 
Catilina,   L.  Sergius,  68,  79  ff., 

Cato,  M.  Porcius,  speech  in  Sen- 
ate,  Dec._  5,  63  B.C.,  85,  89  ; 
defeats    Cicero's    policy,    99  ; 
I  opposes  CiTcsar's  land  bill,  109  ; 
^  proposes  to  surrender  Cresar  to 
the  Germans,    191  ;  evacuates 


Sicily,    265  ;    at    Utica,    317 ; 
death  and  character,  320 

Catulus  (Lutatius),  78,  79,  88 

Catuvellani,  the,  203 

Charleroi,  174,  '211  ff. 

Cicero,  M.  Tullius,  early  con- 
nection with  Caesar,  14  ;  his 
oratorical  studies,  36,  38  ;  his 
consulship,  73  ff. ;  defeats 
Catiline's  conspiracy,  80  ff.  ; 
relations  with  Pompeius,  88^./ 
declines  to  join  the  triumvirate, 
10 1  ff.  ;  exiled  by  Clodius, 
123  ;  policy  after  return,  178 
ff.  ;  meets  Caesar  at  Ravenna, 
251  ;  at  Formiae,  266  ;  at 
Brundisium,  316  ;  his  relation 
to  the  conspiracy  against 
Caesar,  3^1  ff. 

Cicero  (Quintus),  84,  178,  181, 
209,  211/: 

Cinna  (L.  Cornelius),  27,  28, 
105 

Civil  w^ar,  outbreak  of,  238  _^. 

Claudius  (the  Emperor),  205 

Cleopatra,  310,  311,  313 

Clodius,  P.,  12,  92,  93,  123, 124, 
178  ;  death  of,  246 
I   Coinage,  Caesar's,  9,  365 
-^olgnisation,  113,  343 
/^Commentaries of  Csesar, i8,i27_^. 

Commius,   195 

Corfinium,  2^)2  ff. 

Corinth,  colonised  by  Caesar, 
343,  note  ;  isthmus  of,  366 

Corn,  distribution  of,  controlled 
by  Caesar,  337  #• 

Crassus,  M.  Licinius,  commands 
in  slave  war,  48  ;  consul  70 
B.C.,  ^o  ff.  ;  relation  to  con- 
spiracy of,  65,  B.C.,  68  ;  to 
that  of  63  B.C.,  79  ff.  ;  lends 
money  to  Caesar,  94  ;  coalition 
with  Caesar,  loi  ;  relation  to 
publicani,  115  ;  meets  Caesar 
at  Lucca,  181  ;  death  in  Par- 
thia,  244 

Crassus,  P.  Licinius  (the  younger), 
158,  165,  174,  177,  184 


Index. 


387 


Crastinus,  304 

Cromwell,  86,  91,  107,  120,  208, 

320,  323,  365 
Curio,  255,  256,  265 


D 


Dictatorships,  Caesar's,    279,  330 

ff-.  335,  371 
Dio  Cassius,  history  of,  94 
Divitiacus,  165,  168 
l)olabella(P.  Cornelius),  36^.  308 
Domitius  Calvinus,  296,  301 
Dumnorix  (the  ^duan),  141,  200 
Dyrrhachium,  282  j^. 


E 


[^J^ucation  at  Rome,  1 5  _^. 

Egypt,  70,  71,  179.  305,  311  # 
Empire,  unity  of,  due  to  Caesar, 

353,  379/". 
Equites,  the,  74,  99,  118,  180 


Gabinius,  61 

Gades,  95,  277,  357 

Gallic  rebellions,  lO"]  ff. 

Gaul  (Cisalpine),    120   ff.,    r43, 

175  ;  political  condition  of, 350 
Gaul  (Transalpine),  122,  132  ff., 

240,  350 
Geneva,  134,  139/". 
Gergovia,  223^. 
Germans  defeated,  11^6  ff. 
Gnipho,  Caesar's  tutor,  13,  14 
Goethe,   opinion  of,  on  Caesar's 

murder,  377 
Government,     organisation      of, 

350/: 
Gracchus  (Gains),   7,  19,  22,  58, 

76,  105,  119,  250,  327,  337,  343 
Gracchus  (Tiberius),  6,  26,  no 

H 

Helvetii,  138^. 
Hildebrand,  2 


Hirtius  A.  (consul  43  B.C.),  128, 
239,  258,  368,  372 


I 


Herd  a,  2'joff. 
Illyria,  121,  176 
Imperator,  title  of,  333 
Isauricus,  Servilius,  280 
Italians,  political  status  of  22   26 


J 


Juba,  King  of  Mauretania,  317, 

319 
Judices,  46,  93 
Julia  (Caesar's  aunt),  7,  9,  57 
Julia    (Caesar's    daughter),    115, 

178,  208  ;  death  of,  245 
Julia  gens,  i)  ff. 
Julian  calendar,  the,  366 


Laberius,  compelled  by  Caesar  to 
act  in  his  own  play,  363 

Labienus,  T.  Atius,  prosecutes 
Rabirius,  75  ff.  ;  proposes  bill 
for  election  of  pontifex  maxi- 
mus,  79 ;  Caesar's  legatus  in 
Gaul,  143,  163^.,  184,  202, 
209,  227,  234  ;  deserts  to  Pom- 
peius,  258 jf"./  at  Dyrrhachium, 
284^.  ;  at  Pharsalus,  295  ;  in 
Africa,  317  ;  death  at  battle  of 
Munda,  325 

Larissa,  297  jf. 

Legatio  libera,  123 

Lepidus  (M.  ^milius),  268,  279, 

330,  363,  376 
Lex  agraria  (of  Rullus),  72  ;  (of 

^C^esar),  108 
Lex  Julia  Municipalis,  343,  355 
Lex  repetundarum  (of  extortion), 

116/: 
Lex  Rubria,  for  Cisalpine  Gaul, 

356,  note 
Lex  Vatinia,  121,  176 
Lucca  (conference  at),  181 


388 


Index. 


Luceria,  262 

Lucullus,    M.    Licinius,   44,    53, 

54,  60,  61,  66,  114 
Lupercalia,  scene  at,  370 
Luperci,  Julii,  370 


M 


Marcellus,  consul,  254 

Marius  C,  7,  9,  20,  21,  24,  27, 
57,  70,  104,  107 

Massilia,  95,  133,  134,  136,  269, 
278 

Memphis,  314 

Menapii,  the,  186 

Metellus  Nepos  (tribune 62  B.C.), 
26,  88,  89 

Metelhis  Scipio,  247 

Milo,  T.  Annius,  246,  341 

Mithridates,  21,  33,  39,  41,  66 

Mithridates  of  Pergamum  suc- 
cours Caesar  in  Egypt,  313 

Molo,  37^. 

Mommsen  (Th.),  183,  278,  note, 

339,  356 
Monarchy,     Caesar's     intentions 

with  a  view  to,  336 
Morini,  the,  186,  194,  199 
Muhlhausen,  154 
Munda,  battle  of,  325 

N 

Narbo,  134,  136 
Nervii,  itqff. 
Noviodunum,  167 

O 

Oppius,  C,  259,  263,  372 
P 

Parthians,  Caesar's  projected  ex- 
pedition against  the,  368 

Patrician  families,  10  ;  new  ones 
created,  365 

Pericles,  3S3 

Petreius,  276 


Pharnaces,  son  of  the  great 
Mithridates,   315 

Pharsalus  (battle  of),  297  ff. 

Philippus,  Q.  Marcius,  367 

Piracy,  8,  61 

Pliny,  correspondence  of,  347 

Pompeia (Caesar's  wife),  12,  92,  93 

Pompeius,  Cn.  Magnus,  under 
Sulla,  29  ;  commands  against 
Sertorius,  44  ;  consul  70  B.C., 
48  ;  campaigns  against  the 
pirates  and  Mithridates,  60 
ff".  ;  conquests  in  the  East,  66, 
71,  114;  returns  to  Italy,  87 
ff.  ;  renounces  power,  90 ; 
coalition  with  Caesar,  100^.  / 
his  veterans,  109 ;  marries 
Julia,    114  ;     at    Lucca,    181, 

243  ;    sole  consul  52  B.C.,  219, 

244  ff.  ;  allies  with  Senate 
against  Caesar,  248  ff. ;  ne- 
gotiations with  Caesar,  254, 
256,  261,  264  ;  his  campaign 
in  Epirus  and  Thessaly,  281 
ff.  ;  death  and  character,  306- 
308 

Pompeius   (Cnasus),    son    of    P. 

Magnus,  324  ;  death  of,  325 
Pomptine  marshes,  Caesar's  plan 

for  draining,  366 
Pontifex  maximus,  TJ  ff-,  92 
Portus  Itius,  the,  196,  200 
Praetorship,  the,  88,  91 
Ptolemy  Auletes,  71,  179 
Publicani,  the,  99,  115 
Puteoli,  Cicero  entertains  Caesar 

at,  367 


Q 


Quaestorate,  55,  56^. 
Quinctilis,  month  of,  changed  to 
July,  370 


Rabirius,  C,  75,  76,  77 
Religion,  local  character  of,  be- 
fore Coesar,  381^. 


Index. 


389 


Remi,  164^.  ;   214 

Rhine,     the,     159,     162,     175  ; 

(bridge  over  the),  193,  217 
Rome,  the  beginnings  of,  4 
Romney  marsh,  196 
Roscius,  260 
Rubicon    (the    river),    59,     260, 

269 
Ruspina,  battle  at,  318 


Sabinus  (Titurius),  165,  184,  210 

Sabis  (Sambre),  battle  of  the,  169 
Sallust    (the   historian),   83,  85  ; 

Governor  of  New  Africa,  322 
Samarobriva,  209 
Senate,  functions  and  power  of, 

5.  63,  65  ;  attempts  to  repress 

civil  war,  266 
Sequani,   137  ff.,    148  ff.,    160, 

163 
Sertorius,  48,  57,  58,  65,  71,  91, 

13.5,  162 
Servilius  Rullus,  72 
Sestius,  P.,  180 
I  Shakespeare,    his   conception  of 

Caesar,  359 
Silanus  (consul  62  B.C.),  81,  82, 

85 
Slaves,  8,  16,  42,  48,  339 
Spain  (provinces  of),   56,  91,  94, 

243  ;    political    condition    of, 

352,  360 
Spartacus,  40 
Stoffel,  Colonel,  260,    note,   272, 

274,  note,  288,  298 
Suebi,  137,  187/:,  214 
Suessiones,  165,  167 
Suetonius,  history  of,  254 
Sugambri,  the,  192 
Sulla,  L.  Cornelius,  the  Dictator, 

27,  29  ff.,  33,  35,  44  ff.,   55, 

59,  88,  279,  337 
Sulla,  P.  Cornelius,  301 
Supplicatio,  175 
Syria,    Pompeius   in,    67,     304  ; 

Caesar  in,  315 


T 


Tax-farmers,  115 

Tencteri,  189^. 

Tenth  Legion,  143 _^. 

Thapsus,  battle  of,  319 

Tiberius  Nero,  82,  85 

Tigranes,  39 

Tigurini,  145 

Tolosa,  135 

Trajan,      correspondence      with 

Pliny,  348 
Transpadani,  59,  60,  So 
Trebellius,  63 
Tribunate  of  plebs,    11,   35,  45, 

47,  56,  64 
Trinobantes,  the,  201  ff. 
Triumph,  (j8  ;  Caesar's  first,  322  ; 

second,  363 
Triumvirate,  formation  of,  100 _^. 

U 

Ubii,  the,  188/:,  214 
Usipetes,  the,  I'igff. 
Uxellodunum,  239 

V 

Varro,  M.  Terentius,  the  scholar, 

129,  277,  359 
Veneti,  177,  184 
Vercingetorix,  ill  ff.  ;  surrender 

of,  to  Caesar,  236 
Vesontio,  152 
Vespasian,  384 
Veteran  soldiers  (allotments  to), 

108,  344 
Vienne,  219 
Volusenus,  194 

W 

Wellington,   Duke  of,  274,  287, 

295,  297 
Wissant  (portus  Itius),  196,  200, 
202,  204 

Z 

Zela,  l)£»nle  of,  315 


IDeroes  of  the  IRationa 

EDITED    BY 

EVELYN  ABBOTT,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 


A  Series  of  biographical  studies  of  the  lives  and  work 
of  a  number  of  representative  historical  characters  about 
whom  have  gathered  the  great  traditions  of  the  Nations 
to  which  they  belonged,  and  who  have  been  accepted,  in 
many  instances,  as  types  of  the  several  National  ideals. 
With  the  life  of  each  typical  character  will  be  presented 
a  picture  of  the  National  conditions  surrounding  him 
during  his  career. 

The  narratives  are  the  work  of  writers  who  are  recog- 
nized authorities  on  their  several  subjects,  and,  while 
thoroughly  trustworthy  as  history,  will  present  picturesque 
and  dramatic  "stories  "  of  the  Men  and  of  the  events  con- 
nected with  them. 

To  the  Life  of  each  "  Hero  "  will  be  given  one  duo- 
decimo volume,  handsomely  printed  in  large  type,  pro- 
vided with  maps  and  adequately  illustrated  according  to 
the  special  requirements  of  the  several  subjects.  The 
volumes  will  be  sold  separately  as  follows : 

Cloth  extra $i   SO 

Half  morocco,  uncut  edges,  gilt  top       .         .         .       i   75 
Large  paper,  limited  to  250  numbered  copies  for 
subscribers  to  the  series.     These  may  be  ob- 
tained  in    sheets    folded,   or   in    cloth,    uncut 
edges         .         .      • 3  50 


The    first    group    of   the    Series    will   comprise   twelve 
volumes,  as  follows  : 

Nelson,  and  the  Naval  Supremacy  of  England.  By  \V.  Clark 
Russell,  author  of  "The  Wreck  of  the  Grosvenor,"  etc. 

Gustavus  Adolphus,  and  the  Struggle  of  Protestantism  for  Exist- 
ence. By  C.  R.  L.  Fletcher,  M. A.,  late  Fellow  of  All  SoulsCollege, 
Oxford. 

Pericles,  and  the  Golden  Age  of  Athens.  By  Evelyn  Abbott,  M.A., 
Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 

Theodoric  the  Goth,  the  Barbarian  Champion  of  Civilization.  By 
Thomas  Hodgkin,  author  of  "  Italy  and  Her  Invaders,"  etc. 

Sir  Philip  Sidney,  and  the  Chivalry  of  England.  By  H.  R.  Fox- 
Bourne,  author  of  "  The  Life  of  John  Locke,"  etc. 

Julius  Caesar,  and  the  Organization  of  the  Roman  Empire.  By 
W.  Warde  Fowler,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Lincoln  College,  Oxford. 

John  Wyclif,  Last  of  the  Schoolmen  and  First  of  the  English  Re- 
formers.    By  Lewis  Sargeant,  author  of  "New  Greece,"  etc. 

Napoleon,  Warrior  and  Ruler,  and  the  Military  Supremacy  of 
Revolutionary  France.  By  W.  O'Connor  Morris,  sometime 
Scholar  of  Oriel  College,  Oxford. 

Henry  of  Navarre,  and  the  Huguenots  in  France.  By  P.  F.Willert, 
M.A.,  Fellow  of  Exeter  College,  Oxford. 

Alexander  the  Great,  and  the  Extension  of  Greek  Rule  and  of 
Greek  Ideas.     By  Prof.  Benjamin  I.  Wheeler,  Cornell  University. 

Charlemagne,  the  Reorganizer  of  Europe.  By  Prof.  George  L.  Burr, 
Cornell  University. 

Louis  XIV.,  and  the  Zenith  of  the  French  Monarchy.  By  Arthur 
Hassall,  M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church  College,  Oxford. 

To  be  followed  by : 

Cicero,  and  the  Fall  of  the  Roman  Republic.     By  J.  I..  Strachan 

Davidson,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 
Sir  Walter  Raleigh,  and  the  Adventurers  of  England.     By  A.  L. 

Smith,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 
Bismarck.     The  New  German  Empire  :    How  It  Arose  ;   What  It 

Replaced ;  and  What  It  Stands  For.     By  James  Sime,  author  of 

"  A  Life  of  Lessing,"  etc. 
William  of  Orange,  the  Founder  of  the  Dutch  Republic,     By  Ruth 

Putnam. 
Hannibal,  and   the   Struggle   between   Carthage   and    Rome.      By 

E.   A.   Freeman,   D.C.L.,   LL.D.,   Regius   Prof,   of  History  in  the 

University  of  Oxford. 
Alfred  the  Great,  and  the  First  Kingdom  in  England.     By  F.  York 

Powell,  M.A.,  Senior  Student  of  Christ  Church  College,  Oxford. 
Charles  the  Bold,  and  the  Attempt  to  Found  a  Middle  Kingdom. 

By  R.  Lodge,  M.A  ,  Fellow  of  Brasenose  College,  Oxford. 
John  Calvin,  the  Hero  of  the  French  Protestants.      By  Owen  M. 

Edwards,  Fellow  oJ  Lincoln  College,  Oxford. 
Oliver  Cromwell,  and  the  Rule  of  the  Puritans  in  England.     By 

Charles  Firth,  Balliol  College,  Oxford. 
Marlborough,   and    England   as  a   Military   Power.     By  C.  W.  C. 

Oman.  A.M.,  Fellow  of  All  Souls  College,  Oxford. 

G.  p.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW    YORK  LONDON 

37    WEST   TWENTY-THIKD    ST.  24    BEDFORD    ST.,    STRANI^ 


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